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
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Affection in Orexis

By

P. S. NAIDU,

(*Annamalai University*)

Two eminent psychologists have passed away recently, one at a ripe old age after giving the last finishing touches to his system, and the other at a comparatively early age before giving a well rounded form to his unique psychology. Freud and his psycho-analysis are firmly established institutions in the Western world, while McDougall's Hormic Psychology has yet to fight its way to the front rank. It is true that an outstanding system of psychology cannot be perfected within two decades or so, the period during which McDougall did all his written work ; but when the master-hand has put in patches on the canvas which seem to fit ill with one another, and with the original design, it becomes exceedingly difficult for the disciples to touch up the unfinished parts, and evolve a picture capable of producing unity of impression. Freud's system is luckily free from this unfortunate defect which mars the splendid effects of McDougallian hormism. The founder of psycho-analysis displayed, in the last stages of his scientific career, a tendency to enlarge his list of urges ; but this tendency does not in any sense mar the symmetry of the original system. But, the situation is different in hormic psychology. *The Social Psychology*, *An Outline of Psychology* and *The Energies* represent three distinct stages in the progressive development of the hormic theory, and *The Riddle of Life*, published just before the authors' death, seems to me, to mark a further important stage in the advance. McDougall's mind seems to have been growing

richer and richer, in complexity and inter-relation, right up to the moment of his death, and it is this fact that suggests the pathetic thought to us that had he lived, he would have resolved the many difficulties and clarified the several obscure points in his brilliant system. Of the difficulties present in the fundamentals of the hormic doctrine, I have spoken elsewhere.¹ Here, I shall concern myself with the imperfections of a significant contribution which McDougall has made to psychological theory, namely, the hormic theory of the affective tone of experience.

Professor Flugel's paper² on the subject under discussion is a very valuable contribution to the study of the nature of "Feeling in Hormic Theory." The Professor was, at one time, associated with McDougall very intimately. He has had, in addition, the great advantage of a thorough acquaintance with psycho-analysis. (I hold that hormic psychology stands to gain considerably by affiliation with Freud's system.) Yet the author experiences considerable difficulty in so presenting the hormic theory of affection as to make it embrace all the relevant facts. One wonders whether there is not, in the mind of the professor, a suspicion, lurking somewhere, regarding the validity of the hormic explanation of pleasure. Professor Flugel's final conclusion is that, "It seems on the whole unlikely that the theory of psychological hedonism that once made such vast claims and is now reduced to the doubtful tenure of one tiny fraction of its original territory will hold out permanently even here." This is very encouraging, no doubt, to the supporters of McDougall. But there are discouraging elements in the references, earlier in the paper, to the psychological hedonistic elements in such avowed purposivists as Stout, Ward and Freud and also in James, as well as in the concluding sentence of the essay which runs, "Nevertheless, the fact that it (hedonism) cannot be dislodged is a standing challenge to the hormic psychologist to prove his point in this one matter too (simple sensory feelings), and thus establish his sway over the whole realm of feeling."³ What is the obstacle in the way of a complete and unreserved acceptance of the hormic theory? The difficulty, to some extent at least, is due to the defects inherent in McDougall's system. Barring these defects, we must assert that it is a lack of clear understanding of the peculiar hormic point of view that is responsible for the obstacles encountered even by Professor

1. "On an Extension of McDougall's Hormic Theory" Phil. Quarterly, Vol. xiii, 1937.

2. J. C. Flugel: *Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1939, pp. 211-229.

3. J. C. Flugel, *Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality*, Vol. 7, 1939, p. 229.

Flugel. Hence a determined attempt will be made in this paper to establish the sway of hormic psychology over the whole realm of feeling by such additions to, and elaborations of, the original McDougallian theory as may be found necessary.

In dealing with any psychological problem from the hormic point of view it is necessary to emphasise, at the outset, two important points:

(1) We should never lose sight of the fact that both McDougall and Professor Woodworth stress so frequently, that the substantives used in psychology are really either verbs or adverbs. The substantival usage is a relic of the old faculty psychology.

(2) Though hormic psychology gives great prominence to the innate propensities of the human mind, yet it should be remembered that the immediate activating forces of human behaviour are drawn not from the primitive instincts and emotions, but from the well developed sentiments.

And in dealing with the specific problem of affection, we have to make the following observations :

(1) The affective tone (usually distinguished as pleasure or pain) is a characteristic of behaviour, and is, in consequence, to be treated as an adverb.

(2) There is an affective tone which is the concomitant of behaviour on the higher plane of sentiments, concrete and abstract. There is also another operating on the lower plane where elemental propensities govern behaviour. We should not confuse the one plane with the other.

(3) The affective tone of unpleasantness should not be mistaken for the sensation of pain. When once a clear psychological analysis of pleasantness and unpleasantness has been made, and the meanings of these terms clearly fixed, thereafter there is no excuse for an indiscriminate use of the expressions *pleasantness*, *pleasure*, *feeling* and *affection* to indicate the same quality of experience.

Unfortunately Professor Flugels' paper introduces, at the very opening of the discussion, the very source of confusion that we want to fight against. In a preliminary statement of the hormic position the Professor says, "...conation may be said to be directly attuned to cognition, and not dependent on *affection*."

Where then does *feeling* come in ? The hormic theory maintains that *affection*, far from being the cause of conation, is itself dependent on conation.....*Pleasant feeling*, it is said, is an accompaniment of

successful conation. all the above writers are agreed that *pleasure* is conditioned by success".⁴

Four different terms, each possessing its own specific shade of meaning, are used here to indicate only one aspect of experience, namely, its affective tone. "Feeling" refers to the totality of the affectively toned experience, from which psychological analysis has isolated the "tone" alone for special investigation. *Pleasant feeling* and *pleasure* are meant to indicate the affective tone of pleasantness, and may, with great advantage, be dropped from our terminology. For the sake of simplicity and clarity of understanding we shall speak of "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness" (remembering that those are adverbs masquerading as substantives) and of "affective tone" as a common term embracing both, "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness."

McDougall himself is responsible for the confusion of ideas found in Professor Flugel's paper. In one of his early works he says, ". . . . pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action, but at the most of undirected movements; they serve rather to modify instinctive processes."⁵ Not only is the objectionable word "pleasure" used here, but "pain" is also used as the opposite of "pleasure". In a later work the second defect is set right. The author recognises the difference between pain as a sensation and pain as an unpleasant affective tone.⁶ But the words feeling, and pleasure are used freely. The only means for removing all traces of confusion is to hold fast to the simple terminology mentioned above. It is in this direction that we wish to suggest a slight, but very necessary, improvement on the hormic vocabulary of McDougall.

There is another source of confusion in Professor Flugel's paper for which McDougall is certainly not responsible in any sense. Hormic psychology has laid bare the innate and inherited structure of the human mind. The elemental propensities that constitute the foundation of the structure have been carefully analysed. The mind, however, being dynamic, these elements are in a constant state of synthesis, recomposition and decomposition. The fundamental propensities are being steadily built into sentiments, concrete and abstract, of varying degrees of complexity and value. "Man is an assemblage of innumerable elements, bound up in many systems in such a manner that the same element can successively enter a great number

4. J. C. Flugel, *Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1939, p. 213. (Italics ours).

5. *Social Psychology*, 1936, p. 37.

6. *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 267.

of systems, which are themselves elements in still larger systems ; and so on, until we come to the personality regarded as a whole, which should be the greatest system of all, if man's organisation were complete; but it presents a remarkable incoherence, so that the secondary systems are not united in a superior system, and instead of joining and combining they often interfere with one another. This assemblage of systems, which is man, is in relation with the outer world ; the impressions which reach him from it, are organised within him, decomposed and recomposed."⁷ Civilised man, in spite of the several centuries of "civilisation" which form his boasted heritage, has not achieved a perfect organisation of his scale of sentiments. His character is yet ill-formed. And so it is that his mental structure which functions now and then on the high level of *cultured* sentiments, often slips down and begins to function on the lower level of primitive propensities. It becomes necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the affective tone of the lower level of experience from that of the higher. Such a distinction was drawn by McDougall in his "Social Psychology". While attempting to distinguish between pleasure and happiness, he raises these two questions, "What is happiness ? Is happiness merely pleasure or a sum of pleasures, and if not, what is it ?"⁸ and gives the answer that "Pleasure is a qualification of consciousness of momentary duration, or, at most, of a fleeting character, and it arises from some mental process that involves but a mere fragment of one's whole being.... Happiness arises from the harmonious operation of all the sentiments of a well-organised and unified personality....."⁹ While this distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness" is clear, and there is no excuse for mistaking the affective tone of the lower "emotional" level of experience with that of the higher "sentiment" level, there is, unfortunately, room for confusion in regard to another aspect of the hormic theory, and for this McDougall is certainly to blame. In the earlier stages of its evolution McDougall's hormic psychology contained a very convincing tri-partite analysis of the instinctive structure of the human mind, with provision for the incorporation of the various psychological aspects of experience. At a later stage the three factors were abridged to two, with consequent loss of clarity and of psychological effectiveness. Professor Flugel approves of this abridgment. He says, "..... the distinction between affection and conation has proved in many cases more difficult than that between either of these and cognition ; hence the increasing use in recent years, at least among British psychologists, of

7. Paulhan, *The Laws of Feeling*, London, 1930, p. 140.

8. *Social Psychology*, p. 132.

9. *Social Psychology*, p. 134.

the term "Orexis" to cover both affection and conation as distinguished from cognition."¹⁰ I do not see any merit in merging the colourful emotional aspect of human nature in the conative. On the other hand there is great danger, in this artificial division of experience into the cognitive and the conative parts, of losing sight of the affective tone altogether. In some of my previous papers¹¹ I have argued for the retention of the three-fold analysis of the instinctive structure of mind into the cognitive, affective and conative phases. It is there pointed out that it is in deference to the wishes of his critics, the psycho-pathologists and the middle-of-the-road positionists, that McDougall merged emotion in conation. Such a merger appears to acquire great validity in the light of the incomplete analysis of "sentiments" found in McDougall's works. A very important modification that I suggest of the hormic theory as it emerges from the "Energies of Men" is a return to the position held in "Social Psychology."

Another improvement that is suggested is a clear tri-partite analysis of sentiments, into their cognitive, affective and conative aspects. Two or more instincts enter into an organic unity to generate a sentiment. Just as the emotional components of these elementary instincts merge in the unified "Sentiment," so also the cognitive components unite to produce a single cognitive situation which would serve as the excitant of the emotion, and the conative components result in unified action.

With a hormic theory improved in the manner sketched above we may proceed to discuss the role of affection in orexis. We may start with a provisional definition of the affective tone as given by Professor Patrick. "Pleasure...is the affective tone which accompanies mental and physiological processes when they are normal and healthy, when life is at full tide, when all goes well, and the vital strivings of the individual are being realised.....the elementary things in our soul life are profound impulses or desires, *conations*, as we call them, perhaps the Will-to-live. In his striving after life, full and free, the individual finds the environment sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile. To its friendly contacts nature has added something which we call *pleasure*—a new and wonderful value."¹² The affective tone of pleasantness is the

10. J. C. Flugel, *Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality*, Vol. 7, 1939, p. 211.

11. "Some Landmarks in the Evolution of Professor McDougall's Hormic Theory of Emotions," *Phil. Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, 1938.

"A Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments". This Journal, Vol. VIII.

12. *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 445.

result of nature's "friendly contact" with the human mind in its fundamental striving after life. It *accompanies the normal and healthy functioning* of all biological and psychological processes.

Starting with this provisional definition, and with an improved hormic theory of the structure of the human mind sketched already, we may proceed to make a critical evaluation of Professor Flugel's estimate of McDougall's "Pleasure-Pain" hypothesis, and through such a critical evaluation arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the rôle of affection in orexis.

The initial approach to the whole problem in Professor Flugel's paper is, in itself, misleading. The question is raised "Do we strive (and therefore act) because we feel? Or do we feel because we strive?" The relationship between conation and feeling is conceived in temporal terms, and the problem is to discover which is the antecedent and which the consequent. *On the hormic theory, the affective tone is neither antecedent to nor consequent on the conative drive, but is concomitant with the smooth and normal functioning of the innate mental structure.* An affective tone is after all the tone of an experience. It is dependent for its very existence upon the concrete experience. How, then, could it have any causal efficacy by itself? The fallacy is due to a misunderstanding of the nature of mental structure. When that structure is understood in terms of the hormic theory, then the question raised at the beginning of this paragraph will cease to have any meaning. It is in the very nature of mental structure to work out its function, and in the course of such functioning the affective tone occurs concomitantly as an integral part of the total experience.

The entire argument and its refutation may be stated in a slightly different way emphasising another aspect of the problem. It is said, by those who have not grasped the full significance of the hormic view of mental structure, that the prior existence of the affective tone of unpleasantness generated by a consciously felt unsatisfied need is an invariable condition for experiencing pleasantness resulting from the progressive satisfaction of the need. The unpleasant pangs of hunger must first be experienced before pleasantness can be generated by the act of enjoying a good meal. Common experience, it is said, justifies this view. We contend that this is a mis-representation of the facts of the case. According to the hormic theory the functioning of the instinctive structure is always affectively toned, either pleasantly or unpleasantly. In the so-called precondition of an unsatisfied need for the experiencing of "pleasure", what has really happened is that the structure has been stimulated, but the functioning is neither normal nor healthy. There is obstruction to smooth working, and is it any wonder that the unpleasant feeling tone

should occur as a concomitant of the hindered experience ? As soon as the hindrance is removed, the structure begins to function smoothly and normally, and has therefore a pleasant affective tone. Hence there is no question of an antecedent "pain" for the experience of pleasure. We have either a smooth functioning of innate propensities toned pleasantly, or hindrances to such functioning with an unpleasant affective tone. To say that conation, as such, can exist without any affective tone, and can then give rise to pleasantness or unpleasantness, is not to give a hormic account of experience.

The distinction between "pure" and "impure or mixed" pleasures, which Plato drew long ago in the *Philebus*, and which Professor Joad¹³ upholds is a natural corollary of the mistaken view of the relationship between conation and affection criticised above. An "impure or mixed" pleasure depends on a pre-existing "want" whereas a pure "pleasure" implies no such antecedent "want". "Pure" pleasures are classified into intellectual, aesthetic and sensory. As a consideration of the last type will sweep away the fallacies inherent in the theory under criticism, we shall take it up for discussion first.

Professor Flugel cites "a warm bath," a "pleasing colour" and a "lovely tone"—as examples of pure sensory pleasure. Allen in his book on "Pleasure and Instinct" devotes several chapters to the discussion of the problem that we are now considering. He too draws a distinction between "pleasures and unpleasures which appear to arise directly from bodily conditions, such as the feeling excited by the scent of a rose or by a prick on the skin, by a warm bath or by severe muscular fatigue." and "pleasures" and "unpleasures" connected with such instinctive tendencies as ambition and self-assertion." The two psychologists agree in holding that McDougall's theory is applicable to the second type, but not to the first. "So forced and artificial does the hormic explanation seem in such cases," says the former "that even enthusiastic supporters of the hormic view begin to hedge, and falter when they come to deal with sensory feelings." It must be said that Professor Flugel makes a very laudable attempt to push the hormic theory, as he understands it, as far as possible. ". . . we may suppose that every sensory stimulus. . . . (possessing a marked feeling tone) is a specific excitant of some type of behaviour. Allen too in the chapter entitled "Summary of results"¹⁴, wherein he applies the results of his discussion in the previous chapters to the formulation of a theory of sensory pleasure and unpleasure, says, "Our view is thus that bodily pleasure and unpleasure depend

13. C. E. M. Joad: *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, pp. 64-65.

14. Allen: *Pleasure and Instinct*, p. 62.

on an analogue of conation existing in the organism, a *nisus* to maintain, or to carry out to the full extent, the functions proper to the bodily system. They are the results for consciousness of a process of the nature of conation, which has taken place in the nervous system, without the direct co-operation of the conscious self; pleasure being the feeling of the success and smooth working of that process, and unpleasure of its obstructed working." It is evident, therefore, that the only field of experience, the sensory field, which is considered to present some difficulty to the hormic psychologist, may be overcome by a careful analysis of the facts.

Those who assert the immediacy of the affective tone of sensation and of its independence of conation have not grasped the hormic position thoroughly. At any rate, they have not understood the hormic view of the status of cognition. Cognition is an outgrowth of conation in the development of the mind whose structure has been conceived of as being completely instinctual. McDougall has demonstrated, and so have other psychologists of his way of thinking, that intelligence invariably functions in the service of instinct. The development of the cognitive structure of the mind occurs only in the interests of the proper and efficient functioning of the instinctive structure. Sensation and sensory discrimination have no existence apart from conation. While asserting the truth of this position, we should at the same time remind ourselves of two facts connected with the status of sensory experience. The conation which is the basis of a given sensory experience need not be of the elementary type. It may belong to the higher level of sentiment. Then, in the second place, the dependence of a sensory experience on the conative structure of the mind may not be visible on a superficial examination. Often, it will be necessary to apply the psycho-analytic method to reveal such dependence. We should also note that it is wrong to postulate a "want" as the antecedent of a sensory experience and its affective tone.

In the light of the three observations that we have made just now, let us examine the illustrations cited by Professors Flugel and Allen. A warm bath, a sweet tone and a beautiful colour are "pleasant" in themselves. Are they? What would be the affective tone of these sensory experiences, if they were forced upon one suffering from high fever? This fact is recognised by Professor Flugel, and he is prepared to admit that the hormic theory is adequate to the demands made by many of these experiences. But he thinks there are certain simple sensory qualities which baffle the hormic psychologists. Our contention is that they appear to be baffling because cognition is given an independent status which it does not possess. The smell of a rose has been given as an example. To us, in this part of the country, there is another flower whose fragrance has an intensely pleasant affective tone. It is the jasmine.

The odour emanating from the flower is not pleasant to all people. As a matter of fact Westerners find it rather strong and unpleasant. The extraordinary attractiveness of the smell of jasmine is due to its association with social and religious functions in our life which have a most important and abiding interest for us. The bride and the bridal chamber are unthinkable without jasmine garlands. Love of the most exalted type, human or divine, is inextricably linked with the delightful fragrance of this pure white flower. To my mind the slightest whiff of its smell suggests sometimes consciously but often unconsciously all the gorgeous scenes of marriage or of divine worship on special festive days. Similarly we find that a simple colour or music is associated with deep lying conative tendencies of the human mind. Simple green is not so *simple* as we seem to imagine. It is restful to the eyes, and has deep physiological effects. To the adult mind it may have a significance stretching far beyond the spectral value which the physicist associates with it. The ancient Hindu aesthetic philosophers studied the effects of these so-called "simple sensations," and reduced their emotional values to some sort of order. Each *raga* or *ragini* has a particular colour scheme associated with it. The reference here is not to synesthesia, but to the excitation of our emotion by a *raga* operating in conjunction with other physical factors which are the natural stimuli for the various sense organs. The *Bhairavi*, (I refer here to the pure and unadulterated Karnatic type, not to the distorted northern type with its Hindustani aberrations), is to me a powerful excitant of the emotion which McDougall calls "Sympathy". So the simple sensory experiences (not excluding such very simple ones as the perception of contours) owe their affective tone to the emotional qualities embedded deep in them. A sensation existing by itself is a psychological myth.

In this connection we may, with profit, remind ourselves of the very valuable work done by the Gestalt psychologists¹⁵ on the nature of the various sensations. When the intensity of a physical stimulus (such as light) is just below the lower threshold of sensation, it has been found that the stimulation of another sense organ (the cochlea, for example) has the effect of producing a visual reaction to the otherwise invisible stimulus. This phenomenon of inter-sensory interaction has been widely investigated, and the results have been used for supporting the Gestaltic position. The concept of the *Gestalt* does receive support from this new field of study, but more than that, we hold that what is behind the Gestalt, namely, the conative drive which generates the Gestalt and holds it together is clearly indicated by the new hypothesis of

structural and functional relationship between sensations. Unity of sensation and the dependence of sensation, even the so called pure and simple sensation, on conation are now becoming established facts.

Our conclusion, then, is that sensory experiences are merely parts of total experiences, wherein conation plays the most significant role.

Before concluding the discussion of this problem and passing on to the next, we wish to point out that several of the obstacles confronting the hormic psychologist will vanish if he would admit the validity of psycho-analysis. Not only the working of the conative structure of the mind at the sub-conscious and the unconscious levels, but also the formation of sentiments and their working at these hidden levels should be recognised. Such an admission will produce a new hormic theory in which the healthy elements of the now conflicting schools could be made to supplement one another and to raise psychology to the level of a respected science.

We shall now consider the significance of the affective tone accompanying aesthetic experience for the theory that is under criticism here. Recent axiological studies in European Philosophy have shed much light on aesthetic problems. The aesthetic "object" has been carefully analysed. The distinction between the "form" and "content of" aesthetic experience has also been drawn. And there have been many noteworthy psychological analyses of aesthetic feeling made recently. Yet in the midst of all this wealth of material, the student of aesthetics finds himself at sea. It is the conviction of the author of this paper that a new orientation to the psychology of aesthetics, a new psychological angle of vision, is urgently needed.

Let us consider, in the first instance, an aesthetic object created by man, a striking picture in water colours or oil, a statue, a piece of poetry, music or a great work of literary art. The "object" is the expression of the entire mental structure of the artist at the time of its production. Unless the artist is producing something to order for the sake of earning a little money, he is creating a new object. What, then, is the relationship between this "object" and the "mind" which creates that object? In the mind of the artist, the elemental propensities have been organised into highly evolved sentiments, unique in structure and exalted in their nature. And an essential characteristic of these sentiments is that they must express themselves. The artist soon discovers that the ordinary channels of expression are inadequate for his unique experience. So he literally creates a new channel, a new "object". Such an "object" strives to appeal to the cultured mind. The aesthetic object is both the product and the excitant of a unique sentiment. If in

the mind of a cultured person, a sentiment identical with or similar to that of which the aesthetic object is both the expression and the excitant, has been formed, then a full-blooded rich aesthetic experience, with its concomitant affective tone, ensues, the intensity of the experience depending upon the degree of similarity existing between the sentiments of the artist and the enjoyer of the "object" produced by the artist. In other words, aesthetic experience is the result of the sympathetic induction of the same emotion in the mind of the on-looker as that which was functioning in the mind of the artist when he created the "object". This theory, based on the hormic sympathetic induction of emotions and sentiments is the only one that seems to fit all the known facts.

McDougall explains how natural objects generate sentiments in us.¹⁶ A great water fall or a terrible volcanic eruption may generate admiration or awe in us. And the region which produces "objects" of our sentiment may easily generate aesthetic objects too.

We have also to consider the question of the aesthetic appreciation of beauty. Does this appreciation stand by itself? Is it *sui generis*? Or, is it merely one aspect of the general aesthetic experience that we have been discussing? In answering these questions, McDougall's distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness" is of great help to us. "Pleasure," we are told is the affective tone concomitant with the working of the lower levels of mental structure, where there is conflict, and happiness the affective tone belonging to the higher organised levels of developed character. Similarly the different aesthetic feelings belong to the lower levels of sentiment formation, while beauty, the appreciation of beauty and the affective tone accompanying such appreciation belong to the highest level of fully organised and unified sentiment.

In aesthetic experience, therefore, there is no question of cognition functioning apart from conation. The aesthetic "object" merely touches off some mental structure and thereafter the mind passes through the whole gamut of experiences familiar to the psychologists.

When we understand the hormic position clearly we find that such statements as "*we are not miserable because we are not listening to music,*" become meaningless. For, we have shown clearly that temporal priority in the hormic dynamism of the mind is a myth. There is only concomity, never any priority so far as conation and affection are concerned.

16. *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 333-334.

There is, in Professor Flugel's paper, a very valuable discussion of the nature of the affective tone accompanying the perception of aesthetic form. "Here" says the Professor, "there seems no question of conation in the sense of goal seeking, of the kind that the hormic psychologist is inclined to regard as instinctual." We agree with the professor. There is no goal seeking. But a fundamental confusion has been introduced here between the structure and function of mind. Mental structure is being constantly modified and developed. The modifications are ready to function when the proper stimulus is present. Just because I have mastered type-writing, it does not follow that my fingers should always be seeking to feel the keys and tap them. As I pointed out, when the structure is touched off functioning occurs with the proper affective tone.

A second source of confusion is due to the unjustifiable separation that has been made between cognition and conation. The cognitive function of the mind (the perception of form), according to the hormic theory, is the result of its conative structure.

A third source of confusion is due to McDougall himself. I am merely repeating an observation that I have made already. The pure form of an aesthetic object and the feeling connected with sensory experiences appear to be independent of conation, because hormic psychology has not conceded to psycho-analysis what is due to it. When we recognise the validity of the principles underlying the sub-conscious and the unconscious working of the mind we shall find that the so called "pure" pleasures are grounded in hormic structures.

The intellectual pleasures are not considered here, because Professor Flugel has shown how the hormic principles cover all cases of affective experience relating to this field.

In conclusion, we have no hesitation in asserting that the hormic theory of affective experience is both adequate and sufficient. Difficulties confront only those who have not grasped fully the distinction between structure and function which McDougall stresses in the earlier chapter of his "Outline of Psychology". A felt need, which in itself is unpleasant, has been believed to be the fundamental requisite of behaviour. This position, we contend is untenable and is not the position held by the proper type of hormic psychologist. There need be no "need" at all, either "felt" or "unfelt," as a temporal antecedent of behaviour. The correct hormic position is best expressed in Professor Allen's words. "It is not the case" he says, "that an unpleasant state of want gives the initial impulse and that the agent learns gradually what will satisfy that

want and remove the unpleasure. The picture that presents itself is rather that of an innate capacity, which tends to unfold itself gradually, until the full possibilities inherent in it are realised. This process may be accompanied by pleasure throughout, though this will vary in degree according as progress is more or less equal, and will give way to unpleasure, if progress is at any time held up by some impediment.”¹⁷

Finally, it is not claimed here that the McDougallian form of the hormic theory is perfect in all its details. It does need revision, and extension. But what is claimed is that it is sound at its core.

17. *Pleasure and Instinct*, p. 77.

Some Aspects of Electrical Development in the Madras Presidency*

By

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Electricity and Industry are complementary and to achieve optimum results both must be developed together, a procedure which is not adequately followed in this Province.

Electricity being thus only a phase of industrial development, it is difficult to discuss that part without frequent reference to the whole.

In Madras, hydro-electrical development has probably made more progress in the last decade than in any other part of India. Construction is, however, approaching the demand and, unless special measures are soon taken, the productive capacity may exceed that demand. This is not due to excessive capacity, far from it. It is due to retarded industrial progress as I shall explain later.

There has been a plethora of talk and advice on electrical and industrial development in India, particularly from persons who know little or nothing of the subject, but to-date no comprehensive scheme of planned, co-ordinated, and rational industrial development has been evolved for any Province. So called planning is a fashionable plaything for Governments to-day. It is nothing new, but merely an attempt to introduce into Government the principles of efficient administration and the long range practical judgment, usually followed by technical administrators in successful large scale private enterprises. The first Government to advertise and popularise state planning was Russia but, as well-informed people know, the original efforts were a partial failure due mainly to the somewhat academic nature of the first recommendations, and a lack of proper co-ordination between the various activities.

Even with practical plans available, there is yet another and bigger problem to face, namely that of bringing them to successful fruition.

The consumption of electricity *per capita* is now taken by many countries as an economic index of prosperity, with electrical development as one of the leading industrial activities. Its importance to this

* Inaugural Address of the Economics Association.

Province must, therefore, be emphasized, particularly as there is a marked tendency among a section of the intelligentsia to under-estimate its value to civilisation, a value almost universally recognized.

I read recently in the Technical Press some interesting statistics of the electricity generation and consumption per capita in 18 countries. As it is of such general interest I have had the data extracted. A study of the figures shows that the four leading countries are Norway, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden, and it should be noted that the density of population in each country differs. The per capita consumption ranges from 2760 to 1270 units per annum, and practically all the generation is hydro. The four lowest in the list are Russia, the Argentine, Mexico, and Poland. Japan is also included and stands a little higher in the list than Russia. Large and commercially important countries like India and China are not even mentioned—Why?

An estimate of the total consumption of electricity in India is difficult to obtain, on account of the lack of complete published statistics. As far as can be ascertained, it approximated 2500 millions last year, giving a per capita consumption of 7 units. It is therefore not surprising that India was not included in the list I have just referred to. For this Province the corresponding figure is about 5; yet an agricultural country like the Argentine consumes 156 units. These data are depressing and provide food for careful thought. It may be argued that statistics are misleading, but they are undeniably an indication of relative conditions. Again one may object to using the per capita basis as an argument; yet if the figures are based upon areas, potential wealth, trade etc., the result is still unsatisfactory. Little Belgium with an area of 12,000 square miles, and a population of 8,350,000, generated in 1938, 5,300 millions K.W.H. all by thermal stations, against a total of 203 millions for Madras with a population of 47 millions and an area of 124,363 square miles. Let us even assume that critics might point out that Belgium and Madras are not comparable, then what of our neighbour Mysore. That State has an area of 29,483 square miles, a population of 6½ millions and generated approximately 240 millions in 1937-38 (excluding the energy transmitted to the Kolar Gold Fields, it was about 100 millions). The consumption per capita is thus 37 units. However one reads the statistics or whatever comparisons one makes, the position of this Province is certainly disappointing. The progress of Mysore is not exceptional, it is rather due to an enterprising and progressive state administration. But there seems no practical reason to suppose that our Province, given the proper stimulus, could not only reach the figures of Mysore but exceed them. In fact a consumption of 60 units of electricity per capita for Madras is not an unreasonably high

figure to aim at, but even when attained, we should still occupy a very humble place in the international list already referred to. Yet 60 units, small as it is, represents a total provincial consumption nearly as great as that of the whole of India today and, what is more important, exceeds the probable maximum economic output of the Provincial Water Powers. These are estimated roughly at 400,000 K.W. with a 50 per cent utilisation factor or about 1750 millions annually. With the addition of certain auxiliary thermal plants the utilisation factor of hydro-electricity can be increased. A local example of such a combination is the Papanasam Hydro-Thermal scheme, now under construction.

There is a certain glamour about hydro-electricity, and it is popularly supposed to be cheaper than thermal-electric power. This, however, is not so in all cases. Under certain conditions electricity distributed from thermal stations is lower in cost than that transmitted from hydro-plants. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the relative merits of hydro and thermal electricity in more detail; suffice it to say that it is quite probable that the large scale electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical industries, which will one day be established in India, may be located on or near the coal fields, rather than at a water power site. As far as is known at present there are no really cheap and accessible water powers in India, such as are found in some other countries, particularly Norway and Canada. The rivers are not entirely perennial; need costly storage, and the power sites are far removed from load centres.

What then are the factors which go to make up an economic hydro-electric development in India?

The test of productivity will vary according to local conditions. Such a test would not be very rigid in this Province, as no important coal or oil deposits have yet been discovered, and due regard has also to be given to the fact that the surveyed water powers are only likely to meet the power requirements of the Province for another quarter of a century. Hence a long range view has to be taken and hydro-electric schemes which might be judged uneconomic elsewhere, may prove to be a valuable future asset to this Province.

Any scheme has first of all to be technically feasible, and secondly economically sound, having due regard to the previous remarks. The unit investment should not exceed a pre-determined figure, and there must be an assured market for the output.

The bogey of any large development scheme is heavy capitalisation and fixed charges—mainly interest. Once incurred they remain a bur-

den to the undertaking until the capital is gradually amortised or even partly written off. It is therefore of the highest importance that the capital cost be kept down to a minimum and, to achieve this, the construction work must be expedited and efficiently executed. This requires an adequate and experienced staff with effective supervision which, together, are not always easy to obtain on all Government work. The ponderous and somewhat anachronistic administrative machinery which seems to be associated with many Governments tends to restrict progress and, through lack of official understanding, causes needless delays and inconvenience. Under such conditions works cost more than necessary. Such handicaps should not exist under the Board which I shall refer to later.

The limit of unit investment cost depends upon local conditions, particularly interest rates and cost of power from competitive sources. Experience during the past decade in this Province has indicated that for hydro-electric schemes Rs. 1000 per effective K.W. installed down to the high tension distributing stations is roughly the present economic maximum.

The limit is an inclusive figure and to maintain a proper economic check, it is necessary to restrict to certain proportions the percentages of the investment devoted to generation, transmission and distribution. The unit cost of a scheme may be well below that economic limit but, if the percentage of the capital invested in transmission lines or distribution system is too high, the scheme may prove to be unremunerative.

Once the hydro-electric undertaking is in operation other factors have to be carefully watched. One of the most important is the operating ratio, that is the ratio of operating expenses (which should include depreciation) to gross revenue. This ratio ought in normal circumstances, to be kept down to 33% or lower. Another check is the investment ratio, which determines the limiting conditions under which extensions should be made. This ratio is the minimum gross return required on capital invested in new extensions. It is based upon the operating ratio, fixed charges, and permissible profit. It varies generally from 12½% to 20% for different undertakings and according to local conditions. The lower figure may be considered as the extreme limit, and would only be practicable when taxes and interest rates are low. A highly taxed corporation might conceivably have to adopt a higher ratio than 20 per cent, and thus severely handicap development.

Among other limits, which have to be fixed and checked at intervals, are the ratio of gross revenue to investment and the revenue per

K.W. of demand at certain points. The latter is mainly dependant upon the tariff structure and load factors.

It may well be asked whether electrical development has proved of any material advantage to the Provinces. It is not difficult to rate the direct economic benefits, but the indirect ones are not so easily measurable.

The gross receipts from the sales of electricity are expected to reach half a crore in 1940, and progressively increase if no obstacles are placed in the way of a normal growth of the Department. Seven years ago the receipts were under a lakh.

It is significant that the year before Electricity from Pykara was made generally available in the Coimbatore District, *viz.*, 1933, there were 8 Textile mills; to-day there are 35 in the hydro-electric areas all of which are operated by State electricity. Would such progress have been made without an economic electricity supply together with hire-purchase and conversion facilities? Consensus of opinion says no. This has resulted in increased prosperity to the District as evidenced by :

- Higher land values,
- Extensive new building construction,
- Improved roads, water supply, and other amenities,
- Additional employment, not only in the mills, but in ancillary industries and occupations,
- Increased spending power of the people.

Perhaps two of the most important economic benefits are due to the large replacement of foreign yarn and cloth by the local articles, and the substitution of a large amount of imported oil and coal by State electricity. These items alone would run into many lakhs annually.

It is true that the textile industry is in a somewhat depressed condition at present but, as far as Southern India is concerned, it is not necessarily due to saturation caused by the encouragement of cheap electricity and other facilities unless the spending power of the population has been reduced of late. The annual consumption of cloth per capita is about 16 yards which is considered by many people to be rather low, even for a comparatively poor country like India. Furthermore the imports of yarn, particularly from Japan, are considerable. There is thus no real reason to suppose that saturation point has been reached. It has to be admitted that had the industry been suitably controlled and regulated, it would probably have resulted in larger and more economical units, but even now the economic grouping of the

smaller units under one management should tend to improve the situation.

Apart from textiles there has been an increase in miscellaneous small industries in and around towns.

Rural life has not been neglected either.

The area under cotton in the Coimbatore District alone has increased by 61,000 acres in the last 10 years due to the greater demand of the mills.

Pumping by electricity has enabled many small ryots to dispense with at least one pair of oxen. It has reduced his labour costs as he is now able to cultivate the fields while pumping is in progress; the electric motor, unlike the oxen, does not need constant attention. Furthermore, in some cases, he has been able to increase the acreage under cultivation and the number of crops raised in a year.

Perhaps the greatest benefit from a humanitarian point of view is the decreased number of oxen that have to be maintained, and consequently there are fewer stray and half starved animals on the road side. It is well known that there is not sufficient fodder and food-stuff in the rural districts to keep the large number of working oxen in a reasonably fit condition, and there is practically nothing for the numerous cast-off ones. There are now around 1500 electric pumping units installed in the areas commanded by hydro-electric power representing probably the displacement of at least 2,000 oxen.

An electricity supply has been given to over 150 villages in the Province and a gradual change is noticeable after a few years. There is a tendency to increased cleanliness. People do not retire so early at night, but take a greater interest in reading and discussing the questions of the day, while the cinema and radio have supplemented electricity in improving the outlook on life of the average villager.

Electricity is supplanting imported kerosene for illumination and gradually becoming a servant of the people. Perhaps one of the greatest benefits that the electric motor is conferring on village life is to relieve the housewife of much of her erstwhile drudgery. Women are no longer obliged to spend a large part of their time grinding various articles of food, baling water, and attending to other arduous duties. The grinding can be done better by an electric motor installed at a local mill, while the water can be obtained from the electrified village well. The electric motor is thus bringing a more civilised atmosphere into the household and allowing women more time to devote to their home and

children, which must result in a healthier and happier family life. Yet, strange though it may seem, there are local authorities and others in this Presidency to-day who are actually discouraging the installation and use of electric motors and even village lighting.

Cottage industries are rather a delicate subject in India, but in an address of this character it cannot be ignored. It is repeatedly said and preached throughout this Country that a happier life will ensue if manual labour is adopted in preference to the machine. Yet it is generally recognized by well informed people that, if efforts are made to put back the hands of the clock and return to the days of yesterday, it can only lead to a lower standard of living. Most people are living and thinking differently today. The rest of the World, unfortunately, will not allow any nation to live entirely as it pleases. It must go with the times or stagnate and go under. There are numerous examples of the fact that industrialism does not ruin cottage industries. Where industry provides employment, the cottager often abandons his small occupation to accept the more reliable and better paid work which can be obtained in the factory. Some small industries may be killed but others are developed in their place. This is particularly so in France, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. In those countries the cottage industrialists, many having an installation of fractional horse power motors, are found supplementing large industries with small machine fittings and appliances, buttons etc., while gloves, toys, combs, brushes and similar articles are produced in the various villages.

In India cottage industries will generally require assistance. They have to be financed and efficiently organized, from the supply of the raw material at a fixed price, to the provision of appliances, and a steady and profitable market for the finished product. This can only be done by large interests or the State, and would be a function of the Power and Industrial Board which I shall refer to later.

I have now attempted to show how electricity has benefitted the Province economically, and assisted in the development of the Textile industry. It has also been made clear, I hope, that there is not likely to be any substantial progress in electrical development unless industry is developed *pari passu* with it.

The world is full of examples of large scale industrial development. There is nothing new in the idea. In pre-war days the outstanding examples were North and South America. A study of the progress of the more important countries of those continents shows that the pre-requisites of such development are adequate capital, low taxes, initiative,

enterprise, and hard work. The same conditions hold good to-day except that the State has to be substituted for private enterprise to an increasing extent. Rampant nationalism has rendered in many cases orthodox economic theories and policies impracticable, and the fundamental law of supply and demand out of date. It is becoming more difficult for private enterprise to compete with the artificial commercial methods adopted by many Governments today. The State has therefore to interfere more and more in Industry, and support it by financial and other means, if the standard of living of the nation is not to suffer.

Of post-war examples in industrial development Russia is perhaps the most interesting, but the changes to more modern methods that are gradually taking place in Japan, Italy, Germany, England and the U.S.A. are also worthy of careful study. It is not generally known that a most impressive development is in progress in Manchukuo; hydro and thermal-electric power systems, blast furnaces, steel rolling mills and other factories are being constructed. One hydro-electric plant, the Sukia, is designed for 8—115,000 horse power turbines, three of which are being installed now. A single unit in this plant can generate more electricity than the combined Mettur and Pykara Stations. An iron and steel works, reported to be one of the largest in the World, is located at Anshan. It is understood that the basic industries are controlled and mostly operated by Government. Ten years ago Manchukuo was generally considered an agricultural country, the home of the valuable soya bean, although limited exploitation of its mineral resources was also being carried on.

The feverish industrial activity in Manchukuo and Japan to be followed, perhaps, by a similar development in China must result one day in a heavy overproduction of goods and a wholesale dumping in the Eastern markets. This would appear to provide a strong argument in favour of a reasonable selfsufficiency in manufactured products for this Country, combined with suitable control to prevent over-production and fiscal protection against dumping.

However let us return to Southern India. Mysore is, to a certain, extent following the modern trend, but Madras is, rightly or wrongly, leaving industry to private enterprise.

There is at present less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent of the population in this Presidency employed in industries coming under the Factory Act. If therefore World statistics can be accepted as a basis of comparison, the industrial situation in the Province even for an agricultural country is not particularly favourable.

It would seem that private enterprise cannot be regarded now in all cases as a wholly satisfactory agency for developing the industries of this Province.

On the other hand, from an all India point of view, the jute, textile, cement, and sugar industries have made substantial progress under private initiative, but this very progress is another argument in favour of the Board. The progress made has not been regulated or, in some cases, carefully considered. It has been too easy and we are already faced with a possible overproduction in those articles.

A well balanced scheme of nationalisation and regulation, combined with assistance to private enterprise, which is now being attempted in the case of electricity, seems to be the solution. It might be desirable to include a few large State Farms utilizing modern machinery and methods. Based upon the results of, say 5 years' operation, it should then be practicable to organise a few collective farms of small ryots, without unduly prejudicing the rights of private property. The question of including road transport deserves consideration.

Nationalisation does not necessarily connote State management. It is almost universally recognized that the State cannot successfully manage and direct commercial enterprises.

There is a growing opinion among economists that all industrial activities wholly or partially financed by the State including electricity and State farms would be better controlled and directed by a National Industrial Board or Authority. Following modern practice this Board would be non-political in character, and constituted on the lines of a public corporation with adequate financial and administrative powers. Government would, however, in a general way control the policy of the Board, which should be based upon the legitimate economic interests of not only the Presidency, but those of adjoining States and Provinces.

The revenue accruing to Government from properly organised industrial activities, as outlined, ought to be considerable and the indirect benefits due to an accelerated development, which should in all cases pay due regard to existing private interests, would be appreciable.

I know with what horror industrialisation is looked upon by a section of the intelligentsia and I sympathise with their point of view. But increased industrial activity is generally believed to be an economic necessity to the Province and has to be faced. One of the main duties of the proposed Industrial Board would be to prevent over-industriali-

sation. The productive capacity of all industries would be restricted to the average demand of a predetermined economic market and a too strictly parochial or even provincial outlook avoided. Due advantage could be taken to store nonperishable goods over cycles of business depression in order to stabilise production. Only such industries which are economically suited to the Province should be established. The list is not a long one ; so a modest start could be made in the near future without waiting for other parts of India to take the initiative.

It may be of interest to note, in passing, that the Government of Bihar is reported to have under consideration the formation of an Electricity Board. Why should not Madras take the lead in such matters instead of waiting for others to show the way ? An electricity bill, embodying the constitution and powers of a Board for this Province, was drafted in 1935, but Government decided not to proceed with it.

Electricity development has been pursued during the past decade to suit the modest needs of the Province and the anticipated economic benefits have been fully realised. But past progress is not likely to be maintained unless the industrial problem is tackled in a concrete and practical manner.

It has to be recognized that a national industrial policy such as suggested would present a greater problem in our Province than in many other countries. To adjust it to the existing social order would not be easy, and the transition stage must be gradual.

In the final picture Madras might still be essentially an agricultural country with limited industrial activities but so controlled, as to assist the ryot and supplement agriculture wherever feasible.

Studies in Sanskrit Texts on Temple Architecture with Special Reference to the Tantrasamuccaya*

By

N. V. MALLAYYA

PART I.

INTRODUCTION

What is really interesting in the civilisation of a race is its distinctive contribution to the stock of ideas which build up a magnificent fabric of art that raises and instructs mankind. In our study of Indian temple architecture, we shall attempt to unfold the spiritual content which is the most vitalising feature of India's culture. Against the background of world's civilisation, India stands unsurpassed in her spiritual attainments. Spirituality is inherent in her soil; it is rooted in the soul of her people. It is expressed in every conceivable pursuit of her race, in every creative activity of her people. In our investigations into the architectural literature of India, we propose to consider not merely the material aspect of architecture but also the mental side thereof. In other words, we are inclined to interpret architecture, not only from the point of view of its origin and development, but in the light of idea and reason which it embodies; for, as the philosophical and architectural literature reveals, the ideal of sacred architecture of India was born of the true Indian conception of 'divinity in a spiritualised body.'

Much has been said and written about Indian architecture by modern exponents and critics of the subject. "The critical and historical study of Indian architecture," as Manomohan Gangoly remarks, "has not been crowned with a measure of success commensurate with the amount of labour bestowed upon it."¹ The genesis of temple architecture is shrouded in doubtful speculations and the theories advanced bearing on its origin and development are various. Among the divers theories started, mention might be made of 'Mound theory' 'Grave theory,' 'Car theory,' 'Umbrella theory' and the like. Then again, there are theories of Greco-Roman influence, Persian influence, Bud-

* Thesis approved for the M.Litt. Degree.

1. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XII, Pt. IV, p. 465.

dhist influence and so on, arising in the course of discussions on the constructional details. The study of Indian architecture, thus presents a tangle of confusion, the reason whereof is not far to seek. Few of the exponents of Indian architecture have cared to explore the vast amount of original architectural literature available in India. A consistent and precise terminology, expressive of the genius of the nation and of the self-contained and distinguishing character of its culture, which the ancient Indian Śilpaśāstras have evolved, has been passed over in silence or neglect. Some feel it an unfortunate position that Śilpaśāstras were ever written in India. Mr. Longhurst thus ventilates his grievance against the existence of Indian architectural texts in the following words : "It is unfortunate for Indian art that the Śilpaśāstras were ever written, as they have been the means of suppressing all originality on the part of the sculptor and have led him to adopt a stereotyped mechanical style of art that is anything but pleasing."² When the dignity of original literature on the subject of architecture and sculpture is thus found impaired by criticism of a hostile character, we feel an imperious instinct to know what the ancient authors have thought and felt about the subject of art, how they valued the literature on the subject which in modern eyes may appear outworn or as portraying a system struggling to express itself. Without minimising the importance of the method of true historical study and criticism, we observe that it will be highly profitable if we do not allow our criticism to override India's architectural idealism, for, idealism has got its own permanent and universal value. We value architectural literature of India because it reflects a phase of the great Indian mind, embodies the process of her mental workings and expresses the inner nature of things. It seeks to emphasise on what is permanent rather than temporary, on what is essential rather than accidental. It is the tendency of modern times to drift towards something which is pleasing or amusing, towards something which is pandering to individual taste. The public of India, especially of ancient and medieval times, however, did not tolerate individualism of a rampant nature and the Śilpaśāstras treat mainly of types rather than of individuals. In the conception of Indian authorities, freedom lies in restraint, and too much of liberty it was thought would end in licence. As Eric Gill observes : "It is not merely that you may get tired of 'too much liberty,' but also that too much liberty is a weight, a positive hindrance. Do we not often say that so-and-so has got 'off the rails'? Do we not thereby imply our instinctive recognition of the fact that there must be rails on which to run ? Truly free-

dom is only found within bounds and rule is the removal of fetters".³ *The rules of Śilpaśāstras are the rails of freedom on which Art travels to its destination of Truth and Beauty.* In the search for beauty, they do not lead the artist in the line of vague aspiration for what is pleasing or amusing. On the other hand, they guide him and direct him to look behind the outward phenomena to thought and purpose. They enable him to pass beyond the seeming appearances of men and things to their inner nature. In Platonic language, the Śilpaśāstras might be said to teach the artist to 'contemplate the divine ideas.' They contain the investigations of the past human experience in the quest for Divine Beauty and Truth. They leave us the record of art-traditions and tendencies that have been the determining forces of a rich civilisation. They provide us the best key to open the art-treasures of India. Should we not therefore concern ourselves to explain their necessity, just why they are written, what they represent and how they could not have been otherwise? The first law of scientific criticism of a work of art or literature is that we should refrain from judging one culture by another and that we must estimate the perfection of one or the other "in terms of the degree to which it realises its own tendencies and becomes itself." In dealing with Indian art then, we must "first of all make its meaning clear; for this, and not a vague aspiration for the beautiful, was the immediate cause of its production; meaning has created shape, and without understanding meaning, unfamiliar shapes will still appear to us arbitrary, quaint, or exotic." We propose to treat in the first place of the significance of architectural literature, for in the exposition of the ideals of architecture, the basis according to Indian Śilpaśāstras is the human organism and the expression, the spirit which it enshrines. The theory of architecture in terms of the human organism, rooted in the subjective consciousness of the race constitutes the primary subject of our study.

THE BASIS AND EXPRESSION OF INDIAN TEMPLE ARCHITECTURE

In every department of culture, the Indians of old struck the note of spirituality that permeates the rhythmical order of creation. There is a vast force that moves mysteriously behind the veil of appearances and is present in all forms of nature either manifest or latent. This is the 'Spirit' and it is revealed in an ascending degree in forms that are perfect. Of all forms in nature, the human form is the most perfect, for it is the most organic in structure. The 'system of relations' is

evident there and all parts are harmonised in one living unity. Every member of the body bears its responsibility to this living unity, which rules the entire body. If the leg for instance, does not behave itself properly, what embarrassment it gives to the body and what hideous picture to the spectator! But when it keeps its relationship with the body and blends in the harmony of its organism, it reveals the higher truth, the higher beauty and the higher unity that underlies the diverse parts of the body. In fact, the significance of the human frame lies in its synthetic content which makes it the fitting abode of the spirit, the spirit that moves behind the phenomenal creation. Our ancient seers possessed the power of visualising and realising the radiating inner spirit which constitutes the essential significance of things. The idea of unity that rules the body, of the spirit that dwells in it, is expressed in their works. In such Upaniṣadic expressions like “ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकम्”⁴ where the human form is conceived as the ‘Temple of Brahman’ the idea of body as the abode of spirit is clearly revealed. In *Skandopaniṣad*, the following statement is found which glorifies the human body :

“देहो देवालयः प्रोक्तो जीवो देवः सनातनः ।

त्यजेदज्ञाननिर्मात्यं सोऽहंभावेन पूजयेत्” ॥⁵

Enjoining the true nature of worship, this text stands for the assimilation of the external with the internal, the synthesis of macrocosm and microcosm, or in other words, the identification of the individual soul with the Universal Soul. It emphasises the glory and dignity of human form, for, it is here treated as the unique home of the eternal spirit-form, the perfection of which is attained in the course of evolution. Hence has the human body become the standard to be attained for the achievement of organic unity.

This heightened significance of the human frame has been inherent in the consciousness of our architects and the style of structure they evolved has ample human references. Our temple architecture thus essentially reflects the spiritual ideal of the race. In the imagination of Hindu devotees, temple is the House of God. God is the Spirit immanent in the universe and temple is His abode. He is Omnipresent, but His Omnipresence is confined within the walls of a shrine in the same way as the Soul is confined within the human body. Again, the Hindu idea of temple as the House of God has its roots in the particular psychology of the worshippers. The large mass of Hindu devotees are necessarily worshippers of images symbolic or anthropomorphic; for,

4. *Chāndogya* (8, 1, 1).

5. *Skandopaniṣad* No. 11.

the Unconditioned and the Absolute, devoid of name and form, is beyond their mental reach. Naturally, their spiritual hunger can be satisfied only in the recognition of an object of adoration and the object thus conceived or perceived is the image. This image represents the immortal spirit. The inevitability of the use and service of image is recognised even by the great philosophers and leaders of religion. Even they who visualised the supreme Godhead felt the impulse to worship irresistible. Image-worship hence is an unavoidable human necessity and a correct appreciation of this form of worship demands a clear understanding of its psychological import.

Enough has been said to show that God and His temple correspond to Soul and the human body. One who probes into the significance of our architectural terms will be struck by this conception of architecture in terms of the human organism. Among the preliminaries connected with architecture, the final ceremonial is known as *Garbhavinyāsa*. The *Garbhādhāna* ritual governs the life of every twice-born while in the stage of conception and this is supposed to govern the structure as well in its incipient state of construction. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, *Mañjarī*, *Gurudeva*, *Tantrasamuccaya*, *Śilparatna* and similar treatises on architecture, all refer to this ritual of symbolical significance.⁶ In the wake of several early authors, *Śilparatna*⁷ sets forth the view in clear terms in the verse half :

“ प्रासादं पुरुषं मत्वा पूजयेन्मन्त्रवित्तमः ॥ ”

The names of the various limbs of the body are found applied in architectural literature to denote the different parts of the structure⁸ such as *Pāduka*, *Pāda*, *Prapada*, *Carana*, *Anghri*, *Jaṅghā*, *Ūru*, *Kaṭi*, *Kukṣhi*, *Pārśva*, *Gala*, *Grīvā*, *Kandhara*, *Kanṭha*, *Śikhara*, *Śiras*,

6. Vide Notes under stanza No. 30 in Part I, Notes.

7. *Śilparatna* XVI, stanza 114 (T. S. S. Ed.)

Also vide stanzas 121, 122, 123:

प्रपदं पादुकं विधात् शिखा स्तूपीति कथ्यते ।
लोहकीलकपत्रादि सर्वं दन्तनखादिकम् ॥
सुधा शुक्लं त्विष्टकौचमस्थिमज्जा च पीतरुक् ।
मेदः श्यामरुचिस्तद्वत् रक्तं रक्तरुचिस्तथा ॥
मांसं मेचकवर्णं स्याच्चर्म नीलं नसंशयः ।
त्वक् कृष्णवर्णमित्याह प्रासादे सप्तधातवः ॥

8. Vide Notes under stanza 23 (Pillars), and stanza 50 (*Stūpikā*) in Part II, Notes.

Śirṣa, Mūrdhan, Mastaka, Mukha, Vaktra, Kūṭa, Karṇa, Nāsikā, Śikhā and the like. These terms should not be viewed objectively as they are not intended to denote the mere reproduction of the facts of the human system. They are used and understood in a subjective sense and are employed to strike the note of organic unity in architecture. The harmony that reigns supreme over the build of the human body is here transformed by the alembic of the artist's consciousness into the ultimate expression of his ideal in the art of building. Indian temple is consequently a perfect organic unit complete in itself, as perfectly organic as it is articulated. It is fully vitalised and breathes life at every point. The different parts are so closely united in one organic whole that to tear any one part away would leave an open wound. Even an unsympathetic critic of Indian art will be constrained to admire the glorious achievement of India's genius, which possessed such strong power of articulation of the parts of the structure in a manner that makes it a living organism. The relationship of body and spirit is consistently and persistently proclaimed. Indian culture guards us against the teaching of those who would accept as sufficient one of the two alone, without regard to the other. The spirit demands a body for its expression and the body attains significance when it is infused with the spirit. Indian architecture, which is one phase of the great Indian culture, not merely develops the structural scheme fully but considers the spiritual quality as of equal moment. Indian thought is so pervasive in its influence on fundamentals, that it is hard to say where philosophy ends and art begins. In fact, our culture as its expression shows in the tangible form of architecture or art, or the conceptual form of religion or philosophy has sprung from one and the same perennial spring of thought.

In the whole range of Indian thought, the ruling idea is 'unity' which is best expressed in the harmonious relationship of body and spirit. This is found in the expression of her culture in art and architecture, where the fundamental view-point was to introduce unity in the midst of diversity and diversity in the midst of unity. The members of the structure differ from each other to express the differing functions of each. Each member is thus a unit in itself and the different units in their differing functions give rise to diversity in the midst of unity. This idea of diversity in the midst of unity was born of man's desire to sacrifice monotony. In its absence, the structure would appear one mass. Any plain surface in Indian architecture is broken up into parts, and in its break-up it furnishes a resting place for the eyes. The surface is decorated and enriched with ornamentation which forms a keen source of delight to the searching eyes. The idea of unity in the midst of diversity is, on the other hand, expressed

in the harmonious relationship of the different members of the structure with the structure as a whole, in the modulation of the parts in the Supreme. This fundamental note of unity, not however divorced from diversity, is indicated in the Hindu conception of temple in terms of the perfect abode of spirit, the most organic of forms, the human frame.

Indeed, architecture is certainly the activity of man's clever hand. But, equally certain it is that it is the product of his great thinking mind. His constant environment that it is, he viewed it in the same subjective terms in which he considered himself.⁹ He stamped it with his character and sought to express in it his desires. A deep dive into the inner significance of architectural terminology will not fail to bring home to our minds the essential teaching of Indian architecture, which guides us to great heights, stirs up our higher aspirations and impresses us with the leading idea, the idea of unity which inheres in the consciousness of our race. Rām Rāz¹⁰ observes and in his wake Gauranganath Banerji¹¹ that "the several members of the order are curiously compared to the several parts of the human body." We maintain that this comparison is perfectly natural, if not inevitable, in view of the essential character of Indian culture.

Western writers on architecture too, have not failed to note this human reference to architecture in their writings, ancient and modern. Vitruvius, the ancient Roman writer remarks in his work: "In truth they (symmetry and proportion) are as necessary to the beauty of a building as that of a well formed human figure If nature, therefore, has made human body so that the different members of it are measures of the whole, so the ancients have, with great propriety, determined that in all perfect works, each part should be some aliquot part of the whole; and since they direct that this be observed in all works, it must be most strictly attended to in temples of the Gods, wherein the faults as well as the beauties remain to the end of time."¹² Geoffrey Scott, a modern architectural critic, in his treatise on the *Architecture of Humanism* thinks that architecture like literature was born of man's desire to create and to extend his ego in his creation. Whether he builds or writes, the artist adopts forms and names which echo the human body or its activities. "Architec-

9. Vide Notes under stanza 54 in Part II, Notes under the title Sthānaka, Āsana and Śayana.

10. *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, p. 22.

11. *Hellenism in Ancient India*, pp. 35-36.

12. Book III, Chapter I.

tural art," as stated by Scott, "is the transcription of the body's state into forms of building." The phrase "the body's state," as paraphrased by Williams-Ellis, is here used to convey the notion of bodily function.¹³ Stratton, a modern author, in his *Orders of Architecture* attributes organic character to the great Classic Order, thereby suggesting that organic nature is a universal feature of all great architecture. In the course of his remarks Stratton observes: "The very term 'organic' seems to suggest that the qualities of the Order should be related with those which find expression in the forms of animate nature. If principles of composition can be discovered which are alike exemplified in the order and in the shape of animals and plants, it may be claimed that the Order possesses some of the vitality usually associated with the latter. Several such principles may here be mentioned, beginning with that of *Punctuation*. It will be observed that no branch of any tree or plant comes to an end abruptly as if it were cut off at random, but invariably has its ends modulated in some manner as to express the fact that the branch or limb in question has come to a conclusion. Another principle of organic design which is expressed in all the forms of animate nature is that of *Inflection*. Everything which is inspired by the principle of life has each part so disposed that it appears to be naturally joined on to the adjacent parts and has its forms so modified that it expresses this relationship. To give an example of this peculiar sensitiveness to position the features of the human face may be cited: these could not be turned upside down and replaced in that disposition without completely disorganising the formal pattern, because each one of them is conscious that its summit is different from its base. When the body as a whole is considered it is also clear that the head differs from the feet, and a human being could not be turned upside down without assuming an attitude that is inappropriate and a cause of distress both to the person himself and to those who observe him. But a classic column also has a head and a foot, and these differ from each other to express the differing functions of each. Turn the column upside down and it appears to scream at such an indignity. Yet there is no question that it could very well be of plain cylindrical shape and still perform its structural function adequately as in fact many columns designed in what is called the 'modernist' style are seen to do; but these cylindrical columns are dead; they have no knowledge of head or feet because their parts are neither punctuated nor inflected".¹⁴

13. *The Pleasures of Architecture* by C. & A. Williams-Ellis, p. 106.

14. *Orders of Architecture*, page 2.

In the instance of an Indian temple, the two top parts,¹⁵ viz., Śikhara and Stūpikā illustrate the principles of inflection and punctuation. The etymological meaning of the term Śikhara शिखरा अस्त्यस्येति शिखरः is noteworthy. In ordinary literature, the word Śikhā signifies the tuft, the hair on the head tied in upward knot and in architectural literature, it denotes the 'finial'. Its synonym Stūpikā also means the same thing and in Vedic literature, the word 'stūpa' is found employed in the only sense of tuft or top-knot. The final element of a temple, stūpikā or śikhā as it is alternatively called, lends to the structural form a sense of conclusion and thus it satisfies the principle of punctuation. That which has the śikhā is the Śikhara, and this term Śikhara unmistakably refers to the head of an Indian temple. This member of the structure thus corresponds to the head of the human body. The other terms most commonly used to denote the same portions are śiras and śirṣa. A man is known and recognised chiefly by the features of his face. So is the style of an Indian temple determined by the shape of its Śikhara. The distinguishing feature of a Nāgara shrine is its square Śikhara, that of a Vesara shrine its circular Śikhara, and that of Drāviḍa shrine is faceted Śikhara. This element, Śikhara is the fifth member in the six-fold division of an Indian temple and is situated above Gala and beneath Śikhā or Stūpikā. The treatment of Śikhara and Stūpikā with their sure reference to the head and tuft portions of a man's frame confirms the interpretation of architecture in terms of the human organism. The principles of Punctuation and Inflection which are found evidenced in important works on architecture are universal principles and products of the universal mind. As elsewhere, so in India, they are expressed in her classic treatises on the subject. Here, it must be remembered, they are born of the true Indian conception of divinity in a spiritualised body and are worked out with such consistency and continuity as compels our appreciation.

We propose to examine here some of the theories of influence in the field of architecture which some scholars have either attempted or ventured to prove. In this connection the main source of our investigation is the architectural literature of the land. A comparative study of the Indian and Western systems of treatment leads us to the conclusion that what is generally described as "Orders in Indian Architecture" is a misnomer.

15. Vide Notes under Stanza 50, Part II, Notes under the title Śikhara and Stūpikā.

ORDERS IN INDIAN ARCHITECTURE—A MISNOMER.

In his essay on the *Architecture of the Hindus*, Rām Rāz takes a general survey of what he considers as "the several members connected with the "Orders¹⁶ of Architecture." In the wake of European method of approach towards the subject, he proceeds to treat of the column and entablature as one architectural feature and seeks to find considerable correspondence between the Indian columns and the Graeco-Roman columns. He holds that there is a common basis of classification and this is with respect to dimensions. "Pillars of Indian Architecture may with respect to the dimensions, be divided into seven sorts".¹⁷ He then mentions the proportions of seven sorts of columns and entablatures associated with those columns. He observes: "Concerning the proportions of columns, the second sort of column in the Hindu architecture may be compared with the Tuscan, the third with the Doric, the fourth with the Ionic, and the fifth with the Corinthian or Composite pillar. This affinity between the columns of India and of Rome and Greece is so striking, that one would be apt to ascribe it to something more than mere chance, etc".¹⁸ Dr. Ācārya in his thesis on *Indian Architecture* closely follows Rāz and subscribes to his view. Ācārya hits the mark further and goes to the extent of suggesting a relation of indebtedness between Mānasāra, the Indian author and Vitruvius, the Italian writer. His conclusions as briefly stated are as follows: "The striking similarities in the names of mouldings like *Padma* or *Cyma*, *Hāra* or bead, or in the names of orders like *Mīśra* or Composite, may sometimes be attributed to inexplicable coincidence. But in view of other striking similarities between Vitruvius and Mānasāra, such as the classification of orders into exactly five, and the division of subservient parts, called mouldings, common to all the orders, into eight, and also the proportionate measurement varying equally from six to ten diameters, and tapering in the same way, there would seem to have been something more substantial than mere coincidence. An influence, direct or indirect, of the one upon the other, seems highly probable. I venture to think, further, that there might have been a relation of indebtedness between the two authors".¹⁹

The position held by Rāz and Ācārya with respect to the comparison of Indian columns with the Graeco-Roman orders does not seem to us tenable. Indian and Graeco-Roman architects have adopted funda-

16. *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, p. 37.

17. *Essay*, p. 29.

18. Rām Rāz, *Essay*, p. 38.

19. *Indian Architecture according to Mānasāra* by P. K. Ācārya, p. 153.

mentally divergent attitude towards the theme of pillars and entablature. In the conception of their architecture, the Graeco-Roman builders took column and entablature as a single architectural feature. They considered the whole structure as one composite unit, and never thought of parts as units in themselves. In such a circumstance, what strikes any one most is the union of post and beam. The column is divided into three parts, the base, the shaft and the capital; entablature, is likewise divided into three parts, the architrave (or epistyle or lintel), the frieze and the cornice. The whole is known by what is generally called the 'Order.' The Graeco-Roman architecture is thus one of column and entablature and the so-called orders of architecture—Doric, Ionic and Corinthian, Tuscan and Composite—are all systematised classifications of the features and forms of the association of capital and beam as found originated and developed by the different branches of Graeco-Roman race, in the various cities, Doria, Iona, Corinth and Tuscany. The Composite Order is a hybrid order, created out of the mixture of the features of Ionic and Corinthian orders. Order of architecture is a misnomer in Indian architectural literature, for, column or strictly speaking capital and entablature are not considered in India as one architectural unit.

The question "what is an Order?" has been answered by Stratton in the statement that the 'Order creates an organic unity between column and lintel'.²⁰ All Western constructions, it is held, have some affinity with this mode of building as originated and established by the ancient Greeks. Thus Stratton remarks: "In England, France, and Germany, Italy and Spain, in America and Africa and Australia, wherever the white race has erected buildings of any consequence, column and entablature are found of a type which declares its affinity to those which the ancient Greeks developed. Surely this is a remarkable phenomenon, etc".²¹ It is beyond reasonable doubt that the association of post and beam in an organic union is the distinctive feature of Western architecture. Now, proceeding to the question of the classification of orders, it must be borne in mind, that the basis of differentiation is not the shape of the column. Columns of all orders have always circular shape. This is obvious from a general look at the existing columns of these types in Europe, as well as from the employment of the unit of measure which has reference always to the diameter of the column at the bottom of the shaft. "Several methods have been used for determining the scale of equal parts by which the Orders are

20. *Orders of Architecture*, p. 2.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

measured for purposes of delineation, but they are all founded on the diameter of the column at the bottom of the shaft. It has been found convenient to take the lowest semi-diameter of the column as a unit—known as the Module—and to divide it into a given number of equal parts or minutes, the number of parts varying with the character of the Order.”²² Shape, which serves as the basis of differentiation and classification of Indian columns never enters into the Western mode of classification. As has been observed, it is the union of capital and beam that constitutes the differentiating mark of Western orders. Richest and most varied ornament occurs in the capital and the entablature, and all vital elements in the design and composition of a building are displayed there. Thus capital and entablature which together form one single architectural feature, gain supreme importance in the western system of composition and it is by the characteristic features of this architectural unit, that Orders or Styles of Western construction are recognised. But, in Indian architecture, while all parts are related to the whole in organic union, parts are also treated as units in themselves. This conception is clearly revealed in the six-fold division of an Indian temple. The six members, Adhiṣṭhāna, Stambha, Prastara, Gala, Śikhara and Stūpikā are individually considered and in actual practice are required to be ornamented, accented and emphasised. In the instance of column, the second element from bottom upwards, various parts are described which are said to enter into its composition such as the Oma, Ghaṭa, Maṇḍi, Vīrakāṇḍa and Potikā. Every part of the structure is thus seen considered as a unit in itself and is given a degree of self-consciousness consistent with its importance as a unit. This conception of parts as units in themselves, conscious of their individual existence and importance is a unique feature of our architecture. No exponent of Indian architecture can afford to ignore this peculiar aspect of Hindu composition. The fundamental divergence in the basis of classification is the most serious and powerful objection that can be raised against any theory of the relation of indebtedness between the Indian and Western systems of architecture. Rāz²³ admits that ‘the plan of the Grecian and Roman columns is always round, but the plan of the Hindu columns admits of every shape,’ but curiously enough he fails to realise that it is this recognition of the shape as the fundamental basis of differentiation by Hindu architects and its non-recognition by Western architects that brings about serious divergence between both the systems, apart from other differences in the view-points such as the recognition of structural parts as

22. Stratton on ‘Module,’ p. viii.

23. Rāz, *Essay*, p. 39.

units in themselves in Hindu system and the absence of such a feature in the Western system.

Dr. Ācārya observes that corresponding to the five Graeco-Roman Orders, Doric, etc., columns are classified in India into five Orders, Brahmakānta, etc. Indian columns, it must be remembered, are not found classified as Brahmakānta, etc., on the basis of dimensions. Their classification is on the basis of shapes, and the classes such as Brahmakānta and the like do not correspond to the Western Classic Orders, Doric and the like. The question of dimensions which is relevant in the case of Western classification does not enter into the Indian mode of classification of columns into types such as Brahmakānta and the like. If any correspondence were to be shown between the systems of treatment Western and Eastern, the basis of classification ought to have been common, but a common basis is not found to have been adopted and differences exhibited are wide and typical. In a host of varieties of proportions prescribed, it is but natural to find some correspondence in the matter of proportions prescribed elsewhere. But such casual agreements do not tend to strengthen the argument of influence of one system over the other; for, such proportions are born of certain principles which it is wrong to suppose as the prerogative of one particular race. Mind being universal in essence, its products bear the stamp of universal character in their essentials. The principle of diminution of the breadth of the pillar at the top is such a universal principle of good composition and this is found expressed in both the Western and Eastern systems of constructions. The higher the columns are, the less they diminish in their breadth at the top. While this universal principle is seen working everywhere in the Eastern as well as in the Western modes of construction, the rules and details of measurement are not always necessarily the same. Agreement if there is, is in the matter of broad principles. On the strength of such similarity in the matter of principles, which are universal in their origin and application, we cannot advance a theory of influence of one system over another with any amount of safety or verity. Art everywhere speaks its own language which is international and its forms assume the shape of man's inner experiences. Just as there are universal and common experiences, so are there universal and similar products of art; and just as there are typical utterances which distinguish one man from another, so are there certain typical elements and devices which express most intimately the peculiarities inherent in the systems of art. The problem of influence in such instances is an artificial one, clearly preconceived. The word 'influence' carries with it a biting suggestion of domination or the supremacy of one over the other, and in the realms of art such a

domination is the worst form of aesthetic nihilism, for, it kills all sincerity and freedom of the form of expression, the essential condition of artistic creation. Certain similarities in the employment of certain decorative patterns such as the Padma, which Dr. Ācārya points out do not serve to express any sense of relation of indebtedness. They are universal decorative forms, found in the works of people all the world over. They are not originally Greek only or Indian only, but cosmopolitan and universal and their direct source is to be sought in 'Nature.' The products of nature are copied by man and harmoniously associated with certain architectural elements. The simple and gracious shapes of the flowers of nature are objects of universal appeal and imitation and they cannot be neglected by those who wish to possess a comprehensive repertory of architectural ornament. In view of these factors, any relation of indebtedness, one way or the other between the Indian and European authorities as believed by Rāz and Ācārya, is scarcely conceivable.

THE MOUND AND GRAVE THEORIES EXAMINED

We shall here pass on to consider the Mound and Grave theories started to explain the origin of Indian temple architecture and see how far these theories satisfy the spiritual aspiration of India. Mr. Longhurst observes: "The term Stūpi would appear to be a corruption of the Sanskrit word 'Stūpa', since both words are used to designate the same type of structure. With the Buddhists, the Stūpa was a dome-shaped structure which was a development of the low sepulchral tumulus or mound of earth and stones in which baked bricks were substituted for earth with a view to durability."²⁴ He then starts the theory that Hindu architecture is derived from the older art of the Buddhists.²⁵ Continuing, he remarks: "The Indo-Aryan Hindu temple is a development of the Buddhist temple. The origin of the typical South Indian temple is not quite clear. It would appear, however, that the usual dome-shaped brick and plaster ornament set up over the roof of the shrine chamber of South Indian village temples, known as 'Stūpi' is nothing more or less than a conventionalised model of a medieval Buddhist Stūpa." Here by 'Stūpi' he understands obviously the finial. Counter to this interpretation runs the identification by the same author of 'Stūpi' with the 'tower over the shrine.' Thus, Longhurst states: "They (finials) are known as Kalaśas or Kalaśams in Southern India and are generally made of stucco moulded round a wooden rod firmly embedded in the ridge, or the crown of a Stūpi or

24. Annual Report of Archaeological Department, Southern Circle, Madras, 1915-16, p. 30.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

tower over the shrine..... One may presume that the Hindus borrowed this architectural ornament from the Buddhists".²⁶ In his recent book on the *Story of the Stūpa*, Longhurst seeks to find correspondence between 'Stūpa' the Buddhist mound, and Stūpi (Tower or Finial? of the Hindu temple) and observes: "These striking resemblances between the Buddhist Stūpa and the Dravidian Stūpi cannot be due to mere coincidence".²⁷ He takes a village shrine for example and remarks: "The latter (i.e. flat roof) is surmounted by a brick and plaster structure known in the south as a 'Stūpi' a name which is obviously a corruption of the Sanskrit word 'Stūpa'. If we compare this architectural ornament with the domed roof the Nalanda temple, it is clear how it originated and why it is called a Stūpi at the present day".²⁸ There underlies a lot of confusion in the vague statements of Mr. Longhurst we have quoted above. We do not know what exactly he understands by the term 'Stūpi'. Sometimes he takes it to mean the tower, at other times to mean the pot-finial. In the light of the investigations we have carried into the origin and significance of the term 'Stūpikā'²⁹ on the basis of the original Samskrit authority, we are constrained to remark that Mr. Longhurst has gone wrong in his understanding of the original significance of the term 'Stūpikā'. Vedic literature of the earlier and later period gives for 'Stūpa' the only meaning 'tuft'. Architectural authorities have all of them understood the term 'Stūpikā' with reference to tuft, and this view is consistent with their interpretation of architecture in terms of the human organism. The synonym 'Śikhā' that they employ to denote the same part 'Stūpikā' clearly expresses this view. The statement of Gurudeva "शिखा शब्देन स्तूपिकोच्यते" proves beyond doubt that originally the term 'Stūpikā' signifies the 'tuft'. This point unfortunately has not so far struck the attention of the exponents of Indian architectural literature and as a result wrong theories have been started with regard to the origin of Indian temple architecture based on a wrong understanding of the original significance of technical terms. We observe that 'Stūpikā' (otherwise known as Śikhā), the final element of an Indian temple is a pure Sanskrit term and should not be confused with 'Stūpa' in the sense of Buddhist burial mound. The terms 'Stūpikā' and 'Śikhā' are never found used in the sense of burial mound anywhere in the course of

26. Ann. Arch. Rept., Southern Circle, Madras, 1916-17, p. 34.

27. *The Story of the Stupa*. (Printed at the Ceylon Government Press, Colombo, 1936), p. 28.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Vide Notes under Stanza 50, in Part II, Notes under the title 'Stūpikā.'

architectural writings. They are used only with reference to the top-most architectural element.

In the wake of Longhurst, Dr. N. Venkataramaṇayya attempts to trace the origin of South Indian temples to the primitive grave. He states : " South Indian temple is a development of the primitive grave ; and how can the theory of Buddhist origin square with it ? There is, however, a splendid way out of the difficulty. We are not able to trace the Vimāna surmounting the temple from indigenous sources. It has a striking resemblance to the developed Stūpa, and is also called by the name ' Stūpi '..... Thus the one feature of the Dravidian temple which defied explanation from native sources appears to have been sufficiently accounted for, and the difficult problem concerning its origin seems to have been solved."³⁰ It is not possible for us to agree with the authors of the ' Grave theory '. Nowhere in the course of our study of architectural literature, are we able to detect any evidence in support of the theory of the origin of temple architecture from the grave or mound. The terms employed such as Śikhara, Stūpikā or Śikhā are clear enough in their signification and start from the conception of Prāsāda or temple in terms of Puruṣa or Person. The ' grave theory ' has no conceptual background and it should be remembered in this connection that nothing did the Hindus represent or record the significance of which they could not imagine. They were clear, clean and lofty about everything they stated and even in a subject of tangible character the dominant mode of thought was essentially spiritual. And in their expression of architectural idealism, no form was found better suited to represent the spiritual content than the human frame, for, as we have observed already it is the most perfect and organic in structure and hence the best fitted to be the abode of ' spirit '. As regards the forms in architecture we think it is more in accord with the lofty architectural idealism of the Hindus if we seek their source to the various gracious shapes which Nature in her creative moods presents us in her creations. Real artists that they were, the Hindu artists caught the hints that Nature suggests through her objects, and developed on their model architectural forms. The various parts which compose the Stūpikā such as the *Padma*, *Nāla*, *Kuḍmala*, as their very names indicate, were moulded and shaped after the patterns of Nature.³¹ This being the case, the question of one sect borrowing from another does not arise. Longhurst argues that the Hindus had no temples before the Buddhist period and that Hindus adopted as their temple Buddhist Stū-

30. *An essay on the Origin of South Indian Temple*, p. 38.

31. Vide Notes under Stūpikā.

pas, when Buddhism began to decay. It deserves to be stated here, that it is not safe always to advance a theory on the ground of negative data. Temples, it is easy to imagine, would have been built in very ancient times, out of evanescent material like wood which would have fallen prey either to natural decay or to the destructive energies of iconoclasts. From literary sources, we shall attempt on a later occasion to indicate the antiquity of the idea of image and temple worship, prior to Buddhistic period. After all what has Buddhism to do with the genesis of Indian temple Architecture? Did Buddha rise on Indian soil like a sudden flush of light out of darkness or order out of chaos? True, Buddha appeared on the stage of Indian Culture, but his presence should not be described as something cut off from India's spiritual field. His religion is inherent in the soil of India and his rise represents only a stage in the continuous growth of India's synthetic culture. As M. M. Gangoly observes: "It will be irrational in this age to accept the advent of Buddha as a phenomenon which cannot be accounted for as being outside the chain of causation and effect forged in the eternal process of evolution."³² It is reasonable to expect some type of structure, from which Buddhists would have developed the so-called Buddhist architecture. The classification into Hindu Architecture and Buddhist Architecture should not be taken in any exclusive or sectarian sense and as Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy observes: "There is certainly no sound basis for the view that Hindu architecture and art are modelled on those of the Buddhists; the style and technical achievement of Indian art, can never at any stage be described in sectarian terms."³³ In the same strain does Dr. Bhandarkar rightly remark that "it is an absurd solecism to characterise any style as Buddhistic or Jaina or Hindu merely from the accident of its employment under the service of any of these creeds" and that, "the main current of Indian craft tradition is non-sectarian in character".³⁴ Forms in Indian architecture whether under the service of Buddhism or Hinduism, may be generally regarded as having had an indigenous origin, and as such Buddhist, Jaina or Hindu forms as they are called should be considered as cognates rather than as borrowings. This point of view deserves to be remembered whenever we attempt to discuss the theory of origin of Indian temple architecture and the relationship of the forms developed under the service of religions like Hin-

32. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XII, Part IV, p. 467.

33. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th Ed., Coomaraswamy's article on 'Indian Art and Architecture'. Also vide his *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, p. 72.

34. *Rupam* 1920, page 11.

duism and Buddhism. Climatic conditions, the character of the materials in use, racial peculiarities, the psychological union which binds different minds, and above all the architectural idealism of the nation—these and similar circumstances constitute the possible criteria in the tracing of the origin and determination of particular style or form of construction. Longhurst and others who carry the distinction of Hindu and Buddhist art too far and presume that Hindu architecture was derived from the Buddhist Stūpa, are not unfortunately seen basing their theorisings on the above sets of considerations. Their theory fatally ignores the most important of reliable criteria viz., the architectural idealism which a careful study of Indian architectural literature never fails to reveal.

THE THEORY OF THE 'EVOLUTION OF STŪPA.'

We shall make here a passing reference to Longhurst's theory of the evolution of Stūpa itself in view of his consideration of Stūpa as the forerunner of Hindu temple. This theory it will be found is purely a product of imagination which runs counter to India's spiritual aspirations as we see reflected in her religious and philosophical literature.

While tracing the evolution of 'Stūpa' the mound of the dead, Longhurst feels inclined to think that what led people originally to raise a mound was the intention of suppressing the spirit of the dead. He thus observes: "The unchambered tumuli have only a floor of stone slabs about 6 feet below the ground, or no floor at all. On this the remains of the dead together with the usual offerings were deposited and covered with earth. Then, as a rule, two or three big heavy blocks of stone were placed on top of the remains, presumably to prevent the spirits of the dead from returning to earth and causing trouble to the living. It seems that these massively built megalithic graves were the outcome of an intense fear of the evil spirits of the dead, rather than to a feeling of affection for the departed, a fear which still survives, among all primitive tribes in India at the present day."³⁵ This presumption is opposed to the current of Indian thought and religion. The practice of burying the dead, of covering the body with earth and of raising a mound over it, is a time-honoured practice, and is found recorded in ancient literature. We are unable to detect any sentiment of fear or any idea of suppressing the spirit as having actuated those who followed the custom of burying the dead. R̥g Veda presents us a beautiful hymn which is uttered at the time of the burial and it is addressed to Earth in the most endearing of terms. The following two verses will give us an idea of the sentiment

35. *The Story of the Stūpa*, page 12.

expressed in connection with the burying of the body. The body is laid and addressed :

“ Approach the bosom of the earth, the mother,
This Earth, the far-extending, most propitious ;
Young, soft as wool to bountless givers,
May She preserve thee from the lap of dissolution ”.
Then the Earth is addressed :

“ Wide open, Earth, *O press not heavily on him* ;
Be easy of approach to him, a refuge safe ;
As with a robe a mother hides
Her son, so shroud this man, O Earth.”³⁶

Why was mound erected ? We believe that it was with a view to marking out the spot where the dead lie buried. It could not be the intention of any cultured race to raise a mound over the dead in the hope of suppressing the spirits. On the other hand, any structure is built on the spot where the dead lie buried as a mark of distinction and honour to the departed spirit. Otherwise, it is likely that men might trample over the buried place and such an act is supposed to dishonour the departed spirit. Raised ground prevents the possibility of any act of that nature and therefore it is reasonable to assume that mounds were erected with the lofty intention of preventing the living from causing any disrespect to the buried, of extending to the departed spirit a mark of reverence and of perpetuating the memory of the dead. There is no room in the imagination of any civilised race for fear from a passing soul. Surely, we will be giving a distorted view of Hindu culture if we go to a few jungle tribes that still haunt the outskirts of civilisation to derive the source of ideas which build up the magnificent fabric of India's civilisation.

THE ‘ UMBRELLA THEORY ’ OF MR. LONGHURST

In the train of the theories of origin and influence comes the theory of the influence of Umbrella on the roof of Indian shrines. Mr. Longhurst thinks that umbrella as a motif had remarkable effect on the architecture of India³⁷ because umbrella is held in India as a symbol of authority and honour. He presumes that Buddhist structures were the first to be so influenced and along with the spread of Buddhism this motif too equally spread. When the Buddhist missionaries spread in South India and entered Kerala, it is presumed that they carried with them their

36. Rg Veda X, 18, (10 and 11). Translation by Macdonell. Vide “Hymns from the Rg Veda, p. 88.

37. *The Story of the Stūpa*, p. 11.

umbrella motif as well which became so popular that it had a remarkable effect on the roof of Kerala shrines. Thus Longhurst seeks to explain the peculiar style of wooden temples of Kerala.³⁸ We do agree with Mr. Longhurst in holding that umbrella is regarded in this country as the symbol of regal honour and authority, but it does not appear to us as something that shaped the architecture of India. Roof of any house, is first of all intended as a cover to structure, as a member provided to keep out heat and water. While this structural function of a roof is true, roof need not be regarded as an enlarged umbrella, prompted by a sense of high regard for authority and power. The shape of the roof is the natural expression of the material employed. It is dictated also by the meteorological conditions prevailing in the province. If any sort of influence of one upon the other were possible, umbrella being a thing of temporary use and convenience, it will be more reasonable to assume that there is better chance of umbrella being influenced by the functional motif of the roof which serves as a permanent shade-and shelter-giving member. In this case, umbrella has to be considered as a small replica of roof serving a limited and temporary purpose rather than presume that the roof is an enlarged umbrella or as a structure fashioned after the umbrella. In the question of sequence, the possibility of precedence must certainly be taken in favour of roof as the idea of shelter is essentially and permanently associated with roof, ever since man thought of shelter from rain and sun. Again, roof does not appear to have been influenced in its shape by umbrella, as the roof as reflected in the description of theorists and evidenced in actual practice, admits of different shapes such as square, rectangular, octagonal, elliptical, apsidal and the like whereas umbrellas of similar variety of design are not found either described or manufactured. As for circular roof, it might be said that it is the natural expression of the material brick that is used in dome-shaped structures. "The dome is an obvious type of covering for the primitive circular hut in countries where building materials are only in small units, such as bricks, and where timber is lacking".³⁹ India is enormously rich in building materials and she is especially so in timber. This being the case, the fundamental and dominant shape in structures will certainly be square or rectangular or octagonal when timber is the material commonly employed. Circular form usually appears in buildings where brick is the material chiefly used. Circular design of the roof cannot be held in India as the shape dominating over every other shape such as square or octagonal. When it appears, it has to be originally taken as only a case of the natural ex-

38. *Ibid.*, pages 29, 33.

39. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* under 'Dome'.

pression dependent on the nature of the material employed. Apart from this inherent tendency of the material in use, if we still demand suggestion from some outside phenomenon, we might as well safely look at the sky and imagine dome as having been shaped after the shape of the far-extending canopy above, the canopy that comprehends the expanse of the universe. In any case, the theory of the influence of umbrellas on the roofs of Indian shrines does not seem to us probable. In the vast amount of architectural literature available, there is no reference or indication which tends to support the theory of the influence of Persian or Buddhist or any umbrella on Indian architecture, which Mr. Longhurst seeks to propound without any single reference to the architectural literature of the country, so rich and varied in her treasures of symbolism.

THE CONCEPTION OF PRĀSĀDA AS THE HOUSE OF THE ALMIGHTY.

The term 'Prāsāda' is used to signify both temple and palace, temple when it refers to the abode of God and palace when it stands for the house of the monarch. Thus Amara observes : " वासी प्रासादो देवभूमिजम् ". This statement echoes the structural correspondence between temple and palace and reflects the character common to both. The splendour and grandeur of each makes it a thing of beauty and of marvel. Upon places of highest eminence rises the Prāsāda (temple or palace) in monumental calm and dignity. The subtleties of its measurements, the relative proportions of its parts and the graciousness of its ornaments are of most delicate description. It is the supreme expression of the noblest efforts and the best skill of artists. It exhibits the care by which great builders obtain fine harmonies and please the minds of men. In the world of men King is looked upon as the central figure and in ancient India was supposed to represent in his person the various divine elements."⁴⁰ By virtue of such a position, he commands dignitaries and attendants and receives from his people willing tributes. With the aid of accumulated wealth and the best skill available in the land, is constructed his palace. Round the hall of the King are constructed accessory structures to meet the demands of royalty. God enthroned in the shrine in 'sacred majesty' is also offered 'Rājōpacāras' or regal service and honour consistent with the conception of God as the Supreme, the Almighty, the Ruler of the Universe. In the system of worship of God as 'Sārvabhauma' or 'Mahāprabhu', rites and ceremonials play a gorgeous part. Gifts of incalculable value fill up God's treasury and the attendants and wor-

40. Vide *Manusmṛiti* (a) Chapter IX (303-311), (b) Chapter VII, 4 and 5.

shippers of the Almighty add to the spectacular aspect of worship. Accessory construction in such a grand and majestic mode of worship is an unavoidable necessity. Thus came to be built around the central sanctum accessory structures such as the Arcanāmaṇṭapa, the Pañca-prākāras and the like. Śilpaśāstras provide rules for the construction of these accessory structures as well after the principal structure has been described. The term 'Prāsāda' refers to the central structure, the sanctum sanctorum, the Holy of Holies. All rules which describe and direct the making of the Prāsāda refer to the central shrine. Architectural interest is chiefly centred on it and it constitutes the chief object of ornamentation. The various rites and ceremonials conducted inside are all in keeping with the presence of the Supreme Being. The abode of the Godhead that is invoked must be accented and emphasised and distinguished from subordinate structures. Hence the central shrine invites the repose and contemplation of the finest works of art and presents situation for the most impressive works of architects. In the midst of structures, it stands firm, as firm as the faith of the faithful and through the hands of artists blooms into beauty. The accessory structures too in their turn enhance the importance of the Holy of Holies and testify to the expression of added dignity which it commands by virtue of its holding the position as the home of the Godhead invoked.

PRĀSĀDA—NOT A CONGREGATIONAL STRUCTURE, BUT THE HOME OF THE SPIRIT

The presence of accessory construction reveals one important feature of Indian temple architecture. It indicates that Prāsāda as conceived in the Śilpaśāstras is the home of the deity and not a hall for mass prayer. It thus distinguishes itself from congregational structures. Since it is not intended to accommodate people, one should not expect to find in it large space inside. Any building, it must be noticed, 'is an act of enclosure whereby a parcel of space is set aside for some purpose'.⁴¹ As Geoffrey Scott would observe, it is the 'art of modelling in space as a sculptor in clay' or a musician in sound. The rules and proportions of the Prāsāda as laid down in the Śilpaśāstras proceed from this conception of building as *enclosed space with a set purpose*. The size of the temple depends upon the size of the image and the division of the space of the main shrine into Garbha, Nāḍī, the internal and external Bhittis is so carefully considered that the set and enclosed space may be taken for 'a language that speaks of the veritable mystery of being, 'Rahasya' as it is called in the instance of the shrine at Chidambaram.'

41. *The Pleasures of Architecture* by C. & A. Williams-Ellis, p. 68.

The walls which enclose the *sanctum sanctorum* as described in the Śilpaśāstras are thick indeed, as the term 'Ghanabhitti' would indicate. The parcel of space that is left inside is shrouded in 'darkness which becomes dimly visible,' when the religious lights are lit. This interior darkness made visible by the dim burning of lights inside the parcel of space suggests beautifully the idea of mystery that envelops the universe and the spirit that moves behind the veil of mystery. Here the parcel of space symbolises the universe, darkness the mystery that envelops it, gloom the veil of appearances and God the Spirit immanent in the universe. The idea of infinity, of the spirit that works behind the drapery of mystery was the guiding factor which led the ancient authors to set the proportions of the divisions of Garbhagṛha in the manner in which we find them prescribed in the Śilpaśāstras. One need not take this as a borrowing from the gloom and darkness that spreads in the interior of a cell-tomb.

DECORATIVE ELEMENT IN INDIAN TEMPLE ARCHITECTURE

Indian builders never contemplated with satisfaction a building which is divorced from ornamentation. Their desire to decorate their creations was so strong that they display a keen sense of ornamentation in every phase of their art and in every part of their building that attracts human eyes. It must not be supposed that carvings in their exuberance destroy the integrity and unity in structural expression. Applied fittingly and in their proper resting parts they make the building most pleasant to behold and invite the eye to pause and to travel and to revel in the beauty of its parts. Ornamentation is an enriching factor in the beautification of a structure in the same way as dress and ornaments are in the beauty of a youthful human figure. Further, the idea that actuated the builders to ornament a structural part was to put accent on it, to emphasise its importance and to make us feel its existence as a unit in itself. The different parts when ornamented thus give the impression of different units which introduce into the building an element of diversity in the midst of unity that pervades the structure conceived as a whole.

Variety is the sign of abundant resource of the human spirit in its creative aspect and this is richly exhibited in India's decorative art. Like the genius of nature, the genius of Indian artist equally rich, profuse and inventive produced sculpture and ornamentation varied in its types of expression. Its creation on the side of architectural ornament comprises representations of both natural and supernatural objects, but with respect to the latter, the achievement is unsurpassed. Representation of forms never seen by human eyes before is the prerogative of

the Indian artist. It is the preferred theme of his decorative art. It takes so large and frequent a part throughout Indian decorative art that it bears testimony to the absorbing interest which the people of India evinced in the mythology of their land. In a country like India, where mythology appeals most to the mass mind, it is difficult for the artist to cut himself off from the depiction of images of mythological fancy. Designs of strange figures, dragons, mythical monsters and many fanciful objects described in the mythology become the theme of the artist in the scheme of decoration of temples. By the miraculous vividness of their forms they rouse strange feelings in their beholders and open the gates of wonder. These objects are not born of jaded tastes or of a mere longing for what was not or of 'life's impoverished glamour.' They are creations of fertile and wonderful minds, products of mythopoeic fancy. 'Vyāla' which appears so frequently and prominently among India's carvings and paintings is a fabulous animal, a creature of mythopoeic imagination. It is ferocious in look and is described as living upon lions, the kings of the animal world. The creative force that led to the production of such fanciful and fierce objects, such strange and striking creatures is inherent in the soil of a tropical country like India. As William Cohn would remark: "Where could this creative force be more fruitful than in the glowing heat of a tropical country, where side by side with the mightiest, eternally snow-clad mountains stretch away extensive plains, where side by side of deserts scorched by the sunshine teeming, impenetrable, primitive forests, where elephants and snakes, tigers and poisonous insects all similarly threaten men". Fergusson condemns profusion of decoration as "over-decorated ugliness", but this remark does not hold good in the case of an Indian shrine, for temple, it must be remembered, is an offering, a gift to the Supreme enshrined in it. Ornament here is not a kind of upholstery, but a 'deliberate incitement to more abundant energies'.

IDEALISM—THE LEGACY OF INDIA

"Ideals may be supplied to art by a small school or society, or by a race and country. Or they may come from a deeper source still, human nature, or the subconscious life which lies at the roots of human nature. If the ideals are narrow and local, the art works only for a clique or coterie. If they are broad and thoroughly human, the art works for a nation or for the whole human race:" thus observes Percy Brown.⁴² India leaves to the human race a rich legacy of idealism. She bequeaths to us art which is the true exponent of human spirit. This art bears the message of spirituality and carries the mind of the beholder from the

42. *A Grammar of Greek Art*, p. 15.

visible to the invisible and the spiritual. This art is classical in the sense that it derives its life and strength from the conception of what is permanent and fundamental. At the present time, at the close of a cultural cycle, when traditions are all breaking down, India stands alone of old nations that have passed through the different stages of youth, maturity and decay. She is the only surviving country of the ancient civilised world and her continuous cultural life is due to her adherence to the permanent values of life. Her Śilpaśāstras are records which set forth themes of art, commonly termed 'religious.' A careful study of these records will amply repay the attention bestowed upon them since they truthfully reflect a distinct and potent art-tradition which is a priceless possession of the Indian people and an object of respect and reverence with the lovers of India. Should we not therefore tap the springs of India's art-treasures which lie hidden in her classic treatises on Śilpa?

Aphaeresis, Syncope and Apocope

By

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Aphaeresis, the tendency to remove a letter or a syllable at the beginning of a word, has been the cause of the loss of the initial “y” in such Tamil words as āru (= a river), ānai (= an elephant) and āḍu (= sheep) which were originally yāru, yānai and yāḍu. Due to the same tendency “tāy” (= mother) seems to have been first weakened into “yāy”¹ and then into “ñāy”² and “āy” (cf. “Tāy” in *Malayalam* and “dāi” in *Gond*) (also “tāyi” in *Yerukala* and “tāi” in *Baḍaga*).

“Tāy”, however, was not completely crowded out. Slowly there appeared, it seems, a preference for the old “tāy” which had once been simplified. Here a later process has ended by favouring the very same acoustic type as was eliminated by an earlier change.³ Thus tāy has come back with greater vigour. Whereas at one stage in the history of the Tamil language easing was brought about in this word by the *dropping* of the dental plosive “t”, at another it was by means of the *insertion* of the same phoneme that ease was secured. The respective reasons are set forth below. “T” is produced by the tip of the tongue making a complete closure against the teeth-ridge.⁴ But the semi-vowel “y” is produced somewhere near the teeth-ridge and is the last in the series of front sounds produced without contact.⁵ And in between these two sounds has to be produced “ā”, the first vowel in the back series. In anticipation of the sound “y” that is to follow,⁶ the articulatory organs seem to have produced the front semi-vowel “y” instead of the

1. Puṛaṇānūru verse 159 and Aiṅkuṇūru, verses 1-10, 186, 280, 385.

2. Kuṛuntokai. verse 40.

3. Cf. Leonard Bloomfield: *Language* (Revised Edition, 1935), p. 368.

4. Vide Tolkāppiyam—Orthography, rule 93.

5. Vide Dr. I. J. S. Taraporewala: *Elements of the Science of Language*, p. 234; and Tolkāppiyam—Orthography, rule 99.

6. Hermann Paul: *Principles of the History of Language*, p. 46; and Otto Jespersen: *Language, its nature, etc.* (1934 edn.), p. 280. Also cf. L. R. Palmer's *Introduction to Modern Linguistics*, p. 24.

front plosive "t". Therefore it is that "tāy" originally changed into "yāy".

But when "yāy" was in vogue for sometime, the vocal organs perhaps found it difficult to execute a rapid succession of identical movements for "y" and hence the palatal nasal "ñ" replaced the initial "y". The merit of "ñ" is that its place of production, the hard palate, is nearer to the place of production of the vowel "ā". This merit itself appears to have disserved it later, for this seems to have been the cause of its ousting. When, as a result of this, "āy" came into being and was in use for sometime, it was probably in danger of being lost, unless some "body" was given to it. As Mr. Vendreyes remarks,⁷ "very short words often lack expression and when phonetic changes tend to abridge words, these are especially prone to disappear." In order that the word might be preserved, lengthened forms such as "āyi", "āyā" and "ā(y)cci" arose in ordinary conversation. When the form "āy" was not serviceable in itself and when more "body" had to be given it, the same phoneme "t", which was originally sought to be eliminated, came to be alternately introduced and ultimately it gained favour by means of suitably supplying the substance the word "āy" lacked. Thus it is that "tāy" has come back with redoubled vigour. In this instance therefore *epenthesis* as well as *aphaeresis* is found.

Syncope, the phonetic tendency to drop an intermediate syllable in a word, is also found in Tamil. In the word "ām" (= Yes; literally, will be or will happen) of to-day the medial syllable "ku" has been completely omitted after a long period of slurring over that sound. "Ku" was very probably corrupted into something like an aspirate "hu" or a sonant "gu" which in turn has been dropped. To the original root "ā" (= to become) the formative "ku" should have been originally added. Then "āku" + "um" (the aorist particle) should have become "ākum" by rule. This has, however, been simplified into "ām" because of the relative frequency of the occurrence in Tamil of the compound phoneme "ku", which happens to be the sign of the dative case. Furthermore, "ku" is found occasionally to have served the purpose of indicating a noun in the genitive case too, as in "avaṛku makaṇ" (= son to him). These occurrences were in addition to its appearance in several words as a formative infix. Thus the number of times of the occurrence of "ku" in Tamil being proportionately large, it came to be slurred in articulation and was finally left out.⁸ The same tendency is found in the words "pōm" for "pōkum" (= that which goes) "cām"

7. Language, a Linguistic Introduction to History. p. 213.

8. Cf. Bloomfield: Language, p. 387.

for “cākum” (= that which dies) and “vēm” for “vēkum” (= that which warms). Besides the syncopation of “ku” or “k” there is that of “y” too. Instances are “vākkarici” for “vāykkarici” (= rice for the mouth) and “pāccal” for “pāyccal” (= that which rises or jumps).

Weakenings far in excess of normal phonetic change are also found. They are not ordinary syncopations and cannot possibly be explained now except by stating that they are in some manner related to what Mr. L. Bloomfield, the famous American philologist, would call “the sub-linguistic status of conventional formulae”.⁹ “Arumanta-piḷḷai” is an instance in point. That compound word is the result of the weakening of the old “arumaruntanna-piḷḷai” (= a son as dear as a rare medicine). The articulating apparatus having slowly stunted its work of complete and exact enunciation, several slurrings and abbreviations must have taken place before the form “arumanta” was reached. At any rate, this excess weakening should be regarded as very different from sound change proper. It is a weakening similar to the English weakening of “God be with you” into “Good-bye”.

Apocope seems to be less common than syncope but much more common than aphaeresis in Tamil. This tendency to reject or to weaken a final sound is evident in the modern pronunciation of the Tamil words “eṇṇey” as “eṇṇai” and “veṇṇey” as “veṇṇai”. Doubtless these words should have had a final “y” in the Primitive Dravidian, for they have emerged from a combination with the word “ney” of old, meaning any gleamy liquid.¹⁰ “Y”, however, is scrupulously preserved in the Tamil literature because of the sentimentally alert protection imposed by the writers themselves.¹¹ Whereas in spoken Tamil the tendency to apocopate “y” is very often found, in the other main Dravidian languages it started long before and has spread :—

<i>Kannada.</i>	<i>Tulu.</i>	<i>Telugu.</i>	<i>Malayalam.</i>	<i>Tam. (lity.).</i>	<i>Tam. (coll.).</i>
Beṇṇe		Venna	Veṇṇa	Venney	Venṇai
Yeṇṇe	Yeṇṇe		Eṇṇa	Eṇṇey	Enṇai

9. Language, p. 388.

10. Vide my article on “The Semantic Principle of Expansion”—A. U. Journal (January, 1937), p. 151.

11. Cf. Dr. T. G. Tucker : Natural History of Language, p. 354.

It is noteworthy that the tendency, however, is extending its range in modern Tamil to other sounds such as the trill “r”, as is evident from the disappearance of the final “r” in the word “taṇṇir” (= cold water) which is mostly pronounced as “taṇṇi”. Sometimes, in order to compensate for the loss of “r”, an elongation of the final vowel “i” takes place and thus we have the alternative pronunciation as “taṇṇī”.¹²

12. Cf. Dr. John Peile : *Philology*, p. 36.

Industrial Disputes and Their Settlement

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Ever since the Industrial Revolution disputes between employers and labourers have been almost inevitable features of the modern organisation of industry. This may, in part, be ascribed to the fact that the existing industrial organization has shattered the personal bond between workers and employer. In spite of various attempts, industrial disputes have existed in the past, are still persisting in many countries at the present day, and it is, beyond doubt, desirable that they should be minimised, if not totally abolished, in the future. Different types of machinery have been adopted in different countries to settle industrial disputes. The Canadian Industrial Dispute Act of 1907, the Italian Act of 1926, the Belgium Order of 1926, the Conciliation Act and the Industrial Courts Act of 1919 in Great Britain, the Labour Courts of Germany, the Industrial Disputes Act of India and various pieces of legislation in Australasia have all sought in different ways to settle disputes in industries, as far as possible, amicably. It has been the consistent and persistent endeavour of legislators to secure closer contact between the employees and employers in order to effect peaceful settlement of industrial differences. The various recommendations of the Whitely Committee in England such as the establishment of Workshop Committees, District Councils, Industrial Councils, aim at arriving at solutions acceptable alike to employer and employee.

From a close examination of the legislation on the matter in almost all countries of the world one fact emerges, *viz.*, compulsory arbitration is no longer favoured for an effective solution of the problem. A few of the probable reasons for this attitude may be mentioned. As compared with conciliation, compulsory arbitration has the disadvantage that it does not automatically win the support of both parties to the dispute. The task of the arbitrator is very difficult since he does not possess any recognised body of laws or precedents on which he can base his decisions. These decisions are therefore, necessarily, empirical and arbitrary. Besides, compulsory arbitration takes away from the

worker his right to strike and the opposition from organised labour may make the enforcement of the arbitrator's decisions well nigh impossible. It has also the added disadvantage that Government becomes directly involved in the dispute and has to use sanctions against the employers or against a large body of the employees. While the former may be comparatively easy the latter would be an extremely difficult proposition. Voluntary conciliation, on the other hand, is based on the mutual agreement of the parties. Instead of trying to enforce on the parties a decision from outside steps are taken to bring the parties together and bring about an agreement acceptable to both. Voluntary conciliation eliminates the necessity for enforcement of sanctions and makes for greater stability of the settlement agreed on. It may, however, be contended that State interference in industrial disputes is only logical in that the State which has laid down conditions of work for the protection of the workers and interfered in industry in countless other ways, seeks also to minimise industrial wastage by ruling out strikes; the answer is, that while this position is absolutely justifiable in theory, it has been an unequivocal failure in practice. It has, also, to be remembered that voluntary conciliation has its own limitations: for its proper functioning, sound organisation of workers and employers is a necessary condition. Future legislation in India has to take this aspect of the question into consideration.

Before the Trade Disputes Act of 1929 the only official body for the arbitration and conciliation of trade disputes in India was a solitary Conciliation panel in Bengal. The Employers' and workmen's (Disputes) Act of 1860 was restricted to railway and public works and dealt only with individuals. It did not seek to provide any machinery for the settlement of disputes in other trades or industries. In the same year and in 1861 this Act was extended to various districts in the Bombay Presidency and in 1873 to Sind. This Act was repealed in 1932 and there are no records to show the extent of its effectiveness while it was on the Statute Book. In 1919 and 1920 violent industrial disputes occurred in various parts of the country. In 1921 and '22 the Governments of Bengal and Bombay appointed committees to go into the matter; and in 1924 the Government of India prepared a Bill based on the Bombay recommendations. But it was only in 1929 that the Trade Disputes Act was actually passed. This Act is applicable for a period of five years. In the provinces too legislation on this subject has either been effected or attempted. Being most vitally interested in large scale industry Bombay passed the Trade Disputes Conciliation Act in 1934. In the first instance it applied only to the textile industry in and around

Bombay City. The Act provides for the appointment of a Government Labour Officer and the creation of a Board of Conciliation. The Officer is meant to guard the interests of labour and promote good relations with the employers. He has the powers of a Civil Court and he is the ex-officio head of the Board of Conciliation. Obstruction to the Board's work is punishable with imprisonment up to 6 months though picketing to continue the strike is not penalised. Similar legislation has been attempted in other provinces. In Madras the Minister of Industries circulated a memorandum for eliciting public opinion in regard to legislation of the same kind.

I shall confine myself in this paper to an examination of the main provisions of the Trade Disputes Act of 1929 (Act No. VII of 1929) of the Central Government. This Act empowers the provincial governments or the Central Government to refer any matters connected with a dispute existing or apprehended to a Court of Inquiry or a Board of Conciliation. If a majority in each of the parties so desire it, the Government may appoint a Court of Inquiry or a Conciliation Board which ever is desired. The Court may consist of one or more persons unconnected with the dispute, may hold sittings in public or *in camera* and may issue interim reports and a final report. A Board of Conciliation may consist of 1, 3, or 5 persons including an equal number of representatives of the parties. It is the Board's duty to bring about an amicable settlement as early as possible. If a settlement is arrived at in the course of its work the Board must send to the proper authority a copy of the settlement duly signed by the parties and a report of the activities of the Board. Even if no agreement is reached a clearly worded written report must be sent recounting the steps taken by them to effect a settlement along with their recommendations for bringing the dispute to a settlement. The Courts and Boards under this Act are invested with all the powers of Civil Courts for enforcing the attendance of persons and their examination on oath, for compelling the production of documents and material objects and for issuing commissions for examining witnesses and for such connected things. The Act also provides for the interim reconstitution of a Court or Board if that becomes necessary. All the members of the Court or Board have to sign the written report but they may append minority reports. These reports have to be published by the Government but they may use their discretion in the matter of publishing individual evidences. Information given to the Board or Court, if otherwise not available to the public, may be published only with the consent of the parties concerned. Unauthorised publication of confidential information is penalised. The Act also provides for the representation of the parties by legal practitioners before the Courts or Boards.

The Act makes special provision in regard to public utility services, especially the Railways. It penalises strikes and lockouts without 14 days' previous notice when the strike is in breach of a definite contract between workmen and employer. A strike or lock-out is illegal if it is not concerned with a dispute within the trade or industry or if it is designed to cause prolonged public hardship or to coerce the Government. Financial aid to illegal strikes or lock-outs is also penalised. Punishment is also provided for incitement or instigation of illegal strikes. For prosecution under this Act previous sanction of Government is necessary; cases in connection with this can be tried only by a Presidency or First Class Magistrate. Provision is also made for the protection of persons refusing to take part in illegal strikes or lock-outs. In regard to centrally controlled industries, business and undertakings the Governor-General is given powers to make rules regarding the powers of the Courts and Boards, the allowances to their members and establishments and other connected matters. Similar power is also given to Provincial Governors in respect of other industries, etc., in their respective provinces.

This Act has many defects. Till very recently this Act was very sparingly used by the Central Government as well as by the Provincial Governments. In Madras after the advent of the Congress Ministry, the Minister of Labour appointed a number of Courts of Inquiry to investigate into apprehended disputes. This Act was carefully scrutinised by the Royal Commission on Labour who have made many valuable suggestions for the improvement of the Act.

A year before the Act was due to expire, in May 1933, the Central Government invited the opinions of the Provincial Governments as to whether the Act of 1929 ought to be made permanent and if so what amendments were desirable. Besides, the Central Government wanted to know whether any statutory provision should be made for appointing Conciliation Officers and provincial Industrial Courts, the latter being modelled on the British Industrial Courts. They invited opinion also on the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs while proceedings are pending in a court of enquiry or Board of Conciliation, on making the awards of Boards of Conciliation mandatory on the parties and on penalising picketing at all times or during the pendency of proceedings before a Court of enquiry or a Board of Conciliation. In 1934 the Government of India converted the Act of 1929 into a permanent measure.

It would be good if the following points are taken into consideration in any future legislation on the subject. Every provincial minister must have a certain number of trained conciliators and mediators to assist him. When there is a dispute, actual or apprehended, he must send one

to the spot. The conciliator must persuade the parties to use the voluntary conciliation machinery existing in the industry concerned so that a peaceful solution may be secured. In the absence of such machinery he must use his influence to bring the parties together so that they might hit upon a solution. If he fails he must promptly report to the minister who must have the power to appoint a Court of Inquiry immediately. Such a court will collect all the relevant data and find out exactly the points at dispute. In every case the report must be published and rendered easily available to the public. The publication of the report will not only clarify the points at issue but will also serve to educate the general public on the question and concentrate public opinion on the measures needed. After the report is published either of the parties must have the right to request the minister to appoint a Board of Conciliation. Over and above all these there must be in each province a permanent Industrial Court for review work. As in the Canadian Industrial Act of 1907 it must also be provided that the *status quo* should be maintained during the pendency of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. This does not affect the right to strike or lock-out but merely serves to clarify the issues at stake ; these weapons of industrial warfare are only suspended and may be used after the Court of Inquiry has finished its labours.

Before concluding, I wish to reiterate that voluntary conciliation is infinitely better than compulsory arbitration. For the proper functioning of this machinery the Minister of Labour and Industries must use all his influence for establishing Workshop Committees, Industrial Councils and other forms of voluntary Conciliation Machinery so that both the parties in the industry may be able to understand and appreciate the other man's point of view. Very often experience proves that stubborn and protracted disputes between individuals have yielded before the personal touch, misunderstandings have vanished magically and understanding and amity have resulted. So too in industry the brutal and wasteful weapons of strike and lock-out may be abolished if time and opportunity are given for mutual contact and friendly discussion so that the finer side of human nature may be brought into play. Personal contact and complete understanding must inevitably lead to a policy of mutual co-operation between the different limbs of the same organism of production resulting in the contentment of the worker and the stability of the industry and the greater good of the State and the community which they are meant to serve. The triumphs of peace and persuasion are slow but sure ; they are steadfast as granite though not quick and spectacular like the passing victories of power and force.

NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

NĀRĀYANĀRYA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

BY

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INTRODUCTION

I

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF NĀRĀYAṆĀRYA

Among the treatises on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy now extant, *Nītimālā* holds an honoured place. Its reputed author, Nārāyaṇārya, was a bold and original thinker. Vedānta Deśika holds him in high esteem, and frequently cites him in support of his own views.¹

As in the case of other eminent Indian thinkers, it cannot be definitely ascertained when he flourished and where. Since *Nītimālā* contains numerous references to the *Śrī-Bhāṣya* and alludes also to *Vedārtha-Saṅgraha*,² and since Vedānta Deśika refers in his writings to Nārāyaṇārya and his works, it can be said with certainty that he must have lived in the period subsequent to Rāmānuja and anterior to Vedānta Deśika (i.e., some time between 1075 and 1250 A.D.).

The author of *Nītimālā* is not to be confounded with Śrī Raṅga-nārāyaṇārya, otherwise known as Vaṅgīpurattu Nambī, who has composed some well-known Kārikās. The latter was one of the direct disciples of Bhagavān Rāmānuja and the guru of one Nārāyaṇamuni. Whenever Vedānta Deśika refers to the author of the Kārikās, he

1. "Sūtroktam nūnam anyat 'Prājñair Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ'" *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā*, stanza 11; "Yat tu Nītimālāyām Nārāyaṇāryair uktam-jñānasya tu parāktvābhāvamātram eva, na tu pratyaktvam"; *Nyāya-Siddhāntajana, Jaḍa-dravyapariśeḍha*, p. 16; "Nārāyaṇāryais tu sambhūti-vināśa-śabdau phaladvārā lakṣaṇayā vidyā-karma-viśayāv uktau 'viduṣo vidyāsādhyasya apavargasya samyag-abhivṛddhi-rūpatvāt' ityādinā"; *Nyāya-siddhāntajana, Jīva-pariśeḍha*, pp. 162-3; "ayam evārthaḥ Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ apy uktaḥ 'Guṇaiḥ iyattārāhityāt, vastunā aparic-chinnatvaṅca avagamyate' iti"; *Nyāya-Siddhāntajana, Īśvarapariśeḍha*, p. 212; "Yat tu Nārāyaṇāryair uktam 'saṁsthānam eva jātiḥ; tat pratipiṇḍam bhinnatvepi dvitī-yādipiṇḍeṣu saūsādrśyāt pratisandhiyamānam svāśrayeṣu vastuṣu ekabuddhi-śabdā-nibandhanam bhavati"; *Nyāya-Siddhāntajana, Adravyapariśeḍha*, p. 375. In *Sarvārthasiddhi* while commenting on the verse from the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* commencing with the word "Devaprītyādikam vā" Vedānta Deśika quotes the following verse from Nārāyaṇārya's *Nītimālā*: "āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire," *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Benares edition, p. 680. This verse is also quoted in *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, (memorial edition) p. 283: Nārāyaṇāryaistu evam uktam

'āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire |
Bhāṣyakāropi Bhagavān evam evā'nvamanyata |'"

2. *Nītimālā*, p. 54.

takes special care to give his full name,³ lest he should be mistaken for Nārāyaṇārya, the author of Nītimālā.

In his *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*⁴ and in his *Tātparyā-Candrikā*⁵ also, which is an elaborate commentary on Bhagavān Rāmānuja's *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, Vedānta Deśika refers to a gloss on the Bhagavad-Gītā by one Nārāyaṇārya. In the course of his commentary on the Gītā verse "Sarvadharmān parityajya . . .", Vedānta Deśika mentions a number of thinkers who have commented upon the Bhagavad-Gītā and classifies them under two heads⁶:—(i) eminent exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought, such as Bhagavad Yāmunācārya and Bhagavān Rāmānuja; and (ii) rival Vedāntins, such as Piśāca, Rantideva, Gupta, Śaṅkara, Yādavaprakāśa, Nārāyaṇārya and Yajñasvami. In another context, he describes this Nārāyaṇārya as a follower of Yādavaprakāśa.⁷ Nārāyaṇārya who has commented on the Gītā must be different from Nārāyaṇārya, the author of *Nītimālā*, who is referred to as an ardent Viśiṣṭādvaitin. While explaining the verse in *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa*, wherein the expression "Āptasyāhur niyogam" occurs, Vedānta Deśika states in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*⁸ that in the ranks of the Viśiṣṭādvaita thinkers some maintain that *vidhi* is the Lord's command. That he is evidently thinking here of Nārāyaṇārya is clear from another place in *Sarvārthasiddhi*⁹ and from *Nyāya-Parīśuddhi*¹⁰ where he actually quotes the relevant verse of *Nītimālā* found in p. 54.

3. *Pañcarātrarakṣā*, p. 30.

4. "Uktaṇca Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ Bhagavad-Gītā-Bhāṣye-
'Prasiddham api vijñānam vāde Yo nāma nihnute |
Sa sadasyaiḥ niyantavyaḥ vyavasthā nā'nyathā yataḥ ||'"

Nyāyapariśuddhi (Memorial edition), p. 101.

5. "anīyatadharma-parityāgaḥ atra vivakṣitaḥ iti Nārāyaṇārya-vyākhyāyam api na anuṣṭhāna-virodhaḥ." *Gītā-Bhāṣya* with *Tātparyā-candrikā* (Ānandā Press), p. 947.

6. "Piśāca-Rantideva-Gupta-Śaṅkara-Yādavaprakāśa-Bhāskara-Nārāyaṇārya-Yajñasvāmi-prabhṛtibhiḥ svam svam matam āsthitaiḥ paraśśataiḥ Bhāṣyakṛdbhiḥ asmat-siddhānta-tīrthakaraiḥca Bhagavad-Yāmunācārya-Bhāṣyakārādibhiḥ avigīta-parigrhītaḥ ayam atra sārārthaḥ . . ." *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, with *Tātparyācandrikā*, p. 952.

7. *Saccaritrarakṣā*.

8. "Svapakṣaṇiṣṭhānāmeva keśāmcid Īśvara-niyogarūpa-vidhipakṣam vivicya darśayati." *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Benares edition), p. 684.

9. *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa*, p. 680.

10. "Nārāyaṇāryaistu evam uktam—
'Āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcīre |
Bhāṣyakāro'pi Bhagavān evam evā'nvamanyata ||'"

Nyāya-parīśuddhi, p. 283.

Besides *Nītimālā*, Nārāyaṇārya has written a treatise on Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. This work is just alluded to in verse 11 of the *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā*. But Kumāra Varada Deśika in his *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā-Paritrāṇa*,¹¹ a commentary on *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā*, tells us that Nārāyaṇārya has attempted in this work to give up needless repetitions and to condense the thousand adhikaraṇas (topics) of Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* into five hundred topics. Nārāyaṇārya's views, however, are not different from those of Jaimini. While the latter elaborately expounded his views even at the risk of repeating himself, so that even the student of mediocre ability could follow them, Nārāyaṇārya had in view the intelligent and talented reader who would naturally be impatient of tiresome repetition.

Nītimālā is written in simple prose interspersed with verse. The ease with which Nārāyaṇārya handles philosophic arguments and the purity of his style are commendable. *Nītimālā* contains a brief, but exceedingly lucid, exposition of the essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. It is divided into ten chapters. The first is devoted to showing that the aspirant for Brahma-vidyā should have previously studied the *Karma-Mīmāṃsā*. In the second chapter, he refutes the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that the Veda has action for its ultimate significance and the Nyāya view that the existence of God can be proved by reason and also shows that the Upaniṣads are not the complements of ritualistic injunctions, but have independent logical validity as statements of what exists as a fact (Brahman). In the third chapter he subjects to critical examination the Advaitic doctrine that the world is only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman. Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda as expounded by Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa comes in for criticism in the fourth and fifth chapters. The next chapter inquires into the nature of Brahman, and is followed by a discussion of the nature of the finite soul in the seventh chapter. The precise significance of *vidhi* is explained in the following chapter. The ninth chapter considers the significance of 'jñāna' which is admitted by all Vedāntins to be the means for attaining mokṣa. An inquiry into the ultimate goal of life (mokṣa) is the subject of the last chapter.

11. "Ata eva prājñā Nārāyaṇāryāḥ:—

parimita-gabhīrāṇi paraspara-virodhādi-rahitāni sūtrāṇi praṇīya adhikaranānāṃ pañcaśatīm eva Mīmāṃsā-Śāstram ācakṣate. Anyāni punaḥ adhikaraṇāni paunaruktyādi-doṣa-dūṣitāni akathayan . . . Yat tu prājñair Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ saṃgrhya kathānam na tat Jaimini-vacana-dūṣaṇāyate. Jaiminir hi mandāmanda-sakala-śiṣyajana-saṃvitti-saukaryārtham mandaprayojanāni adhikaraṇāni prthak anukathayāñcakāra. Nārāyaṇāryās tu prauḍha-vidvajjana-parigrahābhisaṃdhinā pradhānārtha-prakāśanena tulya-nyāyatayā sarvam api artha-jātam parimitena granthasandarbheṇa prācīkaśan itī dvayor api aikarasya-siddhiḥ iti na virodha-gandhaḥ."

Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā-Paritrāṇa, p. 16.

II

ARGUMENT

1. HOW INQUIRY INTO BRAHMAN PRESUPPOSES
INVESTIGATION INTO KARMA

(Brahma-vicārasya karmavicārānantarya-nirṇayādhikārah.)

The Advaita Doctrine.

The opening chapter of *Nītimālā* discusses the question : Does the study of the Vedānta presuppose as a necessary preliminary an investigation into the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* ? The Advaitins answer this question in the negative and contend that, just as the inquiry into the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* (*Karma-jijñāsā*) presupposes only the memorising of the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*, *Brahma-Mīmāṃsā* (the inquiry into Brahman) presupposes only the memorising of the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*, and not the inquiry into sacrificial duties.

Objection may be taken to this view on the following grounds :—

(i) The two inquiries must be undertaken in the order in which the two parts of the Veda—the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*—have been memorised. (ii) Since the Vedānta enjoins meditation on *udgītha* and the like, which are auxiliary to sacrificial ritual (*karma*), such meditations presuppose acquaintance with sacrifices. (iii) As the injunction ‘The Veda should be studied’ (*svādhyāyo’dhyetavyaḥ*) insists not merely upon memory by rote, but also upon an understanding of the significance of the texts memorised, even the person who is keen on attaining *mokṣa* must necessarily have inquired into the import of the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* before taking up Vedānta-śāstra. This injunction (*adhyayana-vidhi*) must be taken to insist upon an understanding of the significance of the Vedas for the following reasons : (a) It is least likely that anybody should strive enthusiastically for unintelligently memorising the Vedas, unaccompanied by an insight into their meaning. (b) The injunction, ‘The Veda should be studied’ meaning thereby, “By study the Veda must be made to acquire a certain excellence or sanctity (*saṃskāra*),”¹² implies that the Veda thus sanctified should subserve some purpose. This purpose could be no other than grasping the meaning (*artha-grahaṇa*) of the Vedic texts. (c) Unless this injunction is taken to prescribe also the inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, there would be no opportunity for the pupil to learn the import of the Veda ; for the pupil would, in pursuance of another *vidhi* (*adhītya snāyāt*), leave the *gurukula* immediately after having memorised the Veda.

12. ‘Adhyayanena svādhyāyam saṃskuryāt.’

None of these difficulties, says the Advaitin, is insuperable. The first objection is pointless ; for the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa* are intended respectively for two sorts of aspirants—those who aspire for advantages, such as celestial bliss, and those who are desirous of attaining mokṣa. Not setting much store by inferior *puruṣārthas*, the latter class is under no obligation to study the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*.

Against the second objection, it is urged that mediation on *udgītha* and the like only serves to heighten the effects of karma and is, in no sense, an indispensable preliminary to the fruition of karma, and that there is nothing improper in the inquiry into the Upaniṣadic texts preceding the inquiry into karma.

The third difficulty is met by saying that the *adhyayana-vidhi* enjoins only memory by rote ; for that alone is the immediate result of *adhyayana*. The insight into the import of the Vedic texts which may come later cannot be treated as the goal of *adhyayana*.

Of the three considerations advanced against the Advaitic position, the first is brushed aside. For there is nothing strange in making unintelligent memorising a *puruṣārtha*. Though it may have little value in itself, it may be treated as a legitimate object of human aspiration in so far as it paves the way for the ultimate goal of life, by successively leading to a knowledge of the significance of the Vedas, and the performance of karmas enjoined therein. In fact, even on the view that *adhyayana* includes the understanding of the significance of the Vedas, it has to be admitted that men value this understanding not for its own sake, but for the results which it eventually yields. The second is no serious difficulty ; because its serviceability in leading to a grasp of the meaning (*artha-grahaṇa*) is not the only use of the Veda sanctified by study (*adhyayana*) ; in itself it is useful for the purpose of *japa*. As for the last, none need be commanded to study the meaning of the Veda ; for it is a matter left entirely to the discretion of individuals. Even after returning home, the earnest pupil may go to the *guru* again and seek instruction regarding the meaning of the Veda. The plea that he who has returned home has his time fully taken up by a round of duties, and can possibly have no time to seek the *guru* again needs no serious consideration. In the midst of his multifarious duties, sacred and secular, the eager person can still spare time for this purpose. Further there is nothing in the injunction, *adhītya snāyāt*, to suggest that the student should leave the gurukula immediately after *adhyayana*. He may well stay on to inquire into the import of the Veda. All that it emphasises is that he should not think of returning home before finishing the study (*adhyayana*).

The Advaitin continues that even he who maintains that the knowledge of the import (*artha-graḥaṇa*) is the goal of study (*adhyāyana*) has to make an exception in two cases :—(i) the study of meaningless expressions found in the Veda, such as *hum* and *phaṭ*, and (ii) the study of those portions of the Veda which describe the sacrificial duties that the learner concerned is not expected to discharge. He will also have to admit that the fruit of their study is either some unseen merit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) or mere memory of the text (*akṣaragrahaṇa*). Rather than make this needless discrimination between two sorts of Vedic texts, it would be preferable to maintain that mere verbal memory or some unseen fruit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is the universal result of *adhyāyana* (study).

From this it would not follow, says the Advaitin, that none need inquire into the significance of the Veda. All that is contended is, it is not part of the injunction that the Veda should be studied (*adhyāyana-vidhi*). As the person memorising the Veda does so with the help of the *aṅgas* (supplementary studies), he is sure to have understood the general drift of Vedic teaching even while engaged in memorising the Veda. Only he cannot be said to have understood it fully. If he is desirous of getting a fuller and clearer knowledge of Vedic teaching there is nothing to prevent him from obtaining this enlightenment from the *guru*. Once it is shown that the injunction, viz., ‘the Veda should be studied’ does not prescribe inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, it would be clear that there is no point in saying that one should have inquired into the meaning of the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* before taking up the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*, as that is the order in which one has studied the Veda. Therefore, the person desirous of obtaining mokṣa may straightway study the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*.

Refutation of the Advaitic Doctrine.

While conceding that the injunction that the Veda should be studied (*adhyāyana*) does not insist upon the inquiry into the import of the Vedas memorised, the author is not prepared to accept the Advaitic view that the aspirant for *Brahma-vidyā* may straightway study the Vedānta. On the contrary, he urges that the inquiry into the nature of sacrificial duty (*karma*) should precede the investigation into Brahman.

Three considerations are advanced by Nārāyaṇārya in support of this thesis : (1) The scriptures explicitly assert that the performance of sacrificial duty is the means of acquiring knowledge of Brahman. One scriptural text, for example, says, “They desire to acquire knowledge with the aid of sacrifice (*yajña*), gift (*dāna*), and austerities (*tapas*) of the nature of freedom from desire for the fruit of actions (*anāśakena*).” This is enough to demolish the Advaitic contention that, as the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa* are intended for two sorts of aspirants

(*adhikāri*), the person who is desirous of attaining mokṣa may straightway study the latter without having inquired into the former.

The Advaitin might raise the objection that the text quoted makes sacrifice (*yajña*) the means of the desire for knowledge (*vividiṣā*), and not of knowledge itself (*vedana*). The reply to this is twofold:— (a) In accordance with the well-known dictum that the goal (*sādhya*) of endeavour is either some result (*phala*) or what leads up to it (*phala-sādhana*), the goal of *yajña* should be either the fruit or what leads up to it. But desire for knowledge is neither the result itself nor the means therefor. (b) The sentence, “He desires to go with the aid of horses” (*aśvena gigamiṣati*) obviously makes horses the means for ‘going’, and not for ‘the desire to go’. Likewise, the proposition, “They desire to obtain knowledge by means of *yajña*, *dāna* and *tapas* . . .” means that *yajña* is the means of knowledge (*vedana*), and not of the desire for knowledge (*vedanecchā*).

The Advaitin may object and say that knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna*) is to be obtained from a study of the Vedāntic texts, and not from sacrifices. This objection is met by the remark that by knowledge is not meant ‘knowledge born of Vedāntic texts’ (*vākya-janya-jñāna*), but knowledge which is of the nature of meditation (*upāsanātmaka-jñāna*). If a person performs his religious duties in the spirit of non-attachment to the fruits of his actions, he obtains first mental purification and then knowledge (*vedana*).

While conceding that *upāsana* may stand in need of sacrifice, the Advaitin may still urge that acquaintance with *karma* is unnecessary for inquiry into Brahman. The reply to this is that *Śārīraka-Śāstra* discusses three important problems: (i) the nature of Brahman; (ii) the *upāsana* necessary for realising Brahman; and (iii) the goal (*phala*) of Vedānta. Inquiry into *Karma-Kāṇḍa* is essential for the second of these problems. It is but reasonable that the investigation of the *sādhana* (means) should precede the inquiry into the nature of the goal (*phala*). This principle has been followed in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* also. Hence, it must be concluded that *Karma-vicāra* should precede *Brahma-vicāra*.

(2) As the scriptures declare that he who neglects his duties falls into sin, even the person longing for mokṣa is obliged to perform his *karma* in order to avoid sin (*aniṣṭaparihāra*). He too is, therefore, required to study the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*.

(3) The student of the Vedānta must be acquainted with the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, because the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* employs some of the rules (*nyāyas*) followed in *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. For example, in distinguishing

the several *vidyās*, such as *Dahara* and *Bhūma*, from one another, the *Vedānta-Sūtra*¹³ employs *Mīmāṃsā-nyāyas* which serve to distinguish the *karmas* from one another.

The Advaitin may further argue as follows :—The knowledge that Brahman is a pure unity (*advitīya-vijñāna*) is the means to mokṣa. For acquiring this knowledge of oneness the aspirant must necessarily possess, so the Upaniṣads declare, mental and moral excellences such as control of the mind (*śama*), restraint of the senses (*dama*), renunciation (*uparati*), fortitude (*titikṣā*) and power of concentration (*samāhita*). It would, therefore, follow that the possession of mental and moral traits, such as *śama* and *dama*, and not sacrifice (*yajña*), is the means to mokṣa. Besides, there is an insuperable difficulty in considering *yajña* as a means to *apavarga* (liberation). *Yajña* implies plurality. How can sacrifice which can flourish only in the soil of diversity be the means for obtaining knowledge of oneness ?

To this Nārāyaṇārya replies that it is nowhere stated in the Upaniṣads that knowledge of Brahman who is without distinction leads to mokṣa. Far from asserting that knowledge of *nirviśeṣa* Brahman leads to *mukti*, the Upaniṣads proclaim that he who understands Brahman as being endowed with *viśeṣaṇas*, as having the entire universe consisting of sentient and non-sentient objects as His body, and as possessing illimitable perfections, attains immortality. A *Śvetāśvatara* text, for example, declares : “ He who knows the soul and matter to be distinct from their controller, secures the grace of the Lord and thereby attains immortality.”

Nārāyaṇārya goes on to say that the text “ They desire to acquire knowledge with the aid of sacrifice (*yajñena*) . . . ” by using the term *yajña* in the instrumental case definitely asserts that sacrifice is the cause of the saving knowledge. *Śama*, *dama* and other virtues are to be treated as auxiliary factors (*anugrahaka*). The Advaitin may ask : How can *yajña* and qualities such as *śama* and *dama*, which are wholly contradictory in character, the former standing for what could be accomplished by activity (*vyāpāra-sādhya*) and the latter taking the form of cessation of activity (*uparama-rūpa*), be the conjoint means for the selfsame knowledge (*vedana*). Nārāyaṇārya replies that they serve two aspects of the same and are not contradictory, because the *vyāpāra* refers to the actions enjoined in the Veda, while *uparati* pertains to those actions that have been prohibited and that arise from desire for fruits.

¹³. Vide *Vedānta-Sūtra*, III, iii. 26 and 42.

2. ON THE VALIDITY OF THE VEDĀNTA.

(Vedānta-prāmāṇya-nirṇayādhikāra.)

Taking a pragmatic view of knowledge, the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā asserts that every proposition, whether it be Vedic or not, must point to something to be accomplished (*sādhya* or *kārya*), and not to an existent something (*siddha*). Although the Bhāṭṭa school admits that propositions may either state facts (*siddha*) or reveal some task to be performed (*sādhya*), it yet maintains that, so far as Vedic utterances are concerned, they have action for their final import. Thus, both the schools of Mīmāṃsā are at one in declaring that the Veda has action for its ultimate meaning. On this view, the Vedāntic texts, though apparently statements of fact, are really to be construed as lending support to the injunctions and prohibitions conveyed in other portions of the Veda. Thus, the Upaniṣads are reduced to a position of unimportance, being denied independent logical value (*prāmāṇya*). Surely, the Vedāntin, who regards the Upaniṣads as the final authority for our knowledge of ultimate reality, cannot allow this doctrine to go unchallenged. Nor can he countenance the Nyāya doctrine that God's existence is proved by reason (*anumāna*); for, though the Naiyāyika concedes that the scriptures convey knowledge of matters of fact, his belief that God is established through inference, and not through scripture, as in the Vedānta, deprives the Vedas of all authority (*prāmāṇya*), so far as knowledge of Brahman is concerned. For there is the well-known dictum that the scriptures deal with matters lying beyond the reach of the other pramāṇas.¹⁴ Therefore, the author attempts, in this chapter, to refute these two doctrines which threaten to nullify the Upaniṣads.

The Prābhākara View.

The Prābhākara view is first taken up for examination. In defence of the view that every proposition signifies something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and that the Vedāntic texts also, of necessity, point to *sādhya*, tasks to be performed, it is urged that words would convey intelligible meaning only when their relation to their respective significations have already been grasped. One who is ignorant of the relation of words to their meanings makes no sense out of them. An examination of the way in which the meanings of words are learnt reveals, the Prābhākara points out, that children get to know the significance of words by comparing and contrasting commands like "fetch the cow" (*gām ānaya*), "fetch the horse" (*aśvam ānaya*), and "tie up the cow," (*gām badhāna*

14. Aprāpte śāstram arthavat.

and so forth, which elderly persons use in daily intercourse. It is but natural that every word comes to be associated in the child's mind with some action or other. Thus, he concludes that words have the power to signify action, but never the capacity to denote existing things. The Upaniṣadic texts cannot be an exception to this ; they too must teach what has to be done and not what exists as a fact, i.e., Brahman. It is possible to argue that an utterance need not always convey commands and that it may also state facts. When, for example, a person's remarks produce in the listener a beaming countenance, the bystander may learn from the facial expression that the remarks only conveyed the news of the birth of a son and not an action. But this contention, the Prābhākara replies, is untenable ; for, as there are manifold causes of joy, all that the bystander could learn is that the utterance is the cause of joy ; and he could not gather that it is an announcement of the birth of a son.

Refutation of the Prābhākara View.

Nārāyaṇārya declines to subscribe to the Prābhākara view for the following reasons :—(i) For one thing, the example adduced by the opponent does not prove his point. It was suggested that as there is plurality of causes of joy, the messenger's utterance could only convey the news that something that could occasion joy has happened. An effective reply to this suggestion is that, for an identical reason, even the sentence "tie up the cow" (*gām badhāna*) can only mean to the bystander that something has to be done. What that task is he cannot easily guess. For, on hearing the words of the teacher, "tie up the cow", the pupil is found to close his book, to get up from his seat, proceed to the garden and then, tie the cow. Which of these activities was referred to by the master's command, the bystander has no means of understanding.

(ii) Again, before entering upon any action, a person must have a knowledge of the action to be executed. This, in its turn, presupposes acquaintance with the objects connected thereto. The proper sequence is an insight into the meaning of the words uttered by the *guru*, the knowledge that a task has to be performed and then the actual performance, i.e., the overt action. Words, then, must be taken to generate knowledge of objects, and not of what has to be effected.

(iii) Further, it is not true that meanings of words are understood only from the commands given by elderly persons in daily intercourse. The father, mother, teacher or other elderly person points with the finger to different objects in the environment and at the same time utters their respective names. The observant child learns in course of time that these words of themselves denote the several objects in the environment and that the application of such and such names to such and such

objects is based upon the denotative power of words and that the meanings of words do not include a reference to actions. Later, at school, the teacher separates the words of a sentence and points to their meanings.

Nyāya Argument for God's Existence.

Next, Nārāyaṇārya examines the Nyāya doctrine that God's existence is established through inference. The main argument advanced by the Naiyāyika to prove the existence of God may be stated as follows :— Being made up of parts, the earth, the mountain and other things composed of diverse parts and comprising this universe must be effects. And effects are everywhere found to point to efficient causes that are of the nature of agents who know the material (*upādāna*) and the auxiliary (*upakaraṇa*) causes and who also know for whom and for what purpose these effects are intended. Clearly, this agent cannot be the finite souls themselves ; for, prior to creation, these souls being devoid of senses, body and also of knowledge (*jñāna*) and power (*śakti*) are scarcely different from non-sentient objects (*acitkalpa*). It is futile to suggest that the countless souls, though devoid of creative power in themselves, yet produce the world by virtue of their past karma ; for it makes the gratuitous assumption that the countless souls have performed diverse deeds, which share in common the responsibility for creating the world. The Naiyāyika brushes aside the objection that the argument can at best establish that the creator of the world, like the maker of jars, furniture and so forth, is a person subject to karma, and not an omnipotent Lord. He thinks that if all the characteristics found in the illustrative example (*dṛṣṭānta*), whether they be relevant to the point at issue or not, must necessarily be inferred in the *pakṣa* (subject of the inference), there must be an end to all inference.

Examination of the Nyāya Argument.

Subjecting this argument to a rigorous scrutiny, Nārāyaṇārya shows that, at best, it may establish only that the world needs a cause ; but that the author of the universe is a Supreme Personality endowed with auspicious qualities can only be learnt from the scriptures. The Naiyāyika argued that the world with its wonderful shape points to a Supreme Person, even as towers, fortifications and the like point to competent agents ; but that argument may as well prove, says Nārāyaṇārya, that, as in the examples cited, many persons are involved in creating the world. Considerations of economy of thought (*lāghava*), he continues, are wholly beside the point ; and consistently with the nature of the effect, namely, its wondrous shapes, diversity of authorship must be inferred. He adds that if, on the analogy of jars, cloth and other objects in our environment, the existence of a maker of the world

is inferred, this maker must, like the potter, be subject to *karma*, and need not be omniscient. It is unreasonable on the part of the Naiyāyika to suggest that the analogy should not be pressed beyond a certain point and that when all the features found in the illustrative example are inferred to exist in the *pakṣa*, there would be an end to all inference. For on the strength of the reason (*hetu*), the argument will certainly prove all those features that have not been proved by other *pramāṇas* to be inconsistent with the case in question. As God is beyond the reach of other *pramāṇas*, none of the *pramāṇas* has shown that certain features present in the illustrative example will be inconsistent here. Hence the *hetu* must be taken to prove that the *pakṣa* does resemble the illustrative example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in all respects.

The Naiyāyika may still contend that the very distinction of the world from objects, like jars, must point to a creator who is an omniscient Lord, rather than a person who is subject to *karma*. But this, says Nārāyaṇārya, is untenable; for he who is free from *karma* must be devoid of all contact with body, senses and the like, and cannot, therefore, enter upon creative activity. And it is idle to contend that though devoid of body, senses and other faculties, he may create with the mere aid of his will (*saṃkalpa*); for there can be no *saṃkalpa* in the absence of the body. Should the Naiyāyika contend that the creator of the world is eternally endowed with a body, it may be replied that this would contradict his belief that whatever is made up of parts is an effect and cannot be eternal. At best the Nyāya argument proves the existence of a person more competent than any of the finite souls; but it would scarcely establish that he is at once the efficient and the material cause, and that he creates at one stroke this expansive world with the sole aid of his *saṃkalpa*. That such a God exists can be gathered only from the scriptures.

The Bhāṭṭa View.

Assigning a distinctive position to verbal testimony (*śabda*), the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka holds that while perception and other *pramāṇas* may acquaint us with facts useful or otherwise, the Veda must exclusively serve some useful practical purpose or other, and, must, therefore, point only to action. Since all utterances are meant for the communication of ideas, none would listen to statements, if they did not serve useful ends. Hence only such sentences as are relevant to our purposes can be treated as a source of true knowledge. The securing of pleasure (*sukha-prāpti*) and the avoidance of pain (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*) are the sole ends which man strives after. And these are to be attained only by performing certain actions and desisting from others. The performance of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, for example, leads to celestial

bliss ; and the avoiding of injury (*himsā*) to living beings keeps away the terrors of hell (*naraka*). Those scriptural texts which neither initiate action nor inhibit it can never lead to pleasure or to the removal of suffering. Therefore, the Vedāntic texts are to be taken as prompting or inhibiting activity, if they are to be regarded as a *pramāṇa*.

To a superficial observer certain sentences which merely state facts, without initiating action (*pravṛtti*) or prohibiting it (*nivṛtti*), may appear to produce joy or to terminate pain. For example, the sentence "Here is a treasure-trove" causes happiness ; and the proposition, "Here is no serpent", dispels fear. But the careful student will realise that it is the knowledge of the existence of the treasure, rather than its mere existence, that leads to joy. Hence, the sentence, "Here is a treasure-trove", must be construed as conveying the command (*vidhi*), "You ought to understand that there is a treasure-trove."

Refutation of the Bhāṭṭa View.

Nārāyaṇārya disagrees with the Bhāṭṭa view and points out that even judgments which do not prompt action or inhibit it may yet serve useful ends. "Here is a treasure-trove" is useful in itself, in so far as it furnishes knowledge of the presence of hidden treasure. It is mere perversity to construe it as an injunction. Since knowledge is under the control of the *pramāṇas*, and not of the self, knowledge cannot be the subject of a command. Perhaps it may be suggested that all that the *vidhi* means is "Engage in such activities as will lead to this knowledge." But in preference to this roundabout explanation, it is more reasonable to hold that it reveals the existence of the treasure and, thereby, produces joy.

One may admit that this proposition occasions joy, but yet argue that there is no guarantee that it reveals the actual existence of treasure. Like the false promises deliberately used by elderly persons to create joy in children, the sentence in question may be false in fact and yet be the cause of joy. To this the author replies that this proposition, like the promises held out to children, produces pleasure only because it is accepted as true. The moment it is discovered to be false, it ceases to generate joy. But as regards the Upaniṣads, there being no subsequent contradiction (*bādha-jñāna*), no doubts concerning their *prāmāṇya* (truth-value) need be entertained at all. Consequently, Vedāntic texts teaching the existence of Brahman have *prāmāṇya*.

Certain Vedic passages enjoining duties, such as the performance of *viśvajit* sacrifice, do not contain any reference to the desirable results accruing from their performance. In such cases, the opponent is prepared to assume some comparatively trivial result and treat those passages as having logical value. When that is so, what difficulty could

he have in attributing *prāmāṇya* to Vedāntic texts which, at the very moment they are heard, deal directly with the supreme goal of life (*parama-prayojana*), namely, Brahman Himself.

3. REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF THE PHENOMENALITY OF THE WORLD

(*Vivartapakṣa-pratikṣepādhikāra.*)

Vivarta-vāda in Outline.

The Advaitic doctrine that the world is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman is refuted in this chapter. The case for *vivarta-vāda* is stated by Advaitins as follows:—The scriptures teach that Brahman, which is responsible for the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, is *sat* (reality), *cit* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (bliss). It is without distinction of any kind (*nirviśeṣa*), self-luminous (*svayam-prakāśa*) and without a second (*advitīya*). Being clouded by ignorance (*avidyā*) which has no beginning, Brahman becomes the basis of the illusory appearance of this world of plurality. It is in this sense that Brahman is spoken of as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world, and in no other.

Refutation of Vivarta-vāda.

Nārāyaṇārya points out that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world in this sense, by showing that the Advaitic theory that Brahman is pure being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) and is without distinction (*nirviśeṣa*), and without a second (*advitīya*) is unsustainable. He proves also that there is no possibility of Brahman ever being clouded by *avidyā*.

To take the first of these points:—*Sat* cannot be treated as a *jāti* (class characteristic); for, according to the Advaitin, there is only one object wherein it is met with. Nor can *sat* denote 'what can be known' (*prameya*); for Brahman, on the Advaitic view, is not the object of knowledge. Nor yet can it signify distinction from unreality (*asad-vyāvṛtti*); for, if it did, the world which on that view is at once distinct from *sat* and *asad* (*sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*) would possess this character and would, therefore, have to be considered real (*sat*). It cannot also mean mere existence; for that would make Brahman a quality of some entity, since existence is a quality (*dharma*).

The term '*cit*' cannot be said to denote 'that which possesses consciousness (*caitanya*)'; for, on the Advaitic doctrine, Brahman does not possess consciousness, since it is consciousness itself. Nor can it denote 'mere consciousness;' for, if so, knowledge obtained from the

pramāṇas must be termed Brahman. Nor can Brahman be said to be *cit* in the sense of *ajāda* (that which is other than non-sentience), denoting what does not depend upon anything else for its manifestation. For Brahman would then be something that possesses a *prakāśa* which depends exclusively upon itself. But, as a *prakāśa* distinct from Brahman is not admitted by the Advaitin, this interpretation of 'cit' is opposed to his view.

Again, on the Advaitic position the term *ānanda* cannot be assigned an intelligible meaning. *Ānanda* cannot signify pleasure (*sukha*) ; for pleasure is well-known to be a quality of the soul ; and Brahman is no quality. *Ānanda* cannot denote 'being agreeable' (*anukūlatva*), as it would raise the inevitable question : To whom is it agreeable ? Since there is no *jīva* (soul) besides Brahman, it cannot be said to be agreeable to the *jīva*. And since *bhoktṛtva* (the character being an enjoyer) is denied to Brahman, *ānanda* cannot be treated as an object of its own enjoyment. Should it be said that it means 'cessation of pain' (*duḥkhanivṛtti*), it may be replied that Brahman would then become a negative principle.

The expression '*advitīya*' cannot mean 'without a second'. It cannot denote the absence of another Brahman like itself; for there would be need of such a description only if there prevailed the view that Brahman is either twofold or manifold. But clearly, such a doctrine was at no time maintained by any one. Again, '*advitīya*' cannot denote that in respect of the world which is only an effect of Brahman, the latter is non-dual ; for the doubt that they are different is least likely to arise, since all Vedāntins are agreed that the cause and the effect are non-different (*ananya*).

The Advaitic Position.

According to the Advaitins, upaniṣadic passages like "In the beginning, my dear boy, all this was just Being, one only, and without a second"¹⁵ teach that at the time of pralaya Brahman existed as a unitary principle, devoid of differences of any kind. The text "There is no plurality here"¹⁶ denies reality to multiplicity. The text "Beginning with speech, a modification, a name"¹⁷ asserts that effects are unreal. So also the passage "All this is indeed Brahman"¹⁸ equates the world with Brahman for the purpose of negating distinctions and showing that what was erroneously perceived as the world is not really

15. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, 11. 1.

16. *Brh. Up.*, IV, iv. 16.

17. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, i. 4.

18. *Chānd. Up.*, III, xiv, 1.

the world, but Brahman only. The text "He who knows Brahman crosses sorrow"¹⁹ teaches that by jñāna sorrow is terminated. And what is terminated by jñāna must be *avidyā* (ignorance).

All Pramāṇas Teach that Brahman is a Pure Unity.

All the pramāṇas, the Advaitin continues, teach that Brahman is a pure unity, devoid of differences. To all appearance, perception (*pratyakṣa*) acquaints us with plurality. But in reality, it gives us knowledge only of unity. Even granting that perception testifies to the aspect of manifoldness, its value as a pramāṇa is negligible, since it is infected by *bheda-vāsanās* (impressions of difference). As for scriptural testimony, the *abheda śrutis* must, in the opinion of the Advaitin, be reckoned more authoritative than the *bheda śrutis*. Reasoning also supports the view that Brahman is nirguṇa and that the world is *mithyā* (phenomenal). The arguments adduced by the Advaitin are the following—(i) All reference to *bheda* must be based on a unitary object; wherever there is an appearance of duality, the basis is unitary, as in the case of the moon appearing double in certain circumstances. (ii) Being perceptible (*dṛśya*) the world is unreal; for whatever is perceived is unreal, as for example the silver wrongly perceived in the shell.

The Scripture Does Not Teach a Nirviśeṣa-vastu.

Nārāyaṇārya vigorously protests against the contention of the Advaitin explained so far and points out that no proposition can establish a *nirviśeṣa-vastu* (distinctionless object); for, in its very nature, any judgment is a combination of words conveying different meanings, and it expresses the relationship of the different meanings conveyed by its parts. Consequently, the scriptural texts cannot teach a *nirviśeṣa-vastu*. Taking the text cited by the Advaitin—"In the beginning, my dear boy, all this was just Being, one only and without a second"—Nārāyaṇārya shows that far from teaching Brahman to be a distinctionless entity, it really draws attention to Brahman possessing infinite perfections. The word '*agre*' (in the beginning) points to a time; '*āsīt*', to an act; '*idam sat*' to the fact of the world existing in the form of *sat*; '*ekam eva*' denotes that Brahman devoid of name and form is the material cause of the world. '*Advitīya*' signifies that there was no other controller (*adiṣṭhāna*) besides Brahman Himself.

Whether it is taken as teaching the true modes of meditation (*upāsana*) or the nature of reality (*tattva*), the text "There is no plurality here" (*ne'ha nānā asti*) necessarily presupposes a listener (*pramātā*).

Its real intention is to deny a world that has not its being in Brahman (*abrahmātmaka*). This idea is echoed in the following verse of the Bhagavad Gītā. "There is nothing moveable or immoveable wherein I am not present as an Inner controller."²⁰

The "ne'ti, ne'ti" text far from denying attributes to Brahman asserts that the attributes referred to in the context do not exhaust Brahman's nature. As Bādarāyaṇa²¹ pertinently remarks, immediately after the *ne'ti* text there follow passages attributing qualities to Brahman.

The text "Vācārambhaṇam vikāro : . ." cannot, unless violence is done to it, teach that effects are unreal and that they are merely modifications. Its aim is only to show that the cause and the effect are non-different. The world, being an effect, is non-different from Brahman. From this text it would not follow that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* (without distinction) or that the world is phenomenal (*mithyā*).

The passage, "All this is, indeed, Brahman" (*sarvam khalu idam Brahman*) does not deny plurality; it only affirms that the world has Brahman for its self, that the world has its source and support in Brahman and that it is dissolved in Brahman. To believe that the world has the same status as that of the silver perceived in the shell is to forget that, unlike silver, the world is not later perceived as false.

The text, "The knower of Brahman crosses sorrow" asserts that knowledge dispels the travails of *saṃsāra*. It is well to remember that this saving knowledge is of the nature of *upāsana* (meditation), and is not mere knowledge of the import of the śruti texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*).

Abheda-śrutis are Not More Authoritative than Bheda-śrutis.

It cannot be said that *abheda-śrutis* have greater authority, in so far as they came later and suppress the *bheda-śrutis*; for there is no warrant for maintaining that subsequent knowledge is more authoritative than the earlier. If such a view were tenable, the preception of the double moon coming after the realisation that there is but a single moon must be valid.

Perception Does Not acquaint us with a Nirviśeṣa-vastu.

The assertion that *pratyakṣa* (perception), being infected by *doṣa* (defect) in the shape of *bheda-vāsanā*, is of little value assumes without proof that *bheda-vāsanās* are a defect. Any attempt to show that they

20. Bhagavad Gītā, X, 39. "Na tadasti vinā yat syān mayā bhūtam carā-caram."

21. Ved. Sūtra, III. ii. 21.

are a defect lands the Advaitin in the difficulty of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). If *bheda-jñāna* (knowledge of difference) is an illusion, then the impressions (*vāsanās*) generated by them would constitute a defect. But, it is only when the *bheda-vāsanās* are considered a defect, that their cause, viz., the knowledge of multiplicity (*bheda-jñāna*), could be condemned as illusory. To try to obviate the difficulty of *anyonyāśraya* by saying that knowledge of difference is illusory, since the upaniṣadic passages teach a *nirviśeṣa-vastu* is to commit the fallacy of *cakraka* (circular reasoning). If it can be shown that the *pramāṇas* which generate *bheda-jñāna* are defective, because they are beset with *bheda-vāsanās*, it would follow that the upaniṣads teach *nirviśeṣa-vastu*. If it is proved that the upaniṣads teach a *nirviśeṣa-vastu*, then, it would follow that *bheda-jñāna* is erroneous. If it is determined that *bheda-jñāna* is erroneous, *bheda-vāsanās* dependent thereon would be rooted in error and would consequently prove that all *pramāṇas* yielding *bheda-jñāna* would be weak.

Inference (anumāna) Cannot Establish a Distinctionless Object.

The arguments advanced by the Advaitin to prove the reality of a distinctionless Brahman and the phenomenality of the world turn out, on examination, to be fallacious. It is quite easy to devise arguments in support of the opposite contention. E.g. (i) Being unperceived, like the horns of a hare, Brahman is *asat*. (ii) The world is *sat* (*real*); because, like the *ātman*, it is not falsified later.

The Advaitic View that Brahman is Nirviśeṣa.

Countless passages such as “*Satyam jñānam anantam*” may appear to speak of Brahman as possessed of infinite perfections, like omniscience. They really teach, says the Advaitin, that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*. He seeks to explain his position as follows:—The text “*Satyam jñānam anantam*” does not speak of a *viśiṣṭa-vastu*, but only refers to a partless whole of reality (*akhaṇḍa-svarūpa*). If it referred to an object possessing qualities, it must denote the qualities and also convey the idea that the object possessing them is unitary. In that case, there could be no unity in the judgment. Again, as the function of each attribute is to mark off its possessor from those not owning it, the three *viśeṣaṇas* (qualifications) mentioned must point to three different objects. Hence the three words of the text cannot be taken to attribute qualities to a single object. A possible objection is that if these words did not refer to *viśeṣaṇas* but only pointed to an identical object, they would be idle repetitions. But this objection is pointless, since the words in question refer to different aspects of Brahman, viz., *asad-vyāvṛtti* (being opposed to unreality), and *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* (being opposed to ignorance). ”

“It may be objected that this amounts to admitting that Brahman is *saviśeṣa*. But this is not an insuperable objection, for *asad-vyāvṛtti*, *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* and so forth are not the qualities of Brahman, but Brahman itself. There is nothing strange in identifying Brahman with *vyāvṛtti*; because such a procedure is adopted in the case of *guṇa* (quality), *jāti* (generic feature) and *kriyā* (action). Whiteness, for example, is distinct from its substrate and from other colours. The character of being distinct from others (*svetaravyāvṛtti*) is whiteness itself, and not a quality of whiteness; for the simple reason that a quality is not supposed to possess a quality. Hence it may be concluded, Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*.”

Refutation of the Advaitic View that Brahman is Nirviśeṣa.

Nārāyaṇārya says that the formula “*satyam jñānam anantam*” asserts that Brahman is a unitary principle endowed with *viśeṣaṇas*. Each word therein refers to a *viśiṣṭa-vastu* (an object possessing qualifications); and from the co-ordination of all the words it is learnt that the entities referred to by the words are identical. The opponent asked: Should there not be as many objects (*viśeṣya*) as there are *viśeṣaṇas* (qualifications) in the text? The reply is that so long as the different *viśeṣaṇas* are not contradictory and may well co-exist in a single entity they will not point to a plurality of bases. ‘Being broken-horned,’ ‘long-horned’ and ‘hornless’ are obviously contradictory features and, therefore, cannot be attributed to one and the same cow. But bigness, blueness and fragrance are not contradictory qualities in the same flower and may well co-exist. Even so, *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* may well characterise the same reality, Brahman.

On the analogy of *guṇa*, *jāti* and *kriyā*, the Advaitin maintained that *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* and the like are not the attributes of Brahman, but Brahman itself, and that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*. But his argument is unsound. For in the case of *guṇa*, *jāti* and *kriyā*, *vyāvṛtti* is treated as the very essence of *guṇa*, *jāti* or *kriyā*, since a quality can have no quality. But the case of *dravya* (substance) is different. ‘Being distinct from a cloth (*paṭa-vyāvṛtti*)’ is not the *svarūpa* of the jar, but its quality. Even so, *asad-vyāvṛtti* and the like are the qualities of Brahman. Thus it is clear that Brahman is *saviśeṣa*.

Pratyakṣa Yields Knowledge of Manifoltness.

Since *pratyakṣa* (perception) acquaints us with a world of distinctions, it is unreasonable on the part of the Advaitin to maintain that Brahman is *advitīya*, in the sense of being devoid of *vi-jātīya-bheda* (distinction from dissimilar objects).

The Advaitic View that Pratyakṣa Cannot Apprehend Difference.

The Advaitin replies that perception can never apprehend difference (*bheda*). For whether *bheda* signifies *anyonyābhāva* (mutual negation) or something else, in any case knowledge of difference presupposes knowledge of *āśraya* (substrate) and *pratiyogin* (the object from which it differs). Being momentary (*kṣaṇika*), perception cannot apprehend both the substrate and the object from which it differs. If *bheda* denotes *anyonyābhāva*, the perceptual judgment "This is not a cloth" points either to the 'this' or to "not a cloth." If the former, it cannot point to anything else; and if it points to 'not a cloth' it must presuppose the antecedent affirmation "This is a cloth." But it cannot point to both, as perception is momentary. If *bheda* denotes something different from *anyonyābhāva*, even then *anyonyābhāva* must first have been grasped. Take for example the judgment "This is a jar." It implies distinction from cloth and other objects. Thus, even here *anyonyābhāva* is presupposed. Thus all the difficulties of the first alternative confront this also. Hence, *pratyakṣa* cannot generate *bheda-jñāna*.

The Advaitin adds perception apprehends mere existence (*sanmātra*), not limited by space and time. In cognitions such as "The jar exists," and "The cloth exists," the invariable element (*anuvartamāna*), viz., *sat* (existence), like the subject in the erroneous perception "This is silver," is rooted in perception; while the variable elements (*vyāvartamāna*), viz., jar and cloth, like the predicative element 'silver' in the illusion "This is silver," are born of illusion (*bhrānti-mūla*).

Anticipating the objection that when our normal perceptions, unlike the objects of illusory cognition, are not later contradicted, they cannot be condemned as illusory, the Advaitin replies that even in true cognitions there is *bādha* (contradiction, sublation), in so far as there is *vyāvṛtti*, the fruit of *bādha*. When a jar, for example, is perceived, its distinction from cloth (*paṭa-vyāvṛtti*) is implied. The cognition "This is cloth" likewise implies distinction from the jar (*ghaṭa-vyāvṛtti*).

Refutation of the Advaitic View.

Subjecting the Advaitic view to a searching analysis, the author shows that none of the arguments of the opponent is tenable and concludes that *bheda* is vouched for by *pratyakṣa*. The Advaitin urged that since *bheda-jñāna* presupposes knowledge of *dharmin* (substrate) and of the *pratiyogin*, (that from which it differs), it cannot be furnished by perception, which is a momentary process. But the fact is *bheda* is nothing more than *jāti*, (generic property). It does not signify either

anyonyābhāva or something else. It is the *prakāra* (mode) of objects, and is always apprehended along with the *prakārin*. At no time is the *prakārin* perceived in insolation from the *prakāra*. It is impossible to perceive a cow, for instance, without noticing its colour, size, shape and other features. To recognise that a given object is distinct from another, there need be no memory of the *pratiyogin*.²² It is because at the very outset an object is recognised as being distinct from others, the person who desires to secure that object acts in an appropriate manner even in the absence of a knowledge of the *pratiyogin*.

The Advaitin may contend that since *bheda-jñāna*, taking the form "This is distinct from that", clearly presupposes a knowledge of the *dharmin* and of the *pratiyogin*, it is impossible to perceive an object, at the very outset as being distinct from another. The reply is that the apprehension of difference (*bheda-grahaṇa*), like the cognition of non-difference (*abheda-grahaṇa*), is of two kinds. Of two objects which are similar to each other in colour, size, shape and so forth, it may be said, "This is not non-different from that." A second variety of *abheda-grahaṇa* takes the form, "This is the pen which I used yesterday." Similarly, the two varieties of *bheda-grahaṇa* are (i) "The motor car is different from a steam engine", and (ii) "This is a tree". For the first type, knowledge of the *pratiyogin* (that from which it differs) is needed. Knowledge of the steam engine is essential, before a person can distinguish the motor car from the locomotive engine. But for apprehending the second variety of difference *pratiyogi-jñāna* (the knowledge of what it differs from) is not necessary.

When the Advaitin argues that *sat* alone is grasped in perception, as *sat* is the only persistent element therein, he is contradicting his theory that *sat* is not an object of perception. It is admitted on all hands that the eye has the capacity to cognise not bare existence, but the colour, the object possessing that colour and also the other qualities inherent in that object.

There is no value in the suggestion made by the Advaitin that the variable elements in our perceptions are to be condemned as fictitious, even as the predicate element in the illusory cognition, "This is silver," is rejected as false. For 'silver' is rejected as wholly imaginary (*kālpanika*), not because it is a variable factor, but because it is later contradicted (*bādhita*).

Vyāvṛtti is not the result of *bādhā*, as the Advaitin imagines. *Bādhā* (contradiction) consists in denying that the given object exists at

22. Vide. Note 104 on p. 69 of *Siddhitrāya* (Annamalai University Philosophical Series).

the time, and place and in the context specified. Vyāvṛtti, on the other hand, signifies the distinction of one entity from another.

The Advaitic Conception of Ajñāna is Indefensible.

According to the Advaitin, unitary Brahman, becoming clouded by *ajñāna*, imagines a world of multiplicity. What is the precise significance he attaches to the term *ajñāna* ?

Statement of the Advaitic Theory.

Ajñāna, says the Advaitin, is not the negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*); for, in that case, it cannot cloud Brahman. Nor can it account for *adhyāsa* (illusion). For an identical reason, *ajñāna* is not *anyathā-jñāna* (wrong knowledge). It is a positive entity (*bhāva-rūpa*), which is distinct from *jñāna-pāgabhāva* (antecedent non-existence of *jñāna*). It is termed *Māyā* or *Tamas*, and cannot be described as either *sat* or *asat* and it is dispelled by true knowledge of reality.

Its existence is established by *śruti* (scriptural testimony), *śrut-yarthāpatti*, (presumption), *anumāna* (inference) and *pratyakṣa* (perception).

Śruti.—A *Taittirīya* text commencing with the words, “Then it was neither Being nor non-Being”²³ proclaims “Tamas alone existed; and all things were clouded by Tamas.” A *Śvetāśvatara* text makes it clear that *ajñāna* is referred to as *Māyā* or *Prakṛti*. “What is called *Māyā* is to be understood as *prakṛti*.”²⁴

Śrut-yarthāpatti.—The famous *Chāndogya* text, “Tat tvam asi”²⁵ identifies the *jīva* with Brahman. But as the two have sharply contrasted features, they cannot be identical. To reconcile this contradiction, it has to be assumed that one of the two things equated must be unreal. And the unreal entity must be the handiwork of *ajñāna*.

Anumāna.—That *ajñāna* is a positive entity (*bhāva-rūpa*) may be proved by inference also. Take the argument.—Knowledge arising from one or the other of the *pramāṇas* presupposes something else, which is different from the anterior non-existence of that knowledge. This something else clouds the object of that knowledge, and is terminated by the knowledge resulting from the *pramāṇas*. It also dwells in the same place as that knowledge; because knowledge illumines an object not hitherto illumined; just as the first flash of light proceeding from the lamp presupposes a darkness which is a positive entity and which

23. *Tait. Up.*, II, viii. 9.

24. *Śvet. Up.*, IV. 10.

25. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, viii. 7.

the light is now able to dispel and which clouded the object now illumined.

Pratyakṣa.—Perception also establishes the existence of *ajñāna*. Direct cognitions, such as “I am ignorant” and “I do not know myself, nor others besides myself”, show that perception reveals the existence of *ajñāna*. The ignorance referred to here is not the negation of knowledge (the antecedent non-existence of knowledge); for, if so, this negation of knowledge would have to be revealed by non-apprehension (*anupalabdhī*). But, as a matter of fact, it is apprehended directly, and is, thus, akin to the perception of pleasure expressed in the judgment “I am experiencing pleasure.” Even granting that the negation of knowledge can be the object of perception, the cognition in question does not denote the bare absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*). For at the very moment of this cognition there must be the knowledge of (i) the ‘I’, the substrate (*āśraya*) of this *abhāva*, (ii) of the *jñānābhāva* itself (*viśaya*) and (iii) knowledge (the *pratiyogin* or counter-correlative). Therefore, this cognition has for its object something positive, and not the negation of knowledge. The advantage in making *ajñāna* a positive something is that it can be perceived without a knowledge of the *pratiyogin*, even as darkness is directly perceived without the mediation of any other knowledge.

It may be asked : How can *Sākṣi-caitanya* (witness, the seer within the *jīva*), whose nature is to illumine the true nature of things, co-exist with *bhāvarūpa ajñāna* which veils reality ? But the reply is the *Sākṣi-caitanya* does not illumine the true nature of the real, since reality is self-luminous. On the other hand, *Sākṣi-caitanya* is a percipient of *ajñāna*. The *Sākṣin* and *ajñāna* may well co-exist. There is no danger of the *Sākṣi-caitanya* terminating *ajñāna*. When we make the perception, “This is silver”, silver does not cease to exist. When the seer perceives the *ajñāna*, *ajñāna* does not cease to exist. Thus, *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* is not without valid proof.

Refutation of the Advaitic Notion of Ajñāna.

Scripture Does Not Establish Ajñāna.

Against this contention, Nārāyaṇārya points out that in the scriptural text cited by the Advaitin the term *Tamas* refers to darkness, or to *prakṛti* where *tamogūṇa* is preponderant. It does not refer to *ajñāna*. *Prakṛti* is referred to as *tamas*, because it clouds Brahman, even as darkness veils objects. *Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad* mentions *māyā* as an alternative name to *prakṛti*, because it creates wonderful objects. The term *māyā* denotes that which works wonders. *Māyā* is two-fold : (i) *māyā* that creates *bhrānti-jñāna* and (ii) *māyā* that creates wonders.

Since *prakṛti* creates wonderful things, such as *mahat* (intellect) and *ahamkāra* (egoity), it is called *māyā*.

Arthāpatti Does Not Teach Ajñāna.

It was suggested that unless the existence of *ajñāna* is assumed, no intelligible meaning can be assigned to the text “tat tvam asi”, which equates the finite self with the Infinite. Surely, it is possible to justify the text without postulating *ajñāna*. The text in question teaches that Brahman which is the cause of the world and Brahman which has the jīva for His *prakāra* are identical, and not that the jīva is Brahman itself.

Anumāna Does Not Establish Ajñāna.

The argument advanced by the Advaitin only establishes that all knowledge arising from *pramāṇas* has *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* for its antecedent. This knowledge itself, resting as it does upon *anumāna pramāṇa*, must presuppose a *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna*—and that knowledge, another *ajñāna* and so on *ad infinitum*. If, in order to obviate this infinite regress, it is suggested that this knowledge furnished by *anumāna* does not presuppose an *ajñāna*, then, the argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. For there is at least one instance where the *hetu* (reason) is present, while the *sādhya* is absent. There is at least one case where knowledge arising from *pramāṇas* is not preceded by *ajñāna*. Again, the illustrative example of the flash of light is defective in not possessing the *sādhana* or *hetu* (*sādhana-vikala*). For the light of the lamp does not illumine objects hitherto unknown. The illumining power belongs to consciousness only. There may be light, but if there is no consciousness, there will be no lighting up of object. The senses are the causes of the origination of knowledge. The light merely discharges an auxiliary function by dispelling the darkness which prevented the organs from giving rise to knowledge.

Pratyakṣa Does Not Prove Ajñāna.

The claim that *ajñāna* as a positive entity is the object of perception is not justified. For the perceptive judgment “I am ignorant”, (meaning “That I am ignorant is realised by me”), yields knowledge of (i) the “I” or the Ego which owns the ignorance (the *āśraya*), (ii) the ignorance itself (*viśaya*) and (iii) knowledge (the *pratiyogin*, the counter correlative). When the cognition conveys knowledge of the *āśraya*, the *viśaya* and the *pratiyogin*, it is wrong to assert that it makes us aware of ignorance:

Again, in accordance with the Advaitic principle that knowledge of the self terminates *ajñāna*, the knowledge of the Ego furnished by this perception must dissipate, and not cognise, *ajñāna*. To say that it is

only clear and distinct knowledge that could remove *ajñāna*, and that the vague knowledge of the Ego furnished by this perception can co-exist with *ajñāna* is as self-contradictory as the assertion that *jñāna* and the negation of *jñāna* can exist side by side.

Further, there is no force in the contention that, like darkness, *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* is apprehended directly, without the thought of anything else. For, unlike *ajñāna*, darkness is regarded as a substance. That is why when darkness is seen its correlate (light) need not be thought of. When, however, darkness is conceived as the opposite of light, the thought of the *pratiyogin* (light) is required. But *ajñāna*, whether understood as the negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) or wrong knowledge (*anyathā-jñāna*) or the opposite of knowledge, necessarily presupposes the thought of its *pratiyogin* (*jñāna*). Thus, none of the *pramāṇas* mentioned by the Advaitin can really prove the existence of *ajñāna*.

Ajñāna Which is said to Cloud Brahman Can Have No Āsraya (basis).

Since the *jīva* is himself the product of *ajñāna*, he cannot be its basis. Nor can Brahman be its basis; for, on the Advaitic view, it is not the basis of knowledge, but knowledge itself; and what is not the basis of *jñāna* cannot be the basis of *ajñāna*. That is why the jar, which is not the basis of *jñāna*, is never spoken of as the seat of *ajñāna*.

Ajñāna Cannot Cloud Brahman.

To cloud an object is to prevent a knowledge of that entity from arising. But as Brahman is not admitted by the Advaitins to be an object of knowledge, it cannot be clouded. Again, as Brahman is consciousness itself (*prakāśa-svarūpa*), its clouding would amount to its own destruction (*svarūpa-nāśa*).

Is this *ajñāna* known either before or after it has veiled Brahman? Either alternative would lead to an unwelcome result. If Brahman witnesses it before it has cast its spell, there would be no need to posit *ajñāna* or *tirodhāna* (clouding) in order to account for the perception of difference (*bheda*). For if Brahman could perceive *ajñāna* when it is not clouded, Brahman could as well perceive *bheda* which is the result of *ajñāna*. If *ajñāna* clouds Brahman and is known subsequently, *ajñāna* obscures Brahman's nature by its very existence (*sat*). If so, it would follow that it is real; and cannot be dispelled by knowledge. And the world would be real, and not *mithyā* as the Advaitin thinks.

Ajñāna cannot be dispelled.

The belief that *ajñāna* is dispelled by knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is without a foundation. For this knowledge must be either

Brahman itself which is of the essence of consciousness or a knowledge apprehending this supreme consciousness. On the former view, *ajñāna* cannot be said to dwell in Brahman; for, when knowledge of reality which is Brahman itself exists, *ajñāna* stands dispelled; and when *ajñāna* prevails, Brahman cannot exist. The latter view is equally unacceptable, because Brahman is not, on the Advaitic view, the object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge.

The Advaitin may contend that what dispels *ajñāna* is the knowledge that Brahman is without a second (*advitīya*). But this contention is futile; for this knowledge must be either the very essence (*svarūpa*) of Brahman or a quality of Brahman. It cannot be the first, since it would imply that, before that knowledge arose, Brahman must be deemed to have been non-existent. Nor can it be the second; for it would amount to abandoning absolute monism and admitting that Brahman is endowed with distinctions.

Slightly modifying his position the Advaitin may urge that the knowledge which dispels ignorance concerning Brahman is the knowledge that the world is *mithyā* (phenomenal). But this reasoning would fare no better; because such a knowledge may drive out the antithetical thought that the world is real; but it would be powerless to dispel ignorance of Brahman. For this ignorance is not opposed to the thought of the unreality of the cosmos. It is futile to argue that the illusoriness of the world is true knowledge of Brahman, since *prapañca-mithyātva* (the illusoriness of the world) and *Brahma-svarūpa* (the essence of Brahman) are not identical. Thus it is abundantly clear that the Advaitic doctrine of an *avidyā*, which is positive in form (*bhāva-rūpa*), which veils Brahman and dwells therein, and which is terminated by knowledge of Brahman, is illogical.

Brahman Under the Influence of Avidyā is Not the Material Cause.

To the question whether it is Brahman or *avidyā* or both that act as the material cause of the world, the Advaitin is unable to furnish a satisfactory answer. Brahman cannot be the material cause; for, if so, on the well accepted principle that the cause and the effect should share the same features, the world would have to be considered real (*sat*). *Avidyā* cannot be the *upādāna-kāraṇa*, since the scriptures speak of Brahman as the material cause. Nor can Brahman and *avidyā* conjointly act as the material cause of the world; for, in that event, the world should exhibit the contradictory features of sentience and non-sentience (*jadātva* and *ajadātva*), and of reality and unreality.

The Advaitin may state that Brahman is the *upādāna-kāraṇa* only in the sense that it is the basis of the illusory presentation of the

world, even as shell is the basis of the erroneous perception of silver. To clarify his position, he may elaborate the analogy and say that the erroneous perception, "This is silver," does not have real silver as its object (*viṣaya*), since silver is not present nearabout. It cannot be maintained that this cognition does not point to an object at all; since an objectless cognition is an impossibility. Nor can the cognition refer to itself; for the judgment always treats of an object outside. It does not point to a negative fact (*asat*); for it takes the positive form "This is silver." Nor is it representative cognition (*smṛti*); for it is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). As the cognition takes the form "This is silver," and not "This is a shell," it cannot be said to point to the shell. The only way out of this impasse is to suppose, says the Advaitin, that, on account of certain defects (*doṣa*), a mysterious silver arises for the time being in the shell and explains the cognition of silver. This mysterious silver is not *asat*, because it is perceived; nor is it *sat*, because it is later falsified. Therefore, it is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* (distinct from reality and unreality). In a like manner, on account of *avidyā* this world which is *sad-asad-anirvacanīya* (incapable of being described either as *sat* or *asat*) arises and accounts for the perception of the manifold world. Since even an illusion must have a basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), this illusion of the world must have Brahman for its basis. It is only in so far as Brahman is the basis of the appearance of the world, that Brahman is described as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world.

In reply to this, Nārāyaṇārya points out that the analogy is unhelpful; because the perception of silver is due to the fact that the brightness-aspect of the shell is noticed, while the shell-aspect present therein is overlooked. But a similar explanation does not apply to the perception of the world of multiplicity; for, consistently with the Advaitic conception of Brahman as *nirviśeṣa* and *nirākāra*, it is impossible to maintain that certain aspects of Brahman are known, while others are not. Hence it is unreasonable to assert that the world of plurality is illegitimately superposed on unitary Brahman.

The Advaitic doctrine that silver of an inexplicable kind (*anirvacanīya rajata*) arises in the shell at the time of the illusion is unconvincing; for the selfsame object cannot possess the contradictory features of being at once distinct from *sat* and of being distinct from *asat*.

To account for the perception of silver (*khyāti*) and its later sublation (*bādha*), it is unnecessary to posit a mysterious silver which is at once distinct from *sat* and *asat*. A simpler hypothesis would be to

treat the erroneous cognition as a case of mistaking one thing for another (*anyasya anyathābhāvana*).

If an indescribable silver does not arise, and if error consists in mistaking one thing for another, what, the Advaitin might ask, is the object referred to in the illusory cognition "This is silver"? It must be replied, he continues, that it is the shell. But how can, he might again ask, the shell be the object when silver is apprehended?

The author meets this query by saying that what appears need not be the object. In fact, that object is to be considered the *viṣaya* which is marked off from others by the knowledge arising from the sense organ which is in contact with that particular object.

Perhaps the Advaitin may ask: How can silver be cognised, when it is not in contact with the senses? The author replies that the same difficulty confronts the opponent also. He must explain how the indescribable silver is cognised, when it is not in contact with the senses. If he tries to meet it by saying that even in the absence of sensory contact, the indescribable silver may be presented on account of defects (*doṣa*), it is open to the author to furnish a similar explanation that the silver is apprehended when only the shell is in contact with the senses owing to a sensory defect.

Nārāyaṇārya further points out that the Advaitin too accepts *anyathā-khyāti* without being aware of it. It is because the perceiver mistakes the indescribable silver for real silver that he proceeds to pick it. If, however, he recognises it as indescribable, such an activity would scarcely follow.

Moreover, the Advaitin must explain how *anirvacanīya* silver is cognised and spoken of as silver. If he says that it is due to the generic feature (*jāti*) of silver-ness (*rajatatva*) present therein, it may be asked whether this *jāti* is describable or indescribable. On the former alternative, it cannot any longer be referred to as *anirvacanīya* silver. On the latter alternative, real silver cannot be perceived, or referred to, as silver. Therefore, an indescribable something cannot be spoken of, or recognised, as silver. The upshot of the whole discussion is that since a distinctionless (*nirviśeṣa*) Brahman cannot be the basis of the illusory presentation of the world of plurality, the view that Brahman appears as the world and is the material cause thereof is untenable.

INTRODUCTION

4. REFUTATION OF BRAHMA-PARIṆĀMA-VĀDA.

(*Pariṇāma-pratikṣepādhikāra*)

The Teaching of Bhāskara.

Lest the pariṇāma-vāda established in the preceding chapter should be confounded with the Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda of the Bhedābheda-vādins, the author gives in this and the succeeding chapter a critical exposition of two of the leading schools of Bhedābheda philosophy and shows that they are far removed from his own doctrine. The view that is first taken up for examination may be identified as that expounded by Bhāskara. Expressed in bare outlines his teachings are as follows: At the time of *pralaya* (cosmic rest) Brahman was a unitary reality devoid of differences, but possessed of omnipotence (*sarva-śakti*); and at *sṛṣṭi* (creation) it transformed itself into finite souls (*bhoktā*, literally 'enjoyer') and non-sentient objects (*bhogya*, literally 'objects of enjoyment'). The objects of the world are, thus, constituted of Brahman (*Brahma-maya*), mere modifications of Brahman, even as jars, cups and so forth are the transformations of clay. This view, it is claimed, is the logical outcome of scriptural teachings, such as "Brahman is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world" and "All objects of the world are, in reality, Brahman". Taken in the light of these assertions the upaniṣadic description of Brahman as being unchanging (*apariṇāmi*) must be considered to teach that though Brahman is, in its essential nature, changeless, it undergoes modification when it is in association with *upādhi-śakti*. This theory alone, it is further claimed by Bhāskara, renders possible a harmonious synthesis of the conflicting upaniṣadic texts—the *bheda-śrutis*, the *abheda-śrutis* and those speaking of an origin (*utpatti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*) for man (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*).

The Naiyāyika objects to this theory on the ground that it only proves that Brahman and the world are wholly disparate; for the cause and the effect are everywhere known to be different, in as much as they serve different purposes (*vyavahāra*), have different forms (*ākāra*) and are denoted by different names (*nāma*). If, however, they are said to be identical there would be no need to posit several factors conducive to the production of the effect. The Bhedābheda-vādin easily meets this objection by pointing out that just as the jar is recognised to be no other than clay in a different shape, the world is Brahman in a new shape. Though the two are non-different (*ananya*), causal factors would still be required to account for the different structures (*saṁsthāna*) that the cause assumes in becoming the effect. Differences in state could easily account for differences in respect of name, form and purpose.

Refutation of Bhāskara's Teaching.

Against the teachings of Bhāskara, Nārāyaṇārya has plenty of shots in his locker. (1) He points out that what transforms itself into the world cannot be Brahman; nor can it be an Īśvara distinct from Brahman. For the scriptures assert unequivocally that Brahman is changeless (*aparīṇāmi*); and there is little warrant for posting a God different from the Absolute. (2) Next he shows that it is quite possible to admit that Brahman is the material cause of the world and that all objects of the world are indeed Brahman without being forced to subscribe to Brahma-parīṇāma-vāda. (Vide Brahma-svarūpādhikāra for a detailed consideration of this point). (3) Then he draws attention to the manifest contradiction involved in asserting that matter (*acit*) is the modification of Brahman which is essentially consciousness (*cid-rūpa*). It is no escape to suggest that all objects really possess *caitanya-śakti*, but that, in the so-called material objects, consciousness (*caitanya*) has been obscured, for when *caitanya* is never met with in matter, it must reasonably be said to be bereft of conscious power.

(4) Against the allegation made by the Bhedābheda-vādin that śruti and smṛti texts speak of men and material things as being subject to origination and destruction, Nārāyaṇārya replies that the scriptures really describe prakṛti as *ajā* and characterise the puruṣa or ātman as *aja*, as having no destruction (*avināśī*) and as being eternal (*nitya*). He goes on to state that in the light of these texts, those referring to the destruction of men and things must reasonably be supposed to refer, not to their annihilation, but to their attaining oneness (*ekībhāva*) with Brahman at pralaya, that is, becoming inseparable from Brahman, and, therefore, incapable of being treated as different from Him.

He also mentions some of the main difficulties in the way of accepting the view that souls are non-eternal. For one thing, on this view, deeds performed already would have to go without fruition (*kṛtanāśa*); and the jīva would have to experience the fruits of actions not performed by himself (*akṛtābhyaḡama*). Besides, if at pralaya the souls are destroyed they would have to be freshly created at *sṛṣṭi* and endowed with an equipment of body, senses and so forth, even though they have performed no karma.

Again the *upāsanas* prescribed for the attainment of mokṣa would become pointless; for the jīva being non-eternal would not continue to exist to experience the blessed state.

Should it be said that mokṣa signifies the destruction of the soul (*ātmanāśa*), and that the *upāsanas* are needed for bringing this about, it may be replied that they are quite unnecessary, since at pralaya the souls are sure to be destroyed. It may

be suggested that the *upāsanas* are intended for those who are impatient and do not wish to wait till pralaya. But it is least likely that men will ever be in a hurry to secure this state. In fact, if mokṣa meant *ātmanāśa*, men would run away at the very mention of it. It is open to the objector to say that men will long for *ātmanāśa*, since it leads to the termination of miseries (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*). True, people long for *duḥkha-nivṛtti*, but not at the cost of their very existence.

Further, while all people strive for pleasure, only those who are at present experiencing sorrows will yearn for escape therefrom. Therefore, mokṣa in the sense of *duḥkha-nivṛtti* cannot be treated as a *puruṣārtha* (object of human aspiration). Besides, there is no warrant for interpreting mokṣa to be a negative state of painlessness. The scriptures describe it in positive terms, as denoting experience of bliss (*ānanda*).

(5) Nārāyaṇārya then urges that the positing of an *upādhi* whether in the shape of a substance or in the shape of a quality (*sāmarthyā*) militates against belief in a unitary reality. It is irrational to seek to get over the difficulty by suggesting that it is at once different and non-different from Brahman; for contradictory qualities cannot be ascribed to the self-same entity

At this stage, the discussion naturally turns on the question. Are *bheda* and *abheda* contradictory features, such as could not co-exist in an identical object. Mention may now be made of some of the more important among the arguments advanced by the Bhedābheda-vādin in defence of his main thesis, viz., that *bheda* and *abheda* are not contradictory features, and could well co-exist in the self-same reality.

The first argument is an appeal to everyday cognition. We are conscious, it is alleged, of objects as being at once different and non-different. They are non-different in their causal (*kāraṇa*) and universal (*jāti*) aspects; and different when viewed as effects (*kārya*) or as particulars (*vyakti*). E.g. in respect of the causal substances, jars, plates and so forth are non-different; but they are different when they are considered as effects. Again, from the point of view of the universal (*jāti*), namely, cow-ness (*gotva*) all cows, whether they have long horns or short ones, broken horns or no horns at all, are non-different; but they are different the moment the particulars are taken into account.

The second argument seeks to justify the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* on the analogy of the presence of the two aspects of universal (*jāti*) and particular (*vyakti*) in the self-same entity.

The third argument identifies *bheda* and *abheda* respectively with discontinuity (*vyāvṛtti*) and continuity (*anuvṛtti*), and shows that they

may well co-exist in the cow with broken horns, where cow-ness (*gotva*) represents *anuvṛtti*, and 'being broken-horned' (*khaṇḍatva*) represents *vyāvṛtti* (distinction from cows of other description).

The last argument envisages the possibility of the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* by equating them respectively with the narrower universal (*apara-sāmānya*) and the wider universal (*para-sāmānya*), and showing that, in the cow with broken horns, there exists *khaṇḍatva*, the narrower universal which is found only in cows with broken horns, as also *gotva*, the wider universal which exists in all cows.

None of these considerations, however, finds favour with Nārāyaṇārya. He dismisses the first of these as betraying superficial analysis; because from a given point of view (e.g. that of cause and universal or that of effect and particular) there can be only difference or non-difference, but not both.

It may be said that after all *jāti* and *vyakti*, or cause and effect are identical and that, therefore, both difference and non-difference may dwell together. Against this it is pointed out that if the identity of *jāti* and *vyakti* were a fact, there would no longer be two aspects to justify the simultaneous presence of difference and non-difference. But, as a matter of fact, between the universal (*jāti*), which persists in all the particulars (*anuvartamāna*), and the particular (*vyakti*), which is discontinuous (*vyāvartamāna*), there can be no identity.

The opponent may, however, urge that the identity of universal and particular has to be inferred from the apprehension of identity (*tādātmya*) expressed in judgments like 'This is a cow', where 'this' and 'cow' stand respectively for *vyakti* (particular) and *jāti* (universal). But there is little force in this contention, for, if the relation between 'this' and 'cow' were one of bare identity, the two words would convey the same meaning and the judgment would be guilty of repeating the same idea twice over. In reality, the two parts of the judgment refer respectively to the *viśeṣya* (the thing qualified) and the *viśeṣaṇa* (the qualification). Cowness is present in the object pointed to.

The second argument is shown to be valueless; since it makes the gratuitous assumption that there is an entity distinct from, and serving as the basis of, *jāti* and *vyakti*; for, as a matter of fact, *jāti* is present in *vyakti*.

The main defect of the next argument is that it treats *jāti* as though it were *anuvṛtti* (persistence), while it is really *anuvartamāna* (what persists in the several particulars). If, as the Bhedābheda-vādin says,

jāti were persistence and not what persists, since the *jāti* (cowness) is present alike in the horned, the broken-horned and the hornless cows, these particulars would be *anuvartamāna* (what possess *anuvṛtti*, namely 'cowness'). And he would be contradicting his own statement that it is *vyāvartamāna*.

In refutation of the last point Nārāyaṇārya states that there is little warrant for identifying *bheda* with *apara-sāmānya* (narrower generality) and *abheda* with *para-sāmānya* (higher generality). To use terms in this sense is to take liberties with language.

5. REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ŚAKTI-VIKṢEPA

(*Śakti-vikṣepa-pratikṣepādhikāra*)

The Teaching of Yādava.

The philosophical theory which comes in for criticism in this chapter is the teaching of Yādavaprakāśa. According to Yādava, *sat*, or the Absolute is a self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) substance (*dravya*) possessing manifold powers or potencies (*śakti*). Just as clay undergoes modification and exists in the form of pots, cups and so forth, this unitary reality modifies itself and exists in the shape of souls (*bhoktā*), matter (*bhogyā*) and God (*nīyantā*). The scriptures say 'trividham Brahma etat' (Brahman is threefold). Souls, matter and God are thus parts (*aṁśa*) of *sat* and therefore, eternal.

The entirety of the souls (*bhoktā*) or all the souls taken together constitute a single self possessing the capacity for enjoyment which is termed *Bhoktṛ-samaṣṭi-puruṣa* (the soul which is of the nature of a collective personality). The souls associated with the respective bodies are its manifestations. They are infinite in number and subtle (*aṇu*). Some of the qualities of Brahman are distinctly found in them while others are not open to view. These souls can be classified under three heads—the souls in bondage (*baddha*), the liberated souls (*siddha*) and the ever-free (*nitya*). The bound souls are of three kinds—*prākṛtika*, *vaikārika* and *dākṣiṇātmanaka*. Liberated souls are those persons who have obtained release from bondage to *saṁsāra*. They possess qualities, such as freedom from evil (*apahatapāpmā*). The ever-free are the eternal associates of Brahman.

Objects of enjoyment are no other than the ceaselessly changing *prakṛti*. If they are usually described as *acit*, it is because in them most of the qualities of Brahman remain obscured. *Prakṛti* is of three kinds—time (*kāla*), *paramākāśa* and *avyakta*. Of these, the first is responsible for change in other objects and is infinite. Shorter durations, such as moment (*kṣaṇa*), month and year are the modifications of time,

Paramākāśa is the name given to *Prakṛti* in its initial stage. At *pralaya*, *prakṛti* is known as *tamas* and is said to become one (*ekībhavati*) with *sat*, as it is then scarcely distinguishable from *sat*. Such a state is described as *Śaktyavasthā*. At the time of dissolution, finite souls also are in a state of indistinguishability. It is this fact of souls and matter remaining, before creation, in a state of indistinguishability that is taught in the upaniṣadic text ‘sadeva idam agra āsīt, ēkam evā’dvītiyam.’ The process whereby, at creation, matter is separated out from Brahman and rendered fit for separate treatment is known as *śakti-vikṣepa*.

Paramākāśa or *akṣara*, which is the first to separate from *sat*, is the abode of *Īśvara* and the liberated souls. Since *śabda* is considered to be its modification, it is also called *vāk*. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in their collectivity go by the name *avyakta*. At *sṛṣṭi*, *prakṛti* is transformed into *mahat* (intellect) and other elements.

God (*niyantā*, *Īśvara*) possesses perfections, such as omniscience, infinite bliss, supreme lordship and infinite powers. Along with liberated souls, He is asleep at the time of *pralaya*. Gods, souls and matter are at once different and non-different from Brahman—non-different in respect of substance, and different in respect of their divergent states (*avasthā*). This furnishes, it is claimed by Yādava, a satisfactory basis for harmonising the *bheda* and the *abheda śrutis*.

Refutation of Yādava’s Teaching.

Against this school of Vedānta philosophy Nārāyaṇarya urges that *sat* is not a substance (*dravya*), but a quality belonging to objects, as is evident from the judgments such as “The pot exists”, “The cloth exists.” The term *sat* is used in a variety of senses; sometimes it denotes a wise man (*paṇḍita*); and sometimes it refers to what is effective. But as applied to Brahman, it denotes unconditional existence (*nirupādhikasattā*). The text, “In the beginning *sat* alone existed”, thus states that Brahman alone possesses unconditional existence, while everything else has only a dependent existence.

Next he shows that the doctrine that material objects are parts of Brahman would prove either that Brahman is, like them, non-intelligent (*jaḍa*) or that they share the quality of being self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*). Yādava thinks that the latter alternative is not inherently absurd and that the so-called material objects are really sentient entities, which, on account of certain impediments, do not show off their sentient nature. It demands too much credulity to suppose that a quality never found to exist in an object still belongs to it. If this is possible, any quality may be attributed to any thing.

Nārāyaṇārya proceeds to say that there is little warrant for making a distinction between the Absolute (Brahman) and God (*niyantā*). The scriptures are clear on this point. Having described Brahman as the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the universe they identify the universal cause with *sat* (Being). Lest *sat* should be conceived in materialistic terms, they take care to call it *Ātman*, thereby revealing that it is spirit rather than matter. This would still leave one wondering whether this *Ātman* is any of the finite souls or the God of religion or the Absolute itself. To allay all such doubts the *Śrutis* hasten to call it Nārāyaṇa and identify Him with Brahman. That Nārāyaṇa is referred to as Brahman, not in the restricted sense that He is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman; but that He is wholly and truly Brahman is the unambiguous teaching of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (Hymn addressed to Puruṣa), where Nārāyaṇa is variously called Supreme Brahman, *Ātman*, Supreme light (*Parañjyoti*) and Supreme Reality (*Para-tattva*). Coming to the *smṛtis*, it is significant that in one place in the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* the statement that the world consisting of both the organic and the inorganic beings proceeds from Viṣṇu is promptly followed by the query "How can the spotlessly pure and qualityless Brahman be the agent in creation?" Clearly, this question presupposes identity between Viṣṇu and Brahman.

He points out further that the upaniṣadic statement referring to Brahman becoming threefold far from suggesting that Brahman transforms Himself into God, souls and matter, really states that whoever meditates on Brahman as endowed with the twofold vibūti—*cit* and *acit*—attains to similarity with Brahman (*Brahma-samānākāra*).

The doctrine that souls (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) and God (*niyantā*) are eternally the parts (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, that at pralaya *prakṛti* is absorbed (*ekībhavati*) in Brahman, and that, at prakṛti, it emerges therefrom even as lustre proceeds from a precious gem is next made the target of attack.

What exactly is meant, Nārāyaṇārya asks, by the statement that at pralaya *prakṛti* remains inseparably bound up (*avibhakta*) with Brahman? The opponent must say that, at that stage, the two are either distinct (*vilakṣaṇa*) or non-distinct (*avilakṣaṇa*) or both distinct and non-distinct. But none of these alternatives could be logically defended. For if they are distinct, there is no possibility of saying that they become one (*ekībhavati*) and inseparable (*avibhakta*); if they are non-distinct, Brahman would come to be identified with non-intelligent *prakṛti* and it would be infected by the defects of matter; and if Brahman and *prakṛti* are said to be distinct and non-distinct, it would amount to attributing to them contradictory features. Further,

souls, matter and God can never be said to attain oneness, since they share the character of being ever distinct from one another.

Accepting the identity between Īśvara and Brahman, the opponent may still urge that, at least, puruṣa and prakṛti could be treated as the parts (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, and quote in his favour upaniṣadic texts such as "All this is, indeed, Brahman". But Nārāyaṇārya replies that this would amount to the contradictory features of spirit and matter being attributed to Brahman. In the next chapter he shows that the texts cited by the opponent bear an altogether different interpretation, and that, although prakṛti and puruṣa are altogether different entities, they could still be equated with Brahman and could be treated as the *aṁśa* of Brahman.

In the face of the scriptural teaching that the abode of Īśvara is a kind of immaterial (*aprākṛta*) and changeless (*aparīṇāmi*) entity, the opponent is not justified, says Nārāyaṇārya, in making *Paramākāśa* the first evolute of prakṛti and the dwelling place of Īśvara.

Nor is Yādava on firm ground when he says that Īśvara and the liberated souls (*mukta*) are in a state of sleep at pralaya; since the liberated puruṣas are, according to the scriptures, constantly visualising His essential nature and singing His praises. Moreover, since God is subject to karma, the only cause that could occasion sleep in Him does not exist. Time (*kāla*) cannot be held responsible for the sleep; because it is under God's control, and not God under its sway. Consistently with His nature as a benevolent Person, it cannot be maintained that it is His will that the mukta and He himself should be in a state of suspended animation. It is wholly unsatisfactory to suggest that the Lord sends the mukta to sleep, when it is conceded that they have realized God after having served a long probation on earth, and performed continual meditation (*upāsana*), and when the Lord Himself is said to have been anxiously waiting for the homecoming of the jīvas.

6. THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN

(*Brahma-svarūpa nirṇayādhikāra.*)

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Brahman, the ultimate reality, is the supreme object of enjoyment; He is not limited by space or time or objects. He is free from all evils, and is self-luminous consciousness or light. He is endowed with innumerable qualities, such as knowledge (*jñāna*), power (*śakti*), strength (*bala*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*). All words denoting sentient and non-sentient entities ultimately signify Brahman, since He has them for His body and controls them from within. He is responsible for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world.

BHĀVANĀVIVEKA

BY

MAṆḌANAMIŚRA

WITH

VIṢAMAGRANTHIBHEDIKĀ

BY

NĀRĀYAṆA

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योऽपि व्यवहितफलेषु दृश्यते, १ सोऽपि धात्वर्थान्तरात्मकः
प्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा, न प्राचीनधातुगोचरप्रभावनीय इति ।

कर्मणा च करोत्यर्थो व्याप्तोऽतस्तदयोगतः ।

तदभावः प्रत्ययार्थसाधनेऽपि विभक्तयः ॥ १२ ॥

ननु व्यवहितफलेषु साङ्गहायण्या(हण्या)दिषु धात्वर्थं ग्रामप्राप्तिलक्षणं च फल-
मन्तरा सेवादिरन्यो व्यापारो दृश्यते, स एव प्रत्ययार्थो भविष्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह—योऽपि व्यवहि-
तफलेष्वित्यादि । योऽपि तत्र सेवादिरन्यो व्यापारो दृश्यते, स सवे(सेवि)त्यादिधात्वन्तराभिधेयः २
प्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा, न पुनः प्राचीनसाङ्गहायण्या(हण्या)दिधात्वर्थप्रभावनीयः ३ 'साङ्गहा-
यण्या(हण्या) यजेत' इति यजतेः परस्य प्रत्ययस्याभिधेयः स्यात् । अतो धातूक्तव्यापारस्य
कर्तृत्वे स्थित एव प्रत्ययार्थपर्यनुयागः ४ ।

इतश्च प्रत्ययाभिधेयस्य करोत्यर्थस्याभाव इत्याह—

कर्मणा च करोत्यर्थो व्याप्तोऽतस्तदभावतः(दयोगतः) ।

तदभावः प्रत्ययार्थसाधने च विभक्तयः ॥ (इति) ॥

१. सोऽपि धात्वर्थान्तरात्मकप्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा
न धातुगोचरप्रभावनीय इति—क, ख.
सोऽपि हल्यादिधात्वर्थान्तरात्मको न
प्रत्ययार्थः, प्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा न प्राची-
नधातुगोचरप्रभावनीय इति—ग, घ.

२. अभिधेयप्रयत्नान्तर—छ.

३. 'यः'—अधिकं वर्तते—छ.

४. 'पर्यनुयोगः' इत्यतः परं 'कः प्रत्ययार्थ
इति पर्यनुयोगस्यानवकाश इति ।
एतद्वृषयितुमाह—नैतत्सारम् ; नहि
धात्वर्थेति,' इत्यधिकं दृश्यते—च.

करोते: १ सदा २ सकर्मकत्वात्तद्योगविरहेण करोत्यर्थाभावः
प्रतीमः ३ ज्वलनविरहेणेव ४ धूमाभावम् । तथाहि—न जातु
'यजेत स्वर्गम्', 'शयीत स्वास्थ्यम्', 'आसीत सुखम्' इति
दृष्टचरः ससर्गः ।

यदि मन्वीत सङ्गतिसमर्थविभक्तिभेदाभावादेवम् ।

अयमर्थः—कर्मणा कारकेण करोत्यर्थो व्याप्तः कृशानुनेव धूमः । अतस्तदयोगतो
व्यापकस्य कर्मणः अयोगतोऽसंबन्धात् तदभावः तस्य व्याप्तस्य करोत्यर्थस्याभावोऽवगम्यते
अग्न्यभावेनेव धूमाभाव इति । प्रत्ययार्थसाधने च विभक्तयः इति व्यापकाभावहेतोर-
सिद्धिमाशङ्क्य परिहरति । कथमसिद्धमाशङ्का ? उच्यते । सर्वत्र करोत्यर्थे भाव्यं विद्यत
एव, यजेतेत्यादावपि भाव्यवाचिशब्दप्रयोगाभावः केवलम्, न भाव्याभावः । तदभावश्च
प्रत्ययार्थसाधने विभक्त्यनुत्पादात् प्रत्ययार्थत्वाच्च करोत्यर्थस्येति । एवमाशङ्क्य परिहरति—
प्रत्ययार्थसाधने विभक्तयो—भवन्त्येव । दृश्यन्ते हि प्रत्ययार्थभावनाकरणे तृतीयाविभक्ति-
रुद्धिदादिनामधेये । अतो भाव्याभावादेव तद्वाचिशब्दाप्रयोगः, न पुनः तत्समर्थशब्दा-
भावादिति न व्यापकाभावहेतोरसिद्धिरिति श्लोकस्यार्थः । अस्याविष्करणायाह—
करोतोत्या(तेरित्या)दिना । अयमर्थः—करोत्यर्थस्य सदा सकर्मकत्वादिति
कर्मणा करोत्यर्थस्य व्याप्तिं दर्शयति । तद्योगविरहेणेति—कर्मयोगविरहेणेति—
व्यापकाभावहेत्वभिधानम् । करोत्यर्थस्येत्यादि व्याप्याभावसाध्याभिधानम् ।
ज्वलनेत्यादि दृष्टान्ताभिधानम् । तथाहोत्यादिना कर्मसंबन्धविरहं^१ करोत्यर्थस्य

१. सर्वदा—ऊ.

३. वह्नि—ग, घ, ङ.

२. सकर्मकतया—क, ख. सकर्तृकत्वात्—ऊ.

४. धूमाभावात्—क.

५. विरहः—ख.

तथाहि—धात्वर्थसाधनावगाहिन्यः^१ ^२ सुब्विभक्तयः, ^३ प्रत्ययार्थ-
कर्मणि नियोज्ये स्वर्गकामादौ तददर्शनात् ।

तच्च वार्तम् ; एवं सति ^४ शेषसंबन्धहेतोः षष्ठ्या अव्याहत-
प्रसरत्वात् । अपि च प्रत्ययार्थभावनाकरणधात्वर्थनामधेयेभ्यो
विश्वजिदादिभ्यः^५ करणविभक्तिमीक्षमाणो ^६नेदम^७ध्यवसातुमर्ह-

दर्शयति । नहि स्वर्गं ^८ यजेत (इ)त्यादिसंबन्धो दृष्टः ॥

प्रत्ययार्थेति श्लोकैकदेशव्यावर्त्यामाशङ्कां दर्शयति—यदि मन्ये(न्वो)तेति । कर्मसं-
बन्धप्रतिपादनसमर्थद्वितीयाविभक्त्यभावात्तत्संबन्धाभावः, नाभावात्कर्मणः इति ।
द्वितीयाविभक्त्यभावे हेतुमाह — तथाहीत्यादिना । धात्वर्थसाधन एव द्वितीयादि-
विभक्तीनां सामर्थ्यम्, न प्रत्ययार्थसाधने, प्रत्ययार्थस्य कर्मणि नियोज्ये स्वर्गकामे तस्या-
दर्शनात् इति ।

एतन्निराकरोति—तच्चेति । द्वितीयाद्यप्रवृत्तौ षष्ठ्या भवितव्यं 'शेषे षष्ठी' इति, यत्र
द्वितीयाद्यप्रवृत्तिस्स शेष इति । न च स्वर्गकामादौ षष्ठ्यपि दृश्यते । अतो भाव्याभावः,
तदभावाच्च करोत्यर्थाभाव इति । अभ्युपगम्येदमुक्तम् । न च धात्वर्थसाधनैकगोचराः कारक-
विभक्तयः, प्रत्ययार्थभावनाकरणनामधेयेषु विश्वजिदादिषु तदभ्युपगमादित्याह^९—अपि

१. गाहिनः—क ; प्राहिण्यः—ख.

२. तद्विभक्ति—क. तद्विभक्तः—ख.

तद्विभक्तयः—ङ.

३. प्रत्ययार्थनियोगकर्मणि—ग, घ, ङ.

४. शेषत्वे—ग, घ. शेष—नास्ति—ङ.

५. 'अपि'—अधिकं वर्तते—ख.

६. 'मध्यस्थः'—अधिकं वर्तते—क.

७. मध्यव्यव—ख.

८. यजेते—च.

९. गमादिह—च.

ति । अस्त्येव कर्मसंबन्धो 'यजेत स्वर्गकामः' इति चेत्-
न ; पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन(त्वात्) साक्षादसंबन्धात् । 'स्वर्गाय
यजेत' इति साक्षात्सङ्गतिरिति चेत्-न ; अकर्मरूपत्वात्, कर्म-
रूपसंबन्धाभावस्य च १ भावनाभिधानाभावहेतुत्वात् । अकर्मता

चेत्यादिना । धात्वर्थसाधनविषया एव कारकविभक्तयो न प्रत्ययार्थविषया इत्यनैकान्ति-
कम् ; प्रत्ययाभिधेयभावनाकरणधात्वर्थनामधेयेभ्यो विश्वजिदादिशब्देभ्यस्तृतीयाविभक्ति-
दर्शनादिति । तत्र शङ्कते—अस्त्येवेत्यादिना । अस्त्येव कर्मसंबन्धः ; कर्मविभक्त्यभावेऽपि
'यजेत स्वर्गकामः' इति, काम्यमानस्य स्वर्गस्य कर्मत्वादिति चेत्, तन्निराकरोति—
नेति । २ हेतुमाह—पुरुषविशेषणत्वादिति । पुरुषविशेषणत्वात् स्वर्गस्य साक्षात्कर्मत्वेन
संबन्धानुपपत्तेः । नहि विशेषणस्य पदार्थान्तरेण संबन्धो भवति, ३ राजपुरुषादावदर्श-
नादिति । पुनः शङ्कते—(स्वर्गयिति) । यद्यपि 'स्वर्गं यजते' इति सङ्गतिर्नोपपद्यते, तथापि
'स्वर्गाय यजेत' इति साक्षात्सङ्गतिरुपपद्यत एवेति । निराकरोति—नेति । हेतुमाह—
अकर्मरूपत्वादिति । स्वर्गयिति चतुर्थीनिर्देशात्प्रतीयमानस्य संबन्धस्य कर्मरूपत्वं नास्ति ।
ततः किमित्यत आह—कर्मरूपसंबन्ध(न्याभाव)स्येति । कर्मरूपो यस्य संबन्धः तस्याभावः
करोत्यर्थभावनाभिधानाभावे हेतुत्वेनोक्तः, अतः संबन्धान्तरं सदपि नोपयुज्यते इति ।
अकर्मरूपत्वं कुत इत्यपेक्षायामाह—अकर्मता चेति । स्वर्गयिति चतुर्थीनिर्देशान्न स्वर्गस्य
कर्मता प्रतीयते । कर्मणि हि द्वितीया स्मर्यते न चतुर्थीति ।
स्वर्गस्य भावनया संबन्धमभ्युपगम्य तस्याकर्मरूपत्वादसत्समत्वमुक्तम् । इदा-

१. तद्भावनाभावकृतत्वात्—छ.

२. हेतुमाह—नास्ति—च.

३. पुरुषाभाव—छ.

च चतुर्थीनिर्देशात् । 'स्वर्गाय यागः' इति च धात्वर्थेनापि संबन्धात् ।

तुल्यार्थत्वं भावयति भवतीति २ प्रसज्यते ।

कः प्रत्ययार्थो धातूक्तव्यापारे खलु कर्तरि ॥ १३ ॥

‘भावयति घटं ३ कुम्भकारः’, ‘भवति घटम्’ ४ इत्यपि प्रसज्येत, तुल्यार्थत्वात् । तथाहि—एकस्य(त्र) कर्तुः कुम्भकारस्य व्यापारं णिजाचष्टे, अन्यत्राख्यातप्रत्यय इति न भिद्यतेऽर्थः । प्रयोजकव्यापारो णिजर्थः, कर्तृव्यापार आख्यातार्थः इति नानार्थत्वं यो ५ मन्यते, वक्तव्यस्तेनेह कर्तृप्रयोजकभेदः । यदि साधनानां प्रवर्तयिता निवर्तयिता च कर्ता, स ६ चैकः कुम्भकार एवेति तद्व्या-

नो भावनया सह संबन्धमात्रमपि न सिध्यति, धात्वर्थसंबन्धेनापि ‘यजेत स्वर्गाय’ इति निर्देशोपपत्तेः, ‘स्वर्गाय यागः’ इत्युक्ते तथा प्रतीतेरित्याह—
स्वर्गायेत्यादिना ॥

इतश्च कर्तृव्यापाराल्लिका भावना नाख्यातप्रत्ययाभिधेया भवितुमर्हतीत्याह—

तुल्यार्थत्वं भावयति भवतीति प्रसज्यते ।

कः प्रत्ययार्थो धातूक्तव्यापारे खलु कर्तरि ॥ (इति) ॥

‘भावयति घटं कुम्भकारः’ इत्यत्र यादृशसंसर्गावगमः, ‘भवति घटः’ इत्यत्रापि तादृशः प्रसज्येत । न तथा अस्ति ; भवतीत्यत्र घटस्य कर्मत्वेन संसर्गानवगमात्, भावयतीत्यत्र च तथावगमात् । कथन्तर्हि उभयत्र तुल्यार्थत्वप्रसङ्गः ? उच्यते—उभ-

१. संबन्धनात्—क, ग, घ, ङ.

४. घट इत्यपि—क. ख.

२. प्रयुज्यते—क, ख.

५. योऽपि—क, ग, घ, ङ.

३. ‘कुम्भकारः’ इत्यादिः ‘कर्तुः’ इत्यन्तः

६. एवेकः—ङ.

ग्रन्थो नास्ति ङ. मातृकायाम् ।

पाराभिधानात्तुल्यार्थत्वम् । घटः कर्ता, प्रयोजकः कुम्भकारः इति चेत्—कथमनीशितुः साधनप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योर्घटस्य कर्तृत्वं तादृशं कुलालमतिक्रम्य । अथागुणतो धातुना अभिधीयमान^१व्यापारत्वम्-कस्तर्हि इदानीमाख्यातार्थः ? धातुना अभिहितत्वात्तद्व्यापारस्य । नच व्यापारभेददर्शनम्, ^२येन धातुप्रत्यययोर्विषयविभागः स्यात् ।

यत्रापि कर्तृव्यापारवाचिनौ शब्दौ यतो भवतः—भावयतीत्यत्र कर्तृव्यापारं णिजाचष्टे, भवतीत्यत्राख्यातप्रत्ययः इति, धात्वर्थ^४श्चोभयत्राप्येक एव । अतः प्रसज्यत एव तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अथोच्येत—प्रयोजकव्यापारं णिजाचष्टे, आख्यातप्रत्ययस्तु कर्तृव्यापारम्, अतोऽर्थभेदाद्बुद्धिभेदोऽप्युपपन्न इति । कस्तर्हि कर्ता, को वा प्रयोजक इति तयोर्विविच्य लक्षणं वाच्यम् । यदि साधनानां नियोक्ता कर्ता, ^५स तर्हि कुलाल एव न घट इति उभयत्रापि तद्व्यापाराभिधानादुर्वारं तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अथागुणतो धातुना अभिधीयमानव्यापारत्वं कर्तृलक्षणमिति घटः कर्ता, कुलालः प्रयोजकः इति तद्व्यापारवाचिनोऽशब्दयोर्न तुल्यार्थत्वप्रसङ्ग इति । कस्तर्हि इदानीं प्रत्ययार्थः ? कर्तृव्यापारस्य धातुनैवाभिहितत्वात् । न च व्यापारभेदे प्रमाणमस्ति, येन प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः ^६विषयविभागः स्यादिति । तदेतदाह—भावयतीत्यादिना विषयविभागः स्यादित्यन्तेन । अत्राक्षरयोजना नातीव दुर्ज्ञाना ।

१. व्यापार इति, किं तर्हिदानीं प्रत्ययार्थः?

२. 'विषय'—नास्ति—ग, घ.

धात्वभिहितत्वात्तद्व्यापारस्य—क. ख.

४. आप्मुमयत्रा—छ.

२. यतो—क, ख, ग, घ.

५. तर्हि स—च.

६. विषय—नास्ति—छ.

करणत्वं च शब्दतोऽन्यतो 'वा धात्वर्थस्योभयत्राप्यविशिष्टमिति दुर्वारं तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अतो न प्रत्ययो भावनावचन इति सूक्तम् — 'प्यन्तस्य भवतेरर्थः केनांशेनाभिधीयते' इति^१ ॥

किञ्च—

कर्तृव्यापार^३ इष्टश्चेत्^४ पच्यादावपि भावना ।

धात्वर्थान्तररूपः स्यात्सोऽप्याधश्रयणादिकः ॥ १४ ॥

ननु करणभेदात्कर्तृव्यापारस्य भेदो भविष्यति । तथाहि—भावयतीत्यत्र णिज्वाच्यस्य कर्तृव्यापारस्य धात्वर्थः (क)रणम् ; भवतीत्यत्राख्यातवाच्यस्य तु धात्वर्थ-
 ५ व्यतिरिक्तः । अतः करणभेदाद्व्यापारभेद इत्याशङ्क्याह—करणत्वं चेति । अय-
 मर्थः—शब्दतः शब्दस्वभावात् धातोः प्रत्ययार्थकरणे समर्थत्वात्, अन्यतो वस्तुस्वभावा-
 ६ द्धात्वर्थस्यान्योत्पादस्वभावत्वात् धात्वर्थस्य यत्करणत्वं तदुभयत्राविशिष्टम् ; अतो दुर्वारं
 तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अतः प्रत्ययो न भावनावचन इति सुष्ठूक्तं भट्टपादैः—'प्यन्तस्य भवतेरर्थः
 केनांशेनाभिधीयते' इति । अस्यायमर्थः—भवतीत्यस्मिन्पदे केनांशेन प्रकृत्यंशेन प्रत्ययां-
 शेन वा प्यन्तस्य भवतेः भावनाशब्दस्यार्थो भावना अभिधीयत इति । एवमकर्मकेषु
 भवत्यादिष्वारख्यातप्रत्ययस्य भावनावचनत्वं निरस्येदानीं सकर्मकेषु पच्यादिष्वपि
 तन्निरासायाह—किञ्च—

१. वा—नास्ति—ख.

२. इति—नास्ति—क, ग, घ.

३. दृष्टञ्च—ग, घ, ङ.

४. पच्यादौ यदि—ग, घ, ङ.

५. व्यतिरिक्तिम्—छ.

६. धात्वर्थस्यान्योत्पादस्वभावत्वात्—ना-

स्ति—च.

यदि च कर्तृव्यापारो भावना; स च पच्यादिष्वधिश्रयणादिकः, तं पचिरेवोपादत्ते, अन्यथा सिध्यतिविक्लियतिभ्यामविशेषः स्यात् ।

कर्तृव्यापार इष्टश्च(श्चेत्) पच्यादिष्वपि भावना ।

धात्वर्थान्तररूपस्यात्सोऽप्यधिश्रयणादिकः ॥ (इति) ॥

यदि कर्तृव्यापारो भावनेष्यते, स तु निरूप्यमाणः पच्यादावधिश्रयणादिक एव, नान्यः, स च पच्यादेर्धातोरेवार्थ इति न धात्वर्थादन्यः भावनापदार्थः सिध्यतीत्यभिप्रायः । अत्र व्यवहितसंबन्धादिना वैषम्यादक्षरानुलोम्यं प्रदर्श्यते । यदि भावना कर्तृव्यापार इष्टः, स तु पच्यादावधिश्रयणादिक इति व्यवहितेन संबन्धः । भवतु कर्तृव्यापारोऽधिश्रयणादिकः, किमतः? इति चेत्—तत्राह—धात्वर्थान्तररूपः स्यादिति । धातोरेवार्थान्तररूपः स्यात् विक्लितिलक्षणादर्थात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—पचिरेव विक्लितिमात्रातिरेकेण तत्पर्यन्तं अधिश्रयणादिकं कर्तृव्यापारमप्युपादत्ते । ततश्च तदर्थातिरेकेण कर्तृव्यापारो भावना प्रत्ययार्थो न सिध्यतीत्यर्थः । अथवा—धात्वर्थान्तररूपः स्यात् २ धात्वन्तराणां अधिश्रयत्यादीनां योऽर्थोऽधिश्रयणादिकः कर्तृव्यापारोऽर्थः, स एव स्यात् । पच्यर्थातिरिक्तोऽपि धात्वर्थमात्रान्नातिरिच्यत इत्यर्थः । एतदेव विवृणोति—यदि चेत्यादिना । अयमर्थः—कर्तृव्यापारश्चेद्भावना, स तु पच्यादेरधिश्रयणादिकादन्यो नास्ति, अनुपलब्धेः । स एव तर्हि प्रत्ययार्थो भवती(त्वि)त्याशङ्क्याह—तं पचिरिति । पचिरेव धातुस्तं कर्तृव्यापारं उपादत्ते, न प्रत्ययः । कुत इति चेत्, तत्राह—अन्यथेति । यदि

१. 'च' नास्ति—ख.

२. धात्वर्थान्तराणां—ख.

३. मात्रातिरिक्ताया—ख.

अथापि नोपाददीत, तथाप्याधिश्रयत्यादिधात्वन्तरार्थः^१ इति नान्यो धात्वर्थोद्भावनापदार्थः । अथ मतं—करोतीत्यन्विता^२ भास-प्रत्ययविषयतया अनुवृत्तात्मा^३ व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणगोचरेभ्यो

पचिरधिश्रयणादिकः (कं) कर्तृव्यापारं नोपाददीत विक्लितिमात्रमेवाचक्षीत, तथा-सति सिध्यति विक्लिप्रतिभ्यामस्य नार्थभेदः स्यात् । स चास्ति ।

इदानीं अधिश्रयणादेः पचत्यनभिधेयत्वमभ्युपगम्य दूषणमाह—अथापीति पचत्यनभि-धेयत्वेऽप्यधिश्रयणादेरधिश्रयत्यादिधात्वन्तराभिधेयत्वाद्धात्वर्थमात्रान्न भेदेन भावनापदार्थस्सि-ध्यतीत्यभिप्रायः । इदानीं प्रकारान्तरेण भावनासमर्थनं शङ्कते—अथ मतमित्यादिना अयमभि-प्रायः—पचति पठतीत्यत्र सर्वत्र करोतीत्यनुवृत्ताकारा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, अतः तद्विषयेणानु-वृत्ताकारेण भवितव्यम्, पाकमाठादयस्तु धात्वर्था व्यावृत्ताकारया बुद्ध्या गृह्यन्ते । अत-स्ते व्यावृत्तस्वभावाः, प्रतीत्यनुरूपत्वात् विषयस्य । ततश्च व्यावृत्तस्वभावेभ्यो धात्वर्थेभ्योऽनुवृत्तात्मा करोत्यर्थोऽन्यो भावना सर्वधातुष्वनुवर्तमानस्याख्यातप्रत्ययस्यार्थ इति ।

अत्रैषा अक्षरयोजना । करोतीति योऽन्विताभासोऽनुवृत्ताकारः प्रत्ययः, तस्य विषयतया विषयभावेन अनुवृत्तात्मा अनुवृत्तस्वभावः^४ भावनापदार्थः धात्वर्थेभ्योऽन्यो भवितुमर्हतीति संबन्धः । किंविशिष्टेभ्यो धात्वर्थेभ्यः इत्यपेक्षायामुक्तम्—व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणगो-

१. धात्वन्तरार्थात्मक—क, ख.

४. विक्लितिम्या—च.

२. अन्वितावभासस्य प्रत्ययस्य विषय-तया—ग, घ, ङ.

५. पचत्यभि—च.

६. धात्वर्थव्यावृत्ता—छ.

३. व्यावृत्तावग्रहणगोचरेभ्यो—ग, घ ; व्यावृत्ताकारग्रहणस्यः—ङ.

७. स्वरूपो—छ.

धात्वर्थेभ्योऽन्यो भावनापदार्थ इति—तदसत् । एवं ^१हि सामान्यलक्षणानुपातितया धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव ^२स्यात्, न पदार्थान्तरं भावनापदार्थः ।

अथ ^३मतं—सत्यं साध्यतया सामान्यम्, न गोत्वादिवत्तद्रूपतया । त-

चरेभ्य इति । हेतुगर्भं विशेषणम् । व्यावृत्ता अवग्रहा ओकारा येषां ग्रहणानां विज्ञानानां तानि व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणानि, तेषां गोचराः विषयाः व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणगोचराः धात्वर्थाः, तत एव तेभ्योऽन्योऽनुवृत्तात्मा करोत्यर्थः इति । एतन्निराकरोति—तदसदिति । यदि व्यावृत्तेषु धात्वर्थेष्वनुवर्तमानतया अन्यत्वं करोत्यर्थस्य, तदा तत्त्वान्तरत्वं न सिध्यति, किन्तु धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव करोत्यर्थस्स्यात्सामान्यलक्षणानुपातितया ^४। एतद्वि ^५ सामान्यस्य लक्षणम्, यदेकस्यानेकेषु प्रत्येकं कात्स्न्येनानुवृत्तिः । अतस्तल्लक्षणानुपातितया धात्वर्थसामान्यान्नान्यो भावनापदार्थस्सिध्यति । धात्वर्थसामान्यत्वन्वत्साभिरपोष्यत एवेत्यभिप्रायः ।

तत्र शङ्कते—अथ मतमिति । अयमाशयः—करोत्यर्थस्य सकलधात्वर्थानुयायित्वे सत्यपि न तस्य गोत्वादिवत्तद्रूपतया तत्समवायितया तदनुयायिता, किन्तु तत्साध्यतया । तथाहि—धात्वर्थविशेषसाध्याः भावनाविशेषाः, तेषां करणत्वात् । अतः करोत्यर्थस्य धात्वर्थविशेषानुगमः, धात्वर्थविशेषसाध्यत्वात्, न पुनः स्वयं धात्वर्थसमवायि सामान्यमिति । गोत्वादिवदिति वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । कथं पुनरिदमवगम्यते करोत्यर्थो धात्वर्थसाध्यतया

१. हि—नास्ति—ऊ.

४. पातिततया—छ.

२. सामान्यरूपमेव—क, ख ; सामान्यरूप
एव—ग, घ ; सामान्य एव—ऊ.

५. सामान्यलक्षणं—च.

६. सामान्यत्व—च.

३. मतं साध्यतया तत्सामान्यं—ख.

स्याः प्रतिपुरुषं^१ शीघ्रं करोति, मन्दं करोतीति स्वसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां
योगात् । धात्वर्थवर्ति तु करणरूपं^२ सामान्यमन्यदेव ।

उक्तं^३ हि—

तत्रानुवर्तते, न गोत्वादिवत् तत्समवायितया ? इत्याशङ्क्याह—तस्या इति । तस्याः करो-
त्यर्थात्मिकाया भावनायाः स्वसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां योगात् । स्वशब्देन भावनोच्यते ।
स्वसामान्यं विशेषश्च स्वसामान्यविशेषौ । करोतीत्येतद्रूपं सामान्यम्, 'शीघ्रं करोति,'
'मन्दं करोति' इति विशेषः, ताभ्यां योगात् संबन्धात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—करोत्य-
भिधेयं यद्वस्तु, तस्य साध्यस्वभावानुवृत्तव्यावृत्ताकारयोगात्^४ सामान्यविशेषात्मकं वस्त्वन्तर-
मेतन्न धात्वर्थे सामान्यात्मना अनुप्रवेशमर्हति—इति । अथवा — स्वसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां—
इत्यादेरयमर्थः—सामान्यात्मकौ विशेषौ^५ ताभ्यां योगाच्छीघ्रं करोति मन्दं करोतीति ।
तथाहि—शैघ्रघमान्याभ्यां साध्यस्वभावाभ्यां विशेषणाभ्यां विशेषितौ साध्यस्वभावौ करोत्यर्थ-
स्यावान्तरसामान्यरूपौ गम्येते । अतः ताभ्यां योगादेकार्थसमवायान्न करोत्यर्थो धात्वर्थ-
सामान्यमात्रम्, किन्तु साध्यस्वभावं तत्त्वान्तरम् इति ।

ननु धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव साध्यस्वभावमस्त्वित्याशङ्क्याह—धात्वर्थवर्तीति । धात्वर्थ-
समवायि यत् सामान्यं तत्सिद्धस्वभावम्, करणरूपत्वादिति । उक्तञ्चैतदभियुक्तै-
रित्याह—उक्तं हीति ।

१. पुरुषं—नास्ति—स्व.

३. उक्तं च—ग, घ, ङ,

२. करणसामान्य—क, ग, घ.

४. कारायोगात्—च.

५. विशेषात्मकौ सामान्यविशेषौ ताभ्यां—छ .

‘अन्यदेव हि १धात्वर्थसामान्यं^२ करणात्मकम् ।

अन्यच्च भावना नाम साध्यत्वेन व्यवस्थितम् ॥’ इति^३ ॥

तदेतदपेशलम् । तथाहि—

न क्रियाकरणाकारे द्वे ज्ञाने अनुयायिनी ।

यतः प्रतीमः सामान्ये द्वे साध्यसमवायिनी ॥ १५ ॥

एवं परमतमाशङ्क्य तन्निराकरणायाह—तदेतदपेशलम् । तथाहि—

न क्रियाकरणाकारे द्वे ज्ञाने अनुयायिनी ।

यतः प्रतीमः सामान्ये द्वे साध्यसमवायिनी ॥ (इति) ॥

यदि क्रियासामान्याकारं करणसामान्याकारं च ज्ञानद्वयं प्रतीयेत, तदा धात्वर्थसामान्यविशेषातिरेकेणान्यः ४ करोत्यर्थः सामान्यविशेषात्मा सिध्यति । न चेह सामान्यद्वयप्रतीतिरस्ति, येन धात्वर्थसाध्यक्रियाव्यक्तिसमवाय्येकं साध्यं सामान्यम्, अन्यच्च धात्वर्थसमवायि सिद्धरूपं [न?] प्रतीम इति श्लोकस्य तात्पर्यार्थः ।

अत्रैषा अक्षरयोजना । न क्रियाकरणाकारे क्रियाकारं करणाकारं च द्वे ज्ञाने अनुयायिनी अनुवर्तमाने व्यावर्तमानेषु विशेषेषु न स्तः, यतो ज्ञानद्वयादनुवृत्ताकाराद्दे सामान्ये प्रतीमः । साध्यसमवायिनी साध्यं, समवायि च धात्वर्थेन, साध्यम् करोत्यर्थसामान्यं धात्वर्थसमवायि चान्यदिति । एतदेव विवृणोति—न(हि) करणमिति । पचत्यादिषु कारकव्यतिरेकेण तत्साध्यक्रियाव्यतिरेकेण च करणं करण-

१. यागादि—ऊ.

२. सामान्यकरणा—ग, घ.

३. ‘इति’ नास्ति—क, ग, घ, ऊ.

४. करोत्यर्थसामान्य—ञ.

नहि करणं करणमिति ^१ क्रियाकारकव्यतिरिक्तेऽर्थे पञ्यादिषु प्रत्ययः, यतः क्रिया^२रूपव्यतिरिक्तं करणात्मकं धात्वर्थसामान्यं^३ कल्प्येत । शीघ्रमन्दादिषु^४ तु धात्वर्थसामान्यस्यैव करोतिवाच्यस्यावान्तर^५सामान्यभेदः शोणकर्कादिरिवाश्वत्वस्य^६ ।

मिति अनुवृत्ताकारः^७ प्रत्ययो नास्ति, काष्ठादिष्वेव एवरूपः प्रत्ययः । अतः क्रियारूपातिरिक्ते करणात्मके धात्वर्थसामान्ये प्रमाणं नास्ति । अतः क्रियारूपमेव धात्वर्थसामान्यं न करणरूपम् ।

यदुक्तं 'शीघ्रं करोति' 'मन्दं करोति' इति सामान्यविशेषान्तरयोग इति, तत्राह—शीघ्रमन्दादिष्विति । 'शीघ्रं करोति', 'मन्दं करोति' इति तु धात्वर्थसामान्यस्यैव करोतिवाच्यस्यावान्तरसामान्यभेदः प्रतीयते शोणकर्कादिरिवाश्व(त्व)स्य । नहि तत्राश्व(त्व)सामान्यानाक्रान्तव्यत्यन्तरसमवायि सामान्यान्तरं शोणत्वादिरूपं उपेयते, प्रतीयते वा । किन्तु अश्वत्वसामान्याधारभूतास्वेव कासुचिद्व्यक्तिषु व्यत्यन्तरपरिहारेण वर्तमानमवान्तरसामान्यमेव ।^८ एवमत्रापि शीघ्रमन्दादिषु करोत्यर्थस्य धात्वर्थसामान्यस्यावान्तरसामान्यभेद इति । यथा च धात्वर्थातिरिक्तस्तत्करणको व्यापारो नास्ति, तथा पूर्वमेवोक्तमित्याह—उक्तं चेति(च-)न हीत्यादिना ।

१. इति पञ्यादिषु क्रिया—क, ख.

२. व्यतिरेकोऽन्वेति पञ्यादिषु—क; व्यतिरिक्तोऽन्वेति—ख.

३. 'रूप'—नास्ति—क, ख.

४. सामान्यमन्यत्—क, ख.

५. मन्त्रादिषु—क; मन्दादिभ्य—ग, घ, ङ.

६. 'सामान्य' नास्ति क, ख.

७. अश्वस्य—क, ख.

८. कारप्रत्ययो—च.

९. मेव तत्रापि—च.

उक्तं च—

‘न हि धात्वर्थकरणः फलभेदप्रभावनः ।

धात्वर्थ फलभेदं च व्यापारो दृश्यतेऽन्तरा^१ ॥’ (इति) ॥

वाच्यो लक्षणभेदश्च^२ ननु धात्वर्थभावयोः^३ ।

भावः परिस्पन्द इति यजत्यादावसम्भवः ॥ १६ ॥

एवं धात्वर्थसामान्यविशेषपरिहारेण भावनाख्योऽन्यः पदार्थो न, अस्य शब्दार्थत्वं दूरापेतमिति प्रतिपादितमतीतानन्तरग्रन्थेन । इदानीं पुनरपि धात्वर्थभावनयोर्भेदासम्भवं तयोर्लक्षणभेदासम्भवेन प्रतिपादयितुमाह—

वाच्यो लक्षणभेदश्च ननु धात्वर्थभावयोः । भावः परिस्पन्द इति यजत्यादावसम्भवः ॥ (इति) ॥

४धात्वर्थभावयोर्भेदं वदता भेदेन लक्षणं वाच्यम्, संमुग्धस्य हि वस्तुनो लक्षणानुग्रहाद्भेदावधारणमिति । यदि तावत्परिस्पन्दात्मा व्यापारो भावः, अस्पन्दात्मको धात्वर्थः, इति तयोर्लक्षणभेद आश्रीयते, तदा यजत्यादावाख्यातार्थस्य परिस्पन्दरूपत्वाभावाद्भावनात्वाभावप्रसङ्गः इति श्लोकस्यार्थः ।

अस्यार्थस्य स्पष्टीकरणायाह—अवश्यमिति । लक्षणभेदं शङ्कते—अस्पन्दात्मा धात्वर्थ इति । एतन्निराकरोति—अस्पन्दमानकर्तृकेष्विति । यजते, जानाति, इत्यादिष्वख्यातार्थेषु, भावना(त्वा)भावः प्रसज्येत, तेषां परिस्पन्दरूपत्वाभावात् । तत्रैव

१. अन्तरे—क, ख.

२. तत्र—ग, घ, ङ.

३. भेदयोः—क, ख.

४. वाक्यार्थभावयोर्भेदः वदता भेदलक्षणं वाच्यम्, संमुग्धस्य—ख.

अवश्यं च १ भावधात्वर्थभेदवादिना तयोः स्पष्टो रूपभेदो^२
दर्शयितव्यः । अस्पन्दात्मा धात्वर्थः, स्पन्दात्मको भाव इति चेत्,
३ अस्पन्दमान^४कर्तृकेषु ‘यजते’ ‘जानाति’ ५ इत्याख्यातार्थेषु
तदभावप्रसङ्गः । ६ गच्छत्यादौ च धात्वर्थस्य भावनात्वप्रसङ्गः ।
चेतनव्यापारस्तु पुरस्तात्प्रत्युक्तः ।

दृषणान्तरमाह—गच्छत्यादौ चेति । गच्छति पठतीत्यादौ धात्वर्थस्य परिस्पन्दरूपत्वात्
भावनात्वं प्रसज्येत । ननु तत्रापि धात्वर्थस्य स्पन्दरूपता नास्ति, स तु संयोग-
विभागमात्ररूपः, परिस्पन्दस्तु तद्धेतुभूतोऽन्य[त] एव, यत्र ‘९ चलति’ इति प्रत्ययः। तत्र
कथं धात्वर्थस्य गच्छत्यादौ स्पन्दरूपतेति ? अत्रोच्यते—चलतीति प्रत्ययस्य संयोगविभाग-
मात्रमालम्बनम् नार्थान्तरम्, प्रमाणाभावादिति वक्ष्यमाणनीत्या अङ्गीकृत्योत्तरमित्यनव-
द्यम् । एवं स्पन्दात्मकत्वस्य भावनालक्षणस्यात्मकर्तृकेषु सत्यामपि तस्यामभावात्,
गच्छत्यादौ च धात्वर्थेऽभावनात्मन्यपि भावात्, अव्याप्तिः अतिव्याप्तिश्चोक्ता । इदानी-
मेतद्दोषपरिहाराय प्रयत्नश्चेतनव्यापारो भावना अस्त्वित्याशङ्क्याह—चेतनव्यापार इति ।

परिस्पन्दमभ्युपेत्य तस्य भावनात्वे दृषणमुक्तम्; इदानीं तदेव निरूपणीयमित्याह—कश्चैष

१. भावना—ग, घ.

२. भेदः प्रदर्श—क, ख.

३. एवं अस्प ग, घ, ङ.

४. मानात्मकर्तृ—क, ख.

५. इत्याख्यातेषु—क, ख.

६. गच्छतीत्यादिषु च—क, ख.

७. भावना अर्थः—च.

८. तत्रापि च स्पन्दरूपता अस्ति—च.

९. चलतिःप्रत्ययः—ख.

कश्चैष परिस्पन्दः? न खल्वयमाश्रयाभिमतान्नेदेन गम्यते ।

कथं न गम्यते? यदा सत्यप्याश्रये प्रत्यक्षे कदाचिच्चलतीति
प्रत्ययप्रादुर्भावः, २(अतः) तदतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनः ।

इति क इति क्षेपाभिप्रायेण। ननुप्रसिद्धोऽयं परिस्पन्दः, यत्रायं चलतीति प्रत्ययः । तत्र कथमस्या-
क्षेप इत्याशङ्क्याह—न खल्विति । परिस्पन्दाश्रयत्वाभिमतो यो देवदत्तादिः, तस्मान्नेदेनायं
परिस्पन्दो न गम्यते । देवदत्तादिरेव हि चलतीति प्रतीयते, नार्थान्तरम् । अर्थान्तरत्वे
तदप्रतीतावपि प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गमिति । तत्र चोदयति—कथं न गम्यत इति । आश्रयान्ने-
देन परिस्पन्दः कथं न ४ गम्यते, गम्यत एवेत्यर्थः । तत्र हेतुमाह—यदेति । आश्रये
देवदत्तादौ प्रत्यक्षे सत्यपि कदाचिदेव चलतीतिप्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवति न सर्वदा । यथा-
श्रयमात्रालम्बनोऽयं^५ स्यात्, प्रत्यक्षे तस्मिन्सर्वदा प्रादुर्भवेत् । न च प्रादुर्भवति ।
अतस्तदतिरिक्तार्थालम्बन इति । अनेन परिस्पन्दसद्भावेऽनुमानमुक्तम् । अत्रैवं प्रयोगः—
फ(च)लतीतिप्रत्ययो धर्मित्वेनोपादीयते । देवदत्तादाश्रया(द)तिरिक्तमर्थान्तरमवलम्बते इति
साध्यो धर्मः । तस्मिन्सत्यपि प्रत्यक्षे कदाचिदेवोत्पद्यमानत्वात्—यथा दण्डदेवदत्तयोः प्रत्यक्ष-
योरपि कदाचिदेवोत्पद्यमानो दण्डीति प्रत्ययः तदतिरिक्तविशिष्टालम्बनः, तद्वदिति ।
अर्थापत्तिर्वा अनेनोपन्यस्ता । आश्रयप्रत्यक्षे सत्यपि कदाचिदेव^६प्रादुर्भवन् चलतीति
प्रत्ययोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते, यथाश्रयव्यतिरिक्तम^७स्यालम्बनं न स्यादिति ।

१. प्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवन्—ग, घ, ऊ.

४. गम्यत इति—च.

२. 'अतः' नास्ति—क, ख, ग, घ, ऊ.

५. म्वनो यत्—च.

३. रिक्तमर्थमालम्बते—क, ख, ग, ऊ.

६. प्रादुर्भावः—च

७. मन्यालं—च.

Reviews

Nyāya-kulīśa or 'The Lightning-shaft of Reason' by Ātreya Rāmānuja.
Edited with Introduction and Notes by R. Ramanujachari, M.A.,
and Pandit K. Srinivasacharya, Siromani (Annamalai University),
1938. Pp. xxxiv+40+212. Price.

This is a standard work on the Viśiṣṭādvaita ; and, although fairly well known, it had not so far been published. We owe a debt of deep gratitude to the editors for bringing out so beautiful and reliable an edition of it, and to the authorities of the Annamalai University for giving them the necessary assistance to do so. The author of the work, Ātreya Rāmānuja, was the maternal uncle and spiritual *guru* of the renowned scholar and outstanding exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine, Vedānta Deśika. It also seems that three members of his family viz. his great-grand-father, grand-father and father followed Bhagavān Rāmānuja in the line of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas.

The work is divided into 13 sections of varying length, each dealing with a definite problem of philosophy ; and the aim, in each case, is to establish the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita after confuting the views of the schools that differ from it. Of the topics discussed here, three relate to the theory of knowledge and two to the correct mode of interpreting scriptural statements. Of the remaining eight topics, seven are concerned with what may broadly be described as ontology and one, the last, with the conception of ultimate value in Viśiṣṭādvaita. The treatise throughout shows the great mastery of the author over not only the doctrine he is expounding but also the whole realm of Indian thought, excepting only the non-Vedic schools of Jainism and Buddhism. But it is, as its name indicates, highly controversial and the discussions are often technical. It is written in prose interspersed with *kārikās* ; but one section, whose purpose is to negate negation (*bhāvāntarābhāvavāda*), is wholly in verse. Though several Mss. have been consulted in preparing the edition, there remain many lacunae in the text. Usually it is single words or phrases that are missing, but there are also places where whole sentences, sometimes as many as half-a-dozen in succession, are lacking. The editors have taken great pains to fill them up wherever possible ; and their suggestions, so far as we have been able to judge, indicate discriminating scholarship.

There are two Introductions prefixed to the volume—one in English and the other in Sanskrit. The subject-matter of both is the same ; but they are intended for different classes of readers. This plan requires a

word of appreciation, for it shows that the editors have not forgotten, as modern editors are too apt to do, the non-English-knowing Pandits, who form the majority among the readers of books like the one under review. The most important part of the Introduction, from the standpoint of those who are new to the book, is the summary of the arguments in the various sections. It has been very carefully prepared, and is sure to serve as an excellent aid to the study of the work. There are also numerous footnotes. They are, for the most part, explanatory ; but they also occasionally refer to textual problems and indicate the sources from which the quotations in the work are drawn.

The book is described on the title-page as the first volume in a 'Philosophical Series' projected by the University. It is a high standard of editorial competence that is set here ; and, if the same standard is kept up in the case of the subsequent volumes, there will be every reason to feel gratified with them. We cordially recommend the publication to all scholars that are interested in the study of Indian philosophy. The book is fully indexed.

M. HIRIYANNA.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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No. 2

Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's Theistic Realism

(Continued from Vol. VIII, No. 2, page 171.)

By

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI ŚARMA
(*Annamalai University*)

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND FREEWILL

The question of human freedom and divine control assumes great importance in Madhva's philosophy as he is anxious to emphasise both and maintain that human freedom is not inconsistent with divine control. It is man himself and not God that is responsible for the evil and suffering in this world.

Following the Sūtrakāra and consistent with his Theistic Realism, Madhva proclaims the human soul to be a real agent in all its actions. If we do not admit the agency of the Jīva, the Śāstra which lays down injunctions and prohibitions with reference to the achievement of specific results and the moral law on which these are ultimately grounded, would lose all significance and lapse into a cry in the wilderness. It cannot be that the Śāstra is addressed either to the insentient or to God himself. The jaḍa is incapable of responding to any mandate and God is above the purview of commandments. They cannot therefore have reference to any but the souls.¹

1. अस्त्येव जीवस्यापि कर्तृत्वम् । तदभावे..... । (TP).

This would not however make the Jīva the absolute and independent doer in all cases. The ultimate power of direction is vested in the Lord. The Jīva pursues of his own free will, a course of action that is determined mostly by his own deep-rooted nature, inclination and past Karma. But even this is possible because God has delegated to him the power to do things in conformity with his own innate goodness or its reverse. But he is not, for that reason, a mere puppet in the hands of God. The right to choose between right and wrong is the Jīva's own and the choice comes from him. It may therefore be stated that the Jīva is both doer and non-doer² even as a carpenter in the service of an Architect is a real agent in so far as he works at his job with his hands and tools, but is not merely obliged to the latter from the beginning but looks up to him for advice, guidance and direction. The Jīva's activity is not merely however like that of the carpenter. There is a vital distinction between the two. The carpenter is doubtless under an obligation to his employer and under a contract for the fulfilment of which he would receive due payment ; but his skill and workmanship are his own. He does not owe them to his employer. Not so the Jīva. He derives even the ability to do anything from the Creator : परात् तच्छ्रुतेः (B.S. ii, 3, 41.) i.e., to say that but for God, he cannot even move an inch : न ते त्वत् क्रियते किंचनरे (R.V. x.112,9). This would not however involve God in the meshes of action and make him responsible, ultimately for the good or bad in the life of the Jīvas ; for it should be kept in mind that the Lord *enables* the Jīvas to pursue a course of action *not* arbitrarily, but in strict conformity with his former life and deserts : कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षः (B.S. ii, 3, 42). He does *not interfere* in the decision in any way : Cf. यथेच्छसि तथा कुरु (Gītā, xviii.63)

This he does, not out of any compulsion from anyone but out of a desire to preserve the significance and validity of the Śāstra which prescribes that a man shall reap as he sows—and the moral law that good leads to good and evil to evil,³ and keep his own part in the transaction above the charges of partiality and pitilessness.⁴ It is a law which God sets unto himself ; the limitation therefore is hardly an external one.⁵

2. सातन्त्र्याभावापेक्षयेव जीवस्याकर्तृत्वम् :—

स्ववन्दनं यथा पित्रा कारितं शिशुकर्तृकम् ।

एवं पूजा विष्णवधीना मवेज्जीवकृतेत्यपि ॥ इति प्रवृत्ते ॥

यथा पितृदत्तं पालकत्वं राजपुत्राणामेवं परमात्मदत्तं क्रियासातन्त्र्यलक्षणं कर्तृत्वम् । (G.T. V, p. 679)

3. पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा पापः पापेन (Śruti)

4. अपेक्षा तु वैषम्याद्यप्राप्तये .

5. स्वेच्छानिमित्तैव (TP)

But since even the beginningless Karma of the soul is, in a metaphysical sense, dependent upon Him, God's sovereignty is at no time minimised.⁶ The so-called divine intervention in our actions, consists then, merely in this that God directs our activities in accordance

6. अपेक्ष्यकर्मसत्तादेरपि स्वाधीनत्वात् ; नहि स्वाधीनसत्तादिमदपेक्षायामस्वातन्त्र्यं भवति ॥

If for the same reason, the charges of partiality, etc., are laid at the door of God, Madhva answers that *such partiality*, etc., are no faults. Only a partiality that upsets the moral order need be denied of God :—

कर्मादीनां सत्त्वस्यापि तदधीनत्वात् । न पुनर्वैषम्याद्यापातेन दोषः । तादृशवैषम्यादेरुपलभ्यमानत्वात् (II. 1, 37). Jayatirtha makes the point clearer :— यदि कर्मसत्तापि तदधीना, तर्हि तदपेक्षा नामानपेक्षैवार्थाद्भवति । तथा च पुनर्वैषम्याद्यापातः स्यात्, तथा च दोषित्वमिति चेन्न । स्वाधीनकर्मसापेक्षया फलदानरूपवैषम्यादेरीश्वरेऽदोषतयैव श्रुतावुपलभ्यमानत्वादिति भावः । एवं तर्हि कर्मसापेक्षापि निष्फला ; तदभावेऽपि दोषाभावसंभवादिति चेन्मैवम् । कर्मानपेक्षत्वे वेदाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् ॥ (TP)

The same idea is expounded by Madhva in his *Av.* :—

वैषम्यं निर्घृणत्वं च वेदाप्रामाण्यकारकम् ।

नाङ्गीकार्यमतोऽन्यत्तु न वैषम्यादिनामकम् ॥

which is thus elaborated by Jayatirtha :—

द्विविधं खल्विदं वैषम्यं निर्घृणत्वं च । एकं कर्माद्यनपेक्षताप्रयुक्तम् । तत्रापि वेदाप्रामाण्यकारकत्वेन दृष्टणत्वाच्चाङ्गीकर्तुमुचितम् । वेदो हि धर्मं सुखसाधनमधर्मं दुःखसाधनमाह । तत्र यदीश्वरो धर्माधर्मान-
नपेक्ष्य विषयी निर्घृणश्च स्यात्, तदा वेदोदितधर्माधर्मयोः सुखदुःखसाधनत्वमसत् स्यात् । तथा च कथं तस्य प्रामाण्यं स्यात् ? अतः सूत्रकारेण कर्मादिसापेक्षतापक्षमुरीकृत्य तत् परिहृतम् । अतोऽन्यत्तु द्वितीयं वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च न वैषम्यादिनामकम् ; दोषरूपं न भवतीति यावत् ॥ (NS. p. 312b)

and elsewhere by Madhva himself :—

विषमत्वं तु दोषाय शुभाशुमविपर्यये ।

अतस्तादृशवैषम्यं ब्रह्मसूत्रे निराकृतम् ॥

शुभाशुमनियन्तृत्वं न दोषो गुण एव सः ।

अतस्तदिष्टं कृष्णस्य ब्रह्मसूत्रकृतो विमोः ॥ (B.T. vii, 18, 12)

[The existence of Karma etc., depends on Him. It cannot be contended that partiality and other faults, would again crop up. For such partiality etc., are no flaws.

If the existence of Karma too is dependent on Him, then to depend upon them is as good as not depending on them. Thus again partiality would stare him in the face and He would be sullied. We should like to point out that such partiality as consists in dispensing rewards and punishments in proportion to acts, which are of course dependent on Him, is not represented to be a foible in the śruti. It cannot be argued that to depend on individual Karma under such conditions, is after all futile as even without such de-

with our past Karma, efforts and deserts. In the absence of this ultimate power of direction, nothing would be possible in the world. The soul is thus a free agent in respect of its chosen path—nay, in choosing the one when two courses are open to him, but the power to traverse that path once the choice has been made, is derived from the Lord. Subject to this condition, man is a real agent :

एतदेवं न चाप्येवमेतदस्ति न चास्ति च ।

[It (i.e., the agency of the soul) is like this ; it is not like this. It is there, it is not there.]

(*Mbh.* q. by Madhva, B.S. ii, 3, 42).

Elsewhere, (in his *GT*), Madhva gives a telling analogy to illustrate the relative dependence of the Jīva :

पुमान् दोग्धा च गौर्दोग्ध्री स्तनो दोग्धेतिवत् क्रमात् । (p. 675).

[The cowboy milks, the cow yields (the milk) and the udder yields (the milk)].

Such is Madhva's solution of the problem of Freewill vs. Determinism in life. It goes much further than similar attempts to solve the problem

pendence the flawlessness of God could be maintained. The reason is that if Karma is not consulted, the moral law would be impugned (and the Scripture would lose validity).

Such partiality and pitilessness as jeopardise the validity of Scripture cannot be accepted. Anything other than that is not strictly speaking a partiality at all.

Two kinds of partiality and pitilessness there are. One results from disregard of individual Karma etc. The other lies in depending on them in so far as they themselves are subject to God. Of these, the first one must be rejected as it impairs the validity of the Vedas. For the Veda prescribes right as the means of achieving happiness and warns us against unrighteousness as it brings on misery. Such being the case, if God should act in a pitiless and partial way, irrespective of our Karma, it would mean that the law of right and wrong taught in the Vedas, would be rendered meaningless. How then could they be held valid thereafter ? Therefore it is that the Sūtrakāra admitting the view of God's acting in accordance with Karma, has set at rest the possibility of partiality etc. The other variety of "partiality and pitilessness," is not strictly speaking a foible at all. It does not amount to a defect.

A partiality that interferes with right and wrong is a blemish. Hence it has been rejected in the Sūtras. The proper control of right and wrong and meting out rewards and punishments in accordance with them, is no fault. It is an asset. Hence it is acceptable to Bādarāyaṇa]

by other commentators on the Vedānta. Within a limited sphere, man is free to do as he pleases. There is room for individual effort and initiative. The striving for good or bad constitutes the act of freedom whereby Karma ripens and everyone works out his own destiny. The question is easy to ask: "If He is the cause of everything, does the Lord *influence* the will of the Jīva or not? If He does, then He is responsible for all acts and there can be no freedom of choice for the individual. If he does not, He is powerless, to that extent." Madhva's answer shifts the responsibility for good or bad, to the Jīva or more precisely to his original nature (स्वरूपयोग्यता).

Most Indian philosophers would rather take shelter under the inexorable law of Karma to reconcile the presence of Evil and inequalities in this world with the goodness of God. Madhva has been the only one to push the question to its logical extreme. Karma implies freedom and freedom implies a choice. But it does not explain *why a particular choice is made*. Even a chain of beginningless Karma cannot explain why all souls are not equally good or bad when all of them are equally eternal and all their Karmas too are equally beginningless and the start simultaneous! The only possible explanation is that offered by Madhva, viz., that the Karma itself is the result of an unchanging and underlying nature स्वरूप of each soul.⁷

Even this original nature is, in a metaphysical sense, subject to the Lord; but, this does not interfere with the progress of Man. For God does not interfere to change the nature of beings. The nature of the soul is *allowed* to have its course, whatever it may be. This is the law of God which he sets to himself. There is thus no fear of his sovereignty being compromised. The moral character of God is also preserved on such a view; for, we can accuse God of partiality and cruelty only when He changes the nature of some in preference to others. Madhva would argue that non-interference with the "Svarūpa" of souls does not necessarily denote an inability to do so.⁸ The explanation would rather

7. It is this same difference and distinction which enables Madhva to account for the persistence of multiplicity of souls even in Mokṣa, where the Karmic chain is destroyed. And as already shown, multiplicity without distinction would be an impossible concept.

8. Cf. his remarks on an allied topic—न च प्रकृतेः संसाराभावादिना ईश्वरेणाप्यन्यथा कर्तुमशक्यत्वेन सुदृढत्वात् सर्वसाम्यमेवेश्वरेणेति युक्तम् । ईशस्य महामहिम्नत्वात्, नित्यसंसारित्वस्य नित्यं तदनुग्रहेणैवोपपत्तेः ॥ (Ny. Vivaraṇa, iv, 2, 6)

"To show that the law of Karma is not independent of God, it is sometimes said that God can suspend it, still He does not will to do so." See also the extract from

lie in the inexorable will of the Lord. Nothing can limit His will and movements save Himself.

The theory of "Svarūpabhedā" elaborated by Madhva is thus the only solution of the agelong problem of the plurality of Selves, their freewill and freedom. Questions like the following have been asked by Religionists and philosophers all the world over: "The Jīva was not created out of a void, at a particular time; but he is nonetheless, an expression of the nature of God. How then does he happen to be so imperfect while his archetype is also the type of perfection"? St. Augustine's agony of soul was still more poignant: "Who made me? Did not God who is not only good but goodness itself? Whence then, came I to will evil and nill good so that I am thus justly punished? Who set *this* in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was wholly formed of my most sweet God?" (*Confessions*, Bk. VII, 4-5). The question is answered by Madhva under B.S. ii, 3, 51 : प्रतिबिम्बानां मिथो वैचित्र्ये कारणमाह—अदृष्टानियमात्' इति। अनादिविद्याकर्मादिवैचित्र्याद्वैचित्र्यम्॥⁹ on the basis of a fundamental and corresponding difference in beginningless Karma, Vidyā, etc., which ultimately rests upon an innate difference in *nature*.¹⁰ It is thus *in the nature* of some souls to "will evil and nill good" and of others to "will good" and "nill evil". Yet others are of a mixed nature and these, in the language of Hume, would be "neither good enough for a supper, nor bad enough for a drubbing". These would answer to the "Nityasamsārins"¹¹ of Madhva. It is thus only a half-truth to say that "Freewill is the cause of our doing evil". (Augustine). The question must ultimately arise why when one is free to will good or evil, he does the one and not the other. Not because he has a *free* will; for that same free will might have suggested the other course! That it does not do, or has not done so, must depend on something more ultimate and foundational in the nature of the soul. And *that something*, says Madhva, is the core of the man, his Svarūpa. It would be useless to dispute the logic of this contention, however distasteful to one's *amour propre*, the conclusion may be.

Lokācārya's *Tattvatraya*, given, in this connection, on p. 694, of S. Radhakrishnan's I. *Phil.* Vol. II.

9. 'आदि' will naturally imply 'सर्व' as may be expected from the very nature of the Pūrvaśakṣa under ii, 3, 51 : नचैकप्रतिबिम्बानां मिथो वैचित्र्यं सम्भवति ।

10. Cf. त्रिविधा भवति श्रद्धा देहिनां सा समावजा ॥ (*Gītā* 17, 2).

11. Vide *Tattvasamkhyāna*.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BRAHMAN IS SAGUṆA

Madhva conceives the Brahman as endowed with an infinite number of auspicious attributes. The conception of the Saguṇa has been assailed by Monists as being metaphysically untenable. There is difficulty in assuming these attributes to be either different from or identical with the Brahman. If different, they must be *related* to the Brahman from without and that relation would have to be similarly related to the terms by yet another one and so on *ad infinitum*.¹ If the two are identical, their distinction as subject and attribute becomes meaningless and the truth would rather be that there are really no attributes!² The Advaitin, therefore, denies attributes to Brahman. Rāmānuja distinguishes the Brahman from its attributes. Madhva admits attributes for the Brahman but denies at the same time, that they are different from it. Brahman and its attributes are inseparable, indistinguishable. But the distinction in speech and writing, between them, is not a meaningless fiction. Nor can the attributes be both different from and identical with (bhedābheda) the Brahman, as the same difficulties and regress would crop up severally on this view. There is no way out of the difficulty unless it is granted that the attributes though part and parcel of the Brahman and hence indistinguishable from it, can yet be separated in thought and referred to in language, in their separation. There is thus neither an absolute and *unqualified* difference between God and his attributes, nor even a *colorless identity*. It is an identity that is compatible with differentiation that we have, between the Brahman and its attributes. Language secular scientific and metaphysical has numerous examples of this kind to offer :— पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम् ; राहोः शिरः ; स्वरूप स्वरूपत्वम् ; समवायस्यैकत्वम् ; अहिकुण्डलम् ; सत्यज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म, आनन्दं ब्रह्मणः A triangle is a three-sided figure the sum of whose angles is equal to two right angles. Here the two *ideas* are *separable* in thought and language though the one involves the other. Even so in the case of the Brahman, and its attributes. Not only is

1. नच गुणगुण्यादि भेदसम्बन्धः संभवी । तस्य सम्बन्धस्य ततो भिन्नत्वे गुणवदेव सम्बन्धान्तरापेक्षत्वादनवस्था ।

2. अभिन्नत्वे वस्तुमात्रमिति न सम्बन्धः स्यात् ॥

(Trivikrama Paṇḍita, *Tattvapradīpa*, Catus-sūtri Bhāṣya, p. 12)

there according to Madhva no difference between the Brahman and its attributes but among the attributes themselves :—

अनन्तगुण एवासौ तेचाभिन्ना हरेर्गुणाः ।

परस्परमभिन्नाश्च सर्वे धर्माश्च तद्गताः ॥ (B.T. x, 3, 37.)

This position of Madhva has a remarkable affinity to the orthodox Thomist doctrine :—“In God, the distinction between Existence and Essence must fall away. God can have no nature or essence distinguishable from and making itself felt through the phases of his actual existence. Here and *here only*,³ the distinction between essence and existence, would have no meaning, and consequently, the distinction between an attribute and that which is the subject of the attribute, would be meaningless also. Of the Divine Being we can say, as of nothing else, that it is its own goodness. Its goodness is not *adjectival* to it,⁴ because, in it it is all one (and the same) *to be* and *to be good*”.⁵

Nor can the usages referred to in secular and scientific parlance be dismissed as resting on a mere mode of speech (Upacāra), as that would mean that the attributes predicated have no real existence.⁶ The theory put forward by Madhva, is the only one that could effectively surmount the various difficulties involved in any attempt to establish a logical relation between God and His attributes, and conserve His homogeneity and the reality of His attributes. The theory is known as (the doctrine of) “Sa-viśeṣābheda” (सविशेषाभेद).

Madhva recognises with the Advaitin that there can be no difference of Substance and Attributes in Brahman. But that does not entitle us to suppose that the attributes are *less real* than the Brahman, or that they or their attribution to the Brahman, is illusory. He takes his stand upon significant texts in the *Kaṭha*, etc.,

एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यंस्तानेवानुविधावति ।

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ; य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥

3. गुणगुणिमात्रस्तु एकत्र—ब्रह्मणि विशेषाद्युज्यते ॥ (Td. p. 87)

4. Madhva would however observe that it *can be so termed* with the help of Viśeṣas.

5. Quoted from an extract in G. Dawes Hick's *Hibbert Lectures*, 1937, on “The Philosophical Bases of Theism”, p. 258.

6. न चौपाचारिकं समवायसत्त्वम् ; मुख्यतस्तदभावप्रसङ्गात् ॥ (Tattvapradīpa, p. 12)

Jayatīrtha sums up the argument beautifully :—

यदि धर्मा एव न सन्ति, तर्हि 'नेहास्ति किञ्चन' 'धर्मान् पश्यन्' इत्येव वक्तव्यम् । 'नाना' इति—'पृथक्' इति च व्यर्थमेव । तेन, सन्ति धर्माः ; किं तु, न भिन्ना, नापि भिन्नाभिन्ना इति श्रुत्यर्थः । अनयैव श्रुत्या विशेषोऽपि द्योतितः ॥

(V.T.N. ṭikā, p. 121b)

[If there had been no attributes, the sense would be complete with such terms as 'There is nothing here' 'Seeing attributes' and so on. As it is, the expressions 'different' (पृथक्) and 'separately' (नाना) are without a content. Hence we infer that the real meaning is that there *are* attributes; but that they are neither *different or separate* from the Brahman nor partly different and partly identical with it; but part and parcel of it. The concept of Viśeṣa too is hinted at by this Śruti.]

It is not merely by implication that we know that there are attributes in the Brahman. Direct statements to the effect are not wanting in Scripture :—

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।

(Śvet. Up. vi.8)

मय्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे । (Bhāg. vi.4.48)

ज्ञः कालकालौ गुणी सर्वविद्यः । (Śvet. Up. vi.2)

We cannot ascribe these attributes to the working of Māyā, as the text rules out the possibility of their being adventitious and due to Māyā, by the emphatic declaration that they are "Svābhāvika", essential and natural to Brahman. Neither can the so-called 'Nirguṇa-text': एको देवःकेवलो निर्गुणश्च be of much avail, as the earlier part of it itself refers to a string of attributes in Brahman, such as oneness (एकत्वं) godliness (देवत्वं) immanence (सर्वभूतेषु गूढः) all-pervasiveness (सर्वव्यापी) lordship of creatures (सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा) lordship of Karma (कर्माच्यक्षः) omnipresence (सर्वभूताधिवासः) witnessing capacity (साक्षी) and sentience (चेता). In the circumstances therefore, निर्गुण cannot mean that the Brahman is utterly devoid of any attributes whatever.

The doctrine of Viśeṣas is thus forced upon everyone of us by the very laws of thought. Even the Advaitin (Akhaṇḍārthavādīn), says

Madhva, is forced to concede⁷ the operation of Viśeṣas, in respect of the attributes predicated of the Brahman in such texts as 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' Are the qualities सत्यं, ज्ञानम् and अनन्तम् 'mutually different or not? If they are, we have to admit an element of plurality in Brahman, which cannot be. If they are all the same, there is no need to posit three of them, as any one of them will do. They would thus be synonymous in effect (पर्यायशब्द) and hence redundant. It cannot be that there *are* or may be subtle shades of difference amongst them; for, the Brahman is *ex hypothesi* Nirviśeṣa without any shade of any kind of difference or peculiarity. Nor can their employment be defended on the assumption of "affirmation through negation of the opposite." (अनृतादिव्यावृत्तिमुत्प्रेन) Even there must be recognised, some kind of distinction from the *opposite so negated* as otherwise, the entire negation would be a meaningless proposition.⁸

The distinction from 'unreality (anṛta) must perforce be distinct from the distinction from ignorance, limitation, etc. The doctrine of Saviśeṣābheda is thus forced upon all as a "Sarvatāntrasiddhānta". None who respects the laws of thought can escape it.⁹

7. See *Anuvyākhyāna*, i, 1, adh. 1, ver. 105-13 and iii, 2, p. 36-7 :—

सच्चिदादेरपर्यायसिद्धयर्थं मायिनापि हि ।

अङ्गीकार्यो विशेषोऽयं ॥

अखण्डखण्डवादिभ्यां ।

महादरेण शिरसि विशेषो धार्य एव हि ॥

8. Cf. किं ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेन असत्त्वादिव्यावृत्तिबोधः प्रयोजनमुच्यते ? उत स्वतन्त्र एव व्यावृत्ति-
बोधः [नाथः निर्विशेषत्वात् । न द्वितीयः । अजिज्ञासितत्वात्] (NS. p. 105)

अखण्डवादिनोऽपि स्याद्विशेषोऽनिच्छतोऽप्यसौ ।

व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषे तु किं व्यावृत्त्यवहुत्वतः ? ॥ Av. i, p. 10b.

9. It is known to the Sūtrakāra (iii, 2, 27) and is implied in 'एवं धर्मान्' As a matter of fact it is an ancient doctrine of the Pañcarātrikas as may be gathered from the comments of Śaṅkara himself on B.S. II, 4, 48. Naturally then it appears to have been elaborated in the Samhitās of the Pañcarātra, some of which have been quoted by Madhva in his VTN. :—

गुणक्रियादयो विष्णोः स्वरूपं नान्यदिष्यते ।

अतो मिथोऽपि भेदो न ; तेषां कश्चित्कदाचन ॥

स्वरूपेऽपि विशेषोऽस्ति स्वरूपत्ववदेव तु ।

भेदाभावेऽपि तेनैव व्यवहारश्च सर्वतः ॥ इति परमोपनिषदि ॥

There are doubtless certain texts in Scripture which deny all predicates to the Brahman; but Madhva contends that for reasons already stated, they must be taken to deny only finite and false attributes to Brahman,—not all attributes whatever. In this he is one with Rāmānuja and other Theistic philosophers and has the support of the interpretative literature of the Purāṇas.¹⁰

The Advaitins' objection that all attributes are, in the last analysis, relative and so cannot be predicated of the Absolute Brahman, is not so invulnerable as it may seem; since सत्ता ज्ञान and “आनन्द्य” existence, knowledge and absence of limitations recognised to be present in the Brahman,¹¹ are themselves relative (to an ‘other’) in that they presuppose Time and Space and objects to be known or at least their opposites of non-existence, ignorance and limitation, from which the Brahman is sought to be distinguished. If there be no reality or knowledge in Brahman, how is one to distinguish it from that which is unreal or ignorant? Such distinction at least must be real and to that extent the Brahman would become relative to an “other”.

Madhva conceives of the Brahman as Sva-prakāśa, but not in the Advaitic sense of the term. The self-luminosity of the Brahman as understood by the Advaitin, is without a content. That which would neither illumine itself nor consent to be illumined by another can only be a blank¹²:

न च सर्वप्रमाणागोचरत्वे तदस्तीति सिद्धयति¹²। नास्तित्वं तु सप्तमरसादिवत्
अदर्शनात् सिद्धयति। स्वप्रकाशत्वं च नामानं सिद्धयति। स्वप्रकाशत्वं च ततोऽतिरिक्तं चेद्वि-
शेषाङ्गीकारः। न चेत्तदेव प्रमाणगोचरम्। तत्प्रमाणाभावे परप्रकाशत्वमात्रनिरासे स्वप्रकाशत्वे
प्रमाणाभावात्, अप्रकाशत्वमेव स्यात्! (GT. V. p. 680b).

अभिन्नत्वममेदञ्च यथा मेदविवर्जितम् ।
व्यवहार्यं पृथक् च स्यादेवं सर्वे गुणा हरेः ॥
अमेदाभिन्नयोर्मेदो यदि वा मेदभिन्नयोः ।
अनवस्थितिरेव स्यान्न विशेषणतामतिः ।
मूलसम्बन्धमह्नात्वा ; तस्मादेकमनन्तथा ।
व्यवहार्यं विशेषण ; दुस्तर्कबलतो हरेः ।
विशेषोऽपि स्वरूपं स स्वनिर्वाहकतास्य च ॥ इति ब्रह्मतर्के ॥

10. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* i, 9, 43; vi, 5, 84 and *Varāha*, xiv, 41.

11. Cf. आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्माः। अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात्, पृथगिवाव-
भासन्ते । (*Pañcapādikā*).

12. “Whatever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable is nothing” (Ralph Cudworth).

CHAPTER V

THE WORLD AND ITS RELATION TO THE BRAHMAN

i.

Madhva's conception of the material world and its relation to the Brahman, is free from the difficulties that beset the Parīṇāma and Vivarta-vādins. Pantheism is worse than irreligion. It pulls down the Deity to the gutter. Madhva, therefore rejects the view of Bhāskara and many others that Brahman in itself provides the stuff of which the Universe is made. So far as all our received knowledge and the testimony of the Scriptures go, there would appear to be an unbridgeable gulf between Spirit and Matter : चित् and जड¹. The Brahman is essentially Saccidānanda. How then, could such a perfect Being of pure intelligence and bliss, evolve out of itself, an effect that is inert and wholly lacking in intelligence and is in addition, the abode of so much misery and subject to ceaseless transformation ? There is no use in taking refuge in alleged statements in the śruti to the effect that the Brahman is immediately and in its own person, the material cause of the world. 'For not even the vociferation of a hundred texts can make the crow white'². Reason may test even where it cannot build, and where conflicting authorities claim to interpret the śruti each to suit his own metaphysics, the employment of reason becomes more important than the bare text itself.

Not even Scripture says directly that the intelligent becomes the unintelligent. In that case, the Brahman can as well transform itself into individual souls thus simplifying matters for all philosophers. Moreover, the śruti teaches emphatically that Brahman is immutable and unchanging : Nirvikāra. Since no causation is possible without *some* change or modification in the cause, we *must* naturally look for the material cause of the Universe, elsewhere than in the Brahman.

A strict adherence to the logic of facts and the spirit of the śrutis, compels Madhva to repudiate the profanity of Brahmaparīṇāmavāda in any garb. Even the oft-paraded promissory statement about the knowledge of the One leading to the knowledge of the many,

1. नचेतनविकारः स्याद्यत्र कापि हचेतनम्॥

नाचेतनविकारोऽपि चेतनः स्यात्कदाचन ॥ (Av., i, 4, p. 13b)

2. Cf. नद्यागमाः सहस्रमपि घटं पटयितुमीक्षते ॥ (Bhāmati p. 6. Bby. 1917.)

does not *necessarily* warrant the conclusion that the Brahman is the material cause of the Universe. The examples of "mr̥tpiṇḍa" 'lohamāṇi' and 'nakhanikṛntana', in the form in which they appear in the *Chān. Up.* vi, 1, 4-6 are virtually incapable of suggesting anything more than some kind of general *resemblance* or point of contact between God and the world. The terms एक (used thrice), पिण्ड, मणि and नखनिकृन्तन *stand in the way* of establishing an intimate causal relation उपादानोपादेयभाव among the pairs named in the text.³ A little reflection would prove the truth of this contention.⁴ There is no use pleading that we should not take in the texts literally but look to their spirit; for the spirit itself is to be deduced from the letter. However that may be, the third and last illustration of the "nail-scissors", *has not even the semblance of a causal argument.*⁵ It gives the whole case away. It is in itself an effect and cannot, in the nature of things, be "the cause of

3. अन्यथा 'एक' शब्दः 'पिण्ड' शब्दश्च व्यर्थः स्यात्। मृदा विज्ञातया इत्येतावता पूर्णत्वात्। नह्येकमृत्पिण्डात्मकानि अन्यमृण्मयानि ! सादृश्यमेव हि तेषाम्। नह्येकमण्यात्मकमन्यलोहमयम् ! नचैकनखनिकृन्तनोत्तमकं सर्वं कार्णायसम् ! (Madhva, VTN, p. 25b.)

[Otherwise the words "eka" and piṇḍa" would be meaningless. It would be enough to say "By knowing mud" . . . Surely, all that is made of earth is not the result of one clod of earth ! There can only be a resemblance amongst them. All that is metallic in the world is not the effect of one nugget of gold ! Nor all that is made of iron, the effects of a single nail-cutter !]

4. जगतो ब्रह्मविकारत्वेन तदारोत्वेन वा एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञाने विवक्षिते, 'मृदा विज्ञातया मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्याल्लोहेन विज्ञातेन लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्यात्कार्णायसा विज्ञातेन कार्णायसं विज्ञातं स्यात् इत्येतावता पूर्णत्वात् त्रयाणामेकशब्दानां पिण्डमणिनखनिकृन्तनशब्दानां सर्वशब्दानां च विगतार्थत्वं स्यात्। सर्वमण्यादीनां एकमृत्पिण्ड विकारत्वाभावात् विरुद्धार्थता च स्यात्। (N.S., i, 4, p. 226)

[When the knowledge of the many by the knowledge of the one is posited either in view of the world being a transformation of Brahman or a superimposition on it, the words "eka" (thrice) piṇḍa, maṇi and nakhanikṛntana and "sarvam" would not only be meaningless as the sense would be conveyed even by saying "By knowing mud, all that is made of it is known, by knowing gold all that is made of it is known, by knowing iron all that is of the nature of it is known, but positively misleading.]

5. इदं तु सर्वथानुपपन्नम्। नखनिकृन्तनस्य स्वयमप्यन्यावयवित्वेन कार्णायसं प्रति कारणत्वस्यैवाभावात्। किम्वेकस्य सर्वं प्रति ? (N.S., i, 4, 6, p. 226.)

[As for the example of the nail-cutter it is *utterly absurd* as the nail-cutter is itself an effect (and last in the scale) and not one nail-cutter can be said to be the cause (material) of iron. Much less that it is the cause of all that is made of iron!]

all that is made of *kṛṣṇāyas*". It should be clear then, that the argument to the material causality of the Brahman breaks down completely and at the very first touch, in this instance. The position is hardly better in the other two.

It would be far more reasonable to assume that the object of the three illustrations is merely to insist on the primacy of knowledge of the Brahman over all other knowledge. To know God is to know at one sweep, the world that is His and is so entirely dependent upon Him.⁶ *यज्ज्ञात्वा नेह भूयोऽन्यज्ज्ञातव्यमवशिष्यते* (Gītā vii, 2). For the knowledge of God is the end and aim of life, the cream and culmination of all wisdom. Sage Uddālaka is naturally at pains to impress this fundamental truth upon his boy who is conceited enough (*स्तब्ध एयाय*) to glory in his learning of a kind divorced from God-vision.

An interpretation such as this has no doubt many attractive features ; but it has got its own difficulties in correlation. While there is much truth in Madhva's contention that a relation of material cause and effect could not be established among the pairs named by Uddālaka, (if regard be had to the actual manner of wording), it cannot be denied that in each case, the pairs belong to one and the same species, which renders 'Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam' possible. It is doubtful if such an affinity could ever be established by Madhva between God and the world. There is however little difficulty in the case of the souls which are all sentient and belong like God to the class of *Ātman* having the attributes of *Sat-cit* and *ānanda* in common. It may not be so easy to establish a like connection between God and the world, whose only affinity with the Brahman is that of existence and reality.⁷ A closer bond between the two would be impossible without positing the metaphysical dependence of the material world on God. Madhva could afford to concede that also : cf. *इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिवेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसंभवः* । (Bhāg. i, 5, 20)

And his comment thereon : *इतरोऽपि भगवान् विश्वमिव ; स्वातन्त्र्यात् ।*

6. प्रधानज्ञानादप्रधानस्य ज्ञातवद्वयपदेशोऽस्त्येव । कारणे च पितरि ज्ञाते पुत्रो ज्ञात इति । एवमत्रापि एतत्सृष्टं सर्वमित्यादि । (Madhva, VTN) Cf. also यथैकेन मृत्पिण्डेनेत्यादि दृष्टान्तः परमात्मनः प्राधान्यं सूचयतः यथा सोमशर्मणैकेन ज्ञातेन सर्वे कथा ज्ञाता भवन्ति । *Bhāmātī*, p. 425, in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

7. Cf. Śaṅkara on B.S. ii, 1, 6 :

दृश्यते हि सचालक्षणो ब्रह्मसमाव आकाशादिः पञ्चवर्तमान इत्युक्तम् ॥

The other familiar examples of (1) scorpions being produced from cowdung ; (2) hair and nails from the human body ; and (3) the growth of man from childhood and youth to old age,—quoted to establish the material causality of Brahman, are all equally unavailing. The point at issue is the possibility of an unintelligent (jaḍa) effect being produced *solely* from a sentient source. The analogy of scorpions is therefore doubly irrelevant as the scorpion is a living creature and the dung insentient.⁸ The growth of hair and nails from the human body is possible only so long as it is tenanted and sustained by a soul and not at other times. But the Pariṇāmavādin has necessarily to conceive of a state when Brahma-caitanya alone existed in an incorporeal or pre-corporeal state and *later on* produced the material world out of itself. But a disembodied Brahman cannot on the very same analogy of man, produce anything. It would in any case be impossible to show that nails and hair are directly produced from the soul. The example of the development of man from childhood to old age pertains, in the opinion of all Śāstrakāras, only to the body (śarīradharma) of man not to his soul. The ripening of wisdom with the advance of years and the appearance of virility in youth are all possible only in the event of a body sustained by the presence of a soul. None of the developments can or is known to take place in the *soul as such*. And in all these cases, the purely physical developments are always attributable to the physical part in the causal complement.⁹ Consistent then, with the implications of these analogies, the Pariṇāmavādin must admit that the purely material part of Brahman—if ever it has or can be said to have any—is the material cause of the world¹⁰ and that the soul-part or spiritual element in its make-up, is the operative Cause.¹¹ That would be tantamount to a restatement of the position of Madhva in less rigorous phraseology.

8. Even if such production were biologically true, it admits of other explanation, in so far as the scorpion has a material body which may be derived from the dung. But the soul of the scorpion (in so far as it may have one !), cannot be a product of cowdung. Śamkara's explanation (B.S. ii, 1, 6) that the Brahman has *sattā*, in common with its effects like Ākāśa, overlooks the fact that this *sattā* is not like the body of man, distinguishable from the Brahman !

9. पित्रादिदृष्टान्तानामयं खलु निष्कृष्टोऽर्थः—यत् पित्राद्युपभुक्तमन्नं तच्छरीरभूतं पुत्रादिगता-
चेतनांशोपादानं भवतीति । पक्षान्तरस्यासंभावितत्वात् । (NS. i, p. 197)

10. भागेन परिणामश्चेत् भागयोर्भेद एव हि ।

यो भागो न विकारी स्यात्स एवास्माकमीश्वरः ॥ (Av. i, 13b.)

11. In such a contingency, the material part would have to be regarded as not-

In so far as most *Parīṇāmavādins* like *Bhāskara* and *Śrīkaṇṭha* do not admit the co-existence of a purely material principle (*Prakṛti*) which can figuratively be styled the body of God, the illustration of scorpions, etc., cannot reasonably be cited by them. *Bhāskara* is the only *Vedāntin* who holds fearlessly to actual *Brahmaparīṇāma* and regards not merely the material world, but the souls as well, as products of Brahman. This lands him in further difficulty of having to visit the miseries of the finite selves also, on the Brahman, contrary to the repeated protests of the *Upaniṣads* (अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीत् and the *Sūtra* : संमोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न i, 2, 8.) .

Rāmānuja however cannot afford to go to the same length as *Bhāskara* and *deny* the existence of a purely material principle called *Prakṛti*, co-existent with Brahman though subject to it and acting as its body (यस्यान्तं शरीरम्). The so-called *Brahmopādānatva* on *his* view, is on a par with the procreation of the son (i.e. his body), by the father or the emergence of nails and hair from the body nurtured by food :—

अपादानत्वमेवास्य यद्युपादानता भवेत् ।

अङ्गीकृतं तत् पितृवन्नैव विश्वात्मना भवः ॥

(*Madhva*, *Av.* i. p. 12.)

[If by saying that God is the material cause of the Universe you mean that He is merely the residual Spirit that remains unaffected and untransforming in any given instance of change in its tenement, we agree to *such* *Upādānatva* (material causality) which is on a par with the causality of the father in regard to his son.]

Even the position of *Śrīkaṇṭha* and other (*Brahma*)-*Śaktiparīṇāma*-*vādins*, like *Nimbārka*, *Vallabha* and others, is hardly better. In so far as this (*Cit*-)*śakti* of Brahman, which according to these writers, is the immediate substratum of *Parīṇāma*, is distinguished from the soul-part of Brahman conceived as *Saccidānandātmaka*, the latter ceases to be the real substratum of the change. It is this *Cicchakti*,¹² *śakti* or energy or

Brahman—as there can obviously be nothing material about the Brahman. This would give us but a *Kevala-nimittakāraṇa* in the end.

12. The phrase is peculiar to *Śrīkaṇṭha*. *Cit-śakti*, on his view, is conceived as *Cidacit-prapañcakāra*. It is sometimes identified with the Brahman and sometimes distinguished—a loose procedure, no doubt.

“body” of God (as Rāmānuja calls it) that turns out to be the *real* and immediate material cause of the world. Even this is a far cry from the actual and immediate Upādānatva or Pariṇāmitva of Brahman,¹³ being in effect, no more than a feeble imitation of and a poor apology for it. Thus, in most cases, the so-called Upādānatva of God, turns out, on closer examination, to be nothing more than an “Apādānatva” अपायावधिचलक्षणम्—the residual Spirit that remains unaffected and untransforming in any given instance of change taking place in its tenement. Shorn of the metaphors of “body”, “Cit-śakti”,

13. Cf. the following brilliant analysis by Jayatīrtha (N.S. i, 200):—

अथ मतम्—द्विरूपं ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्यते अनन्तानन्दचिदात्मकं सदात्मकं चेति । तत्राद्येन रूपेण निमित्तं द्वितीयेनोपादानम् । अतो न कश्चिद्विषः निर्विकारित्वं चिच्छक्तिविषयत्वाददूषणम् । तेन, सच्छक्तिकं ब्रह्म परिणमतीत्यङ्गीकारे न युक्तिविरोधोऽपि ... । यदि ब्रह्मणः सद्भागेन परिणामः चिद्भागेन निर्विकारित्वमङ्गीक्रियते तदा वक्तव्यम्—तयोर्भागयोरभेदो भेदाभेदो वा? न तावदभेदः; द्वयोरपि परिणामित्वापत्त्या भागद्वयकल्पनावैयर्थ्यात् । नापि भेदाभेदौ । अभेदेन सङ्करप्रसङ्गात् । भेदोऽभेदकार्यं निरुणद्धाति चेत्; किं तर्ह्यभेदेनाप्रयोजकेन ? तस्माद्भागयोरलान्तभेद एवाङ्गीकार्यः । ततः किमित्यत आह—यो भाग इति । परस्परमलान्तभिन्ने द्वे वस्तुनी । तत्रैकं निर्विकारं जगन्निमित्तमेव । अपरं परिणामि जगदुपादानमेवेत्यङ्गीकारे नेश्वरस्य केवलनिमित्तत्वादिनामस्माकं कश्चिद्विरोधः । निर्विकारस्य जगन्निमित्तस्यास्माभिरीश्वरत्वेन, परिणामिनो जगदुपादानस्य प्रधानत्वेन चाङ्गीकृतत्वात् । अत्र ‘यो भाग’ इति पराभ्युपगमेनोक्तम् । स्वमतेन तु यद्वस्तु इति ज्ञातव्यम् ॥ This criticism though not expressly directed against Śrīkaṇṭha, covers his position also admirably, as indeed of every other variety of शाक्तपरिणामवाद.

[If you think—“There are two aspects of the Brahman. One that is essentially blissful and of the nature of Cit, the other of the nature of “Sat”. (existence). It is efficient cause in the former aspect and material cause in the latter. The immutability of Brahman is thus to be understood with reference to the former aspect. There is no clash with logic in thus submitting that the Brahman in its aspect of Sat, transforms itself into the material world.”

The advocates of such a position will have to say if these two aspects are identical with each other or are partly different and partly identical. They cannot be identical as both will have to transform. Nor can they be different—and identical. For at least in respect of identity there will be the same nemesis. If it is argued that the difference would prevent the identity from bringing about the said nemesis, why not dispense with the identity that is so palpably powerless against the difference ?

Therefore it must be conceded that the two aspects are entirely different. It thus comes to this that there are two different entities, one of which is essentially immutable and acting as the operative cause alone of the Universe. The other one is liable to transformation and acts as the material

“śakti”, *et hoc*, the *Pariṇāmavāda* of most commentators on the *Vedānta*, is little more than (Kevala-) *nimitta-kāraṇavāda*—just a bombastic and a periphrastic statement of the latter, a simple case of *pure Nimitta-kāraṇavāda writ larger* as “*Abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇavāda*”! This is made perfectly clear, by Jayatīrtha, in a masterly review of the position of Rāmānuja :

अत्र कश्चिदन्धानुगतान्ध इव प्रकृतिश्चत्यादीनि सूत्राणि ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानप्रतिपादकतया व्याख्यायोक्तदूषणगणाङ्कीतः सूत्रतात्पर्यमेवमाह—परमसूक्ष्माचित्प्रधानशरीरं ब्रह्म ‘योऽन्यक्ते तिष्ठन् यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरं’ इत्यादि श्रुतिसिद्धम् । तथा च ब्रह्माधिष्ठितं ब्रह्मात्मकं प्रधानं जगदुपादानमिति ब्रह्मैव जगदुपादानतयाङ्गीक्रियते । अतो नोक्तदोष इति । तं प्रत्याह—अपादानत्वमेवेति ॥

एवं हि वदता, पितुरिव पुत्रजन्मनि, जगदुत्पत्तौ ब्रह्मणोऽप्यवधित्वलक्षणमेवोपादानत्वमिष्टं स्यात् । सर्वथा निर्विकारस्य ब्रह्मणो विकारिप्रधानशरीरकस्य तदधिष्ठातृत्वेनोपादानतयोदितत्वात्—एवंभूतं चोपादानत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽस्माभिरप्यङ्गीकृतमेवेति नात्रास्माकं प्रद्वेषः ।

नन्वङ्गीकृतं चेदुपादानत्व ब्रह्मणः, कथं तर्हि तन्निराकरणम् ? इत्यत आह—“नत्विति ।” शुद्धचैतन्यस्यैव ब्रह्मणो विश्वात्मना भवः भास्कराद्यङ्गीकृतः नास्माभिरङ्गीक्रियते । अतस्तन्निराकरणमुपपन्नमेवेति ।

अत्रायमभिसन्धिः—यद्यपि परव्युत्पादितं ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वं नास्माकर्थतो विरोधि, तथापि, नैतेषां सूत्राणामर्थः । तथा हि—किमत्रास्य व्युत्पादनस्य प्रयोजनम् ? न तावद्भास्करस्यैव निमित्तोपादानभेदनिराकरणम् ; प्रधानस्योपादानतयाङ्गीकृतत्वात् ।^{13a}

cause of the world. If this were so, we who are advocates of the view that God is the operative cause only, of the Universe, have no reason to quarrel with you. For according to us God is that which is immutable and is the efficient cause of the origin, etc., of the world. What actually transforms and acts as the material cause of the world is designated by us as *Pradhāna* (Matter). In the above discussion, the term “part” or “aspect” should be understood to have been used from the point of view of the other party. From our point of view the proper term would be “Entity”.]

13a. cf. न वयमभ्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाम्युपगच्छामः । अपि तु, परमपुरुषशरीर-तया तदात्मकत्वविरहेण । तथानाम्युपगमादेव तन्त्रसिद्धप्रक्रियानिरसनम् । अत्रापि तन्त्रसिद्धप्रक्रिया निरस्यते । न ब्रह्मात्मकानां प्रकृतिमहदहङ्काराणां स्वरूपम् ॥ *Śrībhāṣya*, I.4.3.

विकारिवस्त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव मुख्यमुपादानत्वमिति चेत् ; न । लोकविरोधात् । लोकव्यवहारानुसारेणैव हि परीक्षकैर्लक्षणं कार्यम् ! न स्वाभिप्रायेण लोकव्यवहारो नियन्तव्यः ॥

(*Nyāyasudhā*, i. 4, p. 197b). See also the Introduction to my *Catus-sūtri-bhāṣya* of Madhva, p. xxii, xxiii, for an exposition of this criticism.

This would make clear how poor an apology and how lame a substitute for the real redolent Brahmapariṇāmavāda, Rāmānuja's theory is. There is nothing of the substance of real Brahmapariṇāmavāda in it, save a loose and unscientific use of the *terminology* of Brahmopādānavāda.

As for the Vivarta-vāda, it is, strictly speaking, no theory of causality at all, as on that view, there is no causation at all—no world to be accounted for : न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः (*Gauḍapāda Kārikā* ii, 31). Quite apart from the difficulty of *accounting* for the obscuration of the Brahman by Ajñāna,¹⁴ which is the root-cause of world-appearance, there is greater difficulty than even on the Pariṇāmavāda interpretation, in reconciling the promissory statement of the Śruti regarding एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् with the illustrations of clay, etc., and the requirements of *real* Vivartavāda.¹⁵ It would, in the first place, be truer to say from this (Vivarta) point of view that the knowledge of the one *sublates* or destroys the knowledge of the many, rather than that it *produces* or *gives rise* (अश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति) to a knowledge of the many. The expressions used by Uddālaka are not merely inappropriate to the Vivarta point of view but capable of suggesting a different interpretation altogether. There is nothing to show that Uddālaka was trying to equate the many with the unreal. The unreal is that something which has been mistaken for another:—Cf. कोऽयमग्यासो नाम ? अतस्मिन्स्तदबुद्धिरित्यबोचाम (Śaṅkara, B.S.B.). But the “many” in the promissory statement includes also things which have not at all been hitherto brought within the scope of Śvetaketu's

14. यच्चाविकृतमेवैकं ब्रह्म विश्वात्मना मृषा ।

दृश्यते मन्ददृष्टयेव स सर्ग इति कथ्यते ॥

स मन्ददृष्टिः तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः किं ततोऽन्यगा ?

ब्रह्मणश्चेत् क सार्वज्ञं ? अन्यगा चेत्सतोऽन्यता । (AV. i, 4, 13b.)

15. आरोपितत्वं तु, एकस्यापि मृषमयस्यैकस्मिन्मृत्पिण्डे नास्ति ; किमुत सर्वस्य ! युक्त्या समर्थत इति चेत् ; तर्हि विवादपदत्वेन दृष्टान्तानुपपत्तेः । ‘लौकिकपरीक्षाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः’ इति हि न्यायविदः ॥ (NS. i, 4, 6, p. 226.)

understanding or misunderstanding : Cf. अश्रुतं श्रुतं मवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम् । In any case, the illustrations of clay, etc, would appear to assume the reality of effects, the connecting link between the One and the many being nothing more than a general Sādrśya. Clay is never the Vivartopādāna of pots. Since no causal relation can be made out among the pairs mentioned in the text, without distorting the actual wording and asserting a palpable travesty in the last instance of Nakhanikṛtana, the interpretations of both Śamkara¹⁶ and Rāmānuja would seem to be misplaced.

CHAPTER VI.

PRAKṚTI'S ENTITY NEITHER MYTHICAL NOR UNŚĀSTRAIC

It would doubtless be asked, why if the Brahmapariṇāmavāda were so untenable, the Sūtrakāra should have been at so much pains to uphold it in his work ? Madhva denies, boldly, that he has done anything of the kind. There is no proof in the Sūtras that Bādarāyaṇa actually taught the Brahmapariṇāmavāda. To many such a view may appear startling. Doubtless, Madhva could as well have escaped with the admission that the Sūtrakāra teaches or means to teach only *such* Pariṇāma of Brahman as has been adumbrated by Rāmānuja, which we have seen, is no more than a nominal one.¹ But that would merely have shelved the question whether the Sūtrakāra *does* or *does not* concede the existence of a separate material principle *other than* the Brahman and corresponding to the Prakṛti of the Sāmkhya, that provides the stuff of which the material world is made ; and if so, what according to him, is the *status* of that principle,—whether it is *independent* of the Brahman, or is a creation of it, or else, both co-existent with and dependent upon it ?

16. So long as this difficulty persists, nothing could be gained by holding to Sarvajñātman's special pleading :

विवर्तवादस्य हि पूर्वमूढिः ।

व्यवस्थितेऽस्मिन्परिणामवादे स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः ॥

(*Samkṣepaśārīraka*, ii, 61.)

that Vivarta and Pariṇāma are not really so different and inimical to each other, but that the latter is a preliminary to the former or that it is a "development rather than a negation" of the latter. परिणाम assumes real modification which विवर्त denies.

1. Cf. *ante* एवंभूतं च ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वमस्मामिरप्यङ्गीकृतमेवेति नात्रास्माकं प्रद्वेषः । (NS.)

अपादानत्वमेवास्य यद्युपादानता मवेत् ।

अङ्गीकृतं तत्पितृवत् । (Av. i, 4)

Madhva faces this question which is so vital to Hindu philosophy, not merely with special reference to the Sūtras, but to the entire literature of the Vedas, Upaniṣads and Epics. It is this spirit of fidelity to the bulk of the received literature and anxiety to propound a philosophy that would cover and do justice to the whole of it, that distinguishes him from other commentators on the Vedānta.

We shall start our investigation of this issue with reference to the few sūtras which are generally believed to repudiate the concept of Prakṛti and affirm the Brahman itself to be the sole and whole cause, both material and operative, of the Universe. The relevant contexts in the Sūtras may thus be briefly indicated :—

- (1) ईक्षत्यधिकरणम् ; (2) प्रकृतिश्च..... (3) तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ;
(4) आनुमानिकमप्येकेषाम् and (5) रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्.

Now, it is agreed on all hands that the Sūtrakāra has severely criticised the metaphysics of the Sāmkhyas, in his work. But what precisely is the point at issue between him and the Sāmkhyas ? Before answering this question, it would be well to state the fundamental position of the Sāmkhya metaphysics. It is admittedly agnostic if not also atheistic. The Sāmkhya recognises but two ultimate principles : Prakṛti and Puruṣas. Prakṛti is directly the cause of the evolution of the material world from a subtle to a gross state. She is conceived to be essentially unintelligent and virtually *independent* of the Puruṣas, though co-operating with them for *their* welfare. The Sāmkhya has thus no use for a creator-God (Brahman) such as the Sūtrakāra is enamoured of : जन्माद्यस्य यतः। The point at issue would thus be the philosophical necessity of recognising an intelligent Cause, such as the Brahman, for the world.

A little attention now to the ईक्षत्यधिकरण even as interpreted by Śamkara would show that the Sūtrakāra is fighting for the recognition of such an intelligent principle as the Cause of the World—in other words for a Nimittakāraṇa. This is clear from his emphasis on the attribute of ईक्षितृत्वं purposive willing, which is a pre-condition of creation—ईक्षितृत्वात्कारणस्य । The Sāmkhya Pradhāna being avowedly insentient, cannot operate as a discerning Cause ईक्षितृ कारणम् । and cannot therefore be admitted as the ultimate cause of the world. That the Sūtrakāra is here thinking only of an operative cause is also clear from a later sūtra : रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् (ii, 2, 1) and Śamkara's comment

on it :— कथमचेतनं प्रधानं रचयेत् and again, (प्रवृत्तिरपि) नाचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य सत्तन्त्रस्योपपद्यते ॥ (ii, 2, 2).

Though it could not follow from this that the Sūtrakāra was loth to using the term “cause”, with reference to a purely material cause, such as alone the Pradhāna could be, the inference would be quite legitimate that he was in i, 1, 5, conceiving of the Brahman, simply as the Nimittakāraṇa of the world. If he had thought it possible that it was *also* the material cause, he does not say so *in the present context*. At any rate, we will have to look for a clearer statement on that issue, elsewhere. The sense of the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa would be complete (चरितार्थ) even as referring to a Nimittakāraṇa alone. If Śaṅkara could argue from the logical point of view that the ultimate cause of the world cannot be an insentient thing, the Sāṃkhya would equally logically point out that conversely no sentient being can be the material cause with reference to another object, and that to that extent his Abhinnaṇimittopādāna is weakened.

The only answer Śaṅkara gives to this objection is an appeal to the Śāstra. This is hardly convincing since *even he* is not prepared to swallow everything that the Śāstra has got to say. Were he so, there is hardly any need for the *Bhāmatī* under B.S. i, 4, 27, to shy at the acceptance of an actual Brahmapariṇāma which is admitted to be the literal sense of the śruti and the sūtra (i, 4, 27) and prevaricate by saying that what they really mean to teach is the Vivartopādānatva of the Brahman through the backdoor of Pariṇāma, and not an actual Pariṇāma into the form of the material world, in view of the unchanging nature of the Brahman.²

Apart however from this *tour de force* of Vācaspati, the interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa, in terms of the material causality of the Brahman is beside the mark, in so far as the illustrations used in the text, do not, as already pointed out, lend themselves to the requirements of Pariṇāmavāda. By a strange irony of fate, there is more of दृष्टान्तोपरोध (conflict with the illustrations) than its contrary: दृष्टान्तानुपरोध

2. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिमाषा न विकारमिप्रायेण । अपि तु, यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुः एवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम् । न खलु निरंशस्य निष्कलस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वात्मनेकदेशेन वा परिणामः संभवति ॥ (i, 4, 27) Why not, when the śruti teaches it: सच्च लक्ष्मामवत् । It would be well to remember that “Pariṇāma” assumes a real transformation, which Vivarta denies. The two views are thus as poles asunder.

(B.S. i, 4, 27) if the illustrations are sought to be correlated to a *Parīṇāmavāda*. It is worse still, if with the *Vivartavāda*.

This conflict with the illustrations naturally continues in the *तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण* | also (as interpreted by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja) where also, the *विषयवाक्य* happens to be the same text from the *Chāndogya* : *एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन* etc.

There is thus, not a single sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa which can be taken to support the doctrine of actual *Brahmaparīṇāma*, (in lieu of *Prakṛti-Parīṇāma*), without reserve or ambiguity. In the absence of any such indubitable support, it may as well be assumed that he does *not* countenance the view.

ii

The repeated criticism of the Sāṃkhya metaphysics should not therefore, mislead us into thinking that the Sūtrakāra has forever banished the *Prakṛti* from *his* metaphysics, or that he denies that the concept of *Prakṛti* has any place in the philosophical literature of the Hindus (अशब्दम्³) The आनुमानिक and some other sūtras may appear to support such a conclusion. But it would not be justified. Since the *Prakṛtyadhi-karṇa* cannot (as we have seen) be correlated to any doctrine of causality ; it must with due regard to the context: *Saman-vayādhyāya*, be taken merely as attempting the attunement of such (feminine) names as *प्रकृति योनि* etc., in Brahman, as of *Ākāśa*., *Akṣara*, etc., in an earlier context. The *Ānumānika-sūtra* i, 4,1 ; also

3. Such is no doubt the opinion of Śaṅkara. But it is baseless. Rāmānuja has even less justification to dismiss the *Prakṛti* as *Āśabdām* as he grants the reality of Matter. Cf. न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छामः । अत्रापि तन्त्र सिद्धप्रक्रिया निरस्यते ; न ब्रह्मात्मकानां प्रकृतिमहदहङ्काराणां स्वरूपम् ॥ (*Śribhāṣya* I.4.3) | It may not be independent of God but then neither are the souls so. One cannot on that account, dismiss the souls as *Āśabdām* ! Madhva takes B.S. i, 1, 5, to refute the doctrine of the *Avācya* of Brahman :— अशब्दं शब्दवाच्यं न | Even if one prefers to take it as a refutation of the Sāṃkhya, *Āśabdām* may be treated as a technical equivalent of *Pradhāna* : that which is established by the Sāṃkhya, primarily by Inference. शब्दाभिन्नमतुमानं अशब्दः । तन्मुख्यप्रमाणकमशब्दमातुमानिकमित्यनर्थान्तरम् Cf. *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, 15-16.

ought to be and is, capable of being so treated, for an identical reason.⁴ In the next *adhikaraṇa*: चमसवदविशेषात् (i, 4, 8), Śaṅkara is equally anxious to deny that a material principle corresponding to the Śāṅkhya-Prakṛti, and having its essential characteristics (of three guṇas) is anywhere taught in the whole range of Śāstras. The Śāṅkhya puts up in his favour the Śvetāśvatara text: अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम् । Śaṅkara tries to elude his adversary and ends by equating the अजा of this text, with the triple elements पृथिव्यप्तेजस् in their subtle state (भूतसूक्ष्म) तेजोऽन्न-लक्षणा. He further contends that this latter is identical with the Māyā-śakti of Īśvara, which is inanimate (भूतसूक्ष्म) and dependent on Him: परमेश्वराधीना ; न सत्तत्त्वा (Śaṅkara) and that in any case, अजामेकाम् gives no quarter to the Śāṅkhya Prakṛti.

Now, in so far as Śaṅkara has not cared to identify this भूतसूक्ष्म with the Brahman, but has freely admitted that these three elements are essentially unintelligent both in their gross and subtle forms, the distinction of such भूतसूक्ष्म from the Prakṛti of the Śāṅkhyas is without a difference. If the monist could admit a material principle *other than* the Brahman (though subject to it), as providing the stuff of which the world is made, why should he unnecessarily fly at the throat of the Śāṅkhya, for asserting an identical principle under a different name,⁵—a name which is also current in the Upaniṣads. If the objection is to the independence of this Prakṛti, as Śaṅkara's protests would appear to signify, his position turns out to be identical with that of Madhva. But then, there could be hardly any reason or justification for seeking to dismiss the Prakṛti as being outside the pale of

4. It may be pointed out in passing that Śaṅkara is at his wit's end here, to find a suitable correlate (अभिधेय) for the term Avyakta (Katha, 1, 3, 11) which he identifies with the "human body"—śarīram—despite the glaring fact of its being only too clearly visible and manifested (Vyakta), instead of being subtle and unmanifested as required by the Sūtra: सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् । (i,4,2) and by the sense of the term "Avyakta".

5. अनादेरुपादानस्य जडस्य भूतसूक्ष्मसम्बन्धमभिधेयस्याङ्गीकारे, प्रधानं नेति रिक्तं वचः । तल्लक्ष-णत्वात्प्रधानस्य । नास्ति विवादायोगादिति भावः ॥ (N. S.)

[If you admit a beginningless material principle to be designated by the term "subtle element", what is the fun of saying that you don't admit Matter? For the same characteristic is possessed by Matter and the difference in name is nothing.]

Hindu Śāstras, and having no status or *locus standi* whatever, therein ! It would be too much for anyone to eat the cake and yet try to have it.⁶

iii

There are plenty of texts in the Śāstras, attesting the existence of Prakṛti as a material principle acting as the material cause of the world and Madhva has cited a few of them,⁷ to show how sweeping and mistaken Śaṅkara and other commentators are, in dismissing the Prakṛti as “*Aśabdam*”, by a mere stroke of their pen. Every student of the *Mahābhārata* knows that the Epic and the Purāṇic Sāṃkhya have long ago recognised the Prakṛti as co-existing with Īśvara and transforming itself at the direction of the Lord :— ,

तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम । (Mbh. xii, 347, 31)

प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चापि विद्वधनादी उभावपि ॥ (Gitā, XIII, 19.)

6. Cf. जगत्कारणत्वेन स्वत्वराजा प्रतीयते । सा ब्रह्मवादिना ब्रह्मपरतया समर्थनीया । तेजोऽब्रह्मात्मकतया समर्थनेऽतिव्याप्तेः तुल्यत्वादिति । तेजोऽब्रह्मान्यपि परमात्माधीनानि । अतो नात्रातिव्याप्तिरिति चेत् ; एवं तर्हि किं मन्त्रस्य प्रकृतिपरत्वनिराकरणेन ? किं तु, प्रकृतिपरत्वमङ्गीकृत्य ‘यो योनिमधितिष्ठत्येकः’ (Śvet. Up. 4-11) इत्यादि वाक्यबलेन ईश्वराधीनत्वमेवोपादनीयम् । किं च तेजऽब्रह्मेषु न तावदजाशब्दो रूढः । नापि यौगिकः । तच्चेजोऽसृजत (Chān. Up. vi, 2, 3) इति श्रुतेः अजनानासंभवात् । नच स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वमुपपद्यते ; नाप्येकवचनम् । त्रिवृत्करणादिति चेन्न ; बहुत्वानिवृत्तेः ॥ (NS. i, p. 193.)

[An unborn principle appears to be the cause of the world. The Brahmovādin, if he were really thoroughgoing, must equate it with Brahman. If he could identify it with “fire, water and food” why could it not be accepted in the form of Prakṛti itself ? For in any case, the definition of Brahman as the cause of the world would be wide of the mark and apply to another also. If you say that there can be no such fear as “Tejas Ap and Anna” are in turn subject to Brahman and that therefore there can be no over-pervasion of the definition, we ask why in that case, you should have been so very solicitous about establishing that the mantra “*Ajām ekām*” has no reference to Prakṛti. Why not admit that it refers to Prakṛti, but that the Prakṛti itself is not an independent principle as can be seen from such texts as “*Yo yonim.....*”] Moreover the term *Ajā* is not an established synonym of “*Tejobanna*”. Nor can it be regarded as etymologically so. They cannot be “Unborn” in view of the Śruti— It created “*Tejas.....*”. So also, the use of the feminine is incompatible. So too, the singular.]

7. *Anuvyākhyāna*, i, 4, p. 12.

यत्तत्त्रिगुणमव्यक्तमविशेषं विशेषवत् ।

प्रधानं प्रकृतिं प्राहुर्नित्यं सदसदात्मकम् ॥ (*Bhāgavata*, III, 27, 1.)

पञ्चभिः पञ्चभिः ब्रह्म चतुर्भिर्दशभिस्तथा ।

एतच्चतुर्विंशतिकं गणं प्राधानिकं विदुः ॥ (*Bhāg.*, III, 26, 11.)

प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव प्रविश्याशु महेश्वरः ।

चोदयामास सम्प्राप्ते सर्गकाले व्ययाव्ययौ ॥

(*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I, 2, 29.)

Texts from the Upaniṣads are not wanting :

गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभाविनी ।

सितासिता च रक्ता च सर्वकामदुघा विभोः^{7a} ॥ (*Cūlikā*, 5.)

विकारजननीमज्ञामष्टरूपां ध्रुवामजाम् ।

ध्यायते ध्यासिता तेन तन्यते प्रेर्यतेऽपि च ॥ (*Cūlikopaniṣad*, 3)

अजामेकां | (*Śvet. Up.*, IV, 5.)

ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजौ.... | (*Ibid.*, I, 9.)

प्रधानक्षेत्रपतिर्गुणेशः | (*Ibid.*, VI, 16.)

It can never be that the Sūtrakāra was unaware of such overwhelming support to Prakṛti in the sacred literature, or refused to attach any importance to it.⁸ If in spite of his awareness of the Śāstraic character of Prakṛti, he was still bent upon a crusade against the Sāmkhyas, his only conceivable reason for so doing, must have been his unwillingness to concede to the Prakṛti the *independence* that was being claimed for it by the Sāmkhyas. Else, there would be two independent principles in his system. A Prakṛti that is *ex hypothesi* dependent on Brahman and acts at its direction, would never lead to a plurality of causes; for the latter alone would be the ultimate Cause in all cases.⁹ Madhva's position thus preserves the transcendence and

7a. Quoted (N. S. p. 192).

8. To equate it with Māyā would serve no useful purpose, so long as its entity itself is assumed under whatever name.

9. Vide Śruti cited by Madhva under B.S.B. i, 4, 27.

immutability of the Brahman which are alike in jeopardy on the *Parīṇāma* view, and invests the causality of the world with proper significance, denied by the *Vivartavāda*.

CHAPTER VII

CREATION.

The material creation, according to Madhva, is neither an emanation (*parīṇāma*) of the Brahman, nor a production *de novo*. It is merely an actualisation of what is in the womb of Matter and souls by the action of the Brahman. This creation is a reminder, however inadequate, of the majesty of God¹: बहुचित्रजगद्बहुधा कारणात्पक्षक्तिरनन्तगुणः परमः । (*Dvādaśa stotra*, IV, 3). However vivid and profound a man's religious consciousness may be, he can only be conscious of God through His manifestations and working in the Universe. Creation gives us a glimpse into the majesty of God: भीषास्माद्वातः पवते (Taitt. Up. ii, 8). And as already pointed out, there is a benevolent purpose behind God's creation,—that of helping souls to realise their full stature.

Madhva is aware that Creation as an *event* occurring at a specific date in the past, at the fiat of the Deity, is open to numerous difficulties and inconsistencies. The awkward question at once arises as to what induced the Deity which kept in its shell all the time, to suddenly take it into its head to come out and call a Universe into being? The objections apply in the first place to creation *ex nihilo*. No Vedāntin subscribes to such a view. The hypothesis of creation in time and the argument to the existence of God from the supposed necessity of a *prius* to the temporal series, are definitely abandoned by Madhva. Creation to him is no doubt a real process. But it is a continuous creation,—a constant dependence of the world on the Supreme. In so far as "creation", is only the starting point in a process (of eightfold determinations), Madhva would, in a sense, endorse the view of Ullrich that "God is *not first God* and *then* the Creator of the world; but *as*

1. सुष्टिश्च प्राधान्यार्थमन्येते । (Madhva, Chān. Up. B. vi, 1) and in this connection contrast the antitheistic remarks of Śaṅkara under (B.S.B. I.4, 14) नहि तत्प्रतिबद्धः कश्चित्पुरुषार्थो दृश्यते ; श्रूयते वा । and its refutation by Jayatirtha :—अपुरुषार्थ-त्वाच्च प्रपञ्चसत्यतायां तात्पर्यमिति चेत् ; न । सत्यजगन्निर्मातृत्वादिपारमेश्वरमाहात्म्यज्ञानस्यैव पुरुषार्थ-हेतुत्वात् । (NS. 1. 4. p. 210).

God He is creator and only as Creator" (or as responsible for any other determination in the series, Madhva would put in) He is God. This would not be tantamount to a tying down of the Deity as the various attributes are part of his own nature: "Sva-lakṣaṇa" and there could be no limitation of His self and this creative energy of God has a dual aspect of Śakti and Vyakti to be exercised as occasion demands it :—

अनित्यत्वाक्रियाणां तु कुत एव स्वरूपता ?

इति चेत्स विशेषोऽपि क्रियाशक्त्यात्मना स्थितः ।

शक्तिता व्यक्तीता चेति विशेषोऽपि विशेषवान् ॥ Av. i, 2, p. 9.)

Cf. also Av., ii, 2, verses 171-77.

Madhva uses the term "cause" in the sense that a world of imperfect beings, and of ceaseless change, is explicable only as maintained by and dependent upon a Supreme Being who is Himself unchanging and perfect in every way and whose constant presence 'educes' the series of forms latent in Matter and brings the souls nearer to their self-development, at every step, and so brings them into full play and actual manifestation :—

बलमानन्द ओजश्च सहो ज्ञानमनाकुलम् ।

स्वरूपाण्येव जीवस्य व्यज्यन्ते परमाद्विभोः ॥

(B.S.B., ii, 3, 31.)

प्रकृतावनुप्रविश्य, तां परिणाम्य, तत्परिणामनियामकतया सत्र स्थित्वा, आत्मनो बहुधाकरणात् ॥ (B.S.B., i, 4, 27.)

All this would inevitably lead to the assumption of the co-existence with God of matter and souls. Like Aristotle and the Grecian philosophers, Madhva looks upon the orderly realm of natural process as having neither a beginning nor an end² प्रवाहतोज्जादि ; जगत्प्रवाहः सत्योऽयम् ।) The Cosmos is no less everlasting than

2. अनागता अतीताश्च यावन्तः सहिताः क्षणाः ।

अतीतानागताश्चैव यावन्तः परमाणवः ।

ततोऽन्तर्गुणिता जीवानां राशयः पृथक् ॥

इति बत्सृष्टेर्न संसारिणां परिसमाप्तिरस्मत्पक्षे ॥ (Madhva., VTN)

God on whom it depends. The changeable no less than the Unchangeable is an ultimate component of Reality as a whole :—

स्वतन्त्रं परतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।

स्वतन्त्रो भगवान्विष्णुः परतन्त्रं द्विधेतर्त् ॥ (Tattvasamkhyāna)

CHAPTER VIII.

REVIEW OF CERTAIN GENERAL CRITICISMS ON MADHVA'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

Turn we now to the charge that a Dualism like Madhva's "makes the independence of God impossible."¹ One would have thought that the independence of God was nowhere safer and more appropriately demonstrable than in a *dualism like Madhva's*. The explanation of this seeming paradox lies in the fact already made clear, that Madhva's philosophy is in point of fact, no Dualism at all in the odious and generally accepted sense of that term. Dualism is the recognition of *two independent* principles and we have seen only too clearly that Madhva is *not* a Dualist in this sense.

The confusion is however, apt to be produced by the name of "Dvaita" and its English equivalent of Dualism, commonly given to the system. It may be admitted that the system has not been very happy in the choice of a name for itself. The name "Dvaita" was doubtless originally adopted as being in direct antithesis to the "A-dvaita" and so was allowed to pass muster all the time, despite its ultimate inadequacy. Madhva himself does not appear to have been enamoured of it and his own preference, so far as can be judged from his works, seems to have been for "Tattva-vāda",² Theistic Realism or the philosophy of "Truth." The latter is also the name that is largely to be found applied to Madhva's philosophy, in the writings of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas like Jīva Gosvāmin,³ Kavikarṇapūra⁴ and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣana⁵

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, ii, p. 750.

2. इति सर्वज्ञमुनिना मायावादतमोऽखिलम् ।
निरस्तं तत्त्ववादेन सतां संशयवृत्तये ॥ (MK. end)

3. क्वचित्स्वयमदृष्टाकराणि च तत्त्ववादशुरूणां श्रीमद्वाचार्यचरणानां भागवत-
तात्पर्यं ... (Śaṭ-sandarbhā, p. 21-22.)

4. अपरे तत्त्ववादिनः तेऽपि तथाविधा एव ।
(Caitanyacandrodaya, viii, p. 174, Calcutta.)

5. पिबललिः सञ्चिततत्त्ववादः । (Prameyaratnāvalī.)

and even some of the South Indian followers of Madhva such as Vādīrāja⁶ and Purandaradāsa.^{6a} The name “Dvaita” appears to have originated among the opponents of the system, chiefly the Advaitins and thence found its way gradually into the traditional circles also, of the followers of Madhva. It is remarkable that even in that scurrilous stanza of his at the end of the *Advaitasiddhi*, where Madhusūdāna refers to the defender of the Dvaita, he calls him a Tattva-vādi⁷. “Tattva-vāda” would thus contrast with the “Māyāvāda” of Śaṅkara and the “Dvaita” with his “A-dvaita.” At the same time, it would be necessary to remember that Madhva stands *not* for an absolute dualism in philosophy: Aikāntika-Dvaita, of the type of the Sāṃkhya-Yogas or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣkas. Inadequate as it is, the appellation “Dvaita” has come to stay and it would be impossible, at this distance of time, to try to replace it by another even if a better one could be found. The utmost that discerning students can do is, while accepting the term Dvaita as it has come down to us, to disabuse the minds of laymen and others of any erroneous notion respecting the highest metaphysical ideology of Madhva that so inadequate a name for his philosophy might have engendered. The supreme fact in Madhva’s philosophy is *not* so much the co-existence of the Universe with God, but the Transcendent being and Majesty of the latter. This is a fact which he is never tired of emphasising in his works:—

(श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः)

स्वतन्त्रं परतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।

न ततोऽस्त्यपरं जगतीढ्यतमम् ।

न हरेः परमो न हरेः सदृशः ॥

(*Dvādaśastotra*, iii, 2 and 4).

सर्वे वेदाश्च नामानि ता वा एता ऋचस्तथा ।

(*Rg-bhāṣya*, p. 3b et seq.).

6. *Yuktimallikā*, I, 20.

6a. Cf. The refrain in one of his songs :

श्रीतत्त्ववादमतव भजिसि सुखियागिरैर्य्य ।

7. इह कुमतिरतत्त्वे तत्त्ववादी वराकः

... .. ।

स्वतः प्रवृत्त्यशक्तत्वादीशावास्यमिदं जगत् ।

तदधीनप्रवृत्तित्वात्तदीयं सर्वमेव तत् । (Īśa. bh.).

भगवतः सर्वोत्तमत्वज्ञान एव सर्ववाक्यानां महातात्पर्यमिति ज्ञापयितुम् ।

(Kaṭha. bh., ii, 8, p. 11f.).

ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः । (Mundaka bh.)

अद्वैतं परमार्थतः—उत्तमत्वात्परार्थोऽसौ भगवान्विष्णुरुच्यते ।

अद्वैतं नाम यदुच्यते तत् स्वतन्त्रभगवदपेक्षया । (Māṇḍ. Up. i, 17d.)

(Chān. Up. Com. II, 22, p. 15b).

अतः सर्वमुक्तेभ्योऽप्युत्तमोत्तमः पूर्णो नारायण इति सिद्धम् ।

(Śaṭpraśṇa bh.)

नेदं जीवस्वरूपं यत् । (Talavakāra bh.)

न केवलं ऋष्यादि नाम.... (Ait. Up. bh., ii, 2,2).

तस्मान्मुक्तैरपीज्यमानः । (ibid., p. 16.)

एक एव महायोगी । (Taitt. Up. bh. p. 9b).

एवं सर्वोत्तमस्य परमेश्वरस्य विज्ञानात्सर्वं विज्ञातं भवति ।

(Brh. Up. bh., p. 11b).

महातात्पर्यविरोधश्चाभेदे । विष्णोः परमोत्कर्षे हि महातात्पर्यं सर्वप्रमाणानां भगव-
ताभिहितम् । (Chan. vi, 45)

अतः सर्वचिदचिद्विलक्षणः सर्वोत्तमः सर्वगुणपूर्णश्च भगवान्पुरुषोत्तम इति सिद्धम् ।

(Chān. bh., vi, 6.)

य एतत्परतन्त्रं तु सर्वमेव हरेः सदा ।

वशमित्येव जानाति संसारान्मुच्यते हि सः । (TV)

सर्वज्ञं सर्वकर्तारम् । (VTN., p. 19b)

विष्णोः सर्वोत्कर्ष एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् । (VTN., p. 20).

अतः सर्वागमैरेव सर्वस्माद्विज्ञः । (Ibid.)

“एकलं केवलं चेति स्वतन्त्रमभिधीयते ।

.....

स्वातन्त्र्यमेव सत्यत्वं विष्णोः ; अन्यस्य सत्यता ।

प्रवाहतः सदास्तित्वं पुम्प्रकृत्योः सदास्तिता ॥

तत् स्वातन्त्र्येण नैवास्ति यदुत्पत्तिविनाशवत् ।

जगतो नास्तिता सैव या पराधीनता सदा ।

अभावस्तु कुतस्तस्य यद्विभातीह सर्वदा ।

अविद्यमानता नाम जगतः परतन्त्रता ।

यथाशक्तस्तु पुत्रादिरसन्नित्युच्यते जनैः ॥”

(Bhāgavata-Tātparya, XI, 28, 20-7).

[The independent is known as the One : “Ekalam,” “Kevalam” etc. *The reality of God consists in His independence. The reality of others is merely an eternal existence a la the currents a river. It is so in the case of the Souls and Prakṛti. That which has a beginning and an end has no independent existence. The non-existence of the world is no other than its eternal dependence. But it is not for that reason wholly a myth as it is experienced by one and all. So the only way in which it could be described as not existing, is in the sense of its being under the control of another, even as a son who is dependent on his father is treated as of little account.*]

पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमभिधीयते ।

तद्विष्णोरेव नान्यस्य ; तदन्येषां सदास्तिता ॥

(Bhāg. Tāt. XI, 24, 17).

[The highest kind of Reality is independence. That is possessed by Viṣṇu alone. All others merely exist for ever.]

And Mahābhārata-Tātparyanirṇaya, i, 68-et seq.

In view of so much arrestive evidence of the ‘monistic’ bearings of a sort, of Madhva’s Philosophy, at its highest level, I have, as already indicated (P. 14), ventured to coin the name of “स्वतन्त्राद्वैत” “Svatan-

trādvaita" or THE PHILOSOPHY OF "The ONE INDEPENDENT TRANSCENDENT REFERENCE" for the system and this, I am glad to say, has the approval of the greatest living authority on the system: H. H. Śrī Satyadhyāna Tirtha Svamiji of the Uttarādi Mutt.

A correct appreciation then, of this fundamental aspect of Madhva's teaching would remove the popular misconception of the essence of his thought, that one so often finds not merely in laymen but in the writings of scholars who ought to know better.

We have seen that Madhva stoutly denies any kind of independence or even so much as the barest capacity to exist *in their own right*, to Matter and Souls.⁸ There is no power on earth that is capable of challenging the independence of God. How then, could it be in jeopardy?⁹ God's independence again could be challenged only in the event of there existing another equally independent Being or Principle. We know full well that there is no room for any such principle in Madhva's philosophy. Where then is the danger to the independence of God to come from? Again, the very idea of the independence of God presupposes an existence of creatures dependent upon Him. *The only Being that exists* (द्वितीयवस्तुरहित) *can neither be said to be independent nor dependent!* The monist cannot therefore pretend to be over-solicitous about the independence of God! However that may be, the independence of God is unquestionably possible in the system of Madhva in which the other reals are *for ever subject to God*.

Madhva agrees also that the dependent reals cannot be called substances in the highest sense of the term; and to that extent there is no limitation of God's independence by that of any other substance: पारमाथिकसत्यत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमभिधीयते। तद्विष्णोरेव नान्यस्य। It cannot be that the very idea of an "other", dependent or other, besides God, constitutes a metaphysical limitation on God and to that extent renders His independence impossible. Madhva would answer that the merest existence of an "other" that is *ex hypothesi* dependent on

8. प्रकृत्यादिसत्ताप्रदत्वं चाङ्गीकृतमीश्वरस्य । (Madhva, B.S.B., ii, 2, 5.)

It is therefore a gross mis-statement of facts to say that Madhva believes that unevolved matter and unmaterial souls on which the Divine will is dependent at creation, are "given from outside." (S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, ii, p. 699).

9. साधनानां साधनत्वं यदात्माधीनमिष्यते ।

तदा साधनसम्पत्तिरैश्वर्यद्योतिका भवेत् ॥ (B.S.B. II, i, 19).

God, cannot at all constitute a limitation on the latter.¹⁰ It is only when that "other" is raised to a position of equality or set in opposition to the Brahman, that real limitation can arise. Were it not so, even the presence of the "Anirvacaniya" world should have to be considered as an inevitable limitation of the Absolute. The question of its absolute reality can have nothing to do with that of limitation. If an "unreal other" or a "phenomenally real" world could not limit the Absolute, so may the subordinate real (in Madhva's system) be unable to do! For purposes of such limitation, the subordinate real is as good as being "unreal":—

जगतो नास्तिता सैव या पराधीनता सदा ।

(Madhva, *Bhāgavata-Tātparyā*, xi, 28, 22).

As Madhva points out in his com. on Chān. Up. vi 2, even to repudiate it, the Monist has at least in thought to conceive of a difference between the Brahman and the unreal "other" (Vijātiyabheda). This difference at least must be real and true and to that extent there could be no escape from a limitation to the Absolute.

विजातीयाभावे—“येनाश्रुतं” इत्यादिविशेषणं व्यर्थम् । यस्य कस्यचिज्ज्ञानमपि तज्ज्ञानमेव भवतीति । न च मिथ्या सत्यमिति भेदः ; तस्यैव विजातीयत्वात् । तदभेदस्य मिथ्यात्वे तद्वेदस्य सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । मिथ्यासत्ययोरैक्ये इदं सत्यमिदं मिथ्येति भेदाभावाज्जी-
वेशयोर्भेदादेरपि सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । (Chān. Up. bhāsyā, vi, 2, p. 39).

Though Madhva “conceives the Infinite in an abstract manner,”¹¹ it cannot be said that he is therefore “unable to see any unity between the two”. On the contrary, he believes that at least in point of possessing “reality”, there is a common factor¹² and a basis for unity between God

10. नहीच्छ्या प्रकृत्यादिकं उपादानस्य परायत्तता । नहि पट्टकरणो लीलानिमित्तमिच्छ्या
दण्डमवलम्ब्य गच्छन् दण्डायत्तगतिः भवति ! (NS. p. 184-5).

11. Yet his conception of God is not that of a merely last term in an ascending series of real reflecting self-conscious souls, nor that of a merely Transcendent Absolute. While the conscious and the unconscious objects of the Universe co-exist with God, they yet derive their existence from Him and are sustained by Him. He is their life and soul both immanent and transcendent.

12. Cf. Śamkara : ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभावः आकाशादिष्वनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते ॥

(B.S. ii, 1, 6.)

And यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याद्वग्लपि ।

(Nyāyāmṛta, i, 9. p. 95b).

and the world : यथा खलु सकलजगत्सदृशगुणात्मकत्वेन परमात्मा जगदिति व्यपदिश्यते 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' इत्यादौ, तथैवेति भावः (TP. II.3.29). This affinity is still more marked between God and the souls: ज्ञानानन्दादिब्रह्मगुणा एवास्य यतः सारः स्वरूपं अतोऽमेदव्यपदेशः ॥ (Madhva, BS. ii. 3, 29). The only difference is that this unity or affinity between the Brahman and the world is neither physical (as in Rāmānuja's view), nor imaginary as an Śaṅkara's.

"If the Brahman is co-eternal with the world, what is the relation between the two? If it is also a coeternal relation, is the Supreme Spirit bound to objects other than itself?", asks the critic of Madhva. The answer is that the Brahman is co-eternal with the Prakṛti (not with the world as such) and the souls and the relation among them is also co-eternal. But it does not necessarily follow that the Supreme Being is bound to objects other than itself.¹³ We have already seen in connection with the criticism of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, that Madhva is quite averse to tying down the Deity in any manner. Indeed, it is to avoid the necessity of having to tie down the Deity, that he "conceives the Brahman in an abstract manner"! There can be no question of the Supreme being bound to others, when it is repeated time and again that the world of matter and souls derives its very power of existence and functioning from God, that its very co-existence with Him is dependent on His will and sufferance: "द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च.....यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति" Madhva is never tired of reminding us that Time, Space, Causality, Matter, Souls their Karma etc. are all eternally subject to God and exist at His pleasure. Why these should at all so exist, is an illegitimate question. All that we know, can know or need know (of course through the Scriptures) is that they exist in eternal dependence on God. In so far then as their existence is determined by God's will स्वमतिप्रमवं जगदस्य यतः (Dvādaśastotra iv.2), their existence and the relation in which they stand (नियम्यनियामकभाव) to Him, cannot be viewed as anything more than a self-limitation¹⁴ on the part of God. The same could be said of the other difficul-

13. Cf. "The controlled, the pervaded, is bound to the controller and pervader; but not *vice versa*. The former is dependent on the latter, but the latter is independent. The wind bloweth where it listeth but the weather-cock answereth to every movement of the wind. What is the logical absurdity in saying that the weather-cock is bound to the wind but not the wind to the weather-cock?" C. R. Krishna Rau, *Śrī Madhva, His Life and Doctrine*, Udupi, 1929, pp. 153-4.

14. Self-limitation is frequently the refuge of the monist: Cf. "Unlike the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya, it (Māyā) is not independent of God. It is a limitation

ties such as that "we cannot say that it is in the nature of the Supreme to stand related to the individual souls since the former does not contain the reason for the latter's existence, and that it is difficult to believe that God's essence involves a relation to objects whose existence it does not necessitate" (S. Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. ii 750). Madhva admits the truth of these contentions but rejoins that the difficulties are more than counter-balanced by the hypothesis of self-limitation.

The entire question of a possible limitation to the sovereignty of God in the event of recognising the eternal existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣas (though in perpetual dependence on God), has been set at rest by Madhva himself, in his illuminating commentary on the तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण of the Sūtras ii, 1, 15-21. He contends under ii, 1, 15, that the Independent creator of the Universe is none other than the Brahman, i.e., to say the Brahman is itself the Independent Cause of the world—as in R.V. X, 81, 2a. the presence of *independent accessories* to creation, such as Time, Matter and Souls, is denied. The evidence of Scripture merely supports the dependent character of these accessories: काल आसीत् पुरुष आसीत् तदधीनमासीत् (q. in ii, 1, 12) तस्माद्धान्यन्नपरः किञ्चनास । An apparently different statement in नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् । R.V.X., 129, 1. denying the very existence of anything other than the Brahman, should not be understood in the sense of a total negation (स्वरूपनिषेध) of these things. They are spoken of as Asat, not existing, in so far as they were then unmanifest, dependent, inferior, subject to modification and subsequent decay (TP. ii, 1, 18). That they nevertheless existed, is borne out by a subsequent text तम आसीत् as well as by the expression तदानीम्, which proves the existence of Time. It may no doubt be felt that it would be better for God to do without the accessories at all than to make Him rely upon such as are in turn dependent upon Him for their existence. But it is pointed out that it adds to sovereignty of God to conceive of Him as acting with the help of accessories which are themselves dependent on Him. There is not so much sovereignty implied in making Him do straightway without any accessories. For, in the other case, the Sādhana-s themselves would owe their being to Him and that would certainly add to His glory:—

which Īśvara imposes on Himself. It exists even in Pralaya, depending on the Supreme Lord". S. Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p. 573.

साधनानां साधनत्वं यदात्माधीनमिष्यते ।

तदा साधनसम्पत्तिरैश्वर्यद्योतिका भवेत् ॥ (B.S.B. ii, 1, 19)

न महिमाधिक्यलाभाय साधनाभावोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः । साधनान्तरेण सृष्टेरपि युक्तत्वात् ; महिमाविरोधित्वात् । स्वाधीनसाधनैः प्रवृत्तेरपि ऐश्वर्यद्योतकत्वस्य—“साधनानां साधनत्वम्” इत्यादिवाक्यसिद्धत्वात् ; लोके दृष्टत्वाच्च ॥ तर्हि, उभयथापि महिमोत्कर्ष-सिद्धेः, किं साधनसत्त्वपक्षग्रहेणेति चेत् ; निरपेक्षतया स्रष्टृत्वस्योभयपक्षसाम्येन महिमोत्कर्ष-लाभसाम्येऽपि, साधनसत्त्वाभ्युपगमेन एकाकिनः सकशात्सोपस्करस्याधिक्योत्कर्षलाभात् ॥

(*Tattvaparakāsika* ii, 1, 19).

Though it may theoretically be conceded that God *can*, if He so chooses, create *without the help of accessories*,¹⁵ still, the facts recorded in Scripture, go to show that He does not despise the presence of accessories, but avails of them in so far as they owe their existence to Him, and proceeds with Creation, thus conferring a sort of distinction and recognition upon them. Our ‘partiality’ for the recognition of accessories, is *not thus* merely a sentimental one.¹⁶ It is inspired by a desire to abide by the facts vouchsafed to us by Scriptures, which are the ultimate source of our knowledge regarding these matters cf.:—

आम्नायस्यार्थं प्रतिपत्तुं प्रभवामः नाम्नायं पर्यनुयोक्तुम् ॥¹⁷

(Sāṅkara, B. S. B. i, 4, 3).

15. Cf. शक्तोऽपि भगवान्विष्णुरकर्तुं कर्तुमन्यथा ।

स्वमिन्नं कारणाभिन्नं मिन्नं विश्वं करोत्यजः ॥

(Av. ii, 1, p. 17)

and the brilliant exposition thereon by Jayatīrtha, quoted *ante*.

16. It is thus quite unfair to assume, at least so far as Madhva is concerned that “in the discussions of the intermediate degrees of reality, the unit of individuality seems to depend on the *fancy* of the philosophers.” (S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i, p. 41.) [*Italics mine*].

17. We can only *follow* the sense of the scriptures but *not question* it!

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS AND RETROSPECT.*

From the foregoing exposition of certain of the philosophical bases of Madhva's Theism, it would be easy to arrive at a general estimate of its religious and philosophical value. The Ācārya appeared on the scene of Indian Philosophy as a champion of Theism and a re-interpreter of the *entire Vedaśāstra*, whose basic ideas appeared to him to have been distorted by the philosophy of Śaṅkara. Madhva's high sense of orthodoxy was responsible for his endeavouring to give a panoptic interpretation of the *entire sacred literature of his country* and correlating the various parts and strata of it to the highest metaphysics thereof. This is symbolised by his commentaries on parts of the *R̥g-Veda*, the *Ait. Brāhmaṇa*, the *Ait. Āraṇyaka* and the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhāgavata*, and the *Sūtras*, and frequent quotations from the *Purāṇas* and the *Pañcarātras*.

On the religious side, his interpretations had the effect of changing the entire aspect and significance of the distinction between the Karma and the Jñāna-kāṇḍas.

ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः ।

ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचकाः ॥

(*Muṇḍaka Com.*) .

It was no doubt of great spiritual advantage to be told that the entire Vedic literature including the so-called Karmakāṇḍa could help in furthering spiritual knowledge if only we know how to tap them properly and at the correct point. But to carry this doctrine to extreme lengths would be artificial and unhistorical. Yet that was virtually the nemesis that overtook Madhva. His insistence on a literal correlation of every line and syllable of the Karma-kāṇḍa too,¹ to the Brahman, though admir-

*This critique of Madhva's philosophy and interpretation of the Vedānta, which has been inserted for reasons that need not be detailed here, has been undertaken from the point of view of the detached observer. It is not meant for the followers of the Ācārya and may, if so desired, be ignored by them.

1. Cf. सकलजगत्कारणे परे ब्रह्मणि स्वरवर्णपदवाक्यमहावाक्यरूपस्य समस्तशास्त्रस्य साक्षात् परममुख्यया वृत्त्या, ननु लक्षणया ; तथा महातात्पर्येण, ननु पारार्थ्येन; समन्वयः प्रथमाध्याये समर्थितः॥
(NS. ii, 1, p. 229)

able as a stroke of Textual mysticism, fails to carry conviction as a purely exegetic method,—the actual working out of such Samanvaya being, in most cases, little more than a pyrotechny of words.² It would have been simpler and less sophisticated if he had been content with a general correlation of texts (Paramparayā samanvaya) such as may be safely recognised through such texts as : यत्तार्थात्कर्मणोऽयम् (Gitā iii, 9) and कर्म मोक्षाय कर्माणि विधत्ते ह्यगदं यथा (Bhāg. xi, 3, 45). We have already drawn attention to the amount of 'false etymology' and unscientific exegesis that a dogged adherence to the principle of "Sarvaśabdasamanvaya" in Brahman, entails upon Madhva. Much of his unpopularity as interpreter of the sacred literature is due thus to his etymological stunts. But the rule of texts is inexorable: मां । विधत्तेऽभिधत्ते माम् (Bhāg xi 21, 43) सर्वे वेदाः यत्पदमामनन्ति (Katha, i, 2, 15) वेदेष्व सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः। (Gitā, xv. 15)

ii

It would have been noticed in Part II, that Madhva's theory of God in its religious aspect is deeply colored by theological considerations which are generally alien to the philosopher but which are inevitable in one who seeks to combine religion and philosophy or undertakes to educe a philosophy from the entire religious literature of his country. It is in the nature of things impossible for one in the position of Madhva to abjure the national gods and talk glibly of a Brahman. Room has necessarily to be found for them in any scheme of Philosophy. The question of who amongst them is to be regarded as the Supreme Being of metaphysics, comes to be invested with special significance and immediate interest. It does not arise for a Monist like Śaṅkara, to whom the gods of the land are in the last resort but appearances of The One and the question of the real identity of the Supreme has no meaning. But a Theist like Madhva who believes in a Personal God, possessing a unique personality of His own, cannot dismiss the question of the precise identity of the Supreme as of little practical or theoretical importance. Indeed, everything in his case, depends on the fixation of the identity of the True God. It has been said that "Monotheism is the acknowledgment and worship of One True God. It implies a denial of other gods, at any rate of their jurisdiction over the Cosmos." As a Hindu, however, Madhva cannot go to this extreme of denying the existence of other 'minor gods.' And he concedes to them *imperium in imperio*. They are

2. Vide his interpretation of "Jyotiradhikaraṇa":—

जातमोतं हरौ यस्माज्ज्योतिषः प्राणरूपतः ।

reduced to the position of angels subject to the Lord and their jurisdiction over the cosmos is derived from the Supreme Being :

Cf. तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुः तत्तच्छक्तिप्रबोधकः । (Av. i, p. 9b).

and :— तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुः तत्तच्छक्तीः प्रबोधयन् ।

एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमञ्जसा ॥ (B. S. B. ii, 3, 11).

निमित्तमात्रमीशस्य विश्वसर्गनिरोधयोः ।

हिरण्यगर्भः शर्वश्च कालाख्यारूपिणस्तव ॥ (Bhāg, X, 71, 8.)

ब्रह्मणि ब्रह्मरूपोऽसौ शिवरूपी शिवे स्थितः ॥

स ब्रह्मणा सृजति रुद्रेण विलापयति । (B. S. B. ii, 1, 13).

Madhva has sufficient appreciation of the essence of Monotheism to deny that the minor gods are “gods” in any real sense of the term. He puts them down for “Jivas” ; only, there is a hierarchy among them starting from Brahmā down to the lowest^{3a} ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तम् । He overcomes the historical ideas of the plurality of Vedic gods by the doctrine of एकं सद्भिप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति or the doctrine of the Sarvanāmavān. There can be no objection to this though exception may be taken to his identification of the Sarvanāmavān with Viṣṇu. Clever and in many cases really unexceptionable as have been the texts adduced by Madhva to support the equation, he cannot be said to have completely succeeded in proving his case. There are stray texts like जनितोऽत विष्णोः (R.V. ix, 96, 5) which nearly defy his resources and ingenuity. He himself is not unaware of the existence of such passages. In spite of such occasional difficulties that he has had to face, it must be said that he is generally in a position to afford a smooth sailing. The evidences adduced by him are arresting so far as they go. In one instance it is telling: एकं सद्भिप्रा (R.V. i, 164, 46) which is in apposition with सप्तार्धगर्भा विष्णोस्तिष्ठन्ति

3a. Cf. the similar attitude taken up by Rāmānuja :—

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्ता जगदन्तर्व्यवस्थिताः ।

प्राणिनः कर्मजनितसंसारवशवर्तिनः ।

यतस्ततो न ते ध्याने परेषामुपकारकाः ॥

(Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1.)

and :— हिरण्यगर्भादिजीवेभ्योज्य एव परमात्मा ।

(ibid, i, 1, 22)

अदिशा विधर्मणि । (R.V. i, 164, 36). In others it is highly suggestive अन्तः सद्गुद्रे । (T.A. iii. 1,1) अम्भस्य पारे.....मम योनिरप्सन्तः सद्गुद्रे (R.V. x, 125, 7.); though not yet unequivocal till we reach the *Bhāllaveya Sruti*. It is also significant that in the Vedic literature subsequent to the Mantras, Viṣṇu recedes to the background. The attempts made by Madhva to read Viṣṇu into such texts as : णकारो बलं षकारः प्राण आत्मा (Ait. Ā iii.2,6) and find a place for him in the highest philosophy of the Upaniṣads, adroit as they have been (Cf. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत (Chān. Up. com. 3, 14, 1), cannot be said to be convincing. The same is the case in the *Vedānta Sūtras*, where too, textually speaking, Viṣṇu is nowhere seriously thought of; though here again, Madhva is able to find a couple of sūtras from the *Devatākāṇḍa*, which equate the Brahman with Viṣṇu. As these sūtras have been cited by Vedānta Deśika also, *the matter deserves closer attention*. As for the Epic, it is decidedly in Madhva's favour. (See Winternitz, *Ind. Literature*, i, p. 320, para 2). His solution of the conflicting views of the Purāṇas on the relative superiority of the gods, in favour of Viṣṇu, on the basis of (1) the three-fold division of the Purāṇas and (2) the theory of "deception", loses none of its probative value, whatever one may think of the ethical acceptability of such notions. It may be conceded then, that *given the Hindu scriptures in their present form and admitting the rationale of finding the Supreme from that Pantheon सैहव सन्तं न विजानन्ति देवाः* (T. A. iii, 11, 5) the balance of evidence does unmistakably incline to the comparative supremacy of Viṣṇu. If this were sufficient ground for his identification with the Brahman of the Vedānta, Madhva may be said to have won his point. Inevitable as has been the theological bias about Madhva's religious philosophy, it is really not so vital to his metaphysical ideology of the Brahman. It is possible to keep these two things apart and shorn of the trappings of theological preferences and exclusions, Madhva's idea of God as *id quo maius cogitari non potest* and presented in the concepts of the Svatantra defined as स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविध्ये परानपेक्षम् । and Svatantrādvaita, deserve high philosophic recognition. This would by itself vindicate his claims to a philosophical outlook. It would also conduce to the greater philosophical popularity of Madhva's philosophy if the theological side is altogether dropped out and the philosophical one alone presented or maintained.

iii.

We cannot say that Śaṅkara's is the only possible or even that metaphysically it is the best solution of the conflict of the Bheda and

Abheda śrutis,—in other words of the problem of Philosophy. There is less violence done to the Bhedaśrutis in the system of Madhva, which subordinates all else that exists to the Brahman which is conceived as the One Transcendent Reference, *than* in that of Śaṅkara who denies reality to the world that he may preserve the oneness of Brahman and dismisses the Bhedaśrutis as referring to an illusory Bheda. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic view is too concrete to admit of an easy approximation to the Substantive Idealism of the Upaniṣads. The synthesis effected by Madhva from the standpoint of “Svatantrādvaita” or the One Transcendent Reference, is thus a clear improvement upon the colourless monism निर्विशेषाद्वैत of Śaṅkara on the one hand and quaint dualism of Rāmānuja on the other. The oneness visualised by Madhva is that which springs from the world’s recognition of its utter metaphysical dependence on God : तत्तन्त्रत्वाद्वैतदात्म्यम् (Chān. Bhāṣya vi.6) . The Viśiṣṭādvaitin misses the abstract character of God while the Advaitin altogether ignores the relative aspect (and existence) of the world of matter and souls at all times under the aegis of God. The “Svatantrādvaita” of Madhva has the advantage of preserving the two in proper blend. Under the terms of :

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥

(Bhāg. ii, 10, 12.)

which is really the corner-stone of Madhva’s “Svatantrādvaita”, the Absolute is implied in the very life and being of the relative (Paratantra).

iv.

Madhva agrees with the Advaitin in conceiving of bondage as due to a beginningless ignorance (bhāvarūpājñāna). But he shows a fundamentally realistic bias in looking upon this ignorance itself as having a real existence of its own and not due merely to a superimposition (kalpita). It is no doubt difficult to conceive of a *beginningless ignorance* that does *not* penetrate the essence of the soul. But such qualification is necessary if release should at all be made possible.³ A beginningless ignorance that is common to most systems of Indian philosophy (including the Advaita) cannot be deemed to be a flaw in one case alone. To posit a beginning for ignorance is equally unphiloso-

phical as that would at once give rise to the question of the *why* of the *first fall of man*, which no one could satisfactorily answer. There is, however, not much to choose between *an unreal ignorance* that is beginningless and a *real ignorance* that is also *equally* beginningless. Both are in need of explanation. And after all, an unreal ignorance that continues to exist from eternity, is hardly distinguishable from a reality. Opinion may differ if dependence or unreality (of the "other") is the most effective solvent of the conflict and limitation in regard to the Absolute. To dismiss the world as unreal may no doubt serve to preserve the oneness of the Brahman intact; but then, it is not the only way in which such a result could be achieved. Insist on the absolute dependence of all else on God and you have the transcendent oneness of God brought home all the clearer. The latter course is adopted by Madhva as the more reasonable one. For, even the monist has ultimately to fall back upon a Māyā that is not precisely identical with the Brahman but is however dependent on it: परमात्मन्येतप्रोतभावेन समाश्रितम् (Śaṅkara on Kaṭha, i, 3, 11 and B.S. 1, 4, 8). Surely, it would be far more absurd and difficult for God to *delude Himself* than to keep those in *His power* under a delusion! A despotic God may still hope to be One but a foolish one could not! From the point of view of us suffering mortals, it would in any case be the worst despotism to plead that creation is the sport or nature of God. Of the two views however, Madhva's makes the position of God less unenviable. Under Kaṭha i, 3, 11, Śaṅkara admits the existence Avyakta as an "other". No doubt the śruti traces all creation to Brahman; but really Avyakta is the cause of all. Since however it is dependent on God, He is styled as Cause only figuratively,—not in the sense of a changing principle like Avyakta: सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य कारणमव्यक्तम्। तस्य परमात्मपरतन्त्रत्वात् परमात्मन उपचरेण कारणत्वमुच्यते; न तु अव्यक्तवत् विकारितया॥ (Ānandagiri). The Advaitin makes a desperate attempt to escape अद्वैतहानि (danger to the principle of monism) by asserting that Avyakta is only a "power" of Brahman: शक्तिवेन अद्वितीयत्वाविरोधमाह (Ānandagiri). Despite all the ingenious beating about the bush^{3a} the two have necessarily to be distinguished in so far as "Avyakta" is a 'changing cause' while Brahman is not; and the latter is Sat while the former is "Anirvacaniya".

3a. It would for instance be ludicrous to hold that the शक्ति is an unreal principle (मिथ्या) while the शक्तिम् is real. The one should be as real as the other (सवितृप्रकाशवत्)

It would be philosophically less disingenous then to admit the "otherness" of Avyakta and its reality and maintain the sovereignty of God on the basis of the admitted "dependence" of the former than to have to return to the self-same Avyakta and an admission of its essence, through a backdoor. Madhva adopts the former course and in so doing feels that so long as there is this necessity for philosophers to look to an "other" to account for the world, nothing would be lost in recognising that "Other" to be a *real* principle, dependent *ex hypothesi* on God. So long as philosophers have willy nilly to fall back upon a metaphysical "other" (be it the Prakṛti or Māyā or Matter), they need not grudge it its reality !

v.

Madhva conceives God not merely as the Artificer of the Universe (the 'ब्रह्माण्डकुलाल' of the Naiyāyikas) but *as the very Source of its being* (सत्यस्य सत्यम् ; प्रकृत्यादि सत्ताप्रदत्वमङ्गीकृतमीश्वरस्य (B. S. B. ii, 2, 5)⁴ This is sufficient to establish his claims to be recognised as a Vedāntin. Save for a difference in terminology, this view makes the nearest (Hindu) approach to the Christian viewpoint. Of the two however, Madhva's is certainly the more philosophical. An eternal creation is no creation at all, whilst creation in time is fraught with difficulties. The only sense therefore, in which the world can be said to be a creation of God, is (that of) an eternal dependence of one beginningless real upon another and a more powerful One. Madhva makes a concession in thought to Christian Theism in granting *at least hypothetically* that God *can* create a world from nothing. But for some reason known only to Himself, He chooses to educe a world from pre-existent Matter and souls. If he can admit eternal and uncreated souls, the Vedāntin need not shy at the acceptance of an equally uncreated matter! No Indian philosopher however adroit has been able or temerarious enough to *derive* Matter from God. It exists on the Advaitic view also *as a force latent in God* : परमात्मन्योत्प्रेतमावेन समाश्रितं वटकाणिकायाभिन्नं वटवृक्षशक्तिः (Śaṅkara, on Kāṭha, i, 3, 11). Madhva therefore adopts the only sensible and straightforward course in which the sovereignty and ultimate causality of God can be made consistent with the existence of *such* Matter and souls, by making them *ex hypothesi* dependent on God, for their *being and becoming*. This is substantially the view of Rāmānuja also.⁵

4. See Chap. I of this Part for full elucidation.

5. Cf. सहकारिभिरारम्भे न स्वातन्त्र्यं विहन्यते ।

तत्सङ्गावप्रवृत्त्योश्च स्वाधीनत्वव्यवस्थितेः ॥ (Vedānta Deśika, *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, Benares, 1900, p. 255).

vi.

Madhva has done much to clarify the issue of creation. He opposes the enunciation of vague and airy notions. (Cf. his criticism of Śakti-pariṇāmavāda). His contention that a Sentient Cause could not produce solely out of its own self, an insentient effect is virtually the same as the objection of the Vedāntin against the Pariṇāmavādin that the Immutable Spirit could not change into the form of the world. Śaṅkara is thus as much opposed to Pariṇāmavāda, as Madhva. But that does not give him the right to deny the reality of the world. We must only look for the world's material cause elsewhere than in the Brahman. When it comes to that, there is really no special advantage in looking for that material cause in Māyā whose association with the Brahman itself would be difficult to account for. The recognition of Brahman as the Kevala-nimitta and of Matter as the Upādāna-kāraṇa need not be apprehended to involve a plurality of causes, as God is the only Independent Cause and Ultimate Ground of everything—the other causes being 'causes' only in a limited sense: कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथा-व्यपदिष्टोक्तेः । (B. S. B. i, 4, 15).

vii.

True, like every other Vedāntin, Madhva too counsels that we must rise above the world and try to rid ourselves of it. It may therefore be felt that he need not have been so vehement in opposing the Advaitin's advice to his fellowmen to transcend it. But dependent as it is to Madhva, the world is not any the less real as a *fact*. The quarrel between Madhva and the Advaitins is thus something more than one over words. Madhva insists that there is no mistake in our cognition of the world as such. This would not and could not be conceded by the Advaitin who looks upon the "Prapañca-pratyaya" as essentially an "Āropa" or "Adhyāsa" upon the pure consciousness of Ātman.

Cf. स्वाङ्गानकल्पितजगत्परमेश्वरत्वजीवमेदकलुषीकृतभूमावा ।

(*Samkṣepaśārīraka*, i, 2).

viii.

On the intriguing issue of the precise relation between God and His attributes, Madhva's solution is not only ingenious but highly suggestive. Through religion one becomes increasingly aware of the perfections of God. As a modern writer puts it: "There is no mystery whatsoever about the notion of 'pure being'. *Being* is simply the fundamental category of thought which denotes everything and

cannot therefore specially denote anything,—or in other words, connotes nothing. That which every entity is, cannot be a property by which one entity is, distinguished from others. God, whatever else He is (or is not ?), must certainly be ; but so *must* a triangle, a pebble in the street, a planet or the sun. In short, there can be no being which is *simply and purely being*. It is what God is over and above mere being that is of primary significance to the religious consciousness. And as a matter of fact, while insisting that the nature of the Deity can never be appreciated by or expressed in terms familiar to a finite mind, the mystics invariably do ascribe qualities such as oneness, wisdom, goodness and love to Him whom they worship, qualified with which the finite mind is quite familiar and which are not inscrutable.” (G. Dawes Hicks, “The Philosophical Bases of Theism,” Hibbert Lectures, 1937, p. 117.). It is thus incumbent upon us to recognise that many are the attributes of God: कर्तृत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म Bhāg. iii, 32, 13 and मय्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे । (Bhāg. vi, 4, 48). But to say that God and his attributes are different entities, is unsound. Madhva hits the truth when he says the attributes are actually indistinguishable from the Lord though in all our attempts to refer to them we appear to attempt the impossible. To say as we often do, that God is great or good, is to employ a fiction of thought. Viśeṣa is the name that Madhva gives to this fiction of thought, which is defined as भेदप्रतिनिधि (doing the work of Bheda) without being “Bheda” itself न तु स्वयं भेदः । This keeps intact the unity of the divine nature. In this and in certain other cases, Madhva would appear to have been influenced by a monistic outlook एकधैवानुदृष्टव्यं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन though a staunch Dvaitin himself. This shows his essentially metaphysical attitude of mind that is richly susceptible to the best in the thoughts of even one’s rivals.

Rightly understood, the doctrine of Viśeṣas would be seen to be a new and distinctive contribution of Madhva to philosophic thought not only as regards the question of God’s personality but of the relation between Substance and Attributes in general and of the treatment of the category of Difference. (See the discussion on the concept of Bheda as Dharmisvarūpa, in the *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya*, Part II, sec. ii, chapter iv; No. 9.)

ix.

On the question of Freedom vs. Pre-Determination, also Madhva has endeavoured to clear the issues. The soul’s agency is real but not independent of God. Individual freedom if it is to be effective, must

be rooted in an unalterable "Savarūpa-Yogyatā" which not even God sees any reason to change or interfere with.

This makes it perfectly clear that Madhva is most anxious to preserve the character of God as a moral Governor. Indeed, so great in his anxiety that he does not even mind Vaiṣamya and Nairghṛṇya, for his God, *at and after a certain point* : See his arresting comment on the sūtra : उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ॥ (ii, 1, 37): न च पुनर्वैषम्याद्यापातेन दोषः । तादृशवैषम्यादेरुपलभ्यमानत्वात् ॥ and also the remarks :

वैषम्यं निर्धृणत्वं च वेदाप्रामाण्यकारकम् ।

नाङ्गीकार्यमतोऽन्यत्तु न वैषम्यादिनामकम् ॥

(Av., ii, 1.).

quoted and elaborately explained *ante* (Part III, chap. iii, p. 30—31). It would be seen from the earlier exposition, that Madhva would quietly admit *such* Vaiṣamya and Nairghṛṇya (as do not engender a subversion of the moral order) to safeguard the moral personality of God and the smooth operation of the moral law. There is much truth in his contention that beyond a certain point (indicated by him), Vaiṣamya and Nairghṛṇya cease to be moral flaws. Nay, properly viewed, they turn out to be assets. (See page 30-31 *ante* of this part).

The ultimate dependence (metaphysical) of even this Svarūpa on God, is proved by the impossibility of the removal of the last veils of ignorance (Svaguṇācchādikā and Paramācchādikā) without His grace and co-operation. Though essentially a moral governor of the world, God, in Madhva's system is all that religion and philosophy could ask for. The purely philosophical conception of the Deity receives due recognition in the conception of the Brahman as the *One Independent Transcendent Reference* : *Svatantra* defined as स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविध्ये परानपेक्षम् (TS. ṭikā). No philosophy can ask for more.

X.

Fundamentally speaking, Madhva's conception of Mokṣa is impeccable. It guarantees the survival of the human personality there and provides such scope as may reasonably be expected in any Theistic system (which must any day be greater than in a monistic mokṣa), for spontaneous activity of the highest kind. Quaint as it may seem, the theory of आनन्दतारतम्य in Mokṣa, is but a corollary of the uniqueness of each soul as a centre of experience. Of course, Madhva need not have transported the distinction of species too, to the world of Mokṣa and

given us a 'zoological garden' there. One wishes also that there might have been a more liberal portrayal of the picture, doing away with the distinction of sex. But the rule of texts has almost been tyrannical to absurdity in his case. Attention has however been drawn to the finer sides of Madhva's theory of Mokṣa (Chap. ii). The recognition of spontaneous activity and desires and the provision for service, etc., in mokṣa, cannot be lightly dismissed as a transference of our ideas of this world to the Beyond. For the very objection to such a transference on the ground of limitation, *argues a similar transference* of our idea here—that every activity and desire implies a limitation and hence an imperfection! Whatever *else* it is *not*, Madhva's theory of mokṣa is a fulfilment of the highest demands of realistic logic and metaphysics and is *throughout consistent*.

xi

On the question of the rationality of Brahmapariṇāma-vāda, and the interpretation of the texts pertaining to it, Madhva's verdict is generally sound. His criticism of the various types of "Abhinna-nimittopādānatva" of Brahman, shows clearly that he has attempted to go to the root of the matter in all cases and would not be content with or cowed down by rhetorical flourishes. It seems fairly self-evident that no Vedāntin (save Bhāskara) can subscribe to actual Pariṇāma of Brahman as such. "Śakti-pariṇāma" especially when it introduces a distinction between one aspect of Brahman and another, ceases any longer to be the same as an actual Brahmapariṇāma. Even the principle of Avidyā (introduced by the Advaitin) is an admission of the force of Madhva's contention. The question of the reality or unreality of Avidyā, seems to have very little relevance to the central issue whether the Brahman *is or is not* to be viewed as the *sole* and *immediate* material cause of the Universe. It helps no one to father the creation on Māyā. Even then, it has to be represented as absolutely dependent on Brahman and hence incapable of disturbing its philosophical oneness. *Dependence* and *not necessarily unreality*, would *thus appear to be the solvent of the difficulties*. Madhva is frankly unable to see any harm logical or philosophical if one concedes the reality of this principle (equated with Prakṛti) and subordinates it to Brahman.⁶ And in having done so, he does not appear to have been guilty of either bad logic or unsound metaphysics.

6. कौ दोषः सर्वथैवास्ति परिणामि जडं यदि ? (AV. i, 4) . This is a question that is yet to be answered by Absolutist and quasi-Absolutist thinkers.

**Studies in Sanskrit Texts on Temple Architecture
with Special Reference to the Tantrasamuccaya**

By

N. V. MALLAYYA

PART II

अथ प्रथमः पटलः ॥



देवतावन्दनम् .

श्रीमत् षड्गुणसंभृतं वपुरधिष्ठायानुगृह्णाति यः
श्रद्धामक्तिपवित्रितोपहरणैःस्वारम्भभूतात्मकैः ।
पूर्णानन्दरसानुभूरपि सदा सन्तर्पितो यज्वन-
स्तं देवं निगमागमाद्यधिगतं नित्यं समाराध्नुयाम् ॥ १ ॥

गुरुदिवाकरवरणम्, ग्रन्थानुबन्धश्च.

गुरुदिवाकरभद्रकटाक्षरूक्स्फुरितहृत्कमलोदरसंभृतम् ।
लिखितयाम्यथ तन्त्रसमुच्चयं गुणनिकाविधिसाधनसिद्धये ॥ २ ॥

PATAALA I

PRAYER

1. May I worship, always, the God who is known through Nigamas (Vedic texts), Āgamas (Purāṇic and other texts) etc., and who assumes a magnificent form, endowed with the six attributes (omniscience and five others); and who, though always enjoying perfect bliss, is yet pleased by the offerings which are sanctified by His worshipper's faith and devotion and which represent the (five) constituent elements of the worshipper.

HOMAGE TO DIVĀKARA, THE PRECEPTOR AND THE PURPOSE OF THIS WORK

2. I shall set to writing the 'Tantrasamuccaya' collected inside the heart which is the lotus opened by the rays—the kind looks—of the sun of my preceptor—Divākara (by name)—with a view to effecting a repeated study (of what has been learnt).

श्रीशेशशहरिसुम्भजिदाम्बिकेयविधनेशभूतपतिनामविभिन्नभूम्नः ।
वक्ष्ये परस्य पुरुषस्य समानरूपमर्चाविधिं सह पृथक् च विशेषयुक्तम् ॥ ३ ॥

आराधकलक्षणानि.

वर्णाश्रमाधिकृतकर्मरतस्तदुक्तन्यायात्तवित्तनिचयः परमस्य पुंसः ।
नित्यार्चनादिविधये प्रतिमाप्रतिष्ठाकर्मोन्मना गुरुवरं प्रथमं वृणीत ॥ ४ ॥

गुरुलक्षणानि.

विप्रः कुलीनः कृतसंस्क्रियौघः स्वधीतवेदागमतत्त्ववेत्ता ।
वर्णाश्रमाचारपरोऽधिदीक्षो दक्षस्तपस्वी गुरुरास्तिकोऽस्तु ॥ ५ ॥

गुरुकृत्यम् .

यियक्षुणाचार्यवरो वृतोऽथ समूर्तिपः कर्म समातनोतु ।
प्रतिश्रुतं भूमिपरिग्रहादि तीर्थाभिषेकावधिकं क्रमेण ॥ ६ ॥

सामान्येन प्रतिष्ठास्थानम् .

तीर्थान्ते तटिनीतटे जलनिषेत्तीरे सरित्सङ्गमे
शैलग्रगेऽद्रितटे वनोपवनयोरुद्यानदेशे तथा ।
सिद्धाद्यायतनेषु वा गुरुवरो ग्रामे पुरे पत्तने
देशेऽन्यत्र मनोरमे सुरसमिज्यायै क्षितिं कल्पयेत् ॥ ७ ॥

विष्णवादीनां ग्रामादिकेषु स्थाननियमः.

प्राचि प्रतीचि च हरौ निजदिश्युमेशे वायौ निसुम्भजिति तारकजिल्युदीच्याम् ।
ग्रामादिकेषु निर्ऋतौ गणपार्थनाम्नोर्गृह्णातु भूमिमखिलेष्वपि मध्यतो वा ॥ ८ ॥

3. I shall state in general and in particular the mode of worship of that Supreme Person whose majesty is severally represented by (lit—has but split itself into) the names of Śrīśa (Viṣṇu), Īśa (Śiva), Seśa-hari (Śiva-Nārāyaṇa), Sumbhajit (Durgā), Āmbikeya (Skanda), Vigh-neśa (Gaṇapati), Bhūtapati (Śāstā) and the like.

QUALITIES OF THE WORSHIPPER

4. He who is disposed to duties with reference to the castes and the stages of life, who is enriched with wealth which is the outcome of the observance of the rules prescribed thereon, whose mind tends towards the installation of an image for the performance of daily worship of the Supreme Person must first seek a distinguished 'Guru.'

QUALITIES OF THE GURU

5. Let this 'Guru' be a priest, a man of high birth, one sanctified by the observance of a host of purificatory rites, a knower of the essence of the 'Vedas' and the 'Āgamas' learnt in the proper manner, a follower of the traditions bearing on the system of caste and the stages of life, one consecrated to religious observances, one who is skilful, and has practised Tapas, and who is a believer in the existence of God.

THE DUTY OF THE GURU

6. Now, the venerable Ācārya, selected by one desirous of doing religious duties, should, together with the Mūrtipas, carry out in order the work promised beginning with 'Bhūparigraha' (selection of site) and ending with 'Tīrthābhiṣeka' (bathing of an image in connection with the installation ceremony).

SITUATION OF SITE IN GENERAL

7. Let the revered Guru, for the purpose of installing the deity, fix a site in a sacred place, on the bank of a river, the shore of the sea, the place where rivers (or river and sea) meet, the top and slope of mountains, in a forest, grove or garden, near the abode of the blest, in a village, capital or city or in any other lovely place.

LOCATION IN GRĀMA ETC. OF A TEMPLE OF VIṢṆU ETC.

8. In the village, etc., select a place in the east and west for Hari, in the Īśāna for Śiva, in Vāyu for Nisumbhajit (Durgā), in the north for Tārakajit (Subrahmaṇya) and in Nirṛti for Gaṇapa and Ārya; or, in the centre for all the gods.

उत्तममध्यमाधमभूभेदानां लक्षणानि.

गोमर्त्यैः फलपुष्पदुग्धतरुभिश्चाढ्या समा प्राक्प्लवा
 स्निग्धा धीररवा प्रदक्षिणजलोपेताशुबीजोद्गमा ।
 संप्रोक्ता बहुपांसुरक्षयजला तुल्या च शोतोष्णयोः
 श्रेष्ठा भूरधमा समुक्तविपरीता मिश्रिता मध्यमा ॥ ९ ॥

भूमेर्वर्जनीयाः दोषाः.

वृत्तार्धेन्दुनिभा त्रिपञ्चरसकोणा शूलशूर्पाकृति-
 र्मत्स्यानेकपकोलपृष्ठकपिलावक्त्रोपमा मेदिनी ।
 भस्माङ्गारतुषास्थिकेशकृमिवल्मीकादिभिः संयुता
 वर्ज्या मध्यनता सगर्भकुहरा विस्त्रा विदिकस्थापि च ॥ १० ॥

वर्णवशाद् भूमेर्लक्षणानि.

विप्रादिक्रमतः कुशेषुवनदूर्वाकाशयुक्ता भुव-
 स्तुल्यातानवितानसिन्धुररसाब्ध्यंशाधिदीर्घा अपि ।
 श्वेतापाटलपीतमेचकरुचश्चाज्यासृगन्नासवा-
 मोदाः स्वादुकषायतिक्तकटुकास्वादान्विताश्च स्मृताः ॥ ११ ॥

सङ्कीर्णरूपा वसुधात्र वर्णैर्गन्धै रसैर्वाखिलवर्जनोया ।
 एनामनालक्षितवर्णचिह्नां नक्तं परीक्षेत निमित्ततश्च ॥ १२ ॥
 उपलिप्य महीतलेऽवटे घटमामं भृतधान्यकं न्यसेत् ।
 तदुपर्यपि वर्धमानकं न्यसतु प्राग्वदनो मृदात्मकम् ॥ १३ ॥

कपिलाघृतमात्ममूलतः शतसञ्जसममुत्र सिञ्चतु ।
 चतसृष्वपि दिक्षु वर्तिकास्तनुयाद् वर्णवशात् सितादिकाः ॥ १४ ॥

FEATURES OF A SITE OF THE UTTAMA, MADHYAMA AND ADHAMA ORDER

9. That ground is said to be the best which abounds in cows and men and in trees rich in their yield of fruits, flowers and juice; which is even and sloping towards the east; which is soft and producing a hard sound; which has waters running from its left to right; which is quick in its productiveness and rich in soil; which is never scarce in water; and which has heat and cold in moderation. That which is opposite to what has been spoken of is of the lowest type and that is of the middling type which has mixed features.

FEATURES OF THE LAND TO BE AVOIDED

10. That site is to be avoided which is circular, crescent-like, triangular, pentagonal or hexagonal; which has the shape of a trident or a winnow, the form of the back of a fish or an elephant or a tortoise or the head of a cow; which contains ashes, charcoal, chaff, bones, hair, worms, ant-hills and the like; which is dipping towards the centre and has underground cavities; which sends a foul smell and faces the intermediate points (i.e. corners).

PREFERENCE OF SITE ON THE BASIS OF CASTE PROFESSION

11. Those sites that have the growth of 'Kuśa,' 'Iṣuvana,' 'Dūrvā,' and 'Kāśa' grass; that have equal length and breadth, length greater than their breadth by one-eighth, one-sixth, and one-fourth; that have their soil white, red, yellow and dark in colour; that have their smell of ghee, blood, food and liquor; and taste sweet, astringent, bitter and pungent—are prescribed in order for Brahmins and the rest.

12. Here, in the examination of site, that which has mixed shape, colour, scent and taste is to be given up by all; but the earth that has the feature of colour that does not admit of any distinguishing mark has to be examined at night in the manner as laid down below.

13. Besmearing the excavated ground (with cow-dung solution) let him (the Mantrin) facing the east, place therein an unburnt pot filled with grain; over this let him place a platter made of earth.

14. Here let him sprinkle cow's ghee after muttering a hundred times 'mūlamantras' (referring to each of the Gods); let him then kindle in the four quarters four wicks of the prescribed colour, white etc. .

आच्छाद्य नीतेऽत्र मुहूर्तमात्रे यस्योज्ज्वलेद् वर्तिरमुष्य सा भूः ।
दीप्तासु सर्वास्वनुवर्णयोग्या त्याज्या विशीर्णासु समस्तवर्णेः ॥ १५ ॥

सुपद्मानामकभूमेर्लक्षणानि.

कर्पूरागरुनालिकेरतिलकैर्दर्मैः कदम्बार्जुनै-
मालियैः क्रमुकेक्षुकेतककुशैः कुन्दारविन्दोत्पलैः ।
पूर्वोदकप्लवशालिनी बहुजला वा या दरीदृश्यते
सेयं शान्तिकरी सुरेशयजने सूक्ता सुपद्मा मही ॥ १६ ॥

भद्रा.

तीरं वारिनिधेः श्रिताथ सरितस्तीर्थस्य वा दक्षिणे
व्रीहिक्षेत्रविचित्रिताप्यदिशि यज्ञार्हाङ्घ्रिपैरङ्किता ।
कोर्णा पूर्णफलप्रसूनतरुभिर्योद्यानहृद्यापि वा
भद्रा सा परिगीयते वसुमती प्रीतिप्रदा यज्वनाम् ॥ १७ ॥

पूर्णा.

प्लक्षन्यग्रोधनिम्बार्जुनवकुलकुलस्थासनाशोकनिष्पा-
वाङ्गोलैर्मालतीचम्पकतिलखदिरैः कोद्रवैर्मुद्रिता वा ।
भूमिर्या भूधराभीश्वरशिखरगता पार्श्वसंस्थाथवाद्रेः
पूर्णा सा पुष्टिदात्री सुरनिलयसमाकल्पने स्वल्पतोया ॥ १८ ॥

15. Then, after the lapse of an interval (of 48 minutes) after the pit has been covered, the earth is good for that caste if the wick prescribed for it remains burning; it is good for every caste if all the wicks remain blazing; it must be shunned by all the castes if all the wicks are gone out.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITE CALLED 'SUPADMĀ'

16. That site is called 'Supadmā' which is covered with a growth of 'Karpūra' (*Laurus Camphora*), 'Agaru' (*Amyris Agallocha*), 'Nāli-kera' (*Cocos nucifera*), 'Tilaka' (*Symplocos racemosa*), 'Darbha' (a sacrificial grass different from Kuśa and Kāśa), 'Kadamba' (*Engenia racimosa*), 'Arjuna' (*Terminalia alta*), 'Māleya' (*Santalum album*), 'Kramuka' (*Areca catechu*), 'Ikṣu' (*Saccharum Spontaneum*), 'Ketaka' (*Pandanus Odoritisimus*), 'Kuśa' (*Poa cynosuroides*), 'Kunda' (*Jasminum pubescens*), 'Aravinda' (*Nelumbium Speciosm*) and 'Utpala' (*Nymphaea Coerulea*); which is naturally sloping eastwards and northwards; wherein is to be met with a cave which contains plenty of water. Such a place confers peace when offerings to deities are made there.

BHADRA

17. That site is termed 'Bhadrā' which is situated on the shore of the ocean or on the bank of a stream or in the vicinity of a sacred place; which is beautiful because of corn-fields in the south; which is marked in the west with trees serviceable in sacrifices; which is covered with trees that are abundant in fruits and flowers and which is charming like a grove: this place gives gratification to devotees.

PŪRṆĀ

18. That site is known as 'Pūrṇā' which is marked by a growth of 'Plakṣa' (*Ficus Infectoria*), 'Nyagrodha' (*Ficus bengalensis*), 'Nimba' (*Azadirachta indica*), 'Arjuna' (*Terminalia alta*), 'Bakula' (*Mimusops Elenji*), 'Kulattha' (*Dolichos uniflorus*), 'Asana' (*Terminalia tomentosa*), 'Aśoka' (*Polyalthia longifolia*), 'Niṣpa' (*Cajanus indicus*), 'Vāṅgola,' 'Mālati' (*Jasminum pubescens*), 'Campaka' (*Mischelia champaka*), 'Tila' (*Sesamum indicum*), 'Khadira' (*Aracia catechu*), and 'Kodrava' (*Paspalum scrobiculatum*); which stands either on the summit of a mountain or in the valley thereof; which contains a small quantity of water: such a site confers prosperity when temples are built there.

धूम्रा.

अर्कैर्वेणुविभीतकैः स्नुहियुतैः श्लेष्मातकैः पीलुभिः

सङ्कीर्णा बहुशर्करा च कठिना गर्भान्विता सोषरा ।

गृध्रश्येनवराहवायसशिवाशाखामृगैः सन्ततं

जुष्टा यष्टुरनिष्टदा निगदिता धूम्रा मही सूरिभिः ॥ १९ ॥

तद्वृक्षगुल्मादिकमिष्टशस्त्रैरुच्छिद्य संशोध्य निजास्त्रजापी ।

क्षमां क्षमीकृत्य दिशश्च सम्यग्ज्ञात्वेष्टयुक्त्या प्रमिमीत चैनाम् ॥ २० ॥

दिग्विभागज्ञानविधानम् .

*साक्षे शङ्कुमिनाङ्गुलं समतले कृत्वा पृथक्कालज-

च्छायाप्रारचितत्रिबिन्दुपरिवृत्त्योत्पाद्य मत्स्यद्वयम् ।

तत्सौषुम्नसिरोत्थसूत्रयुगयोगाच्छङ्कुनाढ्यन्तिमं

सूत्रं न्यस्य सुसाधयेद् यमधनेशाशे ततश्चेतरे ॥ २१ ॥

सीमास्थापनम् .

पुत्रामैकतरुद्वयान् करमितांस्तत्पादनाहान् दृढाञ्

शङ्कुन् प्राग्वदनोऽस्त्रमन्त्रमहितान् मध्यादिशर्वान्तिमम् ।

कृत्वा कल्पितसालसीम्नि परितः शङ्कुद्विसंवेष्टितं

स्वास्त्रेण प्रविसार्य सूत्रमपि गृह्णातु क्षितिं सर्वतः ॥ २२ ॥

गर्तकरणम् .

स्वात्वा क्षितिं तां पुरुषप्रमाणं जलान्तमश्मावधि वा सुलुग्ने ।

पादोनमापूर्य विशुद्धवेद्यां रात्रौ यजेद् दिश्यथ वास्तुमैश्याम् ॥ २३ ॥

DHŪMRĀ

19. That plot is known by the name of 'Dhūmrā' which is covered with 'Arka' (*Calotropis gigantea*), 'Veṇu' (Bamboo), 'Vibhītaka' (*Beleric myrobalan*), 'Snuhiyut' (*Duphorbia antiquorum*), 'Śleṣmātaka' (*Cordia obliqua*), and 'Pīlu' (*Careva arborea*); which is gritty and hard; which has holes and creatures inside the holes; which is inhabited by vultures, falcons, pigs, crows, jackals and monkeys; this earth is pronounced by competent authorities to bring adversity on those who worship there.

20. After having cleared the ground of its trees and creepers by means of instruments which have been duly propitiated and having examined and levelled well the chosen site, let the master carefully ascertain all the quarters and measure the plot of ground required for the edifice.

PROCESS IN THE FINDING OF CARDINAL POINTS

21. Having levelled the ground which is at the north or south of the equator, erect a gnomon of twelve aṅgulas in height. With three points marked at the end of shadows projected at different times as the centre, describe three circles (of equal radius) and thus produce two (figures which resemble) fishes. Then, extend lengthwise two threads starting from the 'suṣumnaśiras' (madhyanāḍī i.e., the central cord) of the two fishes till they meet at a certain point. From here till the central point at the base of the gnomon lay a thread and thus determine the southern and northern quarters; and then from this (line) fix the rest (eastern and western quarters).

FIXING OF THE BOUNDARY

22. Let the master facing the east and chanting 'astramantras' on pegs which are firm and made of the tree called 'Punna' (*Calophyllum*) and measuring one 'hasta' in height and one-fourth of a 'hasta' in circumference, plant one peg at the centre of the plot first and the rest round the boundary line of the chosen temple-site in the (eight) quarters terminating with the Īśāna quarter; let him then twine a cord round each of the pegs twice and thus encircle the whole boundary in proper order: thus let him choose a plot for every God.

DIGGING OF THE FOUNDATION-PIT

23. After having dug this earth (chosen) in the auspicious time either to the depth of a man's height or till the water or rock (in the bottom) is reached, and then having filled the same till one-fourth of the depth is left, on the 'Īśāna' corner of a purified 'Vedi' constructed therein, let him, when the night falls, offer homage to 'Vāstu'.

गते निधिकलशादिस्थापनम् .

गते तत्र विशोधिते विनिहिताधाराश्ममध्यावटे
 धान्याद्याहितविष्टरेऽथ निधिकुम्भं ताम्रजं वाश्मजम् ।
 मूलेन प्रणिधाय तत्र विधिवद् रत्नादिपूर्णेऽर्णजं
¹शैलं कच्छपमत्र नालमुदितं शुल्बोद्धवं विन्यसेत् ॥ २४ ॥

निधिकुम्भादीनां प्रमाणम् .

²स्तम्भोच्चस्य षडंशविस्तृततदष्टांशाधिकोच्चो घटः
 पद्मोऽष्टांशसमुच्छ्रयोच्छ्रयनवांशोनप्रथोऽष्टच्छदः ।
 अष्टांशायततद्विपांशरहितव्यासायतार्धोच्छ्रयः
 कूर्मो नागयवाग्रतद्विगुणमूला योगनालप्रथा ॥ २५ ॥

इष्टकानां संख्या प्रमाणं च.

²अष्टाशामिहिरैस्त्रिधायततदर्धव्यासपादोच्छ्रिता
 यद्वाकर्माहियुगैर्मिताततिवितत्युत्सेधवत्योऽङ्गुलैः ।
 मार्त्तिक्यः पुटपाकलोहितरुचः शैल्योऽथवाष्ट्रेष्टकाः
 कर्तव्याश्चतुरनुनिताश्चतुररुपेता वा गृहौचित्यतः ॥ २६ ॥

गर्भपात्रप्रमाणम् .

²स्तम्भायामद्वादशांशोपपन्नव्यासं व्यासार्धोच्छ्रयं गर्भपात्रम् ।
 उर्यश्रं तच्छुद्धशुल्बप्रकलप्तं स्वोत्सेधाद्भ्रून्मनोच्छ्रयोर्ध्वच्छदाढ्यम् ॥ २७ ॥

इष्टकान्यासविधिः.

प्रासादद्वारस्य वामेतरस्मिन् पार्श्वोद्देशे भावितत्वादुकान्तः ।
 भूमिं कृत्वा सुस्थिरां शोधयित्वा मात्वा क्षेत्रं कल्पयेदिष्टकानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

1. Reading from a Malayalam ed. of the Tantrasamuccaya.
2. From Supplementary Paṭala No. 12.

LAYING OF NIDHIKALAŚA ETC. IN THE FOUNDATION-PIT

24. In that pit which has been sanctified, which has 'Ādhāraśilā' placed in its central cavity, which has been filled with grains etc., in its low space, let him place 'Nidhikumbha' made of copper or stone after due meditation on the 'mūlamantras'; over this (Nidhikumbha) containing precious stones etc., place a lotus; above this a tortoise made of stone and over this again, a raised 'Nāla,' made of copper.

THE DIMENSION OF THE NIDHIKUMBHA ETC.

25. The Ghaṭa (ie. Nidhikalaśa) will have a 'vistāra' which is one-sixth of the height of the pillar of the Prāsāda and a height which is one-eighth more than the vistāra; Padma (Śilāpadma) will have a height one-eighth of the height (of the pillar) and vistāra which is less than the height by one ninth of the height, and it will have eight petals; Kūrma (Śilākūrma) will have a length which is one-eighth of the height of the pillar, and vistāra which is one-eighth less than the length and its height will be half this length; the breadth of the Yoganāla will be of the measure of eight yavas (grains) (i.e. one aṅgula) at its extremity and twice this will be the measure of its base.

DIMENSION AND NUMBER OF BRICKS

26. Bricks must be made either of clay which turns red being baked in a kiln or of stone having three kinds of length of eight, ten or twelve aṅgulas, breadth which is half the length and thickness one-fourth the length; or breadth of eight 'aṅgulas' and length of twelve and thickness of four. They may be eight, four or twelve in number according to the size of the structure.

DIMENSION OF THE GARBHAPĀTRA

27. Make a 'Garbhapātra' of pure copper, square in shape, which has a vyāsa (i.e. measure, length and breadth) which is one-twelfth of the height of the pillar, height half of this, and the height of its lid one-fourth less than the height (of the Garbhapātra).

DISPOSITION OF BRICKS (FIRST BRICKS)

28. On the right side of the Prāsāadvāra beneath the door-posts, inside the Pāduka that is to be constructed, having made firm the earth and examined it and measured the same, assign plot for the laying of bricks.

क्षेत्रे चतुष्पदयुते चतुरश्ररूपे रेखे लिखेच्छिविरूपदयोः पुरोग्रे ।
तच्छिष्टकोष्ठयुजि पिप्पलशङ्कुनोदगग्रे ध्रुवेण सकलेषु शिवेऽस्त्रतो वा ॥ २९ ॥

गर्भन्यासस्थानम् .

¹नागैर्मितितितं विभज्य चतुरो बाह्वे विहायांशका-
नन्तस्त्रीनखिलेषु गोभिरजिते षड् द्वौ च षाण्मातुरे ।
भूतैस्त्रीनपि चैककं वितनुयाद् गर्भं परांशे स्थितं
विप्रस्योपरि पादुकस्य भुवि राज्ञोऽधः क्रमादन्ययोः ॥ ३० ॥²

1. From Supplementary Pāṭala No. 12.

2. These 30 stanzas are selections from Pāṭalas 1 and 12 (T. S. S. Ed.); in respect of numbers they do not follow the T. S. S. Ed.

29. In a four-quartered and square-shaped ground draw lines with the nail prepared out of the Peepal tree in the Vāyu and Agni quarters, their direction pointing towards the East, as well as in the remaining regions (viz. the Īśāna and Nirṛti quarters), their direction pointing northwards (muttering the Praṇava mantra in the case of all Gods or Astramantra in the case of Śiva). There lay the bricks as described above.

THE PLACE OF GARBHANYĀSA

30. In the temples of all Gods, having divided the vistāra of the (internal) wall by eight, leave four parts outside and three inside and in the remaining part (which is the fifth from outside and fourth from inside) lay the Garbha; in the case of Viṣṇu, in the one part that remains when six parts and two parts are kept outside and inside respectively out of a division into nine parts; and in the case of 'Śāṇ-mātura', in the one part that remains when three parts are kept out and one part inside out of a division into five parts. This Garbha, if it has reference to Brahmin, will be placed above the Pāduka; if to Kshatriya, on the ground level; and if to others beneath in order.

अथ द्वितीयः पटलः ॥



सामान्येन वर्गप्रमाणदिकल्पनकथनम् .

पादोनत्रिकरादिपञ्चदशहस्ताशाङ्गुलान्तोत्तरे-

ष्वष्टाष्टाङ्गुलवृद्धितोऽन्तरभवद्योनिप्रभेदेष्वथ ।

प्रत्यक्प्राग्वदनक्रमेण विहितेष्वल्पेषु वान्येषु वा

प्रासादेषु विशिष्टजातिषु निजेष्टं कारयेत् कारुभिः ॥ १ ॥

प्रासादस्य ईशादिक्रमेण दिकल्पनम् .

ईशादिप्रेतेशपर्यन्तदिकस्थाः प्रासादा ग्रामादिकेषु ध्वजोत्थाः ।

गोयोन्युत्थाः शेषदिकसंस्थिताः स्युस्तत्स्थाप्यार्चा चेष्यते तत्सयोनिः ॥ २ ॥

योन्यादिकम् .

इष्टातानवितानमाननिचये त्रिघ्नेऽष्टभिर्भाजिते

शेषो योनिरिह व्ययो मुनियुजाथायोऽष्टनिघ्नेऽरूणैः ।

ऋक्षैर्ऋक्षमवासित्र तु वयो ज्ञेयं तिथिस्त्रिंशता

वारो भूमिधरैर्निधिप्रगुणिते धर्माह्विते वा व्ययः ॥ ३ ॥

अष्टयोनयः, तेषां फलं च.

ध्वजधूमसिंहकुक्कुरवृषस्वराजवायसाः क्रमेण स्युः ।

प्रागादियोनयोऽष्टौ तेष्वयुजः सम्पदे युजो विपदे ॥ ४ ॥

PATAALA II

A GENERAL REFERENCE TO TYPE, SIZE AND ORIENTATION

1. Get built by artisans, according to one's taste, a temple coming under the 'Alpa Prāsāda' class, in which the 'uttara' will have its measurements beginning with two and three-fourths cubits and increasing by eight aṅgulas ending with fifteen cubits and ten aṅgulas, and which will (consequently) have different yonis and facing towards the West and East; or, a temple coming under any other class.

ORIENTATION OF TEMPLE, ACCORDING TO ITS LOCATION IN ĪŚĀ ETC.

2. In places such as a village, etc., the temple located in the quarters ranging from the Īśāna to the Yama shall have the 'Dhavaja Yoni,' Those standing in the remaining quarters will have the 'Vṛṣa Yoni.' And the image to be insalled, it is desired, should possess a similar Yoni.

YONI AND OTHER FORMULAS

3. 'Yoni' is the remainder that results when the perimeter is multiplied by three and this product divided by eight; and here, when (the same product is) divided by fourteen, the remainder is 'Vyaya.' 'Āya' (is the remainder that results) when (the perimeter is) multiplied by eight and (the product) divided by twelve; 'Rkṣa' (is the remainder) when (the same product is) divided by twenty-seven and the quotient herein is to be understood as the 'Vayas.' 'Tithi' (is the remainder resulting) when (the perimeter is multiplied by eight and the product) divided by thirty, and 'Vāra' is the remainder when the same product is divided by seven. As an alternative, 'Vyaya' is the remainder that results when the perimeter is multiplied by nine and the product divided by ten.

THE EIGHT YONIS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCE.

4. Beginning with the eastern-most quarter, there are eight 'Yonis' in order called 'Dhvaja,' 'Dhūma,' 'Sīmha,' 'Kukkura,' 'Vṛṣa,' 'Khara,' 'Gaja' and 'Vāyasa'. Of these, the odd yonis are beneficent, the even ones adverse.

आयव्ययौ.

आयाधिक्यं व्ययतः सम्पाद्यं सर्वथान्यथापत्तिः ।

नक्षत्रादिशुभत्वं ज्योतिःशास्त्रादिभिः सुविज्ञेयम् ॥ ५ ॥

पञ्च-वयांसि.

बोलत्वं कौमारं यौवनमथ वार्धकं च निधनं च ।

पञ्च वयांस्येष्वन्त्यं नेष्टं शिष्टानि वास्तुनीष्टानि ॥ ६ ॥

प्रासादौन्नत्यम् .

धाम्नो व्यासे शकरीद्वन्द्वभक्ते मित्रेन्द्रेध्मांशैः समस्तांशतश्च ।

विस्तृत्या संयुक्तया पादुकादिस्तूप्यग्रान्तोऽभ्युच्छ्रयः स्याच्चतुर्धा ॥ ७ ॥

स्तम्भाधिष्ठानयोरुन्नतिः.

गेहे त्रिदोर्वर्गभवे द्विदोर्मितान् स्तम्भांस्ततोऽब्ध्यङ्गुलवर्धितान् क्रमात् ।

चतुष्कराद्युत्तरवर्गजेषु तान् करोत्वधिष्ठानमतोऽर्धसंमितम् ॥ ८ ॥

अङ्गाद्यैरुदयोत्तरान्तरगतोन्मानं विभज्य क्रमात्

संख्यानैः शिवपश्चिमैर्निगदिते स्तम्भोच्छ्रये स्वेच्छया ।

अंशं योजयतु क्वचित् त्यजतु वा मासूरके स्वेच्छ्रयं

भङ्क्त्वाङ्गादिनवान्तिमैर्विरहयेद् विंशं यथोक्तोच्छ्रयात् ॥ ९ ॥

स्तम्भविस्तारः.

भक्ते प्रत्युत्तरान्तर्गतचरणसमुन्मानकेऽष्टाङ्कदिग्भि-

स्तेष्वेकांशात्तमूलप्रततितदुरगांशादिहीनाग्रतानान् ।

दास्तम्भांस्तदहर्हं विहितततिदलग्न्यब्धिभागोनतानान्

कुड्यस्तम्भांश्च कुड्ये रचयतु चरणाग्रप्रतानोऽत्र दण्डः ॥ १० ॥

ĀYA AND VYAYA

5. An excess of 'Āya' over 'Vyaya' should always be secured ; otherwise, there is adversity. The auspiciousness of the 'Nakṣatras' etc., should be known through the science of astrology and the like.

THE FIVE AGES

6. Five are the Ages of a building, namely, 'Bālatva' (infancy), 'Kaumāra' (boyhood), 'Yauvana' (manhood), 'Vārdhakya' (old age) and 'Nidhana' (death); of these the last is undesirable and the remaining four are desirable in the case of a building.

THE HEIGHT OF A BUILDING

7. When the vistāra (breadth) of the building is divided by twenty-eight, twelve parts or fourteen parts or twenty-one parts or all the twenty-eight parts, added on to the vistāra, any one of these four will be the height of the building beginning with the 'Pāduka' and ending with the top of the 'Stūpikā'.

THE HEIGHT OF ADHIṢṬHĀNA AND STAMBHA

8. In the class of buildings coming under the three cubits measure type, the pillar will be two cubits high ; and in the succeeding class of buildings coming under four cubits, five cubits etc., the height of the pillar is to be increased by four aṅgulas in order. The Adhiṣṭhāna (basement) should be made half the height of the pillar.

9. Having divided the height between the 'udaya' and 'uttara' by any number beginning with six and ending with eleven add one part thereof to or subtract the same from the height laid down for the pillar or the Māsūraka (basement), if desired. Similarly, the height of the basement being divided by any number beginning with six and ending with nine, deduct any one part thereof from the height above prescribed (for the basement).

THE BREADTH OF THE COLUMN.

10. The height of a pillar from 'Prati' to 'Uttara' being divided into eight, nine or ten parts, one of these parts will be the 'vistāra' of the pillar at the base, while the 'vistāra' at the top will be less than the same at the base by one-eighth or one-ninth or one-tenth thereof. Thus construct wooden pillars (Dārustambhas). 'Kuḍyastambhas' (pilasters) may be built in the wall, in which case the 'vistāra' will be less than that of the wooden pillar by half, one-third, or one-fourth. Here, the 'vistāra' at the top of the pillar is known as 'Daṇḍa.'

अधिष्ठानादप्यधोदेशे पक्षान्तरेण कल्पनीयस्योपपीठस्य क्लृप्तिः.

मासूरोच्चे विभक्ते शिखिविशिखकरैः क्षमेक्षणेन्द्रंशतोऽर्धो-

शोर्ध्वं पादांशवृद्ध्या द्विगुणितचरमं योजयेद् वोपपीठम् ।

दिग्भक्तैः शशाङ्कादिभिरिषुचरमैरेकसार्धद्विलोकै-

र्दण्डैर्वा निर्गतं चारचयतु विलसत्स्वाङ्गभङ्ग्याभिरामम् ॥ ११ ॥

अधिष्ठानादधोभागे पृथक्कल्पनीयस्य पद्मस्य क्लृप्तिः.

इष्टाधिष्ठानोच्छ्रयं संविभज्य सङ्ख्याभिः श्रुत्यादिनन्दान्तिमाभिः ।

कुर्यादिकांशेन तूपान (ड ? द) न्ते पद्मं धामोत्सेधतोऽदोऽधिकं स्यात् ॥ १२ ॥

अधिष्ठानम् ; तदवयवविशेषप्रमाणम् .

मासूरे मिहिरद्वयांशिनि ततोऽशैः पादुकं पावकै-

रष्टाभिर्जगतीं स्वरैः कुमुदकं शेषे दशांशैः शकैः ।

त्रिद्वयान्यश्चमितैर्गलं विरचयेत् कम्पान् गलं पट्टिकां

प्रत्युद्यन्मकरास्यकादिरुचिरां सिंहादिभिश्चोज्ज्वलाम् ॥ १३ ॥

पक्षान्तरेणाप्यधिष्ठानविभागः.

वास्त्वाधारसमुच्छ्रये प्रकृतिभक्ते वा त्रिभिः पादुकं

छन्दोभिर्जगतीं रसैः कुमुदकं चैकेन तत्पट्टिकाम् ।

भागाभ्यां गलपादकान् विरचयेदधोऽंशतः पट्टिकां

क्षुद्रां सार्धधरांशकेन महतीं स्वांशोल्लसद्वाजनाम् ॥ १४ ॥

प्रत्युत्पन्नक्रमपादबन्धावधिष्ठानविशेषौ.

मासूरैः शैर्दिनेशांशिनि सति जगतीकैरवे श्रुत्युपायै-

स्तच्छिष्टैः पट्टिकामन्तरिमपि रचयेद् वाजनं च प्रति च ।

प्रत्युत्पन्नक्रमाख्ये क्रम इति कथितः पट्टिकान्तं तथातः

खण्डान् सार्धैकतो वाजनमपि सदलैकांशतः पादबन्धे ॥ १५ ॥

THE HEIGHT OF THE UPAPĪṬHA, AN OPTIONAL MEMBER BENEATH THE ADHIṢṬHĀNA

11. Add an 'Upapīṭha', the height of which may be one part, two parts or one part when the height of the basement is divided by three, five or two respectively, or it may be half plus a quarter or increasing by a quarter it may reach twice the height of the basement; and give the 'Upapīṭha' a projection which may be one to five tenths or which may be one, one and a half, two or three Daṇḍas. It must be embellished by the beauty of its own mouldings.

THE HEIGHT OF 'PADMA,' ANOTHER OPTIONAL MEMBER BENEATH THE ADHIṢṬHĀNA.

12. Having divided the height of the chosen basement by any number beginning with four and ending with nine, construct a 'Padma' any one of the parts high below the 'Upānaha.' This is in excess (i.e. exclusive of) the total height of the temple.

ADHIṢṬHĀNA—THE PROPORTION OF ITS SEVERAL MOULDINGS

13. The height of the basement being divided into twenty-four parts, construct the 'Pāduka' with three parts thereof, 'Jagati' with eight parts, 'Kumuda' with seven parts; dividing the remaining six parts into ten, make 'Gala' with three parts, 'Kampa' with two parts, 'Gala' with three parts and 'Paṭṭikā' with two parts, the last of these mouldings being made beautiful by such adornments as 'makarāyasa', 'siṃha' and the like.

AN ALTERNATIVE TYPE OF ADHIṢṬHĀNA—ITS DIVISIONS

14. When the height of the basement (vāstvādhāra) is divided into twenty-one parts, make 'Pāduka' with three parts thereof; 'Jagati' with seven; 'Kumuda' with six; its 'Paṭṭikā' with one; 'Gala' and 'Pāda' with two; small 'Paṭṭikā' with half and large 'Paṭṭikā' with one and a half, it being decorated with 'Vājanas'.

TWO OTHER ALTERNATIVE TYPES—'PRATYUTPANNAKRAMA' AND 'PĀDABANDHA'

15. When the height of the basement is divided into twelve parts, construct 'Jagati' and 'Kumuda' with four parts each; with the remaining parts make (successively upwards) 'Paṭṭikā', 'Antarī', 'Vājana', and 'Prati'. Such is the proportion laid down in the variety of basement called 'Pratyutpannakrama.' In (the basement known as) 'Pāda-bandha', however, it (i.e., the order) is the same till the end of 'Paṭṭikā', while above it construct 'Khaṇḍaka' (or Antarī) and 'Vājana' with one and a half parts each.

अवयवानां निर्गमः.

यावत् स्वायोच्चमानं गमयतु जगतीं बाह्यतो मानसूत्रात्
 तत्तुल्यं कैरवं चोच्छ्रयसमचरणोनार्धपादांशकं च ।
 शिष्टं तत्पट्टिकाब्जादिकमपि गमयेन्मानसूत्रात् समन्तात्
 तत्तच्छोभानुरूपं गमयतु जगतीसूत्रतः पादुकं च ॥ १६ ॥

अधिष्ठानतलविभागकल्पनम् .

चिन्वेत्यधिष्ठानमिहानुरूपं समं तलीकृत्य शिलाप्रतनैः ।
 विभज्य गर्भान्तरबाह्यभित्तिन्मध्यनाडी रचयेद् यथार्हम् ॥ १७ ॥

गर्भगृहव्यासः.

वह्वादिदित्यवधिकौजविभागभक्ते व्यासे गृहस्य नयनाद्युरगान्तिमांशैः ।
 पञ्चांशकैश्च वसुभागयुतेऽर्धतश्च गर्भालयस्य वितर्तिर्नवधोदितेति ॥ १८ ॥

गर्भभित्तिप्रमाणम् .

बाह्या गृहव्यासगजांशतः स्याद्भित्तिः परा गर्भगजांशतश्च ।
 नाडी समन्तादुभयान्तराले संमेल्य वा भित्तिर्युगं गृहेऽल्पे ॥ १९ ॥

अल्पप्रासादे पक्षान्तरेण गर्भादीनां विभागः.

विस्तारेऽल्पगृहे कचिद् विशिखभक्तेऽन्तःपदे पीठिकां
 पङ्क्त्या गर्भगृहं करोतु परितः पङ्क्त्या च भित्तिं घनाम् ।
 तस्मिन् नन्दविभाजिते सति विधायैवं ततो वीथिकां
 भित्तिं चोभयपङ्क्तितो विरचयेद् द्वारं च कोष्ठेऽग्रतः ॥ २० ॥

THE PROJECTION OF MOULDINGS.

16. Beyond the mānasūtra let 'Jagatī' project to the extent of its own height or as much as would give the same Yoni; 'Kumuda' equal to it (i.e. the same projection as Jagatī). The rest (of the parts) like its 'Paṭṭikā', 'Padma', etc., should be made to project beyond the 'mānasūtra' on every side, each as much as its own part, three-fourth or half or one-fourth of its height according as beauty demands. The 'Pāduka' should project beyond the Jagatī (sūtra).

THE MARKING OF THE SURFACE OF ADHIṢṬHANA

17. After building up the suitable basement (as described) here, and making it even by paving it with stones, mark out properly the divisions into 'Garbha', 'Āntarabhitti' 'Bāhyabhitti' and 'Madhyanaḍi' (between the internal and external walls).

THE BREADTH OF THE GARBHAGRHA.

18. When the breadth of the Gṛha (main structure) is divided by any odd number beginning with three and ending with fifteen, the Garbhālaya may be given a breadth with parts beginning with two and ending with eight thereof; or, it may be five parts when the breadth is divided by eight; or, it may also be half the breadth: thus the breadth of the Garbhagrha is laid down in nine alternative proportions.

THE THICKNESS OF THE WALLS OF THE SANCTUM

19. The outer wall will be one-eighth of the breadth of the 'Gṛha', while the other (i.e. the inner wall) will be one-eighth of the breadth of the 'Garbha'. All around, in the interspace between the two (walls) (runs) the 'Nāḍi'. In the case of an 'Alpagṛha' the two walls may be combined (into a single wall).

ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION OF GARBHA ETC. IN AN ALPAPRĀSĀDA

20. In the case of an 'Alpagṛha', when the breadth and length are divided by five each, construct in the central quarter the 'Pīṭhikā'; in the row (of quarters surrounding) make the Garbhagrha; in the row (still) surrounding construct the thick wall. When the same (i.e. length and breadth) are divided by nine and (Pīṭhikā and Garbhagrha) constructed as before, make a 'Vīṭhikā' and outer wall in the two rows (of quarters surrounding) beyond. And in the front quarter, at the outer row, construct a gateway.

अम्बुमार्गस्य प्रणालस्य च स्थानं प्रमाणं च.

प्रत्यन्ते वा गलान्ते रचयतु तदुद्वध्यसूत्रेऽम्बुमार्गं
 सोमेशानान्तरोद्यद्गुणवदशभागादिकं वा व्यतीत्य ।
 मासूरोत्सेधमात्रं चरणविरहितं वार्धवृद्धं प्रणालं
 निर्यातं बाह्यतोऽन्तर्विनिहितमधिकुड्यं तदर्धशमात्रम् ॥ २१ ॥

प्रणालस्य प्रमाणं भूषणं च.

स्वायामाग्न्यंशकादिप्रविततनिजमूलानलांशादिविस्ती-
 र्णाग्रं विस्तारतुल्यत्रिपददलघनं त्र्यंशकल्लप्ताम्बुमार्गम् ।
 व्यात्तव्यालास्यमध्यप्रसृमरनिजमूलोज्ज्वलं गोमुखं त-
 न्मुक्तादामादिवल्लीवलयपरिगतं शुण्डुभिर्मण्डितं च ॥ २२ ॥

स्तम्भानां संख्या स्थानं च.

सम्भाः कोणचतुष्कमध्यविनिवेश्याः स्युः प्रतेरुर्ध्वतः
 सामान्येन समान्तराः सुरविमानेषूदिता द्वादश ।
 एते विंशतिरीशदोःप्रभृतिकेष्वेतेषु ते नैकधा
 चोक्ताः स्वाकृतिभूषणक्रमवशादेष्वर्पयेच्चोत्तरम् ॥ २३ ॥

स्तम्भानामाकृतिः.

कार्याः स्युश्चरणा युगाष्टनृपकोणाः सर्वतो वर्तुला
 विस्तारत्रिगुणोपरित्रिगुणविस्तारोन्मिताष्टाश्रकाः ।
 मूलोद्भावितकर्णसूत्रचतुरश्रोर्ध्वाशवृत्ताः पुनः
 शुण्डोद्भेदविचित्रवृत्तरुचिरा वारब्धगेहोचिताः ॥ २४ ॥

THE DISPOSITION AND LENGTH OF THE WATER-COURSE AND THE WATER-CHUTE.

21. Make an 'Ambumārga' (watercourse) at the end of 'Prati' or 'Gala' along the 'Madhyasūtra' running north and moved from the central line (towards the east) by one-eighth, one-ninth or one-tenth etc., of the length between 'Soma' and 'Īśāna'. The 'Prašāla' (water-chute) which has projection outside will have a length which is as much as, three-fourth of, or one and a half times the height of the basement; half of this (length) will remain inside the wall.

THE DIMENSION AND ORNAMENTATION OF THE WATER-CHUTE

22. The breadth of this (waterchute) at its base will be one-third etc., of its length and a third etc., of this breadth at the base will be the breadth at its extremity. Its thickness will be as much as or three-fourth or half of the breadth. The breadth of the passage for water will be a third (of the breadth of the water-chute). It (the water-chute) must be graceful by its base springing from the open mouth of a 'Vyāla'; it must have ornamentations such as the pearl-strings, creepers and armlets encircling and Śunḍu (trunk of an elephant) adorning it; its extremity will be made in the shape of a 'Gomukha' (cow's head).

THE NUMBER AND DISPOSITION OF COLUMNS.

23. In temples of Gods commonly (i.e. coming under the common (small) measure type), pillars are said to be twelve in number, which should be posted above Prati, at the four corners and in the middle, the interstices (between the pillars) being equal. In those (temples) which have eleven cubits measure etc., they are held to be twenty. They are described in a variety of ways on the basis of their difference in shape and ornamentation. On these (pillars) place the 'uttara'.

THE SHAPE OF COLUMNS

24. Pillars ('Caraṇas') may be made wholly four-faced, eight-faced, sixteen-faced or circular; or octagonal from above three times the 'vistāra' of the column to a height which is measured three times the vistāra; or again, square at the base to the extent of its Karnaśūtra (of the base) and in the above portion circular. They must be beautified by such ornamentations like the split reed and circular motifs (like the armlets), as befits the temple begun (for construction).

अधः प्रारभ्य ऊर्ध्वं क्रमात् स्तम्भावयवाः.

ओमां कुर्वीत दण्डद्वयततचरणोच्चां घटं दण्डयुग्म-

व्यासं साङ्गप्रथादिदण्डोच्छ्रयमुदधिततां दण्डतोऽङ्गप्रधूनतीवाम् ।

मण्डि दण्डप्रथाङ्गप्रधंशकरहितघनं वीरकाण्डं त्रिसार्धे-

षुदन्वदण्डदीर्घो चरणतततदर्धोच्छ्रयां पोतिकां च ॥ २५ ॥

द्वारस्थानकल्पनम् .

भित्तिव्यासमिनेर्विभज्य बहिरन्तः पञ्चसप्तांशकान्

कृत्वा कल्पितसूत्रसंस्थनिजमध्यद्वारयोगान्यथ ।

मध्यान्मध्यमतीत्य दिक्षु रचयेद् द्वाराणि तूर्ध्वं प्रते-

रग्रथद्वारमृते घनानि कृतशोभान्यूर्ध्वतस्तोरणैः ॥ २६ ॥

बिम्बद्वारोत्सेधविस्तारौ.

गर्भागारप्रताने शिववसुदिनकृच्छैलतिथ्यंशितेऽशै-

बिम्बद्वारोच्छ्रयः स्याद् गिरिशरतुरगान्नायमातङ्गसङ्ख्यः ।

उत्सेधेऽत्रैकविंशत्यतिष्ठतिथिविधाङ्गभक्ते प्रकलप्ते

व्यासो दिङ्मनन्दशैलोर्म्युदधिपरिमितांशैः क्रमात् कल्पनीयः ॥ २७ ॥

लिङ्गद्वारोत्सेधविस्तारौ.

व्यासे गर्भनिकेतनस्य दहनेषुद्वारनेत्रांशिते

लिङ्गद्वारसमुच्छ्रयं वितनुयाद् द्वित्रीषुचन्द्रांशकैः ।

तस्मिन् द्वारसमुच्छ्रयेऽथ नयनात्यष्टीशशैलांशिते

तद्विस्तारमिलामहोरगशराग्न्यंशैः क्रमात् कल्पयेत् ॥ २८ ॥

THE PARTS OF THE PILLAR FROM BOTTOM UPWARDS.

25. Make an 'Oma', two Daṇḍas in breadth and one-fourth Daṇḍa in height; 'Ghaṭa', two Daṇḍas in breadth and one and one-fourth etc., (i.e., one and a half or one and three-fourth) Daṇḍas in height; 'Maṇḍi', four Daṇḍas in breadth and three-fourth of a Daṇḍa in thickness; 'Virakāṇḍa', one Daṇḍa in breadth and three-fourth of a Daṇḍa in thickness; and 'Potikā', three, five and a half or four Daṇḍas in length, with a breadth equal to the breadth of the base of the pillar and thickness half of this.

THE DISPOSITION OF THE DOORS.

26. Dividing the thickness of the wall into twelve parts and giving five and seven parts outside and inside respectively mark out a line; then construct doors (Dvāras) on all the (four) sides above Prati, they being so situated that the middle-line of their jambs (Dvāraśākhās) coincides with the demarcating sūtra designed, while the centre of the door is a little deviated from the centre of the Prāsāda. Excepting the front-door, all will be 'Ghanadvāras' which are adorned in their above with 'torṇas.'

THE HEIGHT AND BREADTH OF THE BIMBADVĀRA.

27. When the breadth of the 'Garbhāgāra' is divided into eleven, eight, twelve, seven, or fifteen parts, the height of the 'Bimbadvāra' (door of the sanctum where a Bimba or image is installed) will be seven, five, seven, four or eight parts thereof; and its breadth is to be assigned ten, nine, seven, six, or four parts when the height is divided into twenty-one, nineteen, fifteen, thirteen or nine parts.

THE HEIGHT AND BREADTH OF THE LINGADVĀRA

28. When the breadth of the Garbhagrha is divided into three, five, nine or two parts, the height of the Liṅgadvāra (i.e. the door in front of the Liṅga Shrine) will be two, three or five parts or one part thereof in order. The height of the door being divided into two, seventeen, eleven or seven parts, its breadth will be given one part, eight parts, five parts or three parts thereof.

स्तम्भप्रमाणवशात् पक्षान्तरेण द्वारप्रमाणं द्वारशाखादीनां लक्षणं च.

कुर्यात् सर्वसुरेषु शैलवसुनन्दाशंशितेऽङ्घ्रिच्छूये
द्वारोत्सेधमिहैकभागरहितं विस्तीर्णमात्मार्धतः ।
योगौ स्तम्भसमाधिपाददलविस्तीर्णौ स्फुरद्वाजनौ
विस्तारार्धघनौ भुवङ्गमपतङ्गाढ्यौ च मूलाग्रयोः ॥ २९ ॥

भुवङ्गमपतङ्गयोः प्रमाणम् .

द्वारोत्सेधनियुक्तशेषचरणोत्सेधे शरांशीकृते
द्वयंशेनाधरपट्टिकां मितघनां सार्धेन वाङ्कांशिते ।
हीनां वाजनकेन योगविततां शिष्टांशतः पट्टिका-
मूर्ध्वस्थामथ मङ्गलाद्वफलकां युक्तयोर्ध्वपट्ट्युर्ध्वतः ॥ ३० ॥

कवाटलक्षणम् .

दण्डाब्ध्यङ्गमतङ्गजांशवहलं तावद्युतद्वार्दलं
व्यासं मूलशिखायुतं दृढतरं कार्यं कवाटद्वयम् ।
कार्या वामकवाटरोपितपरामगार्धतीव्रा तत-
स्तद्विप्रतता च सूत्रफलका सूद्यस्तनाद्युज्ज्वला ॥ ३१ ॥

कवाटयोः यन्त्रविशेषाः भूषणानि च.

ऊर्ध्वाधरभ्रमरकर्गलसन्धिपालप्रक्षेपणीयवलयान्यपि पत्रकाणि
तिर्यञ्च्युदञ्चि पुलकर्तवकुड्मलानि सश्रीमुखेन्दुशकलानि कवाटयोः स्युः ॥ ३२ ॥

AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF THE DOOR PROPORTIONATE TO THE MEASURE OF THE PILLAR AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAMBS, ETC.

29. In the case of all Gods, when the height of the pillar is divided into seven, eight, nine or ten parts, make the height of the Dvāra less than that of the pillar by any one part thereof ; its breadth will be half of its height. The 'Yogas' (door-posts) will have breadth which is as much as or one and one-fourth or one and a half times the breadth of the pillar and thickness half of its breadth. They will be beautified by 'Vājanas' and furnished with 'Bhuvan̄gama' (the lower piece) at the base and 'Pataṅga' (lintel) at the top.

THE DIMENSION OF BHUVAṆGAMA AND PATAṆGA.

30. The height of the pillar which results when the height of the door is deducted (therefrom), having been divided into five parts, construct 'Adharapaṭṭikā' (lower plate) with two parts thereof for its thickness or with two and half parts if the division is into nine parts. Without the Vājanaka, its breadth will be as much as that of the door-post. With the remaining parts make the 'Ūrdhvapaṭṭikā' (lintel) and above the Ūrdhvapaṭṭikā a suitable plank bearing auspicious figures (like that of Lakṣmi).

THE DIMENSION OF THE PANELS.

31. A pair of strong 'Kavāṣas' (panels) must be made, the thickness of the panel being one-fourth, one-sixth or one-eighth of a Daṇḍa, and breadth half that of the door plus this thickness. It will have a 'Nāla' at the bottom and 'Śikhā' at the top. And a 'Sūtraphalakā' fixed on to the left panel at its back, having a thickness half that of the panel, a breadth twice that (i.e. twice the thickness of the panel) and ornamentations such as bulging breasts should be set.

MECHANICAL DEVICES AND ORNAMENTATIONS OF DOOR PANELS.

32. The panels will be furnished with (mechanical devices such as) 'Bhramarakas' (hinges) at the top and base, 'Argala' (inner bolt), 'Sandhipāla' (protector of joints, i.e., 'Sūtraphalakā'), 'Prakṣepaṇīya' (outer bolt) 'Valayas' (chain), and (adornments such as) 'Patrakas' (leaf-like metallic bands) both lengthwise and breadthwise, 'Pulakas,' 'Ārtavas' and 'Kuḍmalas' (nails in the form of flowers in the three stages of bloom, namely the blossomed, semi-open and closed bud) and 'Induśakalas' (ornaments in the shape of crescents) accompanied by 'Śrīmukha' (face of the Goddess Śrī).

सोपानलक्षणम् .

अग्रघट्टारभुवङ्गमस्थलसमारब्धान्यधोऽधः क्रमात्

सोपानानि समानि सारशिलया चिन्वीतः यावत्तलम् ।

अध्यर्धद्विगुणात्तदण्डविपुलानि द्वारशाखाद्वयी-

पार्श्वोद्यन्मकरास्यनिःसृतलतारुद्धोभयान्तानि च ॥ ३३ ॥

घनद्वारलक्षणम् .

अग्रघट्टारप्रततिमहिभिः संविभज्याशुगांशैः

कलसव्यासं रचयतु घनद्वारमन्यत्रिदिकस्थम् ।

द्विघ्नव्यासायतमधिदलद्विघ्नतेत्याततं वा

सूयद्योगप्रकटितकवाटादिकस्वाङ्गदीप्तम् ॥ ३४ ॥

तोरणलक्षणम् .

स्तम्भे दिङ्मनन्दनागांशिनि श्लषमनलांशेन शेषेण पादौ

व्यासं स्तम्भार्धतोऽब्ध्याशुगरसमितदण्डेन वा तत्र कुर्यात् ।

पत्रादीद्वार्धचन्द्रात्मकमथ मकरास्यादिमत् पञ्चभुगं

कर्तव्यं तोरणं तद् विविधखगलसन्नक्रतुण्डोज्ज्वलं च ॥ ३५ ॥

भित्तिकरणम् .

प्रत्युत्तरान्तर्विरचय्य भित्तिं ततः समन्तात् सुदृढैः शिलाधैः ।

तां भूषयेद् वेदिकयाङ्घ्रिमूले तदूर्ध्वतश्चोज्ज्वलपञ्जराधैः ॥ ३६ ॥

वेदिकालक्षणम् .

प्रत्युत्सेवेन पादायतिवसुमुनिषड्भागतोऽध्यर्धकेन

द्वित्रिघ्नेनाङ्घ्रितारेण च भवतु समोऽभ्युच्छूयो वेदिकायाः ।

उत्सेवे द्वघंशितोऽधोवधि गुणरशनान्तर्यथाष्टाद्विषड्भा-

गोऽशैः कम्पाब्जकम्पाः शशिकरशशिभिः शेषतोऽधोगलं च ॥ ३७ ॥

DESCRIPTION OF STEPS.

33. Starting from the place of Bhuvāṅgama of the front (main) door and descending down to the floor (i.e. level of the ground) in order, construct with hard stone symmetrical and even number of steps which are one and a half or two Daṇḍas in length and covered at their extremity with creeper-like construction issuing from out of the mouth of Makara, rising from either side of the two door-posts.

DESCRIPTION OF THE GHANADVĀRAS.

34. Construct on (each of) the other three sides a 'Ghanadvāra' (false door) whose breadth consists of five parts when the breadth of the front door is divided into eight parts, and whose height is twice or two and a half times the breadth. It should be embellished by its parts such as the graceful posts, panels and the like.

DESCRIPTION OF THE TORAṆA
(PATRA, MAKARA AND CITRA).

35. The height of the pillar being divided into ten, nine or eight parts, make a fish with three parts thereof and with the rest the two pādas (lit-legs, pillars of the Toraṇa). The breadth may be half the height of the pillar or four, five or six Daṇḍas. It may be constructed in the form of a crescent (half-moon) decorated with Patra (foliage) and other motifs; or with five bends endowed with the ornamentations such as the mouth of the 'Makara'; or it may be fully embellished with varied kinds of birds and heads of sharks.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL.

36. Then, construct all around, a wall in the interspace between the Prati and the Uttara with enduring material like the stone and beautify it with a 'Vedikā' at the foot of Anghri and with ornamented 'Pañjaras' and the like at the top.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VEDIKĀ

37. The height of the 'Vedikā' may be the same as that of the 'Prati', or one-eighth, one-seventh or one-sixth of the height of the pillar (pāda); or one and a half, two or three times the breadth of the pillar. This height of the 'Vedikā' being divided into two parts give 'Guṇaraśanā' (three-fold band) till the lower half, and 'Antarī' below; or, when the division (of the height) is made by the numbers eight, seven or six, make 'Kampa', 'Abja' (Padma), and 'Kampa' with one part, two parts and one part thereof and 'Gala' with the remainder below.

भित्तिभूषणानि.

प्रासादः सकलोऽङ्घ्रितोरणचतुर्द्वारान्वितो मण्डित-

स्तम्भाभ्यन्तरजालपञ्जरयुतो वा पञ्चहस्तादिकः ।

युक्तो मूलतले विदिविस्थितचतुष्कूटैः परस्तत्परः

शालाकूटकनासिकादिविलसज्जालोज्ज्वलत्पञ्जरः ॥ ३८ ॥

शालादीनां प्रमाणं स्थानं च.

कुड्ये पङ्क्त्यादिभक्ते विदिशि विरचयेत् कूटमेकांशविस्ता-

रायामं द्व्यंशदीर्घां दिशि दिशि विततामेकभागेन शालाम् ।

शालाकूटान्तराले चरणविरहितांशोन्मितां नासिकां त-

त्पार्श्वद्वन्द्वे सजालं चरणविरहितांशादतः पञ्जरं च ॥ ३९ ॥

शालाकूटयोर्लक्षणम् .

धाम्नोऽष्टांशमितोऽथवा प्रतिमुखैः स्तूप्यन्तिमैः संयुतः

प्रासादाकृतिकश्च कूट उदितो मध्यस्फुरन्नासिकः ।

शाला तत्समसूत्रगा मुखपटीशक्तिध्वजाद्युज्ज्वला

स्तूपीत्रय्युपशोभिता परिलसन्नासा च सङ्कीर्तिता ॥ ४० ॥

पञ्जरजालकौ.

दण्डैर्द्वित्रिचतुर्मितैर्मितवितानातानकं पञ्जरं

नासाद्युज्ज्वलितं च जालकमथो वेद्युर्ध्वतः संस्थितम् ।

दण्डैर्द्व्यादियुगान्तिमैस्ततमतो दण्डैर्द्वितश्चायतं

कर्तव्यं द्विगुणान्तिमं सुषुरितं गोमूत्रकादिक्रमात् ॥ ४१ ॥

THE WALL-ORNAMENTATIONS

38. All Prāsādas (temples) will have 'Aṅghris' (pillars), 'Torṇas' (arches), and four 'Dvāras' (doors). Those which measure five cubits etc., may possess 'Pañjaras' with 'Jālas' between the ornate pillars. Those which are bigger (i.e., which possess larger measure) will have at the base four 'Kūṭas' at the four corners; and those which are still bigger, will have 'Śālās', 'Kūṭas' 'Nāsikās', attractive 'Jālas' and brilliant 'Pañjaras'.

THE DIMENSION AND LOCATION OF ŚĀLĀS ETC.

39. When the length of the wall is divided by ten etc., (i.e., ten or eight), construct a 'Kūṭa' at (each of) the (four) corners, with one part thereof for its breadth and length; and a 'Śālā' on each of the four sides with two parts in length and one part in breadth; 'Nāsikā' between the 'Śālā' and the 'Kūṭa' with three-fourth of a part in measure and on either of its two sides make a 'Pañjara' with Jāla with three fourth of a part etc.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KŪṬA AND ŚĀLĀ

40. That which has one-eighth of the measure of the temple and shape of the temple, which has parts of the temple from 'Prati' to the top of the 'Stūpi', which has 'Nāsikā' sprouting in the centre is called "Kūṭa". That which stands in the same line with the 'Kūṭa' which has grace imparted to it by 'Mukhapatti', 'Śakti', 'Dhvasas' and the like, which is ornamented by three 'Stūpis' and 'Nāsis' shining all around is known as "Śālā".

PAÑJARA AND JĀLAKA

41. 'Pañjara' must be made with a measure of two, three or four Daṇḍas in its length and breadth and adorned with 'Nāsas' and the like: and a 'Jalaka' should be made and it should be situated above the 'Vedijālaka' which has breadth beginning with two and ending with four Daṇḍas, and length beginning with one Daṇḍa added on to the breadth and ending with twice the breadth, the increase being by one Daṇḍa; and which has perforation, the holes whereof are arranged in the order of Gomūtraka (a pattern resembling the course or line marked by the urination of a bull; reference is to an undulatory design).

कुम्भलता.

स्तम्भान्तरे महति धामनि पादविस्तारोच्चाधिपादततपद्मगकुम्भसंस्थाम् ।
पादायतां घटमुखोद्गतपत्रचित्रमूलां प्रकल्पयतु कुम्भलतां समन्तात् ॥ ४२ ॥

अल्पप्रासादे भूषणविशेषः.

भङ्गत्तवा प्रत्युत्तरान्तर्गतचरणमिति भोगिभिर्भागतोऽधो
वेदिं वेदैश्च पादान् दलरचितवलभ्युत्तरं भागतोऽथ ।
यावत्स्वोत्सेधनीप्रप्रसरवलभितः स्वार्हनीपं कपोतं
गेहेऽल्पे सप्तमेनोज्ज्वलपदगृहपिण्डं करोत्वष्टमेन ॥ ४३ ॥

उत्तरलक्षणम् .

खण्डोत्तरं चरणविस्तृतितुल्यविस्तारोत्सेधमुत्तममतश्चरणोनतीव्रम् ।
पत्रोत्तरं दलविहीनघनं कनिष्ठं रूपोत्तरं घनतती विपरीततो वा ॥ ४४ ॥

रूपोत्तरे भूषणविन्यासः.

उत्सेधे विशिखांशिते द्वितयतो रूपोत्तरे वाजनं
षड्भक्तेऽल्पमिलांशतो द्वितयतो वा स्यान्महावाजनम् ।
एतन्निर्गमनं निजांशविहितं न्यस्येदुपर्युत्तर-
स्यैतत्तीव्रसमुच्छ्रयोच्छ्रयदलांशव्याततां पट्टिकाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

फलकाप्रस्तरेणाछादनकरणम् .

एकाङ्गग्रधूनादिदण्डोच्छ्रितमुपरि निधायोत्तरे वाजनं प्राक्
तिर्यग्दण्डोच्छ्रिताङ्गग्रधूनादिविततितुलास्तासु वंशानुवृत्त्या ।
स्वार्धाक्रान्ता जयन्तीस्तदुपरि सुसमीकृत्य कृत्वानुमार्गं
निश्छिद्रं छादयेत् स्वोचितघनफलकाप्रस्तरेणोर्ध्वभागम् ॥ ४६ ॥

KUMBHALATĀ: POT-AND-CREEPER ORNAMENT

42. In a big structure construct “Kumbhalatā” between the pillars all around; its ‘Kumbha’ (pot-shaped part) should be made to rest in a ‘Padma’, the height of which is equal to the breadth of the pillar and breadth one and a quarter of the height; from the mouth of the pot whose base is decorated with leaf-motifs shall spring forth creeper (latā) to the extent of the length of the pillar.

ORNAMENTAL FEATURES OF AN ALPA-PRĀSADA

43. In the case of an ‘Alpageha’ (small structure), the height of the pillar between (Prati) and (Uttara) being divided into eight parts, with one part thereof construct a ‘Vedi’ at the base; with four parts ‘Pādas’ (above it); with one part ‘Valabhyuttara’ half part going to Valabhi and half to the Uttara; then above Valabhi, which has projection equal to its own height, construct ‘Kapota’ with the seventh part giving it a suitable projection; and with the eighth part make a ‘Grhapiṇḍi’ having ornate pillars.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ‘UTTARA’.

44. The ‘Khaṇḍottara’ which has a breadth and a thickness equal to the breadth of the pillar is of the best type; ‘Patrottara’ which has a thickness less by one-fourth is of the middling type; that whose thickness is less by half is known as ‘Rūpottara’ and it is of the lowest type; the thickness and breadth may be optionally reversed in position.

ORNAMENTATION OF RŪPOTTARA.

45. When the thickness of the “Rūpottara” is divided into five parts ‘Vājana’ will be made with two parts; or, when the same is divided by six, with one part will be made the ‘Alpavājana’ and with two parts the ‘Mahāvājana’. The projection of these (Vājanas) will be to the extent of their own parts (ie. their own thickness). Then, above the ‘Uttara’ place a ‘Paṭṭikā’ whose ‘ucchraya’ (height) is as much as its (uttara’s) thickness and breadth half this height (ucchraya).

THE MAKING OF WOODEN CEILING

46. Having first placed the ‘Vājana’ of the height of one or three-fourth of a Daṇḍa etc., on the ‘Uttara’, and then above this ‘Tulās’ of one Daṇḍa height and three-fourth of Daṇḍa breadth cross-wise, above these in the direction of the ‘Uttara,’ place ‘Jayantis’, half cut (into the Tulās); then, having fixed up *anumārgas* (interstices) and made the above even, cover up closely the upper portion with spreading planks of suitable thickness.

पक्षान्तरेण शिलादिभिराच्छादनकरणम् .

द्वारार्धतः कदलिकाकरणेन गर्भकुड्यं क्रमान्मुकुलयेदथवा शिलाद्यैः ।
द्वारोर्ध्वतोऽष्टपुटचारुलसत्तरङ्गगर्भाधितुङ्गमपिधानशिलाभिरामम् ॥ ४७ ॥

लुपाकरणं स्थापनं च.

कुर्यादुत्तरपट्टिकोपरि लुपाः कूटप्रविष्टाग्रकाः
स्वखांशाहितकर्णसूत्रकमिता मध्यादिकर्णावधि ।
स्तम्भोच्चे शरशैलनन्दनयनैर्भक्ते चतुर्थोत्तरात्
तासां स्यादवलम्बनं नयनवह्मध्युर्वरांशैः क्रमात् ॥ ४८ ॥

नीप्रफलका वलयश्च.

अष्टांशकादिकृशविस्तृतिपावकांशतोत्रा च नीप्रफलकोत्तरतो लुपानाम् ।
द्वित्राङ्गुलादिविततं चतुरश्ररूपं कर्तव्यमासु वलयं च निजानुरूपम् ॥ ४९ ॥

लुपानामुपरिगता पिधानफलका स्तूबिका च.

शाकाद्युत्तमदारुकलसफलकैरताः समन्ताल्लुपाः
सन्छाद्योपरि तत्पिधानफलकां कृत्वोल्लसत्कीलकाम् ।
वास्त्वाधारसमोन्नतां प्रथिततत्पाथोजकुम्भादिकां
विन्यस्येन्नवपुण्डरीकमुकुलाग्रामूर्ध्वतः स्तूबिकाम् ॥ ५० ॥

शिखरसंछादने वस्तुविशेषकथनम् .

वर्षातपादिवारणकल्पैः शुल्बादिकल्पितैः फलकैः ।
सारेष्टकादिभिर्वा विमानशिखरं ततः सुपिदधातु ॥ ५१ ॥

CONSTRUCTION OF CEILING WITH STONE, ETC., AS AN ALTERNATIVE

47. From above half the height of the door, (starting) from the corners close up gradually the Garbhakuḍya with materials like the stone as an alternative, in the order of 'Kadalikākaraṇa'; above the door, then, to a height which is half of the Garbha, will be presented an octagonal beautiful wavy ornamentation and a covering slab (Pidhānaphalakā) charming to behold.

THE MAKING AND DISPOSITION OF RAFTERS

48. Above the Uttarapaṭṭikā, place rafters with their extremity entered into the Kūṭa. From the centre to the limit of the corner, their length will measure the extent of their own Karnaśūtra (diagonal connecting the Kūṭa with the Uttara). The height of the column, having been divided into parts five, seven, nine or two, parts two, three, four or one part thereof, will in order constitute their 'Avalambana' (eaves, the overhanging portion below).

THE NĪPRAPHALAKĀ AND THE VALAYA

49. The 'Nīpraphalakā' of rafters will have a breadth one-eighth etc., less than that of the 'Uttara' and a thickness one-third of its breadth. Square 'Valaya' two aṅgulas, three aṅgulas etc., of breadth as befits the rafters must be made (and run) through them.

THE COVER OVER RAFTERS AND THE FINIAL

50. Having covered well the rafters all around in the above with planks made of the best timber like 'Śāka' (*Tectona grandis*) and having placed above this the 'Pidhānaphalakā' (the final phalakā which is the covering for the Kūṭa) with a shining kīla (nail) fixed over it, above it place the 'Stūpikā' (finial), which has a height equal to that of the base-ment, constituent elements such as the full-blown lotus (Padma), pot (kumbha) etc., and top in the form of a fresh lotus-bud (kuḍmala).

REFERENCE TO THE MATERIALS FOR THE COVERING OF ŚIKHARA

51. Then close up well the 'Śikhara' of the 'Vimāna' with plates of metal such as copper or very strong bricks capable of resisting the inclemencies of weather like rain, heat (and snow).

अल्पप्रासादे षडङ्गानि.

अल्पे धामनि विस्तृतिद्विगुणितप्रायोच्छ्रयेऽष्टांशिते
 मूलांशेन मसूरकोच्छ्रयमथ स्तम्भोच्छ्रयं द्वयंशतः ।
 भूयः प्रस्तरमंशतो गलमिलांशेन प्रकलसोच्छ्रयं
 भागाभ्यां शिखरोच्छ्रयं विरचयेदेकांशतः स्तूबिकाम् ॥ ५२ ॥

प्रस्तरविभागाः.

स्तम्भार्धादिसमुच्छ्रये प्रकृतिभक्ते प्रस्तरे वातिष्ठ-
 त्यंशे चोत्तरवाजने त्रिशशिभिर्भूतालिरंशैस्त्रिभिः ।
 क्षमाद्रीन्दुक्षितिभिः सवाजनकपोतालङ्गपट्टयन्तरी-
 स्येकांशैः प्रतिवाजने प्रतिकपोते क्षमांशहान्यावरे ॥ ५३ ॥

एकतलविधानसमाप्तिर्द्वितलविधानारम्भश्च.

इत्येकभूमौ चतुरश्ररूपे सुरालयेऽल्पे विधिरभ्यधायि ।
 अथाभिवास्ये द्वितलादिजातिच्छन्दादिवृत्तादिगतं विशेषम् ॥ ५४ ॥

प्रमाणवशात् तलसंख्याकथनम् .

त्र्याद्याशाकरपश्चिमं शशितलं बाणादिमार्ताण्डदोः-
 पर्यन्तं द्वितलं हयादिनृपहस्तान्तं त्रिभूम्यन्वितम् ।
 कुर्याद् धाम निजोचितोच्छ्रययुतं प्रोक्तोच्छ्रयेष्वेवतो
 युक्त्या पाददलत्रिपादकरसंयोगक्षयौ च क्वचित् ॥ ५५ ॥

द्वितलविधानम् .

औरुढभित्तिमुपचित्य लुपाग्रधानीं युक्त्या तलान्तरविधौ प्रविधाय तस्याम् ।
 बाह्योत्तराहितलुपा विनिवेश्य कृत्वा तत्पट्टिकां च तलितेऽथ गलं विदध्यात् ॥ ५६ ॥

THE SIX MAIN PARTS OF THE ALPAPRĀSĀDA

52. In the case of an Alpaprāsāda, its height which is double its breadth being divided into eight parts, give one part thereof at the bottom to the height of the 'Adhiṣṭhāna' (basement), two parts above to the height of the 'Stambha' (pillar), one part to 'Prastara' (entablature), one part to the height of the 'Gala' (neck), two parts to the height of the 'Śikhara' (head) above it, and one part to the 'Stūpikā' (finial).

THE DIVISIONS OF THE PRASTARA

53. The Prastara which has height half etc., of that of the pillar, being divided into twenty-one parts or nineteen parts, make (in the former case) 'Uttara' with three parts thereof, and 'Vājana' with one part, 'Bhūtālī' with three parts, 'Vājana' with one part, 'Kapota' with seven parts, 'Āliṅga' with one part and 'Antarī' with one part, 'Prati' with three parts and its 'Vājana' with one part; in the second (alternative) division into nineteen parts, make 'Prati' and 'Kapota' each one part less.

CONCLUSION OF EKATALAVIDHĀNA AND BEGINNING OF DVITALAVIDHĀNA

54. Thus has been laid down the prescription relating to the construction of a small temple, which has one 'tala' and square shape. Now shall I specially speak of temples coming under the class of two talas etc., Jāti, Chandas etc., and Vṛtta and the like.

REFERENCE TO TALAS ON THE BASIS OF DIMENSION

55. The temple which has a measure beginning with three cubits and ending with ten cubits, will have one Tala; that which has a measure beginning with five and ending with twelve cubits will have two Talas; and that having a measure beginning with seven and ending with sixteen cubits will have three Talas: each will possess a height which is suitable to itself. In these various heights that have been referred to above there may be brought about, if desired, an addition or subtraction by one-fourth, half, three-fourth of one cubit.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF DVITALA

56. When a second Tala is to be built, having raised the internal wall, and placed thereon a fitting plank capable of holding the ends of the rafters, upon it place the rafters that are fixed on the outer Uttara, and then, having placed Paṭṭikā over these, and levelled the floor make the 'Gala' (regular structural 'Gala-neck').

प्रतितलं ग्रीवाप्रमाणम् .

स्तम्भे प्राथमिकेऽजलादिशिवनिष्ठैरंशितेऽशैः क्रमा-
 नेत्राग्नित्रिगुणेषुशैलशरनागाङ्कोन्मितैः सम्मिता ।
 ग्रीवोक्ता नवधा ततोऽपि तलकलसौ पूर्वपूर्वाङ्घ्रितः
 प्रोन्नेया च तदुन्नतिः प्रतितलं स्यात् प्रस्तरप्रक्रिया ॥ ५७ ॥

ग्रीवावयवविशेषाः.

ग्रीवायामुपरि त्रिदण्डपरिशिष्टांशे चतुर्भाजिते
 मूलांशं च तृतीयकं च दशधा तुर्यं च कृत्वांशकम् ।
 आलिङ्गाह्वयपट्टिकां त्रिभिरुभाभ्यामन्तरं पञ्चभिः
 खद्वयंशाहितवाजनां प्रतिमधःपङ्क्तयंशके कल्पयेत् ॥ ५८ ॥
 शालाकूटगवाक्षकादिरुचिरां भित्तिं द्वितीये तृती-
 येऽंशे पञ्चभिरुत्तरं च वलभिं भूतद्विपाद्युज्ज्वलाम् ।
 तुर्येऽंशे दशभिर्द्विकलसमुखपट्ट्याढ्यं कपोतं ततः
 सखाङ्घ्रिं गृहपिण्डमूर्ध्वनिहितैर्दण्डैस्त्रिभिः कल्पयेत् ॥ ५९ ॥

द्वितीये तले भूषणविशेषाः.

तले द्वितीये विदिशासु कूटान् दिशासु शालाश्च तदन्तरेषु ।
 नासीर्द्विशो वा रचयेद् दिशासु मूर्तीरजाद्याः शिखरे च नासीः ॥ ६० ॥

तृतीये तले कल्पनीये, मध्यमशिखरकरणम् .

बाह्योत्तरेण रहिते विगतोर्ध्वकूटे ग्रीवान्तरे निजगजांशकृशाग्रकुड्ये ।
 न्यस्योत्तरं न्यसतु तत्र लुपास्तुलास्थपादेषु लम्बशिरसश्चरणार्धलम्बाः ॥ ६१ ॥

THE DIMENTION OF GRĪVĀ CORRESPONDING TO EACH (UPPER) TALA

57. The height of the first pillar, having been divided by any number beginning with three and ending with eleven, with parts two, three, three, three, five, seven, five, eight and nine in order thereof, are composed the nine alternative types of 'Grīvā'; in each Tala higher up, must be maintained its height proportionāte to the height of the pillar preceding it (i.e., beneath it); in each will be made the 'Prastara.'

MOULDINGS AND OTHER ORNAMENTATIONS OF GRĪVĀ—(TALA)

58. In the 'Grīvā', having left three Daṇḍas at the top, divide the remainder into Four Divisions; the First (i.e., the bottom-most), the Third and the Fourth being each divided by ten, in the lower (i.e. the First) division into ten parts, with three parts thereof construct the 'Paṭṭikā' known as 'Āliṅga,' with two parts 'Antarī' and with five parts 'Prati' with Vājana, 'Vājana' whereof has two parts.

59. In the Second Division make a 'Bhitti' (wall) beautified with 'Śālās, Kūṭas, Gavākṣas and the like; in the Third Division into ten parts, construct an 'Uttara' with five parts and 'Valabhi' (with the remaining five) decorated with figures of Bhūtas (spirits), Dvipas (elephants), and the like; in the Fourth Division into ten parts, make 'Kapota' accompanied by a 'Mukhapaṭṭikā' which is of two parts thereof; then, with the three Daṇḍas that have been left at the top, construct a 'Gṛhapiṇḍi' together with its own 'Aṅghris' (legs i.e., pillars).

SPECIAL ADORNMENTS OF THE SECOND TALA

60. In the second Tala, construct at the corners 'Kūṭas', and on the sides 'Śālās;' between them (i.e., the Śālās and the Kūṭas) make two Nāsis and again, as an optional addition, the images of Brahmā etc., in the quarters; and in the Śikhara construct 'Nāsis'.

THE MAKING OF THE INTERMEDIATE ROOF WHEN A THIRD TALA IS TO BE BUILT

61. In the succeeding Grīvā (above) which is devoid of the 'Bāhyottara' and the 'Ūrdhvakūṭa,' place an 'Uttara' on its wall, whose top is less than the base in breadth by one-eighth, and then fix there rafters, whose lower extremity is fixed on posts (i.e. supports) standing on the Tulās and whose eaves measure half the height of the pillar.

जातिप्रासादाः.

प्रासादास्त्रितलादिभानुतलनिष्ठा जातयः स्थाणुसू-

र्याद्यैरोजसमैः करैः परिमिताश्चाससतेर्वर्धितैः ।

षोढा वह्नितलादयो द्वाधममध्यश्रेष्ठक्लृप्स्या पृथग्

व्यासाद्रद्यंशगुणांशकाधिकसमुत्सेधाश्च ते प्रायशः ॥ ६२ ॥

छन्दः, विकल्पः, आभासश्च.

विश्वेन्द्राद्येषुषट्षष्ट्यसमसमकरैरब्धिभौमादयः स्यु-

श्छन्दा हस्तैर्नवाशादिभिरिषुरसपञ्चाशदन्तैर्विकल्पाः ।

पञ्चक्षमाद्याश्च सर्वे प्रतितलमृतुभिन्ना विवस्वत्तलान्ता

रुद्राद्येकोनतानावधिभिरुदधिभूम्याद्यथाभाससंज्ञाः ॥ ६३ ॥

प्रतिवर्गं प्रासादभेदाः.

आभासेऽत्र चतुस्तलादिशिवभूम्यन्तं पृथग् वेदभे-

दाद्वयं द्वादशमन्तिमं द्व्यधममध्यादिक्रमात् षड्भिदम् ।

षष्टिर्जातिगृहे भिदाः करवशाच्छन्दे षड्नास्ततः

षट्कोनाश्च विकल्पधामनि तथाभासे दशोनास्ततः ॥ ६४ ॥

वृत्तप्रासादः.

स्वाभीष्टमाने दशयुक्तसप्तशतांशिते विश्वलसच्छतांशः ।

यस्तेन मानेन परिभ्रमय्य वृत्तात्मकं वेश्म समातनोतु ॥ ६५ ॥

चतुरश्रदीर्घप्रासादः.

नाहार्धमानप्रचये हरिर्द्धिर्भक्तेऽर्णवांशैर्वितति तनोतु ।

आयाममंशैर्ऋतुसंमितैश्च तुर्यश्रदीर्घस्य सुरालयस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

JĀTI PRĀSĀDAS

62. Prāsādas which have talas beginning with three and ending with twelve are (called) 'Jātis'; they have measure beginning with the odd and even number of eleven and twelve cubits and increased up to seventy (cubits); these, having three talas and the rest, are each of sixty kinds, both the odd and even measure type admitting of the classification into varieties, Adhama (lowest), Madhyama (middling) and Śreṣṭha (best). They generally have a height which is more than the breadth by three-seventh of breadth.

CHANDAS, VIKALPA AND ĀBHĀSA

63. Beginning with the odd and even measures of thirteen and fourteen and ending with sixty-five and sixty-six cubits respectively, the temples of four talas etc., form the '*Chanda-Prāsādas*'; beginning with (the odd and even measures of) nine and ten cubits and ending with fifty-five and fifty-six, Prāsādas with five talas etc. constitute the '*Vikalpa*' class. All these, ending with twelve talas, in each instance of tala admit of a classification into six different kinds. Now, those which have odd and even measures beginning with eleven and twelve and ending with forty-seven and forty-eight cubits, and which have four talas etc., are known as '*Ābhāsa*.'

DIFFERENT PRĀSĀDAS UNDER EACH CLASS

64. Here, in the '*Ābhāsa*' class which has talas beginning with four and ending with eleven, each case will have four varieties; the last case, which has twelve talas, will have six varieties by reason of the order of 'Adhama,' 'Madhyama' and 'Uttama' for both (odd and even types of its measure). Thus from the point of view of (the different types of) cubit measures, in the '*Jāti Prāsāda*' there are sixty different kinds, in the '*Chandas*' six less (i.e. forty-four), in the '*Vikalpa*' six more less (i.e., forty-eight) and in the '*Ābhāsa*' still ten less (i.e., thirty-eight).

VRĪTTA PRĀSĀDA—CIRCULAR STRUCTURE

65. When the desired perimeter is divided by seven hundred and ten, describe a circle with a radius of one hundred and thirteen parts thereof and then build a circular temple.

CATURAŚRADĪRGHA—RECTANGULAR STRUCTURE

66. When half the perimeter is divided by ten, give four parts thereof for the breadth and six parts for the length of the temple

हस्तिपृष्ठप्रासादः.

स्वाभीष्टे परिणाहमाननिचये धाम्नश्चतुःषष्टिभा-
 गोनेऽष्टादशधा कृतेऽर्णवमितैरंशैः पृथक् कल्पयेत् ।
 पार्श्वद्वन्द्वसमायती मुखततिं च द्व्यंशसूत्रभ्रमात्
 प्रायः साङ्गिरसांशनाहमपि पृष्ठं हस्तिपृष्ठात्मनः ॥ ६७ ॥

वृत्तायतप्रासादः.

भागद्वये द्विरदपृष्ठसमुक्तनीत्या वृत्तोक्ते तदुभयान्तरभागदैर्घ्यम् ।
 स्वेध्मांशतो विरहितेन गुणांशकेन वृत्तायते वितनुयात् सुरवर्यधिष्ये ॥ ६८ ॥

षट्कोणप्रासादः.

षोढा विभज्य निजवाञ्छितमानराशिमंशायतानि परिकल्प्य षडश्रकाणि ।
 कुर्याद् गृहं रसपुटं द्विगुणांशमानो व्यासोऽशितेऽत्र तिथिभिर्नयनांशहीनः ॥ ६९ ॥

अष्टाश्रप्रासादः.

स्वाभीष्टनाहं दशधा विभक्ते व्यासस्त्रिभागैर्द्विषडंशितेऽस्मिन् ।
 व्यासे शरांशैर्विहितायतांस्तदश्रीश्च कुर्याद् वसुकोणधाम्नः ॥ ७० ॥

त्रयो मुख्यप्रकाराः नागरद्राविडवेसराः.

मूलाद्याशिखरं युगाश्ररचितं गेहं स्मृतं नागरं
 ग्रीवाद्याशिखरक्रियं षडुरगाश्रोद्धेदितं द्राविडम् ।
 मूलाद्वा गलतोऽथवा परिलसद्वृत्तात्मकं वेसरं
 तेष्वेकं पृथगात्तलक्ष्मसु विदध्यादात्मनः सम्मतम् ॥ ७१ ॥

HASTIPRŚṬHA—APSIDAL STRUCTURE

67. The desired perimeter of the temple called 'Hastiprṣṭha' being divided into sixty-four parts, deduct one part therefrom and then having divided the remainder (sixty-three parts) thereof into eighteen parts, with four parts thereof in each case make the two sides (pārśvas) of equal length, and the breadth of the front; then with two parts as the radius, draw a semi-circle, the measure of which will nearly (i.e. roughly) amount to parts six and one-fourth.

VR̥TTĀYATA—ELLIPSOIDAL STRUCTURE

68. In a Vṛttāyata class of temple draw on two sides two semi-circles with radius described in the Hastiprṣṭha type; deduct from the division (into 18 parts) three parts and divide the remaining parts into twenty-one parts; with twenty parts thereof determine the length between the two semi-circles.

ṢAṬKOṆA PRĀSĀDA—HEXAGONAL STRUCTURE

69. The desired perimeter of the Prāsāda, being divided into six parts, assigning one part thereof for the length of each of the six sides make an hexagonal structure. Here, having divided two parts thereof by fifteen, and deducted two parts therefrom, the remainder (i.e. 13 parts) will form the breadth of the structure.

AṢṬĀŚRA PRĀSĀDA—OCTAGONAL STRUCTURE

70. The desired perimeter of an octagonal structure being divided into ten parts, three parts thereof will constitute the Vyāsa of the structure. Having divided this Vyāsa into twelve parts, five parts thereof will form the length of each side.

THE THREE MAIN STYLES—NĀGARA, DRĀVIḌA AND VESARA

71. That temple is known as 'Nāgara' which is made square from the 'mūla' (basement) to the 'Śikhara' (head) (both inclusive); that is 'Drāviḍa' which is made distinctly hexagonal or octagonal from above 'Grīvā' (neck) to the end of 'Śikhara' (head); that is 'Vesara' which exhibits circular shape either from the basement or the 'Gala': any one from among these whose features have been particularly prescribed, may be constructed according to one's liking.

मुखमण्डपप्रमाणम् .

नेत्रेषुसप्तदशभानुभिरादिधाम्नस्तारं विभज्य विधुलोकयुगाङ्गभूतैः ।
विस्तारमत्र रचयेन्मुखमण्डपस्य पादोनमर्धमथवा सममस्य दैर्घ्यम् ॥ ७२ ॥

पञ्चप्राकाराणां विभागः.

दण्डेऽर्धेऽन्तर्गतं मण्डलमवनिमितेऽर्धान्विते वान्तहारा
दोःसङ्ख्ये मध्यहारा जलधिपरिमिते बाह्यहाराद्रिसङ्ख्ये ।
मर्यादा मूलधाम्नः प्रथमचरमवर्जं मुखायामयुक्ताः
प्राकाराः पञ्च कार्याः स्युरिह चरमसीमैकविंशेऽपि वा स्यात् ॥ ७३ ॥

दण्डमुखायामलक्षणम्

प्रासादस्योत्तरसमवधेर्जागतान्तस्य वा स्याद्
व्यासो दण्डस्त्रिविध उदितः पादुकान्तस्य वात्र ।
नेयश्चायं निजनिजपदात् सैकदण्डः सपादः
सार्धः साङ्घ्रित्रय इति मुखायाममानं समुक्तम् ॥ ७४ ॥

प्राकारान् प्रति दण्डावधिः.

भक्तायामग्रभूमाविषुभिरिह बहिर्द्वर्धशकं त्र्यंशमन्तः
कृत्वान्तर्मण्डले दिक्परिवृढबलिपीठेषु तद्दण्डसीमा ।
प्राच्यावाच्याः स्वसूत्रेष्वितरदिगधिपाश्चालिताः किञ्चनातः
प्रादक्षिण्यान्मिथस्ते द्वितय इह महादिङ्मुखाः सम्मुखाश्च ॥ ७५ ॥

अर्चनामण्डपविधानम् .

अन्तर्मण्डलतो व्यतीत्य करमात्रं प्रार्चनामण्डपं
तुर्यंशं समसूरकं निजमुखायामस्य वा मध्यतः ।
वेदस्तम्भभृतैकभारमथवा कुर्याच्चतुर्द्वादश-
स्तम्भद्वयुत्तरसंयुतं समकुटाद्यालङ्क्रियालङ्कृतम् ॥ ७६ ॥

THE DIMENSION OF THE MUKHAMANḌAPA—FRONT-PORCH

72. Having divided the breadth of the main shrine by two, five, seven, ten and twelve, with one part, three, four, six and five parts in order, assign the breadth of 'Mukhamanḍapa'; its length will be half or three-fourth of or equal to the breadth (of the temple).

THE DISPOSITION OF PAÑCAPRĀKĀRAS

73. Half a Daṇḍa moved from the main shrine is to be the surrounding inner enclosure ('Antarmanḍala'); one Daṇḍa or one and a half Daṇḍas away, the 'Antahārā'; two Daṇḍas away, the 'Madhyahārā'; four Daṇḍas away the 'Bāhyahārā'; and seven Daṇḍas off the 'Māyādā'. Excepting the first and the last (enclosures) all will have a Mukhāyāma (Facade). Here the last enclosure may be alternatively twenty-one Daṇḍas away.

DESCRIPTION OF DAṆḌA AND MUKHĀYĀMA

74. Here, 'Daṇḍa,' is of three kinds: it may be the measure which is equal to the extent of the Uttara of the Prāsāda (i.e., the breadth between the uttaras) or to that of the Jagatī or to that of the Pāduka; this unit of Daṇḍa in each case, must be started from its own place. The measure of the 'Mukhāyāma' is said to be one 'Daṇḍa,' one and one-fourth, one and a half or one and three-fourth of a Daṇḍa.

THE DAṆḌA LIMIT WITH REFERENCE TO PRĀKĀRAS
(THE LOCATION OF BALIPĪṬHA)

75. When in the Antarmanḍala the top of the Balipīṭha in the quarters is divided by five, the outer extremity of the 'Daṇḍa' will be situated on the line which keeps two parts thereof outside, and three parts inside. The lords of the east and the south will lie in their 'sūtras', while the others are deviated a little from their sūtra in the right-hand circumambulatory direction. Both these will face the principal quarters and one another.

THE DISPOSITION OF ARCANAMANḌAPA

76. Moved one cubit from the limit of the Antarmanḍala with a cubit's distance therefrom or in the centre of its Mukhāyāma, make a 'Prārcanāmanḍapa' which is square, which has a basement, one 'uttara,' borne by four pillars or two uttaras supported by four and twelve (i.e. sixteen) pillars and which is decorated with ornamentations such as the finial.

अन्तहारादिषु दण्डावसाननियमः.

दण्डं स्वं समतीत्य भित्तिरुदिता बाह्यान्तहाराश्रिता
 दण्डान्तो द्विविधस्तदुत्तरविभिन्नोऽग्रे सभाभेदतः ।
 ज्वालासीमनि दीपधामनि तथान्तस्थोत्तरेऽन्तर्गते
 प्राकारेऽथ बहिष्ठितोत्तरबहिःसाले महीयस्यपि ॥ ७७ ॥

अन्तहाराकलृप्तिः.

पृष्ठे सपार्श्वद्वितये स्वमूलयोन्यन्वितं मण्डपमाकलय्य ।
 तुर्यश्रमातत्य ततोऽन्तराले तन्वीत संयोज्य मिथोऽन्तहाराम् ॥ ७८ ॥

अग्रे सभाविधानम् .

कृत्वा वंशं मुखायत्युपचितनिजदण्डस्थितं पार्श्वहारा-
 भारासक्ताग्रमूलं प्रथितगुणविभागादिकलृप्त्या विभज्य ।
 कृत्वा तद्भागतस्तद्विततिमुचितयोन्याढ्यमन्योत्तराणि
 न्यसारूढोत्तरादीन्यपि रचयतु तद्युक्तितोऽग्रे सभायाम् ॥ ७९ ॥

पादसूत्रसभाविशेषः.

स्वामीष्टे सममार्धिते गृहपरीणाहे स्ववंशप्रथा-
 द्वन्द्वोने चतुरादियुग्मपरिसङ्ख्याभिर्विभक्ते समम् ।
 एकांशेन ततिं तनोतु परिशिष्टैराततिं चांशकै-
 रूनांशं परितः प्रपूरयतु चैवं पादसूत्रे क्रमः ॥ ८० ॥

बलिपीठिकास्थानम् .

प्रासादमध्याद् बहिरग्रतो गते तदुत्तरोत्थे सदलद्विसङ्ख्यके ।
 दण्डे त्रिसार्धत्रिशराङ्गसप्तके स्वधाम्नि कुर्याद् बलिपीठिकां तथा ॥ ८१ ॥

THE OUTER LIMIT OF ANTAHĀRĀ ETC.

77. The outer wall relating to the 'Antahārā,' it is stated, should be beyond its own Daṇḍa extremity; in the front, on account of the division of 'Sabhā' based on its difference in 'uttara' the "Daṇḍa" extremity is said to be of two kinds. In the case of 'Dīpadhāman' (light-house which is in the Madhyahārā) it (i.e., Daṇḍa extremity) will be in the extremity of the flame. In the inner Prākāra (inner to the Maryādā, i.e., the Bāhyahārā) it will be in the internal uttara; in the case of the big Śālā (i.e. the Mahāmaryādā) it is at the extremity of the external uttara.

THE MAKING OF ANTAHĀRĀ

78. On the two sides and at the back, giving each a Yoni proper for its quarter, construct square 'Maṇḍapas' and extending them and linking the interspaces between each other, build the 'Antahārā.'

THE MAKING OF THE SABHĀ IN FRONT

79. Along the Daṇḍa limit of the Antahārā with its Mukhāyāma, fix up an uttara in the front Sabhā, whose mūla and agra (both extremities) are entered in the Bhāra (i.e. the uttara) of the Pārśvahārā; then, assigning it a proper yoni and giving it a breadth according to the well-known rule of 'Guṇavibhāga' and the like, place Ārūḍha (internal) and other uttaras, as befits the structure.

PĀDASŪTRA TYPE OF SABHĀ

80. When the desired perimeter of the temple is divided into two equal halves, deduct therefrom two times the breadth of its uttara, and then divide the remainder equally by any one of the even numbers beginning with four; one part thereof will be given to the breadth, the remaining parts to the length; and add to this all around, the portion deducted (namely twice the vistāra of the uttara): this is the order employed in the 'Pādasūtra.'

SITUATION OF BALIPĪTHIKĀ

81. Then outside in front, moved from the centre of the Prāsāda to a distance which may be two and a half, or three or three and a half or five or six or seven Uttara-Daṇḍas away, construct the 'Balipīthikā' (which should be set up) in its own house.

बलिपीठिकाकलृप्तिः.

पूजापीठसमं षडंशरहितं गर्भप्रतिप्रोन्मितं
 प्रासादप्रतिसम्मितं च बलिपीठेऽब्जान्तिमाभ्युच्छ्रयम् ।
 उत्सेधे दशधांशिते सति निजेष्टे पीठिकाविस्तृतिं
 सप्तांशैर्विदधीत मूलनिलयौचित्यात् तदङ्गक्रियाम् ॥ ८२ ॥

बलिपीठिकावयवविशेषाः.

पृथ्व्या पादुकमंशतो जगतिकां वेदैर्गुणैः कैरवं
 तत्पट्टीगलकम्बुनिद्रवमपि क्षमापङ्क्तिभूमीन्दुभिः ।
 कुर्वीत ज्वलनैः कपोतमिलयाग्रे पट्टिकां पङ्कजं
 नेत्राभ्यामपि सप्तविंशतिविभक्ते पीठिकाभ्युच्छ्रये ॥ ८३ ॥

पक्षान्तरेण बलिपीठिकाविधानम्.

पीठोच्चे रदभेदिते सदलभूसार्धेषुबाणेन्दुभू-
 दस्राः पादुकजागते कुमुदतत्पट्ट्यन्तरीषु प्रतौ ।
 अंशा वेदयुगानि वेदिगलयोः सार्धौ वलभ्युत्तरे
 दस्रौ चेत् कपोतके शशिकराः स्युः पट्टिकापद्मयोः ॥ ८४ ॥

THE DIMENSION OF THE BALIPĪṬHIKĀ

82. To the Balipīṭha give a height till the end of its Padma, which may be equal to that of the Pūjāpīṭha (the pedestal of the image), or one-sixth less than that, or as much as the height of the Garbha till its Prati (i.e. the height of the basement of the Garbhagṛha) or the height of the Prāsāda till its Prati (i.e., the basement of the Prāsāda). The height chosen being divided by ten, give seven parts thereof to the vistāra of the Pīṭhikā and make its various parts (mouldings) consistent with (i.e. on the model of those of) the principal structure.

THE MOULDINGS OF THE BALIPĪṬHIKĀ

83. The height of the Balipīṭha being divided into twenty-seven parts, make 'Pāduka' with one part thereof; 'Jagatī' with four parts; 'Kumuda', with three; its 'Paṭṭikā' 'Kaṇṭha', 'Kambu' and 'Nidrava' with one part, ten parts, one part and one part respectively; 'Kapota', with three parts; upper 'Paṭṭikā', with one part; and 'Padma' with two parts.

AN ALTERNATIVE PRESCRIPTION OF BALIPĪṬHIKĀ

84. The height of the Balipīṭha, being divided into thirty-two parts, give the 'Pāduka' and 'Jagatī' one and a half and five and a half parts respectively; 'Kumuda', its 'Paṭṭikā', 'Antarī' and 'Prati' five parts, one part, one part and two parts respectively; 'Vedi' and 'Gala' four parts each; 'Valabhyuttara' one part and a half; 'Kapota' two and a half parts; 'Paṭṭikā' and 'Padma' one part and two parts respectively.

PART III

PART I (STANZAS 1—30) : PRELIMINARY TOPICS IN THE SCIENCE OF TEMPLE ARCHITECTURE

STANZA 1

“*Prayer to the Supreme in the Saguna Aspect.*”

Following the usual orthodox practice of Sanskrit writers, Nārāyaṇa, the author of *Tantrasamuccaya* commences his work with a prayer to the Supreme deity. The time-honoured practice of ‘Maṅgala’ as a preface to any performance, it is believed, would bring the work begun to a successful ‘finis’. So the author begins the treatise with a prayer. The first letter ‘Śrī’ in the opening stanza is employed to strike the note of auspiciousness.

The various epithets employed in this stanza with reference to God sum up the Hindu idea of God. In the system of Hindu worship two phases are recognised ; one dealing with attributes, and the other the negation of attributes. The former is known as ‘Saguṇōpāsana’ and the latter ‘Nirguṇōpāsana’. *Nirguṇōpāsana* treats of an Impersonal Reality, unconditioned by attributes and ungoverned by relations. It is only mystics, who have attained to the highest state of grace, who have gone beyond mind, body and all the limits of worldly nature—it is only such super-beings—who are capable of comprehending such an uncoloured reality. But an ordinary man who is prone to concretise, who is inclined to conceive God in vivid form, worships a God of attributes. Hinduism offers us in the system of worship which admits of the two phases of *Saguna* and *Nirguna* a scale of interpretations of the conceptions of God, ranging from the most impersonal to the intensely personal. “The difference between the Supreme as Absolute Spirit and the Supreme as personal God is one of standpoint, and not of essence.”¹

Jñāna (Omniscience), *Santoṣa* (joy), *Nityatva* (eternity), *Svātantrya* (freedom), *Avighna* (negation of obstacles), *Vaibhava* (might) are the six excellences which are attributed to God. They are enumerated in the scriptural stanza in the *Viṣṇusamhitā*² :—

1. *Heart of Hindustan*, p. 64.

2. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, Paṭala V, stanza 31 (T. S. S. Edition).

ज्ञानसन्तोषनित्यत्वस्वातन्त्र्याविघ्नैवैभैः ।

हृदयादिगुणैर्युक्तः सकलोऽनुग्रहादिकृत् ॥

These attributes which spring from thought, emotion and action are not isolated qualities but inter-connected excellences which lead to perfection. "Mere knowledge unvivified by the warmth of feeling, leads to icy coldness of heart; mere emotion, unlit by knowledge, is hysteria; mere action, unguided by wisdom and uninspired by love, is meaningless ritual and feverish unrest. All the three enter into the integral expression of a perfect life."³ Hence God, when conceived as a personal being, is said to possess all the attributes which constitute the endowment of a perfect and absolute being. The form that God assumes for the sake of his devotees is a shining and resplendent one and one endowed with the attributes described above.

God is the Infinite Spirit immanent in the universe and He is both in us and out of us. "If God were not in us, there would be no sense of need; if God were out of us, there would be no sense of worship."⁴ Religion is the realisation of God, and the paths to realisation are various in view of the fact of divergence in the taste and temperament of men. A few who are gifted with rare intuitive insight claim immediate experience and therefore do not require any means for the realisation of God. But the common man in the world of men, in whom the tendency to worship is ingrained, does not find it possible to think of a God as devoid of form or name. Attention to God in the abstract state is 'exceeding hard' for him without a concrete medium and mode of worship. "The use of means is an inevitable concession to the nature of mortal beings,"⁵ and the 'means' served in the image. The religious devotee, when overwhelmed by spiritual devotion, seeks union with the deity through the service of an image that represents the deity in a chosen form. The supreme God, Formless and Absolute, is therefore said to assume form for the benefit of His aspirants. Thus the *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*⁶ observes :—

भक्त्यैव परया तुष्टो देवदेवः स योगिनाम् ।

पूजाद्यनुग्रहायादौ रूपं भजे चतुर्भुजम् ॥ ५० ॥

3. *Heart of Hindustan*, p. 10.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

5. Ananda K. Coomāraswamy, *Catalogue of the Indian Collection in the Museum of Fine Arts* (Boston), Part II (Sculpture), p. 29.

6. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*, Paṭala IV, stanzas 50, 49, 51² and 52¹.

कार्यार्था मूर्तयस्तस्य लोकानुग्रहहेतवः ।

अतः साकारमिष्टेयं भक्त्याप्याः सर्वसिद्धयः ॥ ४९ ॥

आकारेऽस्मिन् कृता पूजा स्तुतिर्वा ध्यानमेव वा ।

विधिना शास्त्रदृष्टेन देव एव कृता भवेत् ॥

Supreme reality, according to devotional theism is envisaged in a personal God, who assumes a form appropriate to the call of devotion and who becomes to his devotees the guide, master as well as the protector.

God is ever having his being in the highest plane of bliss, yet he feels joy at the offerings of His devotees. These offerings might appear trivial from the point of view of absolute values, but since they are sanctified by the exalted devotion and faith of the worshipper and since they embody the heart and represent the elements which are the cause of the very being of the devotee, they extract response and sympathy from the heart of the personal God worshipped.

In devotional theism, worship is characterised by a personal devotion, and its mode involves offerings in the form of *Gandha* (fragrant substance), *Puṣpa* (flower), *Dhūpa* (incense), *Dīpa* (light) and *Nivedya* (food). These things according to an ancient system of philosophy are associated with the elements or substances known as *Pṛthivī* (Earth), *Ākāśa* (Ether), *Vāyu* (air), *Tejaḥ* (light), and *jala* (water), which constitute the cause of the worshipper's body. Śaṅkara,⁷ the commentator thus remarks :

“तत्र पृथिव्येव गन्धः, आकाश एव पुष्पं, वायुरेव धूपः, तेज एव दीपः, अप एव जलं निवेद्यं च । इति विभागः ।”

In the qualifying expression स्वारम्भभूतात्मकैः which means the offerings which are the cause of the worshipper's being, the author advances the idea that by offering the various things such as *Gandha* etc., what is offered is the worshipper's body, which is composed of the elements identified with the things offered.

The real end of worship being realisation of God, an image forms only a *means* of approach to God. A text of the worshipper lays down : “*dēvo bhūtvā dēvam yajeta.*” This direction implies *identification* as an essential condition of worship in spirit and in truth. An image forms the stage in the process of one's identification with the deity worshipped.

7. *Tantrasamuccaya* with the commentary *Vimarsinī*, Vol. I, p. 2, (T. S. S. Edition).

Realisation of oneness with God which is the aim of *Pūjā*, is a significant idea and it is embedded in the word '*Samārādhana*.' It is explained by Śankara⁸ thus :

समाराधनं समीचीना पूजा । पूजायाः सम्यक्तत्वं नामात्मद्रव्यदेवतानामैक्यम् ।

The last quarter of the stanza answers the query: how do we know the existence of God ? Religion, as we know, is vision, intuitive spiritual experience, which is not a common experience. Ordinary man who is not spiritual at first hand also aspires to enjoy the consolations of religion. Such a man, who may be described as 'religious at second hand', is directed to refer to sacred writings, recourse to which reveals the knowledge about God. '*Nigamas*' (Vedas, Upaniṣads, etc.), '*Āgamas*' (Kāṁikāgama, Viṣṇusamhitā etc.), '*Purāṇas*' and other sacred texts record truths about the existence of God. Vedic Ṛṣis who led a continuous and unselfish life possessed unique intuitive power and they visualised the Spirit eternal. They were 'the first researches in the realm of spirit', and the truths they announced have their root in the intuitive vision of spirit and spiritual experience of a permanent character. The statement '*Sadā paśyanti sūrayah*' tells us that the seer's vision is permanent, eternal. Purāṇas and Āgamas contain myths and rituals, and the description of God that is furnished therein tends towards an imagery that gives clothing to religious visions, for it is imagery that appeals to popular imagination. Through the path of ritual and imagery the Āgamas and Purāṇas guide men to the goal of God-realisation. The popular belief in the existence of God is established on the foundation of scriptural authority. The religious texts which embody the results of the investigations of seers in the divine science, it is believed, are handed down for the benefit of mankind, and their authority is hence looked upon as supreme and not to be questioned.

At the beginning of a book in Sanskrit, it is customary to indicate the four elements which are known as *Anubandhas*. They are (1) *Viṣaya* (subject-matter), (2) *Prayōjana* (purpose), (3) *Adhikārin* (the person entitled), and (4) *Sambandha* (connection). The *viṣaya* (subject-matter) which is here '*dēvārāadhanapratipādana*' is indicated by the word '*Samārādhanyām*.' The subjects dealt with in this treatise are those connected with image-worship such as the making of icons and temples to house the icons, the rituals bearing on daily worship, festivals and other divine matters which are treated in ancient Tāntrik literature. The word '*ANUGRĤṆĀTI*' indicates the *prayōjana* which is '*devānugraha*' (God's blessing). The '*adhikārin*' or person eligible

for the use of the work is the worshipper as the word 'YAJVANAḤ' suggests. The connection of this text '*Tantrasamuccaya*' with the subject treated therein which is *Tantra* is the *sambandha*.

STANZA 2

"Homage to Divākara and character of the work '*Tantrasamuccaya*.'"

After *Maṅgalācarāṇa*, the author proceeds in this verse to pay his respectful homage to his preceptor, Divākara by name. The phrase 'Gurudivākara' indicates the preceptor's name. It is fitting that the author should start his work with due acknowledgment to the source he resorted to. He has collected information for his production from original Tāntrik literature which is vast like the sea. For, says he in the concluding stanza of his work :

“ सोऽयं तन्त्रमिदं व्यधाद् बहुविधादुद्धृत्य तन्त्रार्णवात् ॥”

Tantras are a class of works which treat of a host of subjects such as *Sarga* (creation), *Pratisarga* (destruction), *Devatārādhana* (worship of God as personal being), *Ṣaṭkarmasādhana* (attainment of the six objects or super-human faculties), '*Caturvidhadhyānayoga* (four modes of union with the Supreme Spirit of Meditation) and other kindred subjects. To obtain a detailed idea of the extent of the subjects dealt with in an original and typical Tantra work, vide lines quoted in the *Śabdakalpadruma* beginning with 'सर्गश्च प्रतिसर्गश्च'.

According to tradition, Tantra is 'Śivōktaśāstra' and is treated mostly in the form of a dialogue between Śiva and Pārvatī. Tantra is otherwise called Āgama and the '*Śabdakalpadruma*' calls Āgama a Tantrasāstra. The following interesting stanza tells us how Tantra came to be called Āgama :

आगतं पञ्चवक्त्रात्तु गतञ्च गिरिजानने । मतञ्च वासुदेवस्य तस्मादागममुच्यते ॥

The *Mahāsiddhāntasārasvata*⁹ mentions sixty-four works on Tantra, but in the present state of our knowledge the list given therein is open to suspicion. Tantras are, however, very extensive in their treatment and are encyclopaedic in character. The work we are concerned with viz. the *Tantrasamuccaya*, as the title itself suggests, is a collection of subjects connected with worship of deities in temples, which are elaborately treated in the original Tāntrik literature. It deals with everything bearing on the construction and consecration of temples and images.

9. *Śabdakalpadruma* under the term 'Tantra.'

Thus it contains rules for the making of temples and images, rituals of consecration, daily worship, festivals and other allied matters connected with temple worship. Setting apart the ritualistic portion, with which we have no immediate concern, we shall find in the *Tantrasamuccaya* the codified knowledge of temple architecture whose fundamentals are found firmly rooted in the ancient Tāntrik works. This text, which is seen accepted as the highest authority on temple matters in Kerala warrants the view that the architecture of Kerala is a lineal descendent of the ancient Indian traditional architecture as set forth in ancient traditional treatises 'The Tantras'.

The line 'गुरुदिवाकरमद्रकटाक्षरक्स्फुरितहृत्कमलोदरसंभृतम्' is significant. Śaṅkara, in his *Vimarśinī* tells us that Divākara is the name of the author's preceptor. The 'Guru' is compared to the sun, and his kind looks to the sun's rays. The author's heart is compared to the lotus; just as the lotus is opened by the rays of the sun, so is the heart of the writer in which is collected the *Tantrasamuccaya* opened by the kind looks of the preceptor. The author pays glorious tributes to his preceptor by attributing him the excellence of splendour which is the attribute of the sun. The second comparison of heart with the lotus reveals the pleasant and compact nature of his work, which is a beautiful collection of Tāntrik subjects set in concise writing for the sake of easy study and remembrance. It is of importance to note that this treatise is given such pleasing and attractive exposition and couched in such precise and apposite language as compels our appreciation. With respect to both ideas on the subject dealt with and the language employed to clothe them, there is left nothing to be desired. Integrity, a quality which is rarely to be met with in architectural works like the *Mānasāra*, is the dominant note of treatment in the *Tantrasamuccaya*. The figure of speech that is present in the expression 'Gurudivākara etc.' is *Rūpaka* and it is explained in the following words by Śaṅkara in his *Vimarśinī* :—

गुरुरेव दिवाकरो गुरुदिवाकरः सूर्यः तस्य भद्राः प्रसादयुक्ताः कटाक्षा एव रुचो रश्मयस्तैः स्फुरितस्य विकसितस्य हृदयकमलस्योदरेऽन्तर्भागे संभृतं संगृहीतम् । यथा दिवाकररश्मिभिः कमलानि विकसन्ति, तथा गुरोः प्रसादयुक्तैः कटाक्षरश्मिभिर्हृदयकमलस्य विकासनं सञ्जातमिति रूपकालङ्कारच्छलेन स्वगुरोर्दिवाकरनामत्वमपि सूचितम् ॥¹⁰

STANZA 3

The Supreme is One, but His names and forms are various :

Corresponding to the variety of forms in which the one Supreme personal God manifests Himself, different modes of worship are prescribed. The author proposes to deal with the modes in general and with respect to their particular application to particular deities. The author has not failed here to take note of the governing ideal of Hinduism, which is the recognition of one foundational spirit as the Supreme Person, who reveals Himself through diverse forms. Since taste and temperament are always variant in various men, the One God, who is Omniscient, Omnipresent and Omnipotent, appears differently to different minds. This difference in appearance is natural and inevitable in view of the manifold and varying disposition of the human mind. It is one of standpoint. Viṣṇu, Śiva and so many other names refer not to different persons but to different aspects of one Supreme Person, 'Parama Puruṣa' as the author prefers to call Him by an ultimate expression. The various names are distinguished corresponding to the different functions of God, and corresponding to the distinct attributes which denote the one God. It is the phases of one Supreme Personality that are personified and named as Viṣṇu, Śiva etc., and each phase here embodies a distinct and dominant quality. Thus in essence God is one, in standpoint he appears various. This note of an intelligent understanding of the deeper unity in the midst of diversity is found struck throughout the career of Hinduism. The Vedic poets tell us that poets with many words speak variously of the One Supreme Reality. The same fundamental note of unity, which the Vedic saying 'Ekam Sad viprāḥ bahudhā vadanti'¹¹ gives expression to, is seen underlying the conception of a personal God, who, as described by our author, is the One Supreme Person (Parama Puruṣa) called by different names such as Śrīśa (Viṣṇu), Īśa (Śiva) etc., according to the sphere of activity in which He functions and according to the excellence which is the dominant feature of His Personality. In this connection the following lines of the *Viṣṇusamhitā*¹² may be quoted :—

11. *R̥g Veda*, I, 164, 46.

12. *Viṣṇusamhitā* (T. S. S. Edition), Paṭala III, stanzas 2, 3 and 4.

It further adds :— दर्पणानां बहुत्वे तु दृश्यते नैकता यथा ।

तद्वद् बहुत्वं मन्यन्ते विष्णोस्तस्याल्पचेतसः ॥

यथाम्मसीन्दुबिम्बानि प्रतिशब्दाश्च नैकधा ।

एकोऽप्यात्मा बहुष्वेवमिल्लाहुस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥ (St. 33, 34, 35.)

देवतेह परं ज्योतिरेक एव परः पुमान् ।
 स एव बहुधा लोके मायया भिद्यते स्वया ॥
 पुरुषाख्यः स्वयं मायां प्रकृतिं व्यज्य स द्विधा ।
 स्थितस्त्रिधा च सत्त्वादिगुणभेदात् प्रतीयते ॥
 विष्णुब्रह्मशिवाख्योऽसौ स्थित्युत्पत्त्यन्तकृन्मतः ।
 मूर्तयो वासुदेवाद्या धर्मज्ञानादिभेदतः ॥

STANZA 4

“*The Qualities of the Worshipper*”.

The man who is impelled by the fundamental urge to worship, must first approach a proper preceptor. The construction of a temple and the installation of an image for the use of daily worship is considered an act of religious merit, and such an act is hailed and endorsed by sacred texts. The *Yamasamhitā*, a religious text¹³ thus remarks:—

कृत्वा देवालयं सर्वं प्रतिष्ठाप्य च देवताम् ।
 विधाय विधिवच्चित्रं तल्लोकं विन्दते ध्रुवम् ॥

The *Śaivāgamanibandhana* observes as follows:—

ये वै शिवालयं भक्त्या शुभं कारयतीप्सितम् ।
 त्रिसप्तपुरुषाल्लोकं शम्भोर्नयति स ध्रुवम् ॥
 तस्मात्सर्वप्रयत्नेन महादेवस्य मन्दिरम् ।
 सर्वैरवश्यं कर्तव्यं आत्माभ्युदयकाक्षिभिः ॥¹⁴

The making of the House of God is thus held as a religious duty in India, and the present stanza relates to the qualification of the man who is entitled to get a temple constructed. He should be a man of intense devotional fervour and a man bent on the fulfilment of his duty towards his deity. He is one who strives for the attainment of communion or union with God through the select mode of daily worship. He is one who needs to be guided in the path of religion through the aid of rituals and who requires an image as a means of approach. Not having attained to the highest state of grace, he obtains spiritual vision through

13. Quotation from the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Vol. XIII, Part I, page 30.

14. Paṭala 13, concluding stanza (*Nibandhana*, a Ms. from Tripunithura).

the veil of imagery which appeals to ordinary imagination. He who thus feels the necessity of getting a temple and an image made should seek a 'Guru'. A further qualification is stated. He should be a man whose life is enriched by the observance of the laws which regulate man's life in India in its relation to 'Varṇa' (caste), and 'Āśrama' (stage of life). Every activity of Hindu life being theocratic in character, the qualification laid down in this stanza appears apposite.

VARṆĀŚRAMA

The scheme of *Varṇāśrama* takes a prominent place in the pages of India's Cultural History. Hindu Dharma is the time-honoured code of conduct, sustained by the consciousness of generations of men. It deals, in the main with *Varṇas* (classes of society) and *Āśramas* (stages of individual life). It is a system devised to shape the character of man as an individual and as a member of a growing society. In a land like India, where peoples belonging to stocks of varied capacities are thrown together no system was found in ancient times which was more satisfying than the system of *Varṇāśrama*. It was devised to provide room for the full self-expression of individuals according to their mental and physical endowment as well as for the collective cultural progress of the society at large. Since it was found that Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras were dominating respectively more than others in the powers of thought and reflection, heroism and emotion, business-skill and industry, manual labour and service, society came to be classified accordingly into four orders of Brahmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra. In this social arrangement based on the original temperamental fitness of particular classes for particular kinds of work, Brahmin became the custodian of religious learning, Kṣatriya of protection of the people, Vaiśya of trade and industry, and Śūdra of manual service. The four classes thus arranged correspond to the intellectual, militant, industrial and labour orders. The conception of caste goes back to the Vedic times¹⁵ and appears to have contributed towards the organic structure of society. "So early as the period of the *Rg-Veda* was the organic nature of society brought out by the metaphor of head, arms, trunk, and legs, answering to the four classes which are bound by ties of common fellowship. Each class has its appropriate place, rights and duties in the whole."¹⁶ Pride and exclusiveness are later accretions, which poisoned the stream of social life when life became a competitive struggle for existence. As originally conceived and observed, caste rules relate to

15. *Rg Veda*, X, 90, 2.

16. Implication as understood by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, *vide* his 'Heart of Hindustan,' p. 21.

the functions and expression of individuals with the common end of social progress in view, and respond to variety in human nature. Our forebears who led the van of culture never thought of refining races of unequal values to the point of extinction. On the contrary their assimilative genius sought, through the scheme of classes, to harmonise the divergent elements and transform them into integral parts of an organised society. As one of the best interpreters of Hindu culture would remark: "the four castes and orders are not intended to be special moulds into which the Indian people are thrown, but forms capable of embracing the whole humanity."¹⁷ The traditional Hindu culture owes its life to the organic character of the Hindu social structure as conceived in the *Varṇa* ideal.

The ideal life of an individual being far way off from ordinary life, certain ways of living were laid down with a view to training man for the goal of life. These ways are the four stages of life known as the four 'āśramas'. The term 'Āśrama' comes from the root 'śram' which means 'effort.' Through effort and sacrifice, through steady and disciplined life the ancients sought to overcome the evils that attend human nature. The Āśramadharma that they devised embodies the rules that govern the life of an individual who seeks ideal perfection. It divides an ideal life into four stages in close succession, the four stages being the stage of the student, of the householder, of the hermit and of the ascetic. The first stage is known as 'Brahmacarya', the stage of student-life. In this stage, man learns to discipline desires, to habituate mind, to strengthen character and through education of self, prepares himself for the great world-task which lies ahead of him. The second stage is 'Gārhasthya', the stage of the house-holder. In this stage man enters into worldly activities and directs his energies into the channels of family life and social duties. Fully equipped for earthly work he keeps himself in tune with the spirit of enjoyment. It should not be supposed that enjoyment is the aim of life, but it is not wrong, at any rate, to be happy. For wisdom does not attain completeness without the whole living of life, and the life of the family-man forms an integral part of the whole life. In the third stage, namely 'Vānaprastha,' which is the stage of forest-life, man retreats from the competitive struggle in life and lives outside the fringes of cities. He is now in the world, but not of it. His aloofness is not complete detachment, for he keeps in touch with the life that moves about him and lives by the side of villages and towns. His life is one of plain living and high thinking. Unselfish activity for the benefit of the world is the characteristic feature of this stage. Through self-denial and extinction of earthly ambition he rises

17. 'Heart of Hindustan, p. 56.

above the conflicts of worldly interests and thereby obtains the rare perception of the oneness and wholeness of humanity. Thus he prepares himself for the loosening of life's bonds. In the final stage known as 'Prāvrājyā', or renunciation, he steps out completely of all bonds and gives up gracefully all that has to go. In this final stage, he represents the highest type of manhood conceivable. Through the practice of 'Tapas', he annihilates the petty self in man, and what he awaits now is 'freedom across death.' With the realisation of the final stage, the liberated soul enters the Infinite and faces the Supreme Soul. Brahmacharya, Gārhas-thya, Vānaprastha, and Saṃnyāsa—these constitute the four 'āśramas' or stages of life, passing through which the life of man becomes enriched, purified and sublimated. It is a life of this kind, a life with a meaning and an aim which befits man for his true home, which is the home of spirit, when lived from one end to the other. "For this four-fold way of life, India attunes man to the grand harmony the universal, leaving no room for untrained desires of a rampant individualism to pursue their destructive career unchecked, but leading them on to their ultimate modulation in the Supreme."¹⁸

STANZA 5

In the above it has been said that the devotee whose life is governed by the laws of Hinduism should go to a preceptor (Guru). The qualifications of the 'Guru' forms the subject of the present stanza. The term 'Guru' as interpreted in the *Śabdakalpādruma*, means the instructor or teacher of the Vedas and Śāstras:—

गृणात्युपदिश्यति वेदशास्त्राणि ॥¹⁹

The term 'Ācārya' is often used as a synonym of 'Guru.' This word 'Ācārya' is employed in the sense of 'preceptor' who collects the meaning of Śāstras and establishes the authority of tradition through example and precept. The following definition conveys this meaning of the word 'Ācārya':—

आचिनोति च शास्त्रार्थान् आचारे स्थापयत्यपि ।

स्वयमाचरते यस्मादाचार्यस्त्वेन कथ्यते ॥²⁰

Among the qualifications of a 'Guru' that which is mentioned first is that he should be a 'Vipra' or priest.

18. Vide Tagore's *Religion of Man* (Lecture on Four Stages of Life), page 202.

19. *Śabdakalpādruma* under the term 'Guru'.

20. *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*.

“Hieratic element in Architecture, a contribution of the ‘Guru’.”

Temple architecture has always been the expression of religious spirit in India and art a means of edification. The priest, the custodian of learning, according to the Varna institution, influenced and controlled the science of architecture as he did the other modes of creative thought. The Śilpa-śāstras, which embody principles of Architecture and Sculpture, bear a clear stamp of the priestly authority. Since all rules came to be prescribed by the priest with due regard to the religious requirements of the public they exhibit a certain uniformity in their basic treatment. In the nature of the principles there is nothing that is accidental. The whole system being canonical, the priest came to be looked upon as the supreme director of architecture. Similar was the spirit prevalent in the Europe of middle ages till the end of the thirteenth century when the clergy fell out with the laity. The quarrel between the clergy and laity resulted in the emancipation of architectural activities from the control of the church. In India, on the other hand, the priest and the public always worked in a spirit of harmony and complete understanding. As Manomohan Gangoly would observe: “The architectural traditions in India have all along been theocratic in character; we have accordingly no such thing as Renaissance similar to what we find in Italy in the fifteenth century, or a little later in other parts of Europe. The same canonised system of design and construction is noticeable in all ages, and hence the necessity of Renaissance or reverting back to the classical style, or any style, never arose. “Back to Rome” was the cry of all the Renaissance period in Europe, but in India, we find a steady continuity of the same ideas; even architectural and sculptural details derived from the same basic principles are noticed everywhere.”²¹

A comparison of our text with the *Mānasāra* and others on the subject of the director of architecture reveals a very interesting point with regard to his social status. The *Mānasāra* classifies ‘Śilpins’ into four divisions in order known as ‘*Sthapati*’ (the master-builder), ‘*Sūtragrahin*’ (the draughtsman), ‘*Vardhaki*’ (the painter) and ‘*Takṣaka*’ (the carpenter). ‘*Sthapati*’ is the *Guru* of all the rest and each, the *Guru* of the other below. Of the four classes, ‘*Sthapati*’ is described as the master-builder who is responsible for the whole structure. Among the qualifications stated, it is said that he should have all the characteristics of an *Ācārya* and that he should know the Vedas.²² No reference is made to the caste of ‘*Sthapati*,’ though knowledge of the Vedas has been

21. J.B.O.R.S., Vol. XIII, Part I, page 31.

22. *Mānasāra*, chapter II, lines 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31.

laid down as one of his qualifications. In the Chapter entitled 'Balikarmavidhāna'²³ the Sthapati is described as playing the role of a priest while offerings are being made to the various deities presiding over the quarters. In the *Mayamata*²⁴ also the subject of 'Balikarma' is treated in a more or less similar manner. In both the texts, in the list of articles prescribed for offerings, references are not rare in respect of non-vegetarian dishes such as the meat of goats and other animals, blood, fishes dried or fresh and similar other objects.²⁵ These are intended as oblations to be offered to certain fierce deities with a view to pacifying them. A pious Brāhmin like the Nambūdiri of Malabar shuns flesh and blood, and his offerings to the deity are strictly vegetarian in character. As such, it is scarcely conceivable that the Sthapati, who is described as offering meat etc., should belong to the community of orthodox Brahmins as the Nambūdiris of Malabar. He, however, claims a status on a par with Brahmins, but it is restricted to the sphere of the performance of certain rites connected with building activity. Study of the Vedas seems to be a concession granted to him in view of the fact that he has to construct altars for sacrifice etc., in accordance with the rules laid down in the Vedas. Ānand K. Coomāraswāmy observes: "The Kammālars (as the craftsmen are called in South India) have certain sacerdotal privileges and can claim an equality with Brahmins".²⁶ Their claim, as we have observed, relates and is confined to certain ceremonials connected with their profession. The *śilpīns* are skilled men, trained in professional work such as the casting of images, construction of temples and other arts and crafts. They may be described as workmen who meet the demand of society in respect of all arts and crafts including the art of building and image-making. Their profession is hereditary, and through constant practice they acquire remarkable skill. *The author of the Tantrasamuccaya draws a line of distinction between Guru (or Ācārya) and Sthapati (or Śilpīn).* The one is the preceptor and the other a skilled and trained artist. The 'Sthapati' is described as a *śilpīn* and the 'Takṣaka,' the carpenter is also called a *śilpīn*. The *Tantrasamuccaya* does not refer to the four-fold classification of

23. *Ibid.*, Chapter VIII.

24. *Mayamata*, Chapter VIII (T. S. S. Edition).

25. Vide (a) *Mānasāra*, Chap. VIII, lines 39, 40, 51, 52, etc.

(b) *Mayamata*, Chapter VIII, stanzas 8, 9, 10, 15, etc.

(c) *Gurudevapaddhati* (Uttarārdha), Paṭala 27, stanzas 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, etc. (T. S. S. Edition Vol. III).

26. Indian Collections in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Part II (Sculpture), page 37.

śilpins ; it understands all classes of builders in the general sense of *śilpin*, the trained worker in arts. In stanza 109, the author²⁷ states :—

रक्षामङ्गलपूर्वकं शुभनिमित्तर्क्षे शिलार्थं ब्रजेन्मन्त्री शस्त्रिभिरन्वितः स्थपतिभिः
कर्त्रापि चैन्द्र्यादिषु ॥

Here स्थपतिभिः : is interpreted by Śaṅkara as शिल्पिभिः. In stanza 106, the author²⁸ says :—

किञ्चिन्निवेद्य परितोष्य सुरक्ष्य तक्षणा ।

प्रासादमोरचयतां सहमन्त्रबिम्बम् ॥

Here तक्षणा is interpreted by the expression ‘शिल्पिना’ Though the *Sthapati* or *Śilpin* is ordinarily treated as different from a Brahmin, in his capacity as the builder he commands respect and is as highly honoured as the preceptor himself.

Thus the author directs :—

दध्यन्नमश्नातु गुरुः सकर्ता तत्रार्चनीयः स्थपतिश्च तद्वत् ॥

Śaṅkara²⁹ comments on this statement in the following words :—

सकर्ता कर्त्रा सहितो गुरुः । दध्यन्नं दधिविशिष्टमन्नम् अश्नातु । तत्र कर्मणि स्थपतिः तक्षा च तद्वदर्चनीयः तस्याप्यन्नदानादिना प्रसादं कुर्यादित्यर्थः ॥

Thus according to the author of the *Tantrasamuccaya*, the Guru, the preceptor, is the director in all divine matters and he is the guide to be consulted in the course of the construction and consecration of the temple. He selects the site proper for temple construction ; he performs the rites connected with the selection of the site. The offerings and sacrifices which come under the sphere of his activity are not found to include articles such as meat and fish. The first Paṭala contain rites and ceremonials which necessitate offerings to deities presiding over the various quarters. But in the list of articles intended for oblation or offering, we do not detect any reference to meat or fish. The offerings are composed of purely vegetarian articles such as the sacrificial grass, grain, rice, water, and butter or ghee or such other things. The offering of these pure articles is conducted by the Guru, the preceptor, who is a Brahmin.

27. *Tantrasamuccaya* (T. S. S. Ed.), Vol. I, page 42.

28. *Ibid.*, page 41.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

The following stanzas³⁰ reveal the nature of offerings and the conductor of the offerings :—

विरिञ्चं द्विपञ्चाशता देवताभिर्वृतं चार्चयित्वा यथोक्तक्रमेण ।
 अमुष्यै निवेद्याथ तद्देवताभ्यस्त्रिपञ्चाशते तत्र दद्याद् बलिं च ॥
 कुशप्रसूनाक्षतवारिहव्यैस्त्रिः किरेद् वास्तुचतुर्मुखाभ्याम् ।
 सकृत् सकृत् तत्परितः परेभ्यो बहिर्ग्रहेभ्योऽञ्चितपञ्चकूरैः ॥
 कृत्वा बलिं सलिलमत्र सकृत् सकृच्च दत्त्वा प्रसन्नयजनं प्रविधाय धातुः ।
 तद्वास्तुदैवतकदम्बकृतावलम्बं प्राकारमध्यमवबुध्य करोतु रक्षाम् ॥

In accordance with the requirements of religious aspirants, the 'Guru', the preceptor, gets the temple constructed by workmen,³¹ who are trained and skilled builders. He plays the role of the guide and director, and the *śilpins*, the trained workers, carry out the directions of the preceptor. Thus it is perfectly clear from the *Tantrasamuccaya* that all architectural principles as are found embodied in the *Āgamas* and avowed texts on the subject were evolved and established under the authority and direction of the priest. This fact should be borne in mind before we attempt at understanding the significance and development of Indian architecture. The writers of the *Manuṣyālayacandrikā* and *Silparatna* also take notice of this fact in the wake of the author of the *Tantrasamuccaya*. The point we have observed is made clear by the *Manuṣyālayacandrikā* : Compare the stanzas quoted below³² :—

मर्त्यो विप्रादिवर्णेष्विह भवनविधानोत्सुको यः स पूर्वं
 विप्रं तद्देशसम्बन्धिनमखिलगुणैरन्वितं संवृणीत ।
 सोऽयं तद्वर्णयोग्यां क्षितिमथ परिकल्प्यात्र पूजादिकृत्वा
 वास्तोः शास्त्रोक्तरीत्या गृहमतिनिपुणैः कारुभिः कारयेत् ॥
 वेदागमादिविहितान्यवधार्य विप्रैः
 कार्यो विधिः सकलदेवनरालयानाम् ।
 तद्वाक्यतः सकलधामसु मृच्छिलादे-
 रन्योन्यमेलनमुशन्ति हि कारुकृत्यम् ॥
 स्थपतिः सूत्रग्राही तक्षकसंज्ञश्च वर्धकिः क्रमशः ।
 स्वोचितकर्मणि दक्षा ब्राह्मस्ते कारवश्चतुर्धेति ॥

30. *Tantrasamuccaya*, Vol. I, Paṭala I, stanzas 71, 72 and 73 (T. S. S. Ed.).

31. *Ibid.*, Paṭala II, stanza I, vide कारयेत् कारुभिः ॥

32. *Manuṣyālayacandrikā* (T. S. S. Ed.), chapter I, stanzas 9, 10 and 11.

कुलीनः The Guru, says the author, must be a '*Kulīna*,' a man of noble descent, endowed with all the qualities which characterise a fair family. He should have gravity of manners and dignity of character, and must be above low personal preferences. His conduct should be governed by time-honoured traditions, *ācarās* which are supported by the conscience of generations of men and sages of old. He must be modest in his behaviour and highly educated. He must establish shrines and undertake pilgrimages. He must be sincere in his work and commendable. He should possess the virtues of an ascetic and must be eminently generous. All these qualities which characterise a *kulīna* are enumerated in the verse from the *Mahābhārata* :—

आचारो विनयो विद्या प्रतिष्ठा तीर्थदर्शनम् ।

निष्ठावृत्तिस्तपो दानं नवधा कुललक्षणम् ॥³³

कृतसंस्क्रियौघः—The Guru should, again, be one whose life becomes sanctified by the observance of all usages and ceremonies and sacrifices which govern the life of a Hindu from the moment when he is conceived in the womb till the hour of his death and still further. The *Gr̥hyasūtras* and later law-books deal with a large number of popular customs and usages which refer to conception, birth of the child, naming of the child, its first feeding, shaving, initiation to the teacher, the student-life, marriage and discharge of the duties of the couple, ancestral sacrifice, funeral rites, death ceremonies and the like. These works make perfectly clear how religion permeates the entire existence of a Hindu to the extent that nothing is left to pass in the life of an individual without an attendant religious ceremony. The customs and ceremonials of the above character as they are found embodied in the *Gr̥hyasūtras* and the law-books of the Hindus govern the life of every Hindu. In conformity with the time-honoured traditions of the country the author lays down that the life of the Guru should be one that has received higher sanctity by virtue of the observance of all the socio-religious ceremonials beginning with *Garbhādhāna*.

स्वधीतवेदागमतत्त्ववेत्ता :—The author further prescribes that the Guru should be a knower of the essence of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*. He should learn the meaning of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* under a well-known teacher. The *Veda* is respected since time immemorial as the store-house of all learning and it is therefore customary with Hindu

writers to trace the origin of every branch of human knowledge to the Vedas. With respect to the science of temple architecture and the office of image-worship, however, references are wanting in the Vedas.

“Vedic religion—ani-conic.”

The early hymns of the Ṛg Veda which depict the life of very early Aryans indicate to some extent the character of a people who moved from place to place and came in contact with nature. Hence, in the Ṛg Veda, building of temples, which forms an essential condition of a long settled life does not appear as a part of Āryan religious activity. The Vedic religion, in the main consists in the worship of the great powers of nature by means of hymns and sacrifices without the use of temples or images. The Gods of the Ṛg Veda were for the most part personifications of natural phenomena such as the Sky, Earth, Sun, Dawn, Fire and Wind. “These deities were worshipped not in temples, but in the open air on a sacrificial ground, of which a detailed description is to be found in the ‘Brāhmaṇas.’ When the actual phenomenon before the eyes of the worshipper such as Agni, was prayed to, any definite anthropomorphic image was out of question, even in the case of the invisible Vāta (Wind), of whom a poet of the Ṛg Veda says that “one hears his roaring, but his form one does not see”. Even Yāska, many centuries after the days of Ṛṣis, remarks (about 500 B.C.) in the *Nirukta*: “What is seen of the Gods is not anthropomorphic at all.”³⁴ “Did image worship exist among the Vedic Aryans?”—this query was the subject of discussion between Professor Macdonell and Professor S. V. Venkateswara in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*³⁵ and in the *Journal ‘Rūpam.’*³⁶ We are not able to detect any unmistakable and definite evidence to show that the Gods of the Ṛg Veda were iconographically represented in the earlier Vedic period. The arguments advanced by Professor Macdonell and the replies he has given to the objections of Professor Venkateswara appear to us quite incontrovertible. The character of the Vedic religion does not lend support to the supposition that image-worship was current among the Aryans of Vedic India. Venkateswara believes that there is indication of image in the Stanza ‘Ka imam mama Indram kṛiṇāti.’ (Rv. IV, 24, 10).³⁷ Dr. Ānanda K. Coomārswāmy remarks in this connection: “Just as the Boddhi-tree and pāduka at Bharhut are called “Buddha” (Bhagavato), so here

34. *The History of Hindu Iconography* by A. A. Macdonell in “*The Rupam*,” No. 4, October 1920, page 12.

35. J.R.A.S., 1916, 1917, 1918.

36. *Rupam*, No. 4, 1920 and *Rupam*, Nos. 43 & 44, 1930.

37. *Rupam* 1930, No. 44, page 21.

a symbol, may have been referred to as 'Indra' "³⁸ Two passages are quoted by Venkateswara:—(1) *Indrāgnī śumbhatā naraḥ* (Rv. I, 21, 21); (2) *Sūrmyam sūṣirām iva* (Rv. III, 69, 12). In these he seeks to find references to images.³⁹ His argument depends, in the first instance, upon the interpretation of the verb 'Śumbh,' which in the active means 'to adorn'. The hymn from which Venkateswara quotes invokes Indra and Agni to come to the sacrifice, to receive praise, and to drink the Soma offering. The stanza continues: *tā yajñeṣu pra śamsata, Indrāgnī śumbhatā naraḥ tā gāyatreṣu gāyata*; these two praise forth at sacrifices, adorn Indra and Agni, O men!, to these two sing in *Gāyatrī* measures". As 'Śumbhata' here comes between two verbs meaning "to praise," there can be no doubt that "with praises" must be supplied. It appears far-fetched to make this word to mean "adorn them (*i.e.*, their images) with ornaments." Even Sāyaṇa cannot be supposed to intend this interpretation. He paraphrases Śumbhata by 'śobhitau kuruta' "make them adorned," adding "*nānāvidhairalāṁkāraiḥ*," "with various ornaments" which is parallel to his explanation "*gīrbhīr-alāṁkurvanti*" under Rv. V, 22.4: *tam tvā stomair vardhanty A' trayo, gīrbhīḥ śumbhanty Atrayaḥ* "So the Atris exalt thee with praises, the Atris adorn thee with songs." (Sāyaṇa) (*Stotrair vardhanti—gīrbhir alāṁkurvanti*).⁴⁰ The second passage occurs in a hymn (VIII, 69) addressed to Indra, whose powers of drinking Soma are frequently dealt with upon in the *Ṛg Veda*. The stanza in question (12) is translated thus by Macdonell.⁴¹ "Thou, O Varuṇa, art a good God, into whose palate (*Kākudam*) the seven rivers flow as into a hollow (*Suṣirām*) pipe (*Sūrmyam*)". The word 'Sūrmi' is interpreted in the *St. Petersburg Dictionary* in the sense of a 'pipe' for conveying water; in Sāyaṇa's *Bhāṣya* in the sense of 'sun'; in *Nirukta* in the sense of 'a fair-flowing stream'; in classical Sanskrit in the sense of an 'iron image'.⁴² Macdonell adopts the meaning 'pipe' and remarks: "This is quite a natural parallel to the drinking powers of Indra, who is elsewhere said to consume three lakes of Soma; and of Varuṇa, as ruler of the waters, it is said (V, 85, 6) that by his occult power (*māyā*) the rivers swiftly pouring into the ocean do not fill it with water." In the present context, Sāyaṇa interprets '*Kākudam*' by *tālum* (palate) as equivalent to 'Ocean'. The whole passage as interpreted by Sāyaṇa is as follows:

38. *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, page 42.

39. *J.R.A.S.*, 1917, page 587.

40. *J.R.A.S.*, 1917, pages 592-93, A summary of Macdonell's reply.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, discussion on the uses of *Vyākaraṇa Śāstra*, vide *Udyota* note under मुदेवो अस्ति etc.

हे वरुण जलाभिमानिन् देव त्वं सुदेवो असि यस्य सुदेवस्य ते तव काकुदं तालु
समुद्राख्यं सप्तसिन्धवः गङ्गाद्याः सप्तनद्यो अनुस्रवन्ति जिह्वायां सर्वदा स्रवन्ति । दृष्टान्तः
सूर्यं सुषिरामिव यथा सूर्यं प्रति रश्मिजालं तद्वत् ॥

In the wake of Yāska's interpretation, Wilson thus translates the passage⁴³ :—

'Thou art a glorious God, Varuṇa, across whose palate the seven rivers keep pouring as a fair-flowing (stream) into an abyss.'

⁴⁴Griffith accepts the rendering of Roth and thus translates the stanza :—

"Thou, Varuṇa, to whom belong seven
Rivers, art a glorious God,
The waters flow into thy throat as 'twere
a pipe with ample mouth."

In view of the various translations and interpretations of the passage in question, it is not possible to determine the exact significance of the two expressions 'Sūrmi' and 'Suṣira'. Except in the classical language we do not anywhere come across the meaning 'image' with reference to the word 'Sūrmi.' The two words are variously understood by various commentators, and if we may be allowed to say so these words also may be classified among the many 'winged words' which the R̥g Veda presents. Macdonell observes : "Both these words occur in this passage only and consequently have a somewhat doubtful sense. Both words with a conjectural meaning must not be used in order to prove a theory of far-reaching importance."⁴⁵ He then concludes : "In the earlier Vedic period the Gods were conceived as vaguely anthropomorphic in outward shape, and were not yet iconographically represented."⁴⁶ Professor A. B. Keith also holds the view expressed by Macdonell and others. He says : "It is perfectly clear that save in the latest stratum of the Vedic literature idols are not recognised in cult, and then in the domestic ritual."⁴⁷

It will be worthwhile in this connection to notice whether there is any proof to the effect that Indo-Europeans practised the use of idols,

43. Wilson's R̥g Veda Samhitā (Translation), Vol. V.

44. "Hymns of the R̥g Veda," Vol. II, p. 214.

45. J.R.A.S., 1917, page 594.

46. Ibid., page 602.

47. Philosophy and Religion of the Veda by A. B. Keith, page 30.

because the position in the case of other Aryan nations, such as Iran, Scythia and ancient Germany was much the same as in the Aryan India of early Vedic times. Dr. J. J. Modi who conducted investigation in this direction concludes : "we thus see that none of other ancient people—the Iranians, the Germans and the Scythians—who were offshoots of an old Aryan stock, had idol-worship among them. So, there should be no idol-worship among the ancient Hindus also, an old offshoot whose Ṛṣis sang their songs of Nature in their Hymns of the Vedas."⁴⁸ J. N. Farquhar, in an article on "Temple and Image worship in Hinduism" remarks : "In every part of India, temples and images may be seen ; and the religious life of all classes of the people depends very largely on their use. Yet, the Aryans of Punjab from whom the religion of India with its priests, schools, laws, literature and customs has come, possessed no temples and used no images."⁴⁹ He then refers to the refusal of the Śrauta Brahmins (who continued to perform Vedic sacrifices) a hundred years ago to adopt the cult of images and subscribe to the view of the non-Vedic origin of temple ritual. Here, in the wake of Ananda Coomāraswāmy he draws a line of distinction between *Yajña* of the Vedic cult and *Pūjā* of the temple cult, *Hotṛ* the Vedic priest and *Pūjārī* the temple priest. Coomāraswāmy observes : "In particular, the popular Dravidian element, must have played the major part in all that concerns the development and office of image-worship, that is, of *Pūjā* as distinct from *Yajña*."⁵⁰ In his essay on "Indian Architecture" Coomāraswāmy remarks : "The Vedic ritual required neither images nor temples, but the non-Vedic cults, such as those of the dragon (Nāgas), the tree-spirits (Yakṣas) and the goddesses, may have had permanent shrines with images and wooden temples."⁵¹ He holds that the fundamental elements of temple architecture in India are indigenous and originated in the religious practice of the native population, much older and vaster than the Aryan population.

"Image worship an element of the complex System of Hinduism"

From the foregoing it might be said that the Vedic religion was normally ani-conic, and did not concern with the directions pertaining to the use and service of images and temples. The question now presents itself: What place does the study of the Vedas occupy in what concerns image worship and temple architecture? Something more might be added to

48. Sir Asutosh Mukerjee Silver Jubilee Volume, *Orientalia*, Part II, pages 437-448).

49. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1928, page 15.

50. *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, page 5.

51. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. XII, p. 220, "Indian Architecture."

the answer that the reference to the Vedas was intended "to give the sanction of a great name to the science of architecture."⁵² In order to estimate the total value of Vedic knowledge and to determine its position in the study of the sacred architecture of India, we have to first of all understand the true nature of the system of Hinduism, for the various treatises on image and temple worship took their shape at a time when Hinduism was completely evolved and when it became the vehicle of national religious thought and feeling. The great system of Hinduism, it may be remarked, "is not purely Āryan but Indian."⁵³ It springs from the fusion of Āryan with indigenous religion. The Aryans in the course of their civilising mission, met men of all grades of cultural equipment and religious instinct. They realised the force of image-worship which was inherent in the nature of the masses. Assimilative as the genius of the early civilisers was, it admitted the non-Āryan gods kindly, improved and chastened them where necessary and reconciled them with the Āryan deities. A higher and growing religion never extinguishes but always absorbs, ennobles, enriches and preserves all that is found to be good and inoffensive in older cults. It aims at putting peoples of different equipment in the line of development in social and spiritual directions. Real civilisers that they were, the later-day Aryans attempted to mend popular faith in personal and many gods, where such a mending was necessary. Their aim to gradually civilise the lower masses without hurting the religious sentiment rooted in their nature led them to accept the native religion and in their desire to ennoble the mode of popular worship they gave it the clothing of their philosophical wisdom. "The worshippers of the Mahisha (buffalo-demon) were told that the Cosmic Spirit was greater than the Mahisha. The worshippers of serpents were instructed that there was one greater than the Serpents, the Lord of Serpents, Nāgeśvara or Krishna, who danced over the head of Kāliya."⁵⁴

The peaceful penetration of Āryan ideals into the sensuous polytheism of the popular religion marks the rise of Hinduism. As Havell observes: "Indian civilisation is like Hindu sacrificial vessel, an amalgam of many metals; but the fire which fused them and separated the dross was the Āryan genius—the philosophy of the Vedas."⁵⁵ Whether in the pure Āryan religion or in the complex system of modern Hindu-

52. *Annamalai University Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 2, "*Manuṣyālayacandrikā*," note 22.

53. *The History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, page 46.

54. *The Heart of Hindustan*, page 52, also vide page 25.

55. *Indo-Aryan Civilisation*, page 45.

ism, the central ideal of unity in the midst of diversity is continuously expressed. Truly was Hindu faith built on the steady foundation of the Upaniṣads, which constitute the end and essence of the Vedas and the vital parts thereof. A good Guru, to whom people turn for spiritual advice cannot afford to ignore Vedic philosophy, which forms the source of spiritual wisdom and the basis of Hinduism. Hymns which accompanied the sacrifice in Vedic religion were incorporated in the mode of worship in the new Hinduism. Sacrificial altars too, in accordance with Vedic directions, were raised and certain rituals came to be adopted in the new system. Thus on the *philosophical* side as well as on the *ritualistic* side, Vedic contents have played a considerable part in the development of the system of Hinduism, the result of the welding of Aryan with popular religion. This *complex system of religion* which the Āgamas and Purāṇas embody in its highly developed state has been the spiritual food of millions since its inception. It has been continuously governing and still continues to be the ruling factor in the religious life of Hindus in India. The philosophy that clothes and ennobles the system has its roots deep in the system of Vedic thought. Dr. Coomārawāmy takes note of this fact when he observes that the 'Tantra (system) is based like other systems on the Vedas.....and that the Tantra harmonises Vedāntic monism and dualism.'⁵⁶ In the light of the mixed character of Hinduism which a careful study unravels, it is possible to understand the rationale underlying the text of the author which tells us that the Guru, the spiritual adviser should be a knower of the essence of the Vedas and the Āgamas.

"The term 'Āgama', its general and technical sense explained"

The term 'Āgama' that is used in the expression '*Svadhīta vedāgama-tattvavettā*' refers to the traditional text of worship, otherwise known as 'Tantra'. This term, divested of its technical and restricted sense, means any 'tradition' or 'scripture'. Monier Williams renders it as "anything handed down or fixed by tradition."⁵⁷ It is commonly used with reference to any sacred scripture including the Vedas. Thus Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* speaks of '*Āgamaprāmāṇya*', where Āgama means the sacred text of the Vedas. However, this term is employed in a special sense in technical treatises dealing with temple and image worship. In our text, for instance, where the author uses the compound expression '*Vedāgama*', the fact is indicated that Āgama is distinct and different from the Vedas. 'Āgamas' are a special class of works which inculcate the worship of

56. Bulletin on "Indian Collections in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts," Part I, page 30.

57. "*Sanskrit-English Dictionary*" by Monier-Williams.

Śiva and Śakti. They are otherwise known generally by the term ‘*Tantras*.’ Belonging to a similar class of works, but specially devoted to the sect of Viṣṇu are the ‘*Samhitās*.’ *Tantra* strictly means ‘a system of doctrines,’ ‘a book’; *Āgama* ‘tradition’; and *Samhitā* ‘a collection of sacred texts.’ Thus Winternitz observes: “Strictly speaking, the ‘*Smhitās*’ are the sacred books of the Vaiṣṇavas, the ‘*Āgamas*’ those of the Śaivas and the ‘*Tantras*’ those of the Śāktas. However, there is no clear line of demarcation between the terms, and the expression ‘*Tantra*’ is frequently used as a general term for this class of works.”⁵⁸ They bear the mark of theological works instructing technicalities of the cult of sects together with their metaphysical and mystical principles. “*Tantra* (sysem) forms the specific system suited, according to the orthodox view, to the conditions of the fourth or kali age, and is designed equally for the use of any special sect.”⁵⁹ The *Śaivāgamas*, which are also known by the common term ‘*Tantras*,’ are said to be twenty-eight in number and are believed to have been pronounced by Śiva after the creation of the world. An interesting verse, which we have noticed already, describes them as the utterances come from the mouth of Śiva in response to the queries of Pārvati and endorsed subsequently by Vāsu-deva. In their content, they deal with the cult of symbolic and image worship and in the course of their description of the sectional and devotional elements of worship, there is devoted, in these works, a large portion to the treatment of architectural and sculptural subjects. The ‘*Kāmikāgama*,’ for instance, deals with architecture and sculpture in sixty out of a total of seventy-five chapters. In this respect it rivals any avowed treatise on architecture. A student interested in the temple architecture and image worship of this land, cannot afford to pass by the *Āgamas* in silence. They are encyclopaedic in the nature of their treatment and govern the spiritual life of millions of Hindus in India. Among the class of *Āgamic* works, twenty-eight *Āgamas* are usually enumerated and each ‘*Āgama*’ has a number of *Upāgamas*. The following stanzas attributed to ‘*Svāyambhuva*’ are found quoted in the *Gurudevapaddhati*⁶⁰ :—

“कामिकं योगजाचिन्त्यकारणान्यजितं तथा ॥

दीप्तं सूक्ष्मं सहस्रं चाप्यंशुमान् सुप्रभेदकम् ।

शिवभेदसमाख्यानि तन्त्राण्येवं दश क्रमात् ॥

58. *The History of Indian Literature* by Winternitz (Cal. Ed.), page 587.

59. Bulletin of the Boston Museum on Indian Collections, Part I, page 30.

60. *Gurudevapaddhati*, (T. S. S. Ed.), Vol. III, pp. 5 and 6.

विजयं चैव निःश्वासं प्रोद्गीतं पारमेश्वरम् ।
 आग्नेयं मुखविम्बं च स्वायम्भुवमतः परम् ॥
 रौरवं माकुटं चैव किरणं लम्बितं तथा ।
 चन्द्रज्ञानं वीरभद्रं सिद्धं सान्तानिकं ततः ॥
 शर्वोद्गीतं च विमलं वातूलं चेत्यनुक्रमात् ।
 रुद्रभेदोद्भवान्येव तन्त्राण्यष्टादशैव हि ॥
 एषां भेदोपभेदाश्च तत्तत्प्रकरणान्यपि ।
 सुबहूनिनित्यतोऽस्माभिर्निर्दिश्यन्ते न नामभिः ॥
 उपभेदेन भेदानामस्य संख्या न विद्यते ।
 भेदान्तराणि सर्वाणि महान्ति न महान्यपि ॥”

These verses enumerate the 28 Āgamas.

“Indigenous (non-Vedic) origin of Image Worship”

Beneath the philosophical garb which the Āgamaśāstras display there runs the popular tendency to worship Gods in anthropomorphic terms to the accompaniment of the ritual known as ‘Pūjā’, which is distinct and different from ‘Yajña’. Since no Vedic work describes or prescribes the ritual of temple and image worship, there is ground to believe that its origin is non-Vedic. “Indian religion and ritual,” says Ānanda Coomāraswāmy, “exist in two forms, known to Indians as the Vedic and the Āgamic tradition, but more often designated by western scholars as respectively Āryan (Brahmanical) and Dravidian (Southern) and popular.”⁶¹ Vedic Aryans, as we have already observed, were worshippers of deities who are personifications of natural phenomena and their ritual ‘Yajña’ was composed of offerings offered to the accompaniment of hymns sung in praise of the Gods invited to attend the sacrifice. There is no indication or reference to temple in Vedic literature, but there is description of sacrificial altars which were used to be raised in the open air. The priests through hymns summoned the Gods to descend and attend the sacrifice prepared in their honour. It was believed that in response to the invitations extended, Gods descended to the altar flying from heavens in their aerial cars. The ritual and liturgy connected with the Āryan sacrifice (Yajña), is entirely different in essentials from the original ritual of image-worship (Pūjā). According to the Vedic ritual ‘Yajña’, offering of milk, grain and butter and juice of the

61. Article on “Indian Art and Archaeology” in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. XII, page 209.

Soma plant was mainly put in the fire kindled on the altar and it was believed that what was thus offered reaches the Gods as Agni (the fire) was the mouth of Gods. According to the Āgamic ritual *Pūjā*, the service a personal deity is emphasised, and offerings took the shape of sandal, flowers, clothes, incense, food and light. Such a ritual obviously implies the existence of images and temples to house the images. It is not possible to determine the age of this tradition, since it is a tradition rooted in the religion of the masses. Various scholars suggest that this tradition is indigenous and as such contemporaneous with the life of the native race. Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, one of the distinguished exponents of this view, remarks: "It must always be remembered that the Vedas exhibit only a certain aspect of early Indian religion. Behind the pale of Aryan orthodoxy there lay an extensive and deep-rooted system of popular beliefs and cults and a decided tendency to anthropomorphic presentation. These popular beliefs implied an iconography, such as we actually find at Bharhut, of Yakṣas, Nāgas, Devatas and Vṛkṣas, the Earth and Mother Goddess and divinities of fertility, fairies and goblins and human heroes. Gradually all of these found their place in a theistic Hinduism and Buddhism, which were not purely Aryan, but Indian."⁶² If we do not have enough tangible and material evidence of images and temples going back to the remote period of Āryan and pre-Āryan civilisation, it is because they were made probably of such evanescent material as wood and mud. A peep into the civilisation of the Indus Valley of the third millennium B.C. enables us to detect some evidence, however inadequate, on the strength of which we might justify the supposition that so far as it was possible of being expressed in concrete forms, the religion of the Indus people in several respects was the progenitor of modern Hinduism as a religion, and as distinct from the philosophical side of it. Of course, among the buildings unearthed there is none that definitely shows itself to be a temple. But some materials in the form of engraved seals which are found in abundance in the ruins along with a few clay sealings and copper tablets and a variety of small figurines of terra-cotta shed some amount of light on the religion of the Indus Valley people of the third millennium B.C. A study of these objects has led modern scholars to trace certain features which are common between the old Indus Valley religion and modern Hinduism. Among such features mention is often made of the cults of Śiva and the Mother-Goddess, of the Nāgas and the Yakṣis, the worship of animals, trees, stones, phallism: Yoga, Śāktism and the doctrines of Samsāra (Metempsychoses) and Bhakti (devotion to a personal God). These later constitute the cardinal elements of Āgamic

62. "History of Indian and Indonesian Art," page 46.

and Paurāṇic literature. On the strength of the material evidence which the Mohenjo-Daro remains yield, it appears that the authors of this civilisation were a set of highly cultured people who should not be mistaken for the predecessors of modern jungle tribes. In view of the concrete character of the religion of these people of the third millennium B.C., it will be unreasonable to assert that image worship was unknown to the people of ancient India. When we say that there is no evidence of image-worship in the Vedic literature, we only mean that image worship was not the practice of the Vedic Aryans. We are not thereby precluded from assuming that it was existing among non-Aryans of those distant times. It seems to have prevailed among the non-Aryan population whose religious tradition was distinct and different from the Aryan tradition.

From the religious literature of the Iranians who formed one of the chips of the Aryan block, we know that idolatry was an object of condemnation. As Jackson remarks, "all Pahlavi writings allude to the abomination of idol-worship as wholly abhorrent to the pure spirit of Zoroastrianism that is in keeping with its ideal conception of the divine."⁶³ In *Viśtāspa yašt* (yt. XXIV, 37) Zoroaster asks his royal disciple *Viśtāspa* to keep away from idolatry, which was an evil, an infection from *Ahriman*. In the same *yašt* (59), *Ahura Mazda* advises the rejection of idol-worship and the acceptance of pure *Gāōā*—singing. The word used to refer to idolatry is 'baosu'. In Pahlavi, 'būt *paras-tik*' is employed, which means idolatry. In later Persian, 'būt *parastik*' is employed, which means idol-worship, and the Persian word 'būt' comes from the Avesta 'būiti' (Ven. XIX, 1, 2, 43). In Pahlavi *Bundehish*, the following passage is found:—'*Būt shāeda zak mūnash pavan Hindukān parastand*' *Avash Vakhsh pavan zak butiha mahman chegūn būt-i asp parastet* (Ch. XXVIII, 34)⁶⁴ (i.e. the demon *būt* is one who is worshipped among the Hindus. The increase (of its worship) consists in idols. For example they worship the idol of a horse).⁶⁵ The fact that idolatry was disliked by the Iranians presupposes its prevalence among some people. We, therefore, are not prevented from holding that image worship was current as a tradition in the religi-

63. "Sir Jamshedjee Jijibhoy Zarthosthi Madressa Jubilee Volume," page 274. Article on 'Allusions in Pahlavi Literature to the Abomination of Idol-worship.'

64. Vide Modi's *Bundehish*, pp. 138-139.

65. For these references from Iranian Literature, vide Sir Asutosh Mookerjee *Silver Jubilee Volume, Orientalia, Part II*, page 442, Modi's article on "Idol-worship: Did it exist among the ancient Aryans, and among them among the ancient Hindus of the Vedic time?"

ous practice of the indigenous population of India before as well as after the advent of the Aryans. This view is strengthened by the concrete character of the religion of the Indus Valley people of pre-historic period whose civilisation, thanks to the spade-work of archaeologists, has been revealed in a sudden and completely unforeseen manner.

Among other supporters of the theory of indigenous origin of image worship mention might be made of Prof. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, who in his "*Outlines of Indian Philosophy*" observes: "Temple ritual was elaborated on a grand scale. This ritual was primarily based on the ceremonies of fetish worship of the Dravidian races".⁶⁶ Professor Radhakrishnan subscribes to the view in the following words: "Image worship, which was a striking feature of the Dravidian faith, was accepted by the Aryans".⁶⁷ Dr. A. B. Keith in his "*Philosophy and Religion of the Veda*" tells us that this view is plausible. He observes: "There is no proof that the Indo-Europeans practised the use of idols and the evidence of German religion suggests that the position there as certainly in Iran was much as in Vedic India, and it is therefore, perhaps more plausible to believe that their employment gradually developed in India itself, though under what influences, we simply do not know." He, however, suggests: "The use of idols may have been influenced by non-Aryan population, as it gradually became assimilated; it may have used them and had fixed sanctuaries before the advent of the Aryans".⁶⁸ One of the recent inquirers in this subject, J. N. Farquhar, holds the view that "temple-and-image worship grew up among Śūdras (Dāsas of the Rv.), that it was thrown open to the three Āryan castes about 400 B.C. and thereafter steadily climbed to its present supreme position."⁶⁹

"*The Age of Āgamic tradition and the Āgama Sāstras*".

All the statements of different scholars that we have referred to above lend support to the view that the tradition of image-and-temple worship was inherent in the soil of India, that it was rooted in the faith of her people. It might have existed in a floating state till it was systematically recorded. Since it was alien to the liturgy and ritual of Āryan religion, since it was not a feature of Āryan mode of worship, the Āryan advents did not take note of it in their religious literature. This seems to be the reason why the practice of image-worship does not appear reflected in the literature before the fourth

66. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, page 128.

67. *Hindu View of Life*—Page 41.

68. "*Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*," (pages 30 and 31).

69. J.R.A.S., 1928, page 21.

century B.C. But from the fourth century B.C. onwards, in such works as the *Adbhuta Brāhmaṇa*, *Gṛhya-sūtra*, etc., we come across fragmentary references to image-worship.⁷⁰ A definite account of the details of the mode of image-worship, however, can be gathered from the systematic treatises on the subject (*Āgamas*, etc.) prepared at a later date. In the codified form in which the *Āgamas* have come down to us, they were probably written from about the fifth or the sixth century A.D. The works of Tirumūlar and other Tamil poets unfold familiarity with Āgamic literature. H. W. Schomerus believes that these poets lived somewhere near the first or second century and concludes that the *Āgamas* would have, therefore, originated in pre-Christian times. Dr. Winternitz⁷¹ thinks it more likely that these poets should be assigned to the 9th century and the *Āgamas* to the 7th or 8th century A.D. As the word 'Tantra' is not explained in its technical sense by Amara, as allusions to 'Tantra' are not met with in the *Mahābhārata*, whereas allusions to 'Purāṇas' and 'Itihāsas' are frequently to be met with there, and as references to Tantras are not found in the works of Chinese pilgrims, Winternitz assumes that the *Āgamas* or *Tantras* could not have been written earlier than the 5th or 6th century A.D. Says he: "The earliest Nepalese manuscripts of Tantras date from the seventh to the ninth century, and it is not very likely that this literature originated further back than the 5th or 6th century".⁷² *Āgamas* or *Tantras*, from their contents appear to mark the genesis of the new Hinduism, which is the outcome of the fusion of Aryan and indigenous concepts. In the character of the writings of this class of literature, the hand of the priestly authority is fairly discernible. The impact of Aryan philosophy on the class of Āgamic literature is clearly the work of the priestly class. This fact strengthens the view that in the form in which the Āgamic works have come down to us, they belong definitely to a date after the end of the Vedic period. Modern Hinduism with its comprehensive mission of civilising the aborigines by giving them a systematised religion divested of all evil practices and crude demonstrations and yet quite appealing to imagination, starts its career after the completion of the Vedic epoch. Mr. James Kennedy writes: "The absorption and assimilation of these aboriginal or foreign masses within the Hindu fold was the task of the

70. For evidences from *Sūtra* literature, Vide Introduction in *Indian Images*, part I, by Brindāvan C. Bhaṭṭāchārya. B. C. Bhaṭṭāchārya seems to press his claim too far when he seeks to find sure indication of image-worship in the passages from the R.V.

71. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, page 588, (Cal. Edition).

72. *Ibid.*, page 605.

new Hinduism, a task accomplished between the seventh and eleventh centuries A.D. and it was so thoroughly done that we now find throughout northern India a Hindu population fairly homogeneous in blood, culture, and religion, and sufficiently marked from the degraded tribes that still haunt the outskirts of civilisation.”⁷³

In the foregoing we have tried to point out how the priestly class, who were originally the custodians of pure Āryan religion, admitted in the early centuries of the Christian Era the popular and non-Āryan tendencies of worship and evolved and shaped with wonderful power of adaptability the system of modern Hinduism in which is found chiefly all that concerns image-worship recognised and systematised in relation to Āryan philosophies. Though it is not easy to determine the exact date for the composition of the Āgamic texts, their contents which are clothed in monistic philosophy of the Vedānta, enable us to suggest that they are post-Vedic works, shaped in the course of the evolution of Hinduism in the early centuries of the Christian Era. The fundamental elements of image-worship which these Āgamic texts embody, may, however, be supposed to trace their connection with the indigenous tradition whose age we simply do not know, except that it is ancient and probably as ancient as the religious faith of the native population of India.

वर्णाश्रमाचारः—The Guru should be one who observes the established traditions of the society, traditions which are recorded in the Hindu code of life and conduct with reference to the classes of society and stages of life. Here as elsewhere architecture is governed by the growing needs of the society and in its expression it is shaped by the established traditions of the society. The author hence observes that the directions of the Guru must keep conformity with the spiritual requirements of the classes. The science of architecture, developed and expressed under the guidance of the priest, the follower of social and religious traditions, reveals religious history, not of individuals but of whole classes in India.

अग्नि दीक्षः—The work that a preceptor undertakes being of a sacred and serious character, he must place himself under strict laws of discipline. *Dikṣā* is a religious ceremony which a religious man is required to observe with a view to initiating himself to great spiritual undertakings. It is believed that the observance of the laws of spiritual drill is necessary in order to awaken the inner spiritual life and to kindle one to full self-consciousness. This doctrine of *Dikṣā*

(initiation to spiritual undertakings) is one of the leading concepts which characterise *Tāntrik systems*.

दक्ष :—The preceptor should be again a man endowed with skill in performance. In any undertaking, but more in art, is ingenuity a requisite and the director of architecture must be a man of rare skill and intelligence.

"Influence of the quality of Tapas on the character of Hindu Architecture."

तपस्वी . The author then lays down that the Guru must be a 'Tapasvī', a man who possesses the ascetic virtues of simplicity, purity, and self-sacrifice. Simplicity is the result of the shedding of worldly desires with a view to achieving final illumination. It is the nature of the untrained mind to force its way towards distraction and wastage and lose itself in the fictitious value of things. A simple and austere life is intended to discipline the mind, to strengthen the will, to free man from the fetters of animal passions and to lead him to the higher goal of satisfaction of the Eternal Passion of the Soul. Let not asceticism be understood in the sense of mere self-mortification; for a real ascetic is not one who fiercely is 'in love with a lingering suicide.' Such a practice is condemned in ethical works. Bhagavad Gītā thus states⁷⁴ :—

मूढग्राहेणात्मनो यत् पीडया क्रियते तपः ।

परस्योत्सादनार्थं वा तत्तामसमुदाहृतम् ॥

Self-restraint as different from 'lingering suicide' is the meaning of austerity. The ascetic through the practice of the virtues of austere simplicity and purity and sacrifice of worldly appetites works for the salvation of himself as well as the world. He knows that what is gained through sacrifice is truly and eternally gained. He, therefore, through discipline and penance puts an end to the promptings of brute nature. A seeker after truth that he is, he leads the life of contemplation on the Eternal. A 'tapasvī', as described in Indian literature, is thus a man of serene mind who lives in an atmosphere of simple life and purity in response to the deeper call of spiritual reality. His activity is disinterested, not determined by personal motives. The art of religious architecture, when it is the product of the imagination of such serene and spiritually trained minds, necessarily acquires a transcendental character. There is in it no attempt at pandering to individual fancy or ministering to personal vanity. On

74. Bhagavadgītā, XVII, 16.

the other hand, there is suggested a sublimity, a monumental calm in which eternity seeks to echo itself. Such an art as this functions as the missionary of religion and philosophy, as the spiritual helper of mankind. It reveals to the religious-minded beauty which is spiritual, which is visioned through the shedding of intense worldly desires.

The commentator Śaṅkara interprets the word 'tapasvi' as "बहुप्रकारतपोयुक्तः" :—one who is gifted with different kinds of spiritual experience obtained through the practice of Tapas. Three kinds of asceticism are described—*Śārīra*, *Vāñmaya* and *Mānasa*, from the point of view of its relation to the body, speech and mind. The following stanzas⁷⁵ describe the three kinds :—

देवद्विजगुरुभाज्ञपूजनं शौचमार्जवम् ।
 ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसा च शरीरं तप उच्यते ॥
 अनुद्वेगकरं वाक्यं सत्यं प्रियहितं च यत् ।
 स्वाध्यायाभ्यसनं चैव वाङ्मयं तप उच्यते ॥
 मौनः प्रसादः सौम्यत्वं मौनमात्मविनिग्रहः ।
 भावसंशुद्धिरित्येतत्तपो मानसमुच्यते ॥

The word 'Tapas' is interpreted in a variety of ways. Originally, it appears to have been used in the sense of "heat", "creative heat" analogous to the heat by which brood-hen produces life from the egg. In the poem of Creation in the R̥g Veda,⁷⁶ it is found used in the sense of creative heat. Macdonell, in his 'Vedic Index', interprets it as "creative fervour."

"*Sa tapas taptvā sarvam asṛjata yadidam kiñca*":—Quoting this Vedic passage the poet Rabindranath Tagore thus interprets:⁷⁷ "God from the heat of pain created all that there is." Here the expression "pain" is used in a special sense, in the sense in which Mathew Arnold has used it when he addressed a poem to "Nightingale."

".....hark what pain!"

exclaims the poet, and further in a burst sings

"Eternal Passion!
 Eternal Pain!"

Here 'pain' does not mean what is generally meant by that term in the limited sense of personal injury. It is an idea detached from the con-

75. Vide quotation given in the *Śabdakalpadruma* under 'Tapas.' .

76. *R̥g Veda*, X, 129.

77. "Creative Ideal" by Dr. Tagore in the *Rupam* No. 9, page 8, (1922).

finement of individual facts. It is to be interpreted in the context of ever-lasting life, where it is not different from the unfathomed joy in which all sufferings are made one with it. "The sacrifice," observes the poet Tagore, "which is in the heart of creation is both joy and pain at the same time".⁷⁸ For the same Vedic poets, who have sung the 'truth of pain in eternity' have also said "From joy has come forth all creation." The expression 'Pain' that is used in the interpretation of 'Tapas' must be understood in the particular poetic sense. It reveals, in this sense, the infinity of love and joy in all its truth and beauty. In the wake of Arnold, Dr. Tagore remarks that all creation throbs with 'Eternal Passion', 'Eternal Pain'. Dr. Coomaraswamy takes note of the different meanings which the expression 'tapas' suggests. "It implies," says he "something much more than penance, something more like *effort*, work, or glowing".⁷⁹ Effort in its utmost may be taken to be identical with what Tagore calls "heat of pain", the cause of universal creation. If we grant the various interpretations of 'Tapas', we might answer the question: what is Art? It is the outcome of man's creative heat, creative fervour, creative activity. Just as all creation comes forth from the power of God's *tapas* so does art, man's creation proceed from his *tapas*. In the light of the various meanings we have noticed, the Guru who is described as a *tapasvī* is a man who possesses the power of *tapas* (creative heat, creative fervour, creative activity, which is capable of projecting what is called "art").

The qualities of a Guru enumerated in the following verses⁸⁰ may be compared with those laid down in our text:—

मन्त्रगुरोर्लक्षणम्

गकारः सिद्धिदः प्रोक्तो रेफः पापस्य हारकः ।
 उकारो विष्णुरव्यक्तस्त्रितयात्मा गुरुः परः ॥
 शान्तो दान्तः विनीतश्च कुलीनः शुद्धवेशवान् ।
 शुद्धाचारः सुप्रतिष्ठः शुचिर्दक्षः सुबुद्धिमान् ॥
 आश्रमी ध्याननिष्ठश्च मन्त्रतन्त्रविशारदः ।
 निग्रहानुग्रहे शक्तो गुरुरित्यभिधीयते ॥
 उद्धर्तुं चैव संहर्तुं समर्थो ब्राह्मणोत्तमः ।
 तपस्वी सत्यवादी च गृहस्थो गुरुरुच्यते ॥

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Bulletin of the Boston Museum*, "Section on Sanyāsa and Yoga," part I, page 7.

80. *Sabdakalpadruma*, under "मन्त्रगुरोर्लक्षणम्"

STANZA 6

“*The Status of Guru and Mūrtipas.*”

In stanzas* from 6 to 27, the author deals with the process connected with the veneration of the Guru and the Mūrtipas, the characteristics and number of the Mūrtipas and the obligation of the Guru and the Mūrtipas to the devotee who requests them to fulfil his desire to build a temple and install an image for daily worship. Since we have no concern with the practical side of the ceremonial duties, we make only a passing reference to the ceremonial subject which these stanzas treat of. These verses, however, are of immense use to those who are interested in the study of Tāntrik rites. The doctrine of Guru is a characteristic of all devotional faiths and in Tāntrik system much stress is laid on it. Guru is here treated as the very embodiment of God Himself. The idea of Guru as God raises him to the dignity of God's 'Avatar' (incarnation). The Viṣṇusamhitā regarding the status of Guru remarks :—

८१ देवस्तु द्विविधो ज्ञेयः स्थावरो जङ्गमस्तथा ।
प्रतिमा स्थावरो देवः आचार्यो जङ्गमस्तथा ॥

While under 'Dikṣā' discipline the Ācārya initiates eight Brahmins into spiritual work and appoints them as his associates in the religious task undertaken. These eight associates or disciples are called 'Mūrtipas' (those who protect the Mūrtis representing the different aspects or constituent elements such as earth etc. committed to their care by the Ācārya during the Dikṣā period). While under initiation, the *Guru* is venerated as an incarnation or visible embodiment of the supreme God and the *Mūrtipas* as representations of the different aspects or constituent elements such as Earth etc. Gurudeva makes this point clear in the following stanzas :—

एवं क्ष्माग्न्यात्मसूर्याम्बुवाय्विन्दुव्योमसंज्ञिताः ।
मूर्तयोऽष्टौ शिवस्योक्ता जगद्यन्त्रप्रवर्तिकाः ॥
शर्वा रुद्रः पशुपतिरीशानश्च तथा भवः ।
उग्रश्चैव महादेवो भीमश्चेत्यष्ट मूर्तिपाः ॥
एवं क्षित्यादिशर्वादिमूर्तिमूर्तीश्वरात्मकान् ।
अभ्यर्च्य ब्राह्मणानष्टौ गन्धपुष्पाम्बरादिभिः ॥
आचार्यं च विशेषेण संपूज्याभिप्रणम्य च ।

* Tantrasamuccaya T. S. S. Ed., Paṭala 1.

81. Viṣṇusamhitā, Paṭala 16, stanza 2 (T. S. S. Edition).

ततस्तु वरयेदेतान् यजमानः प्रसन्नधीः ॥
 शिवलिङ्गप्रतिष्ठार्थमाचार्यं त्वामहं वृणे ।
 एभिर्मूर्तिधरैः सार्धं प्रासादं कुरु मे विभो ॥
 इत्युत्त्वा यजमानस्तान् प्रणम्य वरयेच्च ते ।
 आचार्यसहिता ब्रूयुर्यजमानं तथास्त्विति ॥
 ततः सङ्कल्पिते देशे खानुकूलदिनादिके ।
 भूमेः प्राकारसीमान्तं ज्ञात्वा कुर्यात् परिग्रहम् ॥⁸²

In Paṭala 26, Gurudevā prescribes in detail the rites connected with the topics of *Guruvaraṇa*. The *Guru* and the *Mūrtipas* after having received from the *Yajamāna* all the honours due to them, should accède to the request of the *Yajamāna* and promise that the sacred task projected, beginning with the selection of site for the temple and ending with the consecration and bathing of the image, will be accomplished. Then the *Guru*, together with the *Mūrtipas*, must start to fulfil the obligation to the worshipper.

STANZA 7

SELECTION OF SITE

The author now proceeds to lay down rules for the selection of the site with due regard to its situation. A description of the features in general of the environment is first given. In the building of the House of God great enthusiasm was exhibited in the past and no one thought of building man's home more firmly and finely than he thought of the House of God. Greatest attention was centred on the selection of surroundings for the temple, and in the selection, the guiding factor was the intense feeling of man for close association with nature. India does not appear to have been led by any ambition to prevail over nature. The best minds, as the early history of India shows, blossomed in the heart of a lavish nature. The most enchanting songs which the Vedic poets sang were effusions of the unsophisticated human heart which had deepest contact with a creative nature. Nature, to Aryans, was also the perennial source of many a charming myth and legend. The *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*, which embody the highest thoughts on the nature of Soul and the Universe, were expressed by the sages of old during their stay

82. *Gurudevapaddhati* (Vol. III, T. S. S. Edition), Uttarārdha, Paṭala 26, stanzas 64-70.

in forest. The first researchers in the realm of spirit, the Vedic Ṛṣis found fitting abode in woods that abound in hoary trees, cool shades and refreshing streams. Whether it is in primeval poetry, or religion or philosophy or any other conceivable activity of the human mind, influence of nature is deeply marked. Art of architecture, it is in the fitness of things, should also bear the same impact which nature has left on every phase of the creative activity of Indians from the times of the Ṛg Veda. Prolific nature, which sums up the ultimate beauty in God's creation is the source of keen delight to the human mind. It is the spring of inspiration and creative energy to the poet and the artist. To the philosopher who loves to contemplate the Eternal, no place is more satisfying than the one where Nature stands as 'an abiding presence, a revelation of quietude and tranquil repose in the midst of the whirl and unrest of life or the ceaseless bewildering flux of things.' To the imagination of the devotee nature in all her splendour and grandeur appeals as God's creation, and evokes in him a sense of admiration at God's mysterious ways of working. In the situation of a temple, special regard is therefore given to natural surroundings. All texts on architecture are insistent on the proper selection of site and the stanza under explanation prescribes for temples choicest beauty spots in woodland and mountain-scenery, in forest glades and hilly retreats, in river-sweeps and sea-shores, in any lovely place in the heart of Mother Nature. Where such a nature is not revealed as in a town or a city, the author suggests that a suitable environment might be created through the tending of beautiful gardens and groves.

In the first line the author refers to '*Tīrtha*'. '*Tīrtha*' is a holy place, the centre of pilgrimage. A temple, when erected in such a place where people of diverse parts assemble for a common purpose, serves to advertise spiritual conceptions, and bring home to the minds of the humblest the highest teachings of religion and philosophy. For the temple, as we know, is the centre of India's cultural and spiritual life. This fact explains the characteristic feature of Indian culture, namely unity in the midst of diversity. True, that everywhere among the settled people, Indian culture has acquired particular local colour, but the fact that a certain intellectual and spiritual uniformity exists throughout the provinces of this country deserves to be remembered. The cultural bond persists in spite of political or racial differences and the unity, which is the characteristic feature of Indian culture is the product of a uniform spiritual life that has its roots in such centres of common worship as the *Tīrthas* or holy places.

Vana, *Saila* and *Taṭinī* wood, mountain and stream. Temples, if built on spots girded by forests, mountains and streams possess the

Upavana is a grove tendered in the vicinity of a village. *Udyāna* is a garden nurtured by man. The atmosphere of a temple is made happy and refreshing by the presence of a garden or grove in its neighbourhood. Every temple has gardens all around reared for the supply of flowers to the deity. The three words *Vana*, *Upavana*, and *Udyāna* are distinguished from each other on the basis of their size and wild or artificial character of their growth. Similarly, the three terms *Grāma*, *Pura* and *Pattana* are differentiated from each other. *Grāma* corresponds to a village, *Pura* to a capital which is the seat of government and *Pattana* to a city which is the seat of trade and commerce. The last is characterised generally by the presence of a port.

Throughout the description of the site, here as well as in the subsequent stanzas, there is revealed a sense of panoramic variety and exuberance of nature's life.

With the statement of our author, the following lines may be compared :—

83. Śaivāgamanibandhana (A Ms. from Tripunithura), Paṭala XI, Bhūparigraha, stanzas 2 and 3.

- (2) ⁸⁴ पुण्यक्षेत्रनदीतीर्थपर्वताद्यन्विता मही ।
 प्रयच्छत्यधिकां सिद्धिं यतस्तामाश्रयेद् बुधः ॥
 etc. etc.

Following these general remarks, stanzas are found which deal in detail with the specific features of the land.

STANZA 8

“*Prāci*” etc.

In the previous verse the author described in brief and in general terms the nature of the site to be selected for the temple of any God (Śiva, Viṣṇu etc.). Now, in this stanza, the author lays down the exact quarter in *Grāma*, *Pura* and *Pattana*, for the construction of a temple belonging to particular Gods like Śiva, Hari etc. According to the directions of the author, the North-West quarter is assigned to the temple of Śiva, western and eastern quarters to the temple of Hari, South-Eastern quarter to the temple of Gaṇapa and Ārya, North-Eastern to the temple of Durgā and northern to the temple of Subrahmaṇya. The central quarter may be allotted to all the Gods. Usually, the central quarter is preferred in a town, village or city, because it serves equally the convenience of the residents.

STANZA 9

“*A Good Site.*”

In this stanza, the author relates the general features of a good site, features which are conducive to the welfare of man and permanence of his structure. A good site should contain men and animals useful to man. It should abound in trees which are rich in juice and flowers and fruits. It must be even, devoid of ups and downs. Its dipping must be towards the east. This preference to an eastward slope is obviously based on a rational consideration. Such a direction is laid down with a view to enabling the residents to have the full benefit of the rays of the morning Sun. When the slope is towards the east, the morning rays would sweep across the whole area and purify the surroundings. In a temple, they would stream into *Garbhagṛha* to light up the image. Almost every treatise on architecture gives preference to the eastward dip. Its soil should be sticky to touch. Such soil reveals the quality of density

84. *Isānagurudevapaddhati*, (Vol. III, T. S. S. Ed.), Uttarārdha, ‘Bhūlak-
 ṣaṇādhikāra,’ Paṭala 23, stanza 23.

and glitter. It should produce a firm sound when beaten ; in this case it indicates the solidity of the ground and a stable foundation can be safely laid on it. The site must be rich in water and preferably should have water running in a circumambulatory direction. It is believed that “‘*pradakṣiṇa*’ is an auspicious direction in which the sun moves across the sky.”⁸⁵ The site should be abundant in soil. Loose and sandy land is unfit for the construction of any building, and therefore the site selected must be rich in soil. To know whether a land is rich or not in soil, the following process of examination is employed : Dig a pit one cubit deep and return the excavated soil back into the pit. The ground is declared to be the best, middling and worst type according as the soil at the top remains higher than the level, equal to the previous level or lower than the level.⁸⁶ The soil should be highly productive. When seeds are sown, they must quickly sprout up. The place should experience a climate which is neither too hot nor too cold ; it must be moderate. Vitruvius the Roman writer on architecture also prescribes the same condition regarding the climate of a good site. He observes : “Its aspects should be neither violently hot nor intensely cold, but temperate in both respects.”⁸⁷ The site which satisfies the above description in full is considered to be the best ; that which has features opposite belongs to the worst type and that whose features are intermediate is of the middling kind.

The choice of a healthy situation for a building is a subject of paramount importance in a consideration of preliminary matters connected with the science of architecture. The emphasis on this subject as is found given by all architectural authorities in India is quite in keeping with sound architectural traditions prevailing here as elsewhere. Thus Vitruvius, the Roman author remarks : “The choice of a healthy situation is of the first importance; it should be on high ground, neither subject to fogs, nor rains ; its aspects should be neither violently hot nor intensely cold, but temperate in both respects. The neighbourhood of a marshy place must be avoided.”⁸⁸

The description of the choice of a site on the basis of the contents thereof, the nature of the trees that grow there, the nature of the soil,

85. *A Study of Indo-Aryan Civilisation* by E. B. Havell, page 8.

86. Vide for direction texts like *Kāśyapaśilpa* (I, 37-38), (*Ānandaśrama Series*); *Mānasāra* (V, 34-37—*Ācārya Edition*); *Nibandhana* quoted at the end of the notes on this stanza.

87. Book I, Chapter IV (For quotation, vide P. K. *Ācārya's Dictionary of Hindu Architecture*, page 548).

88. Book I. Chapter II.

the dip of the land etc. is in agreement with the treatment of the same theme found in the works of other writers. For example compare our text with the following lines from the *Nibandhana* and *Viṣṇusamhitā* :—

1. The *Saivāgamanibandhana* states⁸⁹ :—

रमन्ते यत्र गोमर्त्याः समा स्निग्धा च सा शुभा ।
 यत्रोष्णकाले शीतत्वं उष्णस्पर्शा हिमागमे ।
 वर्षासु चोभयस्पर्शा सा शुभा सर्ववर्णिनाम् ॥
 हस्तमात्रं खनित्वा तु पांसुतोद्भृत्य पूरिता ।
 मध्यमा चाधिका श्रेष्ठा साधमा या न पूरिता ॥
 जलैः पूर्णा तथा ज्ञेया समारिक्तांगुलान्वितैः ।
 तथा त्रिपञ्चसप्ताहैरुता व्रीह्यादिरोपणैः ॥
 पूर्वप्लवा मही श्रेष्ठा श्रीबलायुर्विवर्धिनी ।
 सर्वसम्पत्करी पुंसां प्रासादस्य च भूतिदा ॥

2. The *Viṣṇusamhitā* observes⁹⁰ :—

बहुपांसुरशुष्काम्बुः क्षिप्रं व्रीह्यादिरोहणा ।
 प्रदक्षिणजला श्रेष्ठा समा शीतोष्णकालयोः ॥
 नदी पूर्ववहा यत्र क्षीरपुष्पफलद्रुमाः ।
 रमन्ते यत्र गोमर्त्याः समा स्निग्धा च सोत्तमा ॥
 शङ्खाभ्रादिस्वरा चेष्टा सवर्णा सर्ववर्णिनाम् ।
 अलाभे कृत्रिमैवं स्यादधमा स्योदतोऽन्यथा ॥

These are the features in general of the site to be accepted. In the next stanza the general characteristics of the site to be rejected are stated.

STANZA 10

“ A Bad Site ”

Features of a site which should be discarded are set forth in this verse in a general manner. They are described from external as well as internal points of view. According to the former, shape of the site and nature of the surface are considered, and according to the latter, the

89. *Saivāgamanibandhana*, Paṭala XI, (A Ms. from Tripunithura).

90. *Viṣṇusamhitā* (T. S. S. Ed.), Paṭala XII, stanzas 3, 4, 5.

contents that are revealed when the ground is broken up by a plough. A site which is circular, or crescent-like or triangular or pentagonal or hexagonal, or that which has the form of a trident or sieve or that which faces towards a corner is to be avoided. All this is from the point of view of shape. It should be noticed in this connection, that a hexagonal site which is rejected by the author of the *Tantrasamuccaya* is laid down by the *Mānasāra* as one that yields prosperity. Says the *Mānasāra* : षड्रैश्च समायुक्ता सर्वसम्पद पदाधरा.⁹¹ The author of the *Tantrasamuccaya* seems to have based his statement on the authority of the *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*⁹² and *Nibandhana*, where the hexagonal is condemned as inauspicious. Of all shapes that which is hailed as the best is the square⁹³ or rectangle. The next prescribed is the octagonal. This predilection of Indian architects for square, rectangular or octagonal shape is clearly revealed not only in architectural treatises, but in extant examples of structures themselves. From the point of view of the nature of the surface, a site which resembles a fish, the back of an elephant, tortoise, or a cow's head is tabooed. (A variant reading given in the text in the place of *Kūrma* is *Kola*, which means 'a boar'). The principle involved in the selection of the site from the point of view of its shape seems to be this that "what pleases the eye is always good and what does not please the eye is always bad."⁹⁴ In the eyes of Indian architectural authorities certain shapes, which are seen condemned above, appeared inauspicious for ground-planning. Whatever we may say concerning the prohibition of certain shapes, the predilection of Indians for square is born of the aesthetic reasoning of a very high order. "On the score of symmetry alone, the square holds higher rank,"⁹⁵ observes Birkhoff in "*Aesthetic Measure*." The same author also remarks : "Corresponding to the degree of symmetry involved, we should expect to find the square to be the best in form, the rectangle excellent."⁹⁶

Next, prohibition is considered from the stand-point of the internal features of the site. If, when the earth is ploughed, ashes, charcoal, husks, bones and hair and anthills and worms, come to sight, the site should be shunned. These things, by their inauspicious associations give indication of a site which probably suffered from destruction by fire

91. *Mānasāra* (P. K. Ācārya's Edition), Ch. IV, line 12.

92. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā* (T. S. S. Ed.), Paṭala 12, stanza 12; *Nibandhana*, Paṭala XI.

93. For instance vide *Mayamata* (T. S. S. Edition), Chap. III, stanza 1.

94. Some Architectural Conventions by K. R. Pisharoti (*Cul. Heri. Ser.*).

95. *Aesthetic Measure* by George Birkhoff, page 25.

96. *Ibid.*, page 24,

or other calamity, or they suggest that it was employed for the purpose of cremation or burial. In any case, the site which reveals inauspicious things is unfit for residence and building projects. If there are subterranean cavities in a site, it gives room for fear from poisonous creatures. In the presence of underground life and cavities, there is no sense of safety of person and permanence of structures. Hence the ground which has these objectionable features is directed to be avoided at all costs.

Choice of site is again based on the rise and dip of its surface. Sites which slope eastwards and northwards, known respectively by the terms Govīthi and Gajavīthi are considered to be auspicious. That which dips towards the centre is bad and is declared to be shunned. The subject of rises and slopings is dealt with in detail in the *Vāstuvīdyā*,⁹⁷ *Gurudeva* etc.⁹⁸

The observations made in the two verses are obviously scientific and rational. There is unfolded a fund of common-sense beneath every statement of the author regarding the features of the site to be preferred and rejected. It might be difficult and even impossible to select a site in strict accordance with the specific directions that are given in the subsequent stanzas concerning the site intended for the four castes having regard to the colour, odour, taste, size and contents of the soil. But such a difficulty is solved by these two stanzas which prescribe the land good or bad for all castes alike in conformity with scientific reasoning and aesthetic taste of a high order.

For comparison, the following lines may be quoted from the *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā*⁹⁹ :—

खाते रात्र्युषितैः पुष्पैस्तथा ज्ञेया सितादिभिः ।
 वल्मीकशर्करारान्द्रतुषाङ्गारास्थिभस्मभिः ॥
 केशकर्मकीटैश्च संयुक्तां वर्जयेन्महीम् ।
 धूम्रतारौक्ष्यदौर्गन्ध्यकाठिन्यैश्चाशुभा महो ॥
 अदिकस्था जलहीना च कुटिला द्विगुणायता ।
 वृत्ता पञ्चत्रिषट्कोणा चार्धचन्द्रा च शूर्पिका ॥

The Nibandhanakāra deals with the features in elaborate details and relates the consequences of the presence of each feature in Paṭala XI.

97. *Vāstuvīdyā*, Chapter II.

98. *Gurudevapaddhati*, Uttarādhya, Paṭala 23, stanzas 23, 24, 25. .
Manuśyālayacandrikā, Ch. I, stanzas 19, 20, 21.

99. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā* (T. S. S. Edition), Paṭala XII, stanzas 10, 11, 12.

Compare also *Mayamata* (T. S. S. Edition), Chapter III, Stanzas 7, 8, 9 and 12; *Gurudevapaddhati* (T. S. S. Edition, Vol. III), Paṭala 23, stanzas 14, 15 and 16; *Mānasāra* (P. K. Ācārya Ed.), Chapter IV, lines 15, 16 and 19; *Vāstuvidyā* (T. S. S. Edition), Chapter II, Stanzas 36-39.

STANZA 11

*Preferences of Site on the basis of qualities associated with occupations—
a traditional view.*

Based upon the associations of caste, a convention has come into vogue according to which a site is assigned to each caste with reference to the nature of the grass that grows in the site, the shape of the ground, the colour, scent and taste of the soil. The present verse treats of this theme. Rām Rāz subjects this determining factor to criticism as follows: "but the principle on which these distinctions are founded is altogether nugatory. It signifies little whether the ground for the residence of a Brahmin be square or oblong, white or red, sweet or sour, provided that the situation is convenient and that it furnishes a firm bottom for laying the foundation."¹⁰⁰ It may be remarked here that, though from the standpoint of impersonal scientific consideration the principle is nugatory, from the *traditional point of view*, it is important. Architectural principles, here as elsewhere, were shaped by the particular demands of society, and in India, where distinctions of classes have entered into the fabric of society on the basis of vocational activity, the principle of preferences cannot but compel attention. In the determination of site, assignment was made with due regard to the special taste of each. The Brahmin needed a site in which ghee, flowers, and other objects most serviceable in sacrifices can be had in plenty, and a site was prescribed for him in which prevails an atmosphere most congenial to his living. *Preferences of site are founded on qualities associated with occupations* and they are observed in all writings which deal with the architecture of the Hindus. In the matter of prescription our author, like every other author, has only kept tune with the spirit of his times. The *Mayamata*¹⁰¹ treats of colour, scent, taste, touch, form, etc., good for each class in Chapter II. The *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*¹⁰² prescribes the shape, colour, taste, scent and the nature of the grass that characterise the soil of each class. The *Gurudevapaddhati*¹⁰³ deals with the

100. *An Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, page 16.

101. *Mayamata*, Chapter II, stanzas 4-15.

102. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*, Chap. XII, stanzas 6, 7, 8, 15.

103. *Īśanagurudevapaddhati*, Uttarārdha, Paṭala XXIII, stanzas 17-22.

smell, grass, shape, colour and dip of the land. The *Mānasāra*¹⁰⁴ treats of the declivity of the site, colour, scent and taste of the soil and nature of the trees that grow there. The *Kāśyapaśilpa*¹⁰⁵ prescribes only the colour of the soil. The *Vāstuvīdyā*¹⁰⁶ treats of declivity, grass and smell that belongs to the soil. In all the works we have referred to there is no note of disagreement concerning the prescription of site with regard to its colour, smell, taste etc. The classification being traditional in character, there is noticeable a certain uniformity and general agreement in the mode of treatment of this subject of preferences.

STANZAS 12-15

“*The wick experiment.*”

It is not always that one comes across an ideal site which satisfies all the requirements laid down in the above stanzas and in the stanzas that follow. When the site presents vague and mixed characteristics, the soil has to be further examined by means of some experiment. The three stanzas describe the process involved in the conduct of an experiment whose aim it is to determine the good or bad nature of the site examined. The test should be conducted as directed below :—

Make a pit a foot and a half in dimension and besmear the same with cow-dung solution. Let the Guru, facing the east, place therein an unburnt pot filled with paddy. On the top of the said pot, place an earthen pan which holds ghee and four wicks of prescribed colour white etc., representing the four classes, at the four cardinal points. Kindle the wicks and let them burn for an interval (of 48 minutes). If at the end of the period, all the wicks remain burning, the site is good for all ; if all are extinguished it is bad for all. If any wick representing particular caste blazes, the site is good for that particular caste. The rule of preference here is purely a matter of faith and convention.

“*A hidden scientific idea in the wick experiment.*”

Leaving aside the preferential side of the experiment, *the scientific side of it is a product of careful thought and observation*, for it reveals the soundness of the site for purposes of the establishment of life. The experiment enables us to detect the predominance of the gas that the earth from beneath sends out. To support life and combustion presence of oxygen is a permanent necessity. It is oxygen that sustains life and

104. *Mānasāra*, Chapter III, lines 15-29.

105. *Kāśyapaśilpa*, chapter I, stanza 39.

106. *Vāstuvīdyā*, Chapter II, stanzas 26-30.

light, and it distinguishes itself in this respect from other gases and noxious odours which quench fire and end life on earth. Marsh-gas, for instance, is always apt to catch fire at the slightest instance of its contact with atmospheric air. A site which sends out from underground such explosive gas as the marsh-gas is definitely unsafe and injurious to living. The presence of such gas, if it exists, should therefore be detected before one starts to lay the foundation. The experiment is intended to discover the nature of the underground. If the lighted candles go out before the lapse of the prescribed time, the quenching may be taken as due to want of oxygen; for oxygen in this instance is soon devoured by those gases which are devoid of the property of oxygen. Richness of life in the world of both animals and plants suggests the abundance of oxygen in the site concerned, as it is oxygen, as we all know, that keeps animal life breathing. The underground experiment, according to which lights must remain burning, also indicates the dominance of oxygen in the area under experimentation, for it is oxygen again that keeps fire blazing and preserves it from getting extinguished. We, therefore, maintain that *beneath the canons of selection of a proper site, there runs a steady stream of reasoning and a consideration for the safety of life and permanence of building*. The experiments are intended to insure the life and property of every man and to free him from the fury of destructive elements.

The following lines from Gurudeva¹⁰⁷ may be compared with the statement of our author :—

धान्यपूर्णमकुम्भं तु निधयेष्टास्य चोपरि ॥
 अमे शरावे कुडुबं गव्यमाज्यं विनिक्षिपेत् ।
 चतुर्दिक्षु क्षिपेद् वर्तीः शुद्धाः कार्पासवस्त्रजाः ॥
 सितरक्तपीतकृष्णाश्चतस्रः समवर्तिताः ।
 ऐन्द्रदक्षिणसौम्याप्यवर्त्यो विप्रादिकाः क्रमात् ॥
 पुरुषाद्योस्तु जातीर्यैरुक्तास्तन्मन्त्रमन्त्रिताः ।
 सङ्कल्य ज्वालायेद् दीपान् गन्धाद्यैः पूजयेदपि ॥
 याममात्रावधिं कृत्वा सुलिप्ते भूतले न्यसेत् ।
 यस्य वर्णस्य या वर्ती सा ज्वलन्ती सुखावहा ॥
 निर्वापिता चेद् वर्ज्या स्याद् विमानकरणादिषु ।
 ज्वलन्ति यदि सर्वास्ताः सर्ववर्णसुखावहाः ॥

The *Saivāgamanibandhana*¹⁰⁸ prescribes the method as follows :—

गोमयेन समालिप्य मध्ये तत्र विधानवित् ।
 आमकुम्भोपरिन्यस्तवर्धमानधृतोदरे ।
 चतस्रश्च चतुर्दिक्षु पूर्वादारभ्य वर्तिकाः ।
 सिताद्या क्रमशो ज्वाल्याः स्वस्वजात्यभिमन्त्रिताः ॥
 एवं कृत्वा तु वास्तुज्ञः सुप्रच्छन्नं तु कारयेत् ।
 निशि निर्वान्ति या वत्यस्तावतामशुभापहाः ॥
 तिष्ठत्येका तु या तत्र ज्वलन्ती स्निग्धरूपिणी ।
 तस्य वर्णस्य सा भूमिर्लक्षिताभ्या विचक्षणैः ॥
 अथ सर्वा विशीर्णास्ताः पुनः प्रज्वलिता अपि ।
 वर्जनीया तु सा नित्यं वस्तुदुष्टा धरा स्मृता ॥
 अथ सर्वास्तु सुस्निग्धा प्रज्वलन्ती दिशो दश ।
 वस्तुसङ्कीर्णकं नाम सर्वेषां सर्वकामदा ॥

The *Manuṣyālayacandrikā*¹⁰⁹ also describes this process of experimentation. On this subject, the *Mānasāra* and *Kāśyapaśilpa* are both silent. This *Silparatna*,¹¹⁰ as usual, quotes our author and he takes note of this experiment in Chapter III.

STANZAS 16, 17, 18 & 19

In these verses is furnished a classification of sites into four categories called *Supadmā*, *Bhadrā*, *Pūrṇā* and *Dhūmrā*. In stanzas 9 and 10 (*Tantrasamuccaya*, Original Text—Chapter I, stanzas 30 and 31) the features of the good and bad site are briefly and in a general fashion stated. Here the author deals in detail with the contents of the site with special reference to the presence of particular trees. There is clear emphasis laid on the presence of certain species of trees. The treatment in this respect is meticulous and unfolds a subtle understanding of the wealth of the forest-world and a power to discriminate the different species of trees. The *Viṣṇusamhitā* further classifies the trees into four categories according as they are internally woody, externally woody, not woody and all woody. The *Viṣṇusamhitā* thus observes :—

108. An unpublished Ms., Paṭala XI.

109. *Manuṣyālayacandrikā*, Ch. I, verses 31, 32.

110. *Silparatna*, chapter III, stanzas 16-17.

अन्तस्सारं बहिस्सारं निस्सारं सर्वसारकम् ।

चतुर्धा स्थावरम् ॥¹¹¹

Then follows the classification of site into Supadmā etc. *Prayoga-mañjarī*,¹¹² *Nibandhana*,¹¹³ *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*,¹¹⁴ *Gurudeva*,¹¹⁵ *Silparatna*,¹¹⁶ all these are agreed on this four-fold classification of site into Supadmā, Bhadrā, Pūrṇā and Dhūmrā and the consequence of each site. The *Mānasāra*, which is elaborate and expansive in many matters, however, is silent on this subject of classification.

We might here; for the sake of comparison, quote the following five stanzas from the *Mañjarī*, which closely agree with our text¹¹⁷ :—

Mañjarī :—

पूर्णा च पद्मा च तथैव भद्रा धूम्रा च भूमिर्विहिता चतुर्धा ।

वक्ष्ये च तासामपि लक्षणानि संक्षेपतो भूमिपरिग्रहार्थम् ॥

अङ्गोलैर्बकुलैरशोकरुभिर्निम्बैस्तथा किंशुकैः

सङ्कीर्णा सह माधवीभिरधिकैर्निष्पावकैः कोद्रवैः ।

पार्श्वस्था वसुधाधरस्य शिखरे संस्थापिता तस्य वा

शस्ता खल्व पूर्णा मही पुष्टिदा ॥

कर्पूरागरुनालिकेरतिलकैर्दर्भैर्कदम्बार्जुनै-

र्माल्यैर्कमुकैश्च चम्पकवनैः कुन्दोत्पलैः संवृता ।

निम्ना सौम्यदिशि प्रभूतसलिला पूर्वप्लवा

सङ्कीर्णा च तथैव केतकवनैश्शस्ता सुपद्मा मही ॥

अभ्याशे सरितांपतेरुपहिते नद्यास्तटे वा पुनः

प्राप्ता तीर्थजलाशयः फलतरुः वृता याज्ञिकैः ।

111. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*, Paṭala XII, 232, 241, (T. S. S. Ed.).

112. An unpublished Ms. (preserved in the Adyar Mss. Library), Paṭala II (*Vasudhāparigraha*), Kerala Character.

113. *Saivāgamanibandhna*, an unpublished Ms. from Malabar (Paṭala XI).

114. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā* (T. S. S. Edition), vide Paṭala XII, sts. 22 to 35.

115. *Īśānagurudevapaddhati* (Vol. III, T. S. S. Edition), Uttarārdha, Paṭala XXIII, stanzas 6 to 13.

116. *Silparatna* (T. S. S. Edition) Chapter III, stanzas 5, 6, 7 and 8. These stanzas are quoted from the *Tantrasamuccaya*.

117. An unpublished Ms., Adyar Library.

वृक्षैः पश्चिमदिक्स्थितैः कुसुमितैर्गुल्मैर्लताभिर्वृता
 क्षेत्रैर्दक्षिणसंस्थितैश्च सुखदा भद्रा मही कीर्तिता ॥
 अर्कैर्वेणुविभीतकैः स्नुहियुतैः श्लेष्मातकैः पीलुभिः
 सङ्कीर्णा च सशर्करा च कठिना गर्भान्विता सोषरा ।
 गृध्रश्चेनवराहवायसकुलैर्गोमायुभिश्चाकुला
 कर्तुर्दुःखकरी शिवालयविधौ धूम्रा मही वर्जिता ॥

STANZA 20

When the proper site has been pitched upon, the Ācārya should perform certain rites in connection with the clearance of the site. These rites are described next. The preceptor chants certain *Mantras* which are addressed to all evil spirits and snakes and other poisonous creatures that haunt or are resident in the place under observation. He announces that the site belongs to the God whose temple is going to be constructed there. He therefore urges all evil spirits that probably might be lurking there, to speedily remove themselves to far off regions. Then, he offers worship to the cutting instruments and cuts and clears the ground of its unwanted trees and creepers.

Determination of Cardinal points.

The site having been fixed with due regard to its qualities and having levelled it, the next most important step is the ascertainment of the true position of the cardinal points by means of a gnomon (*Śanku*). A correct and precise knowledge of the quarters is a necessity of first magnitude in giving the structure an auspicious aspect. A site which faces the intermediate points is condemned as inauspicious.¹¹⁸ To prevent a building facing the corners and to give it proper orientation, cardinal points have to be ascertained. When the cardinal points have been determined, the ground found necessary for the structure must be measured. The next stanza,¹¹⁹ which is an extract taken from the supplementary Paṭala describes the method to be adopted in finding the true East and West, North and South, in any place lying to the North or South of the Equator.

118. Vide the *Tantrasamuccaya* (Vol. I, T. S. S. Edition, chapter I, stanza 31), (in our adaptation, Part I, st. No. 10).

119. Vide the *Tantrasamuccaya* (Vol. II, T. S. S. Edition), Paṭala XII, stanza 2 (in our adaption, Part I, st. No. 21).

STANZA 21

Process of the Finding of Cardinal points.

The direction contained in the text is simple. It is with reference to the land which is situated either to the north or south of the equator (*Akṣa*). Level the ground (in a *Sākṣadeśa*) and plant a gnomon at the centre, the gnomon being of 12 *aṅgulas* of length. Describe a circle round it with a radius more than its length (say double the length). During the course of the Sun from morning till evening, three points will be secured, two touching the circumference and one in the centre, the interval in the course of their marking being equal. The three points are obtained by marking the end of the shadow projected during three different times, the interval between them being equal. With these three points as the centre, draw three circles of the same radius. Two figures in the form of two fishes will be produced where the circles cut. The head and tail of each fish will lie in the North-South direction. Strike two nails at the points (i.e., head and tail) of each fish and then extend two threads cutting through the central cord of the two fishes. At a certain point in the North (when the sun is in the South of the Equator) these two threads extended will meet. From this meeting point in the north extend another thread southwards till it joins the central point at the base of the gnomon. This thread which joins the northern point with the point at the base of the gnomon will give the North-South line. Having found the due North and South as described above, with the two points (i.e. meeting-points northern as well as southern) as centres two circles should be described. A figure in the form of a fish lying in the direction East-West will be obtained. Hold a thread joining the head and tail of this fish, and the due East and West will be known.

The method that is described in other texts like the *Mānasāra* is a little different. According to the *Mānasāra*, only two circles are to be drawn and consequently one fish will be secured while determining the North-South line. Our author describes in the wake of Gurudeva, who after having laid down the usual procedure¹²⁰ remarks that it is good so far as the land lying on the equator is concerned. As regards land lying to the North or South of the Equator, the method is different, and in this context he prescribes the method that we have observed just now.

120. *Isāṇagurudevapaddhati* (Vol. III, T. S. S. Edition), Paṭala XXIV, stanzas 1 to 13.

Says Gurudeva¹²¹ :—

निरक्षदेशे लङ्कादौ स्यादयं दिग्निर्णयः ।

इत्याहुः केचिदित्यस्मात् साक्षदेशस्य कथ्यते ॥

विशेषः साक्षदेशानामस्त्येवाकर्षसर्पणात् ।

.... ॥

अथार्कावलम्बकैर्विनापि प्रकारान्तरेण ।

दिक्परिज्ञानार्थमुच्यते ॥

छाया त्रयाग्नोद्भववृत्तमध्यस्पृक्सूत्रयोर्यत्र युतिः प्रदेशे ।

याम्योत्तरा शङ्कुदिशा ककुप् स्यात् क्रमेण सौम्येतरगोलयोः स्यात् ॥

The author of the *Tantrasamuccaya* has followed the latter alternative. The subject of making of the gnomon and the principles to be followed in connection with the finding of the cardinal points have been more or less elaborately treated by every authority on architecture. Thus *Mayamata*,¹²² *Kāśyapaśilpa*,¹²³ *Mānasāra*,¹²⁴ *Vāstuvidyā*,¹²⁵ *Manuṣyaśālayacandrikā*¹²⁶ and other architectural works, as well as astronomical and mathematical treatises such as the *Sūryasiddhānta* and *Līlavatī*, all these do not fail to take note of the principles to be followed in determining the cardinal points by means of a gnomon.

STANZA 22

Peg-marking of the site.

After ascertaining the quarters, the area required for the building of the temple must be peg-marked. This stanza prescribes the process involved in the fixing of the boundary-line. Nine pegs should be made out of a single tree called 'Punna' (*Calophyllum*). This tree is preferred because it is strong both externally and internally, and happens to be

121. *Īśānagurudevapaddhati*, Uttarārdha, Paṭala XXIV, stanzas 14-15.

122. *Mayamata* (T. S. S. Edition), chapter VI, 1-10.

123. *Kāśyapaśilpa* (Ānandāśrama Series), ch. I, 60-70.

124. *Mānasāra* (P. K. Ācārya's Edition), Ch. VI.

125. *Vāstuvidyā*, (T. S. S. Edition), Ch. III, 7-10.

126. *Manuṣyaśālayacandrikā*, Ch. II, 1-4.

Also vide Rām Rāz, *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, pages 19 and 20; P. K. Ācārya's *Mānasāra*, Vol. III, Plate 2, figures 1 and 2;

K. R. Pisharoti's 'Vāstuvidyā—Translation and critical notes,' figs. 1-5, (Calcutta Oriental Journal).

the best fitted for the making of pegs. The *Mānasāra* and *Mayamata*¹²⁷, offer some more alternatives such as *Khadira*, *Ādimīḍa*, *Madhūka*, all of which are milky and strong internally. The length (i.e. height) of the pegs, according to our author, should be one cubit and circumference one-fourth of a cubit (i.e. 6 *āṅgulas*). According to the *Mānasāra*, the length may be from 21 to 25 *āṅgulas* and circumference equal to the measure of a fist.¹²⁸ Pegs of this description having been made, they should be duly propitiated (i.e. *Mantras* should be chanted on them). The 'Guru' should then plant one peg at the centre of the plot and eight at the eight quarters on the boundary-line beginning with due East and ending with *Īśāna* quarter (i.e., in the four sides East, West, North and South and in the four corners South-East etc.). When the pegs are posted as stated above, strings should be stretched forth and fastened round the posts twice and thus the area should be marked. The string that is referred to here is otherwise known as *Mānasūtra*, because it is used for measuring and marking the ground area. It is made of three cotton or silk threads which are thrice twisted.

A more or less similar description of peg-marking may be observed in the *Viṣṇusamhitā*,¹²⁹ *Gurudeva*,¹³⁰ *Mayamata*¹³¹, *Mānasāra*¹³² and *Nibandhana*¹³³.

The following lines from the *Saivāgamanibandhana* may be compared with our text :—

मही यत्र प्रशस्तोक्ता गन्धवर्णरसादिभिः ।
 तत्र पुण्येऽथ नक्षत्रे कुर्यात् भूमिपरिग्रहम् ॥
 ततो न्यस्य घटं मध्ये तुर्य मङ्गलैः ।
 सूत्रपातं चतुर्दिक्षु कुर्यात् पञ्चाक्षरेण तु ॥
 ऐन्द्रादीशानपर्यन्तं शङ्कून् संस्थापयेत् क्रमात् ।
 पुत्रामैकतरुद्भूतशङ्कुवो निर्वृणा दृढा ॥
 षडङ्गुलपरोणाहायामात्तु चतुर्गुणाः ।
 अधोमूलोर्ध्वशाखास्तु चतुरस्राश्च वर्तुलाः ॥
 प्राङ्मुखेणाष्टधा ताड्याः पूजिता लोहमुद्रगैः ॥

127. *Mānasāra*, chapter VI, lines 111, 112.

128. *Mayamata*, ch. VI, St. 16; *Mānasāra*, Ch. VI, lines 109, 110.

129. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, Paṭala XII, 44.

130. *Īśānagurudevapaddhati*, Vol. III, Uttarārdha, Paṭala XXVI, 79 to 84, 88.

131. *Mayamata*, chapter VI, stanzas 16-20.

132. *Mānasāra*, chapter VI, lines 105-120.

133. An unpublished Ms. from Malabar, Paṭala XI, vide Extract.

Another topic that is closely dealt with by the several authors is the subject of ploughing the site. Preparatory to the laying of the foundation, the ground selected and peg-marked is required to be ploughed over thrice or five times. A description of the plough and oxen is given. In this respect some texts are more elaborate than others. Ploughing is accompanied by certain ceremonials, which are conducted by the *Ācārya*. In the plot furrowed seeds must be sown such as the kidney beans, sesamum and the like. When the crops are matured and flowers are in bloom, they should be grazed by cattle and the ground must be presented to Brahmins in order to get it sanctified and purified. This, in brief, constitutes the subject-matter of stanzas 55 to 58 in the *Tantrasamuccaya*.¹³⁴ The following stanza from the *Mañjarī* briefly deals with the subject that follows '*Karṣaṇa*':—

भूयस्तत्र निधाय गोनिवसनं नीत्वा च संवत्सरं
मुद्गादीनि पुनश्च तत्र निवपेद्धान्यानि पूर्वक्रमात् ।
भूयस्तान्यथ भक्षयेच्च पशुभिः शुद्धे मुहूर्ते ततः
खात्वा शल्यविमोचितामतिदृढां भूयो विदाध्यान्महीम् ॥

The *Viṣṇusamhitā*,¹³⁵ *Kāśyapaśilpa*,¹³⁶ *Mayamata*,¹³⁷ *Gurudeva*,¹³⁸ *Nibandhana*,¹³⁹ *Mānasāra*,¹⁴⁰ all these texts have treated this theme in a rather detailed manner.

STANZA 23

The Digging of the Foundation-Pit.

In this stanza the author gives direction for the digging of the foundation-pit. The ground which has been prepared for the building of the temple, should be dug to the depth of a man's height (with up-lifted arms) or till the rock or water comes to sight. Three-fourth of this pit must be filled with sand and stone and beaten with wooden piece resembling an elephant's foot.¹⁴¹ The surface should be cleaned and purified according to the purificatory rites. A *Vedi* (altar) must

134. T. S. S. Edition, Vol. I, Paṭala I.

135. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, Paṭala XII, 36-40.

136. *Kāśyapaśilpa*, chapter I, 43-59.

137. *Mayamata*, chapter IV, 4-10.

138. *Gurudevapaddhati*, Uttarārḍha, Paṭala XXVI, 75-78.

139. *Nibandhana*, Paṭala XI, in 6 stanzas (unpublished Ms.).

140. *Mānasāra*, ch. V, lines 38-88.

141. *Mānasāra*, chapter XVIII, lines 6-8.

then be raised. 'Vedi' was originally the altar prepared for Vedic sacrifices, but in course of time it was incorporated in the newly evolved system of Hinduism. Any seat raised to make room for the presentation of offerings also came to be known by the term *Vedi*. Here the altar referred to is intended for the conduct of *Vāstupūjā*. 'Vāstu' is the deity presiding over the structural area. He is worshipped when the night falls. Homage is paid to him at the *Īśāna* quarter of the purified *Vēdi*. This subject of digging of the pit and returning of the soil again into the pit till three fourth of it is filled and the paving of its surface and preparing of altar for sacrifice is more or less similarly treated by architectural authorities and instances may be cited from the *Gurudeva*,¹⁴² *Kāśyapa*,¹⁴³ *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*,¹⁴⁴ *Mānasāra*¹⁴⁵ and the like.

The following lines from *Gurudeva* (*uttarārdha*, xxvii, stanzas 40-45) may be cited in support of our author's statement :—

ततः प्रासादसीमान्तं स्थलं यत् तदशेषतः ॥

उद्धाहुरनमात्रं तु खात्वाद्घृत्य त्यथेन्मृदम् ।

जलान्तं शर्करान्तं वा खानयेदिति केचन ॥

अथ प्रतिष्ठापद्धतौ—

“ शर्करान्तं जलान्तं वा खानयेद् देवसद्गनि ।

पुरुषार्थं गृहे वाथ यावद् भूमिर्विशुध्यति ॥”

इति ।

खातं सम्प्रोक्ष्य चास्त्रेण पूर्वमष्टाङ्गुलं मृदा ।

लोष्टाद्यदुष्टयापूर्य शुद्धया चाविवर्णया ॥

ततस्तु वृत्तपाषाणैर्मृज्जलान्तरितं क्रमात् ।

हस्तप्रमाणमास्तीर्य सिकताभिर्मृदा पुनः ॥

आप्लाव्य सलिलेनाथ गजैराक्रामयेत् स्थलम् ।

प्रशस्ततरुसम्भूतैर्हस्तिपादैर्दृढैः समम् ॥

आकोट्यार्घ्येच्चैव मुहुरं चिनुयात् स्थलम् ।

वेदांशशेषिते खाते स्थापयेत् प्रथमेष्टकाम् ॥

142. *Gurudevapaddhati*, Pāṭala XXVII, 40-45 (*Uttarārdha*).

143. *Kāśyapaśilpa*, chapter IV, 6-16.

144. *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*, Pāṭala XII, 45, etc.

145. *Mānasāra*, chapter XVIII, lines 6-9.

“The Fifty-three deities that preside over the ground.”

The ground selected for building is traditionally divided into certain number of plots and each plot is assigned to a deity, who is supposed to preside over that plot. In stanzas from 60 to 70 the author furnishes the names of these several deities and their position in the ground plan. There are altogether 53 deities referred to. Brahmā occupies the central plot. Immediately surrounding this, starting from due East and ending with Īśa (North-East) there are twelve lords presiding over twelve plots and their names are Aryaka, Sāvitra, Savitā, Vivasvān, Indrajit, Indra, Mitra, Rudrajit Rudra, Mahīdhara, Āpavatsa and Āpa. In the external four wings on the four sides consisting of thirty-two plots beginning with Īśāna in the right-hand direction, there are thirty-two deities, whose names in order are Īśāna, Parjanya, Jayanta, Indra, Sūrya, Satya, Bhṛśa, Antarikṣa, Vahni, Pūṣan, Vitatha, Gr̥hakṣata, Yama, Gandharva, Bhṛṅgarāja, Mṛga, Pitaras, Dauvārika, Sugrīva, Puṣpadanta, Varuṇa, Asura, Śoṣa, Roga, Vāyu, Nāga, Mukhya, Bhallāṭa, Soma, Argala, Diti and Uditī. Outside these, on the four sides, there are, beginning with East four demons Sarvaskanda, Aryama, Jambhaka and Pilipiṅcaka and in the four external corners beginning with South-East four demonesses called Carakī, Vidārī, Pūtanā and Pāparākṣasī. Gods and semi-gods, spirits and goblins, demons and demonesses—all these together constitute the number fifty-three. This theme of division of the ground into several plots, assignment of these plots to deities referred to above, and the performance of sacrificial functions connected therewith, all these matters are found observed in every treatise on architecture in connection with preliminaries bearing on architectural activities. The division of the whole ground into several parts is considered important in view of the fact that it later serves as a guiding factor in the proper and auspicious disposition of the various members of the structure.

“Vegetarian nature of offerings, a distinctive feature of the Tantra-samuccaya treatment.”

Coming to the ritualistic side, it will be noted that oblation of food and offerings consisting of different articles are extended to the several deities, in the prescribed manner. According to our author, the ceremonial is to be conducted by the Guru, who, as we have already noticed, is a Brahmin. Here there is an interesting point which attracts our attention. According to the *Mānasāra* and several other works the leading part in the sacrifice is assigned to the ‘*Sthapati*’ and among offerings which fall in the province of Sthapati’s priestly function, mention is made of meat, fishes and blood of animals. These articles are ordered to be offered to demons and demonesses and such other spirits. In our text, on the other hand, the treatment in this connection takes an altogether

different turn. There is no reference at all made to non-vegetarian articles in the list of objects prescribed for offerings. The oblation is purely vegetarian in character and it is conducted by the Ācārya, who is a Brahmin and who by virtue of his Brahminhood shuns articles that are non-vegetarian. The two stanzas which are quoted below will amplify the point we have observed above.

States the author¹⁴⁶ :—

कुशप्रसूनाक्षतवारिहव्यैस्त्रिंशः किरेद् वास्तु चतुर्मुखाभ्याम् ।
सकृत् सकृत् तत्परितः परेभ्यो बहिर्ग्रहेभ्योऽञ्चितपञ्चकूरैः ॥
कृत्वा बलिं सलिलमत्र सकृत् सकृच्च दत्त्वा प्रसन्नयजनं प्रविधाय धातुः ।
तद्वास्तुदैवतकदम्बकृतावलम्बं प्राकारमध्यमवबुध्य करोतु रक्षाम् ॥

Similar are the articles referred to in the Viṣṇu Samhitā.¹⁴⁷

STANZAS 24-25

“*Nidhikumbha and Adhāraśilā.*”

In the foundation-pit which has been prepared according to the rites above described is to be laid the *Adhāraśilā*, the foundation-stone. This stone will be a square, one having a breadth which is half that of the *Śrīpīṭha* and thickness (i.e., height) half of its breadth. Thus the *Silparatna* observes¹⁴⁸ :—

पीठस्य तारार्धततां तदर्धविस्तारयुक्तां प्रकरोतु मन्त्री ।
वा पादपद्मस्य ततां तदर्धतुङ्गायाधारशिलां सुलग्ने ॥

This *Adhāraśilā* will have a low space in its centre which will be filled with grains. Over the seat of grains will be placed, according to rites, the *Nidhikalaśa*, the sacred pot which is so called because of its contents which are precious articles, stones, gold and other valuable things. It is made of copper or stone. At the mouth of the *Kalaśa* must be imagined the figure of a lotus, and in a meditative mood should be invoked therein the Goddess Śakti.

146. *Tantrasamuccaya*, Vol. I, Paṭala I, stanzas 72, 73.

147. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, Paṭala XII, 51 : कुशपुष्पाक्षतान्नद्विर्गन्धपुष्पैः प्रपूजयेत् ॥

148. *Silparatna*, chapter X, 7½.

She is addressed the following *mantra* :

त्वमेव परमा शक्तिस्त्वमेवासनधारिका ।

सन्तृप्तया त्वया देवि ! स्यादव्यमिह सर्वदा ॥¹⁴⁹

Then over the *Nidhikalaśa* should be placed ceremoniously a *Silā-padma* (Lotus made of stone). Throughout the history of Indian ritual, jar and lotus have figured as objects of symbolic significance. Sacrificial jar, for instance, is regarded as the jar of nectar, the jar of the elixir of immortality. The lotus is held as the symbol of Universal creation. the fruit inside as the womb of the universe. It is traditionally associated with the seat of Lakṣmī and in architecture often employed as the pedestal of a structure. Then, towards the right side in the seat of grains, must be placed a *Silākūrma* (tortoise of stone). Lord Viṣṇu in his incarnation in the form of tortoise must then be invoked in the Kūrma and should be addressed thus :—

नमस्ते कूर्मरूपाय विष्णवे विश्वधारिणे ।

करिष्यमाणं प्रासादमिह त्वं धर्तुमर्हसि ॥¹⁵⁰

After having addressed the above prayer, over the *Kūrma* should be placed the *Yoganāla* made of copper, in the prescribed manner and it should be so situated that it should reach the 'janman' or plinth of the structure. The pit should then be filled with sand and stone and beaten well till its surface becomes firm and stable. Observes the author in verse half :—

कूर्मस्योपरि योगनालमुपधायाजन्मभूम्युद्धतम् ।

गर्तं मृत्तिकयामिपूर्य हृषदा चाकोट्यदाढ्यं नयेत् ॥¹⁵¹

The dimension of the *Nidhikumbha*, *Padma*, *Kūrma* and *Yoganāla* is furnished in a stanza¹⁵² which appears in the supplementary Paṭala. For proportion *vide* stanza and its translation No. 25. In stanza No. 24, the reading of the last line is adopted from a Malayālam edition of the text *Tantrasamuccaya*.

149. *Tantrasamuccaya* (T. S. S. Edition), Paṭala I, stanza 75.

150. *Ibid.*, stanza 79.

151. *Tantrasamuccaya* (T. S. S. Edition), Vol. I, Paṭala I, stanza 80.

152. *Ibid.*, Paṭala XII, stanza 3.

STANZAS 26-27

The Making of Bricks and Garbhapātra.

The next ceremonial that is dealt with is the making of bricks and *Garbhapātra* and their disposition. Stanzas numbered 26 and 27 in our selection occur in the supplementary Paṭala XII.¹⁵³ Bricks must be made of clay or stone. In the former case they must be kiln-burnt. According to Kāśyapa, bricks are of three kinds, made of the materials mud, stone or wood. The first should be employed in brick structure, the second in stone-structure and the third in wooden structure.¹⁵⁴ The dimension as laid down in our text is as follows :—

Length=8, 10 or 12 Aṅgulas.	}	or	{	Length=12 Aṅgulas.
Breadth=½ L.				Breadth=8 Aṅgulas.
Thickness = ¼ L.				Thickness=4 Aṅgulas.

Bricks of this size should be made and they may be 12 or 8 or 4 according to the size of the structure.

The proportion here given is supported by the following references from Gurudeva and other authorities. Thus Gurudeva observes¹⁵⁵ :—

“ अङ्गुलैः सङ्ख्यया दीर्घा जगतीपङ्क्त्यनुष्टुभाम् ।
 क्रमात् तदर्धविस्तारा विस्तारार्धसमुच्छ्रयाः ॥
 उत्तमादिविमानानां निर्दिष्टाः प्रथमेष्टकाः ।”

And the Pāsupata states :—

आयामतस्तालमात्रास्तारतोऽष्टाङ्गुलः क्रमात् ।
 अष्टौ सङ्कल्पयेदेवमुत्सेधाश्चतुरङ्गुलः ॥
 चतस्रोऽष्टौ द्वादश वा प्रादक्षिण्येन विन्यसेत् ।¹⁵⁶

The dimension of the *Garbhapātra* which is to be placed at the centre of the pit formed in the middle of the bricks laid, is next prescribed.

Its length and breadth=½¹²th of the height of the Pillar.

Its height=½ its Vyāsa.

Thickness (lit-Height) of lid.=½ the height of the *Garbhapātra*.

153. *Tantrasamuccaya*, Vol. II (T. S. S. Edition), Paṭala XII, 4 and 5.

154. *Kāśyapaśilpa* (Ānandāśrama Series), Ch. IV, 18.

Also vide *Śilparatna*, chap. X, 14 to 16 (T. S. S. Ed.).

155. *Gurudevapaddhati*, Uttarārdha, Paṭala XXVII, 67-68.

156. Pāsupata, etc., quoted from the Commentary *Vimarśinī*.

This *Garbhapātra* is square in shape and is to be made of copper. This description of the *Garbhapātra* furnished in our text is as given in *Kriyāsāra Vaiṣṇava*. Compare the following lines therefrom :—

“चतुरश्रं तदर्धोच्चं शोधयेत् तद् यथाविधि ।
सुगुप्तं तद् यथा भित्तौ भित्तिमानेन वा भवेत् ॥
भित्तिस्तम्भचतुर्भागत्रिभागैकं तु तद्विदुः ।”¹⁵⁷

STANZA 28

The Disposition of First Bricks.

The plot for the lay out of bricks is specified in this stanza. It is on the right hand side of the door-frame, beneath the door-posts. It will be inside the *Pāduka* of the structure under construction. This plot should be paved well and purified according to rites and measured for the lay out of bricks. This prescription is supported by other authorities on the subject as well. Thus Gurudeva observes¹⁵⁸:—

द्वाराद् दक्षिणतस्तस्मादन्तरा भुजवंशयोः ।
पादावशिष्टे खाते तु स्थापयेत् प्रथमेष्टकाः ॥

The *Nibandhana*¹⁵⁹ states :—

द्वारस्य दक्षिणे भागे कर्तव्या प्रथमेष्टका ॥

Similarly vide *Kāśyapa*,¹⁶⁰ and *Mānasāra*.¹⁶¹

STANZA 29

This stanza gives the direction for the lay of bricks,¹⁶² with respect to a square of four *Pādas* or quarters, *Vāyu*, *Īśa*, *Agni* and *Nirṛti*. With a nail, prepared out of the Peepal tree, should be drawn lines inside the

157. Vide *Vimarśinī* under stanza 5 in Paṭala XII, *Trantrasamuccaya* (T. S. S. Edition).

158. *Gurudevapaddhati*, Uttārārdha, Paṭala XXVII, 63.

159. *Saivāgamaniibandhana* (A Ms.), Paṭala on Vāstuvīdhi.

160. *Kāśyapaśilpa*, Paṭala IV, st. 45 (Ānandāśrama Series).

161. *Mānasāra* XII, lines 196-206 (P. K. Ācārya ed.).

162. For similar treatment vide *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*, Paṭala XIII, 13-17.

square to indicate the quarters and the direction of the bricks that are to be placed therein. In the *Vāyu* and *Agni* quarters the position of the bricks will be in the direction pointing towards the East, and in *Īśāna* and *Nirṛti* towards the North. In a *Prāsāda* belonging to the three cubits measure type the square intended for the lay of bricks will be one cubit and four *āṅgulas*. When eight bricks of the measure of 12 *āṅgulas* of length, 8 *āṅgulas* of breadth and 4 *āṅgulas* of thickness are placed in the square in order, according to the direction laid down in the present verse, there will be left in the centre a square spot of 4 *āṅgulas* measure. This central plot will constitute the pit intended for the placing of the *Garbhapātra*, which forms the subject-matter of the next stanza. This idea is set forth by *Śaṅkara* in the following lines:—

अयं भावः—त्रिकरवर्गभवे प्रासादे चतुरङ्गुलधिककरमानेन समचतुरश्रं क्षेत्रं कृत्वा
‘यद्वाक्यार्हियुगैर्मितातवितत्युत्सेधवत्योऽङ्गुलैरिति कर्मशेषे वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या द्वादशाङ्गुलदीर्घा
अष्टाङ्गुलविस्तृताश्चतुरङ्गुलोत्सेधाश्चाष्टेष्टका ईशवाय्वोः पूर्वापरायता इतरयोरन्यथारूपाश्च
स्थाप्याः । तथा सति मध्ये चतुरङ्गुलसमविस्तारस्य गर्भपात्रस्य गर्तं भवतीति ॥¹⁶³

Bricks should be so arranged that they must leave low space in the centre for the disposition of the *Garbhapātra* as directed in the rule that is laid down below.

STANZA 30

The place of Garbhanyāsa.

The exact place of the *Garbhanyāsa* is here referred to. In the case of any God, the *vistāra* of the internal wall should be divided by 8. In the part fifth from outside and fourth from inside will constitute the place for *Garbhanyāsa*. In the case of a temple of *Viṣṇu*, the division is by 9, and the location of the *Garbhapātra* will be in the seventh part from outside and third part from inside. In the case of *Śāṅmātura* (i.e., *Subrahmanya*), the *Garbhapātra* will be situated in the fourth part from outside and second part from inside, the division of the wall here being by five. If the *Yajamāna*, the man for whose use the temple is being built, happens to be a Brahmin, the *Garbha* will be placed on the *Pāduka* if Kṣatriya on the level, if others, beneath the level in order. This prescription is supported by many authorities¹⁶⁴ whose statements we shall furnish below:—

163. *Tantrasamuccaya*, *Vimarśinī* under stanza 90, *Paṭala* I (T. S. S. Edition.)

164. a, b, c, d, e and f. Quotations from *Vimarśinī* under T. S. XII, 6.

Thus the Pāsupata observes :—

- (a) “ आरूढभित्तिविस्तारमष्टधा विभजेत् पुनः ।
बाह्येऽत्र चतुरो भागानन्तर्भागत्रयं त्यजेत् ॥
तन्मध्ये स्थापयेद् गर्भं गर्ते प्रासादमानतः ।”

The *Mañjarī* states :—

- (b) “ तद्वित्तिविस्तारमथाष्टभागं कृत्वाथ बाह्ये चतुरोऽत्र भागान् ।
त्रिभागमभ्यन्तरतो विहाय तत्रान्तरे गर्भमथो न्यसेच्च ॥”

The *Viṣṇusamhitā* says :—

- (c) “ द्वारस्य दक्षिणे भागे तृतीयांशे द्विशेषिते ।
गोमूत्रेणाप्लुते न्यस्येद् द्वारमूलस्य पार्श्वतः ॥”

The *Skandasamhitā* states :—

- (d) “ भित्तिं तु पञ्चधा भङ्क्त्वा त्रीणि बाह्ये परित्यजेत् ।
अन्तरेकं तु तन्मध्ये ॥”
(e) “ पादुकोपरि विप्राणां नृपतेस्तत् समं भवेत् ।
अधस्ताद् वैश्यशूद्राणां ॥

Gurudeva similarly observes in ‘Garbhanyāsādhikāra’ :—

- (f) अथ गर्भस्य विन्यासं कुर्यादायतनादिषु ।
बीजभूतो हि यस्तस्य प्रकृतिश्च समृद्धिदः ॥
इन्द्रपावकयोर्मध्ये द्वाराद् दक्षिणतो भुवि ।
कुर्वीरन् गर्भविन्यासं सर्वे वर्णाः समृद्धये ॥
प्रतेरुपरि विप्राणामुपानोपरि भूभुजाम् ।
विशां चाथ चतुर्थानां भूमावित्यपि केचन ॥
हठां ताम्रमयीं फेळां कुर्याद् गर्भस्य भाजनम् ।

The Garbhādhāna ceremonial with reference to structure.

The ritual bearing on *Garbhavinyāsa*, which constitutes the theme of verses 91 to 106,¹⁶⁵ has special and symbolical significance. In the pit formed at the centre of bricks are placed earth, roots, seeds, grains,

gems and metals.¹⁶⁶ A sacrifice¹⁶⁷ is performed and later the pit is cleared of the various articles deposited therein and it is purified according to rites. On the altar in the pit, Śakti or the Mother Goddess conceived as Energy, is invoked and worshipped. The 'Guru' holds the *Garbhapātra* in both hands and, facing the East, pronounces hundred times sacred syllables referring to the deity. On an auspicious moment, with the approval of the twice-born and to the accompaniment of holy sounds, the 'Guru' meditates on the *Garbhapātra* and conceives in it creative energy, the source of universal production. At night, in the pit conceived as the womb of the Mother Earth, is deposited the *Garbhapātra* gradually and to the accompaniment of the recitals of prayer-formulas. Mother Earth, the supporter and preserver of all beings, the most propitious and lovely, who has for bosoms the lofty and snow-clad mountains and for robes and garments the rivers and the oceans is besought in the most endearing manner to bear and to bring into being the person (*puruṣa*) of the *Prāsāda* (temple) strong and endowed with the best of qualities. Among the preliminary activities which precede construction proper, *Garbhavinyāsa* constitutes the final ceremony. After the completion of this ceremony follows the construction of the temple by artisans.

In the conception of Indian authors, architecture is the transcription of the body's state into the form of building. The symbolism of the ritual bearing on *Garbhavinyāsa* together with the nature of nomenclature revealed in architectural literature echoes the notion of bodily function. 'Prāsāda' is conceived as a *Puruṣa* (Person) and the *Garbhādhāna* ceremony which governs the life of a Hindu while in the stage of conception is supposed to govern the structure (temple) in its incipient state of construction. The *Viṣṇusamhitā* emphasises the importance of the execution of the *Garbhavinyāsa*. It observes :—

गर्भाधानं ततः कुर्यान्नागर्भे धाम्नि सम्पदः ॥¹⁶⁸

After having described the rites connected with the Homa, Nārāyaṇa, the author of the *Tantrasamuccaya*, directs the *Garbhavinyāsa* to be performed in the manner we have observed. The following are the stanzas which describe the process in its final stage;

हृत्वेष्टकागर्तगतं मृदाद्यं संशोध्य गव्यादिसमाप्नुतेऽत्र ।
सविष्टरेऽभ्यर्चितयोगपीठे शक्तिं समावाह्य निर्जा यजेत ॥

166. *Ibid.*, 98.

167. *Ibid.*, 96-100.

168. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, XIII, 22.

प्राज्ञाज्ञातः पिधानोत्तरमखिलजगद्भूमिं तद्गर्भपात्रं
 तिष्ठन् कृत्वाञ्जलौ तत्तदणुशतजपं मन्त्रवित् संविधाय ।
 गर्भीयन्तीं जगन्मण्डलमखिलमनुध्याय शक्तिं स्वयं त-
 द्गर्भाकारेऽत्र गते न्यसतु निशि शनैः स्वोक्तमन्त्र प्रजापी ॥
 सर्वभूतालये ! भद्रे ! सागराम्बरभूषिते !
 उत्तुङ्गाद्रिस्तनभरे ! देवि ! गर्भं समाश्रय ॥
 प्रासादपूरुषतया परिणामिनीह
 मूलेन देवमभिवाह्य समर्च्य गर्भे ।
 किञ्चिन्निवेद्य परितोष्य सुरक्ष्य तक्षणा
 प्रासादमारचयतां सहमन्त्रबिम्बम् ॥¹⁶⁹

The *Viṣṇusamhitā* similarly observes¹⁷⁰ :—

आज्यं समर्प्य तत् पात्रं विधायग्रकरस्थितम् ।
 जप्त्वा मन्त्रं भुवं ध्यात्वा प्राङ्मुखो निशि देशिकः ॥
 सुमुहूर्ते द्विजानुज्ञां प्राप्य तुर्यादिनिखनैः ।
 शक्तिं ध्यात्वा रचयित्वास्यां गर्भभूतमिदं स्मरन् ॥
 ब्रह्माण्डं पार्थिवं शुभ्रं गृहमूर्त्तिप्रसूतये ।
 ध्यात्वास्मिन् पूर्ववच्चोर्वीं शनैर्मन्त्रमुदीरयेत् ॥
 सर्वभूतधरे ! कान्ते ! पर्वतस्तनमण्डिते ।
 समुद्रपरिधाने ! त्वं देवि ! गर्भं समाश्रय ॥

Gurudeva¹⁷¹ also deals with these topics in the same strain. The author of the *Mañjarī* concludes the ritual with the following stanza :

उच्चर्यैवमिमं च मन्त्रमसकृद् ध्यात्वा महोमण्डलं
 गोमूत्रेण परिप्लुते तु विधिवद् गर्भं निधायारवटे ।
 गर्भाधानमिमं प्रकल्प्य विधिवत् सन्तोष्य वित्तैर्गुरुं
 प्रासादं सुदृढं च लक्षणयुतं कुर्यात्ततः शिल्पिभिः ॥

169. *Tantrasamuccaya*, Paṭala I, 101, 102, 105, 106.

170. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, XIII, 40-43.

171. *Īśānagurudevapaddhati*, Uttarārdha, Paṭala XXVII, 100-105.

.References to Earth as Mother and Supporter of beings may be met with in the *Rgveda* and *Atharvaveda*¹⁷² :—

With an enumeration of the main topics dealt with in the First Paṭala, the author concludes the preliminary section. The following is the concluding verse:—

इति तन्त्रसमुच्चयेऽर्चकोर्वीप्रहवास्त्विष्टिनिधोष्टकाक्रियाद्वयः ।
सहगर्भशिलाहृतिप्रकारः प्रथमोऽयं पटलः प्रगुम्फितोऽभूत् ॥¹⁷³

172. *Rgveda*, X, 18, 10 and 11; *Atharvaveda* XII, 1, 10, 11, 15, 22 and 63.

173. *Tantrasamuccaya*, Paṭala I, stanza 121.

The Nayaks of Tanjore

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EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The rule of the Nayaks of Tanjore which comprises roughly a period of about a hundred and fifty years from the second quarter of the 16th century down to the third quarter of the 17th century, has not hitherto received sufficient attention at the hands of historians. The Nayaks of Tanjore who started their rule first as loyal feudatories under the patronage and authority of the mighty Vijayanagara Emperors, grew in course of time to be independent of the suzerain power; but they were never disloyal to their overlords as they were related to the Imperial house and it was only during the time of the last ruler that Tanjore lagged behind in extending her helping hand to the kings of Vijayanagar. Even this was largely due to her own internal weakness and degeneration. The Nayak rule came into existence when the suzerain power was in its palmy days and declined, undergoing all the vicissitudes of fortune so much characteristic of almost all our ancient dynasties. Unlike other dynasties that rose and fell and whose memory and achievements have become past history, the Nayaks have left deep and indelible marks of their rule and benevolence behind, and such monuments still remind the on-looker that their age was after all not far removed in tempo and culture from the modern times. The Chola country and its capital, Tanjore, became the centre of all their activities and it may be said that the period of their rule formed the connecting link between the epoch of Chola rule and the intrusion of foreign powers into the land. Thus the land after the decline of its indigenous Tamil rulers, passed on under the sway of Telugu chiefs coming from the north and after them of Marathas, before it came to be absorbed in the British dominion in the beginning of the 19th century.

Mr. J. H. Nelson (of the Madras Civil Service and author of *The Madura District, A Manual*: 1868) was the first writer to devote some attention to the rule of the Tanjore Nayaks in his well-known work; but his account is meagre and far from satisfactory. He had indeed made a careful study of the Tamil and Telugu chronicles besides the epigraphs then available and had also brought to bear upon his work foreign evidence contained in the letters of the Jesuits and other writers who had come to visit the land from as early as the 16th century. But Tanjore received only a passing and necessarily secondary consideration in his narrative as he was concerned mainly with the history of Madura; and so reference to Tanjore and its affairs was made only wherever and

whenever she came into contact with Madura and her politics. However meagre the information might be, yet it contains a good account of one phase of the history of Tanjore under the Nayaks and furnishes a picture drawn with critical historical judgment based on historical facts. Moreover, his treatment served as the basis for others who followed him. 'The History of the Tanjore Nayaks' in Tamil by Mr. T. S. Kuppuswamy Sastri (1903) was the next attempt made to present a connected account of their work. But it was not meant to serve as an elaborate and exhaustive account and so it remains a meagre narrative based upon Nelson and some indigenous chronicles and accounts available in the Tanjore Palace Library. *The Tanjore Manual* by Mr. T. Venkasami Rao (1883) contains some information about the Nayaks; but much of the matter embodied in it is only an annotated version of what is contained in Mr. Nelson's and Dr. Caldwell's works (*The Madura Country, A Manual* and *A History of Tinnevely*). The account given in the *Tanjore Gazetteer* by Mr. Hemingway (1906) is largely based upon Nelson and Mr. Kuppuswamy Sastri with reference to the history of the period of the Nayak rule. 'The History of the Nayaks of Madura (1924)' by Prof. R. Sathianatha Aiyar, the 'Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara' (1929) by the Rev. Father Henry Heras, S. J., and the 'Tanjore Andhra Nayaka Charitam' (1932) by Kuruganti Sitaramayya Garu are more recent publications; they embody valuable information regarding the Tanjore Nayaks; and their treatment bears ample testimony to the fruit of modern historical scholarship and criticism bearing on South Indian History in the 16th and 17th centuries. The greater portion of the available and necessary information pertaining to these Nayaks has been carefully collected, collated and made use of by them; but they are not unanimous in their views about affairs and in the sequence of events. Thanks are due to the indefatigable energy of the first two of the above mentioned scholars for their great service in getting translations from the French, of the contemporary Jesuit letters contained in 'La Mission de Maduré' and also the originals of the important letters written in the Portuguese language. Father Heras gives us valuable additional information as a result of his wide and intensive study of the letters of of the Jesuit missionaries. Mr. Sitaramayya's book in Telugu presents a connected account of the rulers of the dynasty; the author has studied carefully the available Telugu sources and made a good use of them. A historian needs to be dispassionate and disinterested in his treatment of historical material. This golden rule seems, however, to have been kept out of view by the author in his treatment of the dynasty generally and of the last Nayak in particular, when he grows extravagantly eloquent on the moral and ethical fruits of his reign and activity. Besides, the author's own parochial views are allowed full and

free play. His conclusions are based only on Telugu sources and a few inscriptions and the category of foreign evidence has been largely ignored by him.

Sources.—The principal material for the history of the Tanjore Nayaks falls under two broad divisions, viz., literary and epigraphical. Under the former we have the native chronicles and memoirs, most of which are however not strictly contemporary, but belong to later times. They contain the local traditions current at the time of their composition. The manuscripts collected by Colonel Colin Mackenzie (studied and classified in William Taylor's 'Oriental Historical Manuscripts' 1835, and his 'Catalogue Raisonné of Oriental Manuscripts' in three volumes published in 1857, 1860 and 1862) belong to this category and supply us with varied information besides historical facts. The compilers of many of these chronicles did not display the necessary degree of discrimination in sifting the information obtained; and so they contain both historical as well as non-historical, and sometimes unreliable, details and accounts. However, their usefulness in some particulars cannot be ignored or underrated, as they form the main source of our history, especially for the 16th century, and are really helpful, in those places where other evidence is not available. A careful examination of these chronicles will afford a quantum of valuable facts and will certainly help the student; but he should proceed very cautiously in deducing conclusions from them. The 'Karnāṭaka Rājākkaḷ Śavistāra Charitam' composed under the direction of Col. William MacLeod early in 1803, by Narayan finds a place among these chronicles and can be instanced as a specimen of the more valuable class among them. The accuracy of these writings is obvious when they are corroborated by other sources of evidence. The *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājulu Charitamu* and the *Tanjāvūri Vāri Charitam* (which contains in the main the same matter) belong, likewise, to this category of chronicles as they are not strictly contemporary to the events they portray. But these records are indispensable to the historian of the 16th century, as they give us a fairly connected account of the foundation of the Madura and Tanjore Nayakships. But their historical evaluation needs some corrective and the help of other evidence for balancing and modifying. Only facts common to them and other sources of information may be accepted by a process of searching internal and external criticism. These chronicles invest the bones of bare historical facts with a superfluity of flesh accretion, and fill up the gaps in our knowledge usefully in many points.

Besides these indigenous chronicles, we have a volume of literary evidence which is at once contemporary and native. Tanjore is particularly fortunate in possessing this kind of material in an abundant

measure as the fruit of the enlightened literary patronage of the Nayak rulers. The importance of these works for the study of Tanjore history can hardly be disputed. They are, in one sense, documents of the kingdom and may be taken as authentic to a large extent, since their authors enjoyed the full liberty of knowing things at first hand. The *Sāhityaratnākara* of Yagnanārāyana Dikshita and the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* of Rāmabadrām̐ba, both of them in Sanskrit, the *Mannārudāsavilāsam* and the *Ushāpariṇayam* of Raṅgājamma and the *Vijayarāghava Vamśāvali* of Chengalvaḷa Kālakavi in Telugu are all contemporary and so constitute very important sources of information among others. Besides these, we have another set of works that contain valuable and very direct information on the doings of the Nayaks as they have been handed to us in the form of *prabhandas* composed by the Nayaks themselves, who were noted for their versatile learning and scholarship as well as for their patronage of poets and of men of letters. The *Sangīta Sudha*¹ by Raghunātha Nāyaka along with the illuminating introduction to it by his well-known minister Gōvinda Dikshita and the *Raghunāthābhyudaya Nātakam* by Vijayarāghava Nāyaka contain what may be regarded as the official version of the history of the Tanjore Nayaks; and their value is abundant and obvious, though they are not available to us in their complete form. Tanjore seems to have excelled in having her own historiographer-poets, and in this respect she far surpassed her neighbours like Madura and Gingee. All these works contain almost identical information about facts, expressed in varying diction; but they are not so full of historical facts as one would expect them to be and they contain no chronology. They do not constitute history in the true sense of the word as they are marked by elements of romance, imagination and praise of heroes that are the characteristics of a *kāvya*. Their authors did not aim at writing true and unvarnished history and so the narration of historical details was only incidental to their treatment. They were out to praise and please their patrons and in this they vied with one another, both in the use of pompous language and in the manner of treatment. Still they are historical or, at the least, quasi-historical, poems giving us fair and full ideas regarding the royal capital, the life of the people, the king and his army, his military achievements, his benefactions, his patronage of the different religions of the land, etc., and thus they amplify the truth that the culture and civilisation of an age are best seen reflected in its literature. Hence these are of some value; and a careful study and collation of the information contained in them are very necessary before one arrives at anything definite. There are surprising omissions of otherwise known important historical facts as well as additional information, whose

1. Published in the Journal of the Music Academy, Madras.

validity cannot be accepted without a dispassionate external criticism. For instance, the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* of Rāmabhadrāmba and the *Sāhityaratnākara* of Yagnanārāyana Dikshita, who was a pupil of Raghunātha Nayaka are strictly contemporary works, since both authors flourished in the same reign. Naturally one would expect from them first-hand and fully reliable information. But unfortunately there are some obvious omissions and several differences in narration which may appear to be negligible, but are very important from the point of view of the student. Rāmabhadrāmba refers to Raghunātha's victories in his early wars fought with the Muhammadans on behalf of his overlord, Venkatapathi Raya and to the release of the Gingee Nayak from imprisonment on his intervention. The *Sāhityaratnākara* does not contain, strangely enough, even a passing reference to these facts. Besides, they also differ from each other with regard to the date of the installation of Raghunātha as Yuvaraja. The former would put it before Raghunātha's march against the Muhammadans, while the latter would place it somewhat later. As regards the genealogy again these works give varying information. The Sanskrit books are not so full in their account as the Telugu works ; and the sifting of details of historical facts from them becomes difficult.

Herein comes to our aid the evidence embodied in the writings of foreign travellers and the Jesuit missionaries who visited South India as propagators of the Catholic faith. The Jesuits were primarily concerned with the growth and expansion of their missionary activity and their mission stations. They were obliged to send home periodical reports of their work and progress. In submitting such reports in long letters they gave a good picture of the prevailing political conditions of the land as also of the conditions precedent to the result of their labours. Extracts from such epistolary sources can be taken as a corrective to and a supplement of the local traditions and literary compositions since the letters were of cultured men who had wide experience. However, they, being foreigners by descent and missionaries by profession, had their own views of things Indian; and hence too much reliance placed on all their information may be rather unsafe, because they might not have had either the privilege of knowing incidents and facts at first hand or of consulting the state archives to which they had evidently no access. At best they can be held to be only secondary sources, though affording considerable material for the history of the 16th and 17th centuries. Besides, the records of the Portuguese and the Dutch factors on the Coromandel Coast contain a wealth of information, regarding the life of the people and the commerce of the land. But they contain, in many places, exaggerated and distorted accounts in vital respects. In such cases it may be possible to

disentangle truth from overstated facts by a careful study of the environment, political and social, and the spirit of the age. The observations of the foreign travellers, like Nuniz, Barradas and others contained in "*Purchas: His Pilgrims*" shed welcome sidelights on many facts and events. Even though they are superfluous to the Jesuit letters in many respects, yet their value is seen in the absence of more reliable information. Barradas's account presents the events following the death of Venkatapathi Raya in all their significant aspects and agrees admirably, in the main, with the internal evidence furnished by the indigenous chronicles and literary works; and it fills up the gap very ably, throwing much light on those obscure facts which would otherwise need further elucidation. Passing references to the customs and manners of the people and other social institutions which these contain are remarkable in their own way and are very useful. The English Factory Records volumes embodying the letters written by the Factors of the trade centres in India to the Directors at home, contain a substantial amount of information about the internal and external trade of the land and also on the business carried on with towns and other centres of industrial or political interest. It was during the period of the Nayak rule that the European nations like the Portuguese, the Danes and the Dutch came and settled on the Coromandel coast and developed trading agencies between South India and other countries. The Nayak rule also witnessed the first attempt made by the English Company to share in the coastal trade of Tanjore. The starting and consolidation of these settlements marked the decline of the former traders of the land, like the Arabs and the Moors.

Epigraphy forms an indispensable aid to history and furnishes it with the substance of documents engraved on stones and other durable material. A good portion of these epigraphs approximately constitute contemporary evidence. They serve as mile-stones and the information contained in them can be said to constitute the skeleton of history. They help in settling questions of chronology and also give incidental insight into the details of the administration and other matters of importance, political and economic, religious and social, and are the most trustworthy records of all periods. Inscriptional evidence is preferable to literary and other information. The historical introductions of the epigraphs containing the genealogy of kings, the chronology of events and the distinguishing *birudas* of the rulers, are of much value, while the substance of the epigraphs throws side-lights upon the religious and social life of the people. The facts mentioned in them are rendered real and living by the literary accounts which form a useful supplement to them. In attaching the requisite value to this category of evidence, one needs to be discriminate and critical, and a note of caution has to be

sounded against the acceptance of spurious and forged documents that claim to be genuine and would go forth for popular consumption. And the inscriptions of the Tanjore Nayaks present a peculiar difficulty in as much as they do not contain any reference to the regnal years and in many cases the Saka era and the cyclic year mentioned do not agree with each other. Almost all the epigraphical information now available has been collected in Robert Sewell's *List of Antiquities*, Madras; the volumes of *South Indian Inscriptions*; the *Annual Reports on South Indian Epigraphy* and the *Travancore Archaeological Series* besides other minor publications.

Archæology is a hand-maid to a proper study of history and its remains are silent witnesses to the growth of historical forces as well as of the glorious past. They preserve the art and architecture of the past into the present. The archæological remains belonging to the Tanjore Nayaks are found chiefly in the city of Tanjore and its neighbourhood. The *Seppanēri*, the feeding reservoir to the present Sivaganga Tank, the cracked fort ramparts, the almost unidentifiable and disappearing moat around it, the dilapidated palace walls, the temples at Mannārgudi and Kumbakōnam and the Vallam fort—all these supply us with much of antiquarian interest and have their own sad story to tell of their pristine glory. The names of villages and streets such as Ayyampēt, Ayyankadai Street, Achyutamangalam, Raghunāthapuram, Gōvindapuram and the Dikshitalingam at Pattiswaram trace their own associations with the Nayaks and their Brahman minister. The presence, even at the present day, of a large body of Telugu speaking people living in various places in the heart of the Tamil land is another instance of the steady migration that took place from the Telugu country during the period of the Vijayanagar and Nayak rule. The famous public library in the Tanjore Palace, called the Saraswati Mahal Library has been built upon the nucleus left by the Nayaks. The Editor of the 'Descriptive Catalogue of the Tanjore Saraswathi Mahal Library' says that the present library is the greatest of Oriental manuscripts libraries and its unique value lies in the fact that it has preserved the literary works of authors spread over three and a half centuries. The collections which were begun 'as early as the 15th century (about 1450) were continued both by the Nayaks and their successors in power, the Marathas. And the change of rule from the Nayaks to the Marathas did not, as is usual with alien invasions, produce any serious unsettlement in the existing social and other conditions of the people of the land. Military successes have always meant a full stop, for a temporary period at any rate, of all lines of progress, particularly in *belles lettres*, art and other non-political activities of the vanquished. This was never the case with Tanjore; and

the Maratha rulers seem to have been greater and more enthusiastic patrons of literature and art than their predecessors.'

Coins form another source, and their bearing upon the history of the Tanjore Nayaks has to be proved by future research. Vijayaraghava Nayak's grant to the Dutch postulates the existence of a mint at Tanjore and in some other places.

Apart from these original sources, we have the second hand information contained in the writings of modern historians to which reference has been made above.

CHAPTER II

THE FOUNDATION OF THE TANJORE NAYAKSHIP

Tradition says that the Tanjore Nayaks were first appointed to the regular charge of the Chola country by the Vijayanagar emperor, Achyutadēvarāya, (acc. 1529-30 A.D.).¹ This is confirmed by the evidence of Telugu literature like the *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājulu Charitamu* which says that Śevappa Nayaka who married Mūrtimāmba, the sister of Tirumalāmba, a consort of Achyutadēvarāya, was appointed to the governorship of the Chola country which was given away as dowry to Mūrtimāmba. The Samskrit sources refer to the marriage of Śevappa to Mūrtimāmba, the sister-in-law of Achyutadēvarāya, but do not refer to the gift of *strīdhana*. Yagnanārāyana Dikshita says that Śevappa got Tanjore by his own prowess.² There is no inscriptional evidence to substantiate the traditional account which seems to be true and indisputable. The political circumstances of the times under the powerful emperors of Vijayanagar and their southern invasions, particularly by Krishnadēvarāya and his successor Achyutarāya, do not admit the possibility of Śevappa Nayaka's acquiring the principality of Tanjore by conquest or by usurpation. The already established powerful, loyal viceroyalty of Madura on the one hand and the empire on the other would certainly have put down any attempted insurrection or open hostility on the part of Śevappa. And hence his rise to position and power in Tanjore must have been due to the imperial favour and support; and the reference to Śevappa's marriage with Mūrtimāmba in the chronicles and his close relationship to Achyutadēvarāya only bear ample testimony to his rise under the royal patronage. But there is no unanimity among the various chronicles as regards the date of the actual appointment of Śevappa to the viceroyalty of the Tanjore territory.

Different dates are given by scholars for the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship. (1) There is a tradition which says that a Kannada Brahman of the name of Gōvinda Dikshita, then a boy of seventeen, well versed in the Śāstras as well as in palmistry and astrology, migrated to the then flourishing city of Vijayanagara and there came

1. 40 of 1900 is dated in Virōdhi and in the month of Kārtika. 157 of 1924 from Kālahasti is dated in Saka 1452; also 200 of 1910.

2. "Sāhityaratnākara" by Yagnanārāyana Dikshita, edited by Dr. T. R. Chintamani, University of Madras, Canto III, Sloka 1.

into contact with Achyutarāya who invited that Brahman along with other astrologers, to predict the future of the son that had just been born to him. Admiring his knowledge of Jyōtisha Śāstra, the emperor is said to have honoured him. Shortly after this event, the Dikshita came across a Nayaka orphan, Śeva by name, whom he took into his service. Finding in him signs of future greatness, Gōvinda Dikshita introduced him to Achyutarāya, who had him appointed as his Tāmbūla Karaṇḍavāhin (betel-bearer)—an office of importance in the court, which brought the holder into personal association with the Rāya. Soon, Śeva, the betel-page, distinguished himself in Achyutarāya's wars; and in due course, Mūrtimāmba, the sister of Rāya's consort Tirumalāmba, who fell in love with him was married to him. Achyutarāya appointed him to the governorship of Tanjore which was then in need of a strong ruler. Śeva, on going to Tanjore, took the Dikshita along with him; and this is said to have happened in the year 1540 A.D.³

This account which is relied on by some, falls flat for want of confirmation; nor can it stand the test of intensive criticism. Inscriptional evidence shows that Śevappa belonged to a family of nobles who had for some time been ruling over the Tonḍaimaṇḍalam country. Moreover, Gōvinda Dikshita who is said to have been the minister of two kings in the Tanjore epigraphs of this period, is mentioned in a record dated 1634 A.D.,⁴ and this is the latest year so far available for him. Beginning from 1528 A.D. when a son was born to Achyutarāya and ending with 1634 A.D.,⁵ the latest known date for Gōvinda Dikshita, and adding seventeen years to which age he had attained when he first came to Vijayanagara, we find that Gōvinda Dikshita must have lived for more than hundred and twenty years which is absolutely impossible. The inscriptions assign a period of thirteen years from 1529 to 1542 A.D. for the reign of Achyutarāya. In that case the traditional date, A.D. 1540 given above, would place the appointment of Śevappa towards the end of his reign. The *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājula Charitamu*, the two Sanskrit contemporary poems and the epigraphs, all refer to Gōvinda Dikshita, the illustrious minister, as having flourished only in the last

3. "Gōvinda Dikshita and his times" by Mr. N. K. Venkatesam Pantulu, in the "Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society," Vol. II, Part II. Also "Sāhityaratnākara," Introduction, page 2.

4. 290 of 1927 is dated S. 1553 Prajōtpatti. 257 of 1927, Bava corresponding to A.D. 1634.

5. "Sources of Vijayanagara History", edited by Dr. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar: p. 170 and Introduction, p. 12.

days of Śevappa and not in the earlier part of his reign. Hence this account is unreliable for want of confirmatory evidence.

Secondly, the year 1541 A.D. is assigned for the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship by the Rev. Father Heras.⁶ The learned Father arrives at this date on the ground that Viswanātha Nayaka, the founder of the Madura line of viceroys, was also appointed by Achyutarāya to the southern viceroyalty towards the end of his reign, *i.e.*, about 1541 A.D. And so Father Heras would assign the foundation of the Tanjore and Madura Nayakships to the same date. His arguments in support of this assumption are not conclusive and in one place positively weak. He says (on p. 124, Note 3) that after the execution of Virāśekhara Chōla, Viswanātha was appointed to be in charge of both Madura and Tanjore. He gives no authority for the execution of the Chola king, in spite of the fact that there is no evidence except tradition referring to the rule of a Chōla king at all.⁷ The *Tanjāvūri Āndhra Rājula Charitamu* is definite in assigning the foundation of the Madura Nayakship during the time of Krishnadēvarāya, and Prof. Sathianatha Aiyar⁸ has dated the foundation of the Madura Nayak's rule in 1529 A.D. Again, the Telugu chronicle⁹ says that soon after the death of Chandraśekhara Pāndya in whose life time itself Viswanātha Nayaka had been nominated to rule over Madura, the Pāṇḍyan having abdicated in his favour and retired into private life, Viswanātha Nayak began to rule over both the Pāṇḍya and Chōla kingdoms. Nothing is known about the fate of the Chōla ruler, Virāśekhara. Mr. Venkasami Rao (*The Tanjore Manual*, p. 750) adds that, the fate of Virāśekhara Chōla is not clearly known. He either fell in battle with Nagama Nayaka or was subsequently put to death; and his issue, if he had any, probably shared the same fate; for nothing more is heard of the Chola race.' Thus he proves the impossibility of a Chola ruling over Tanjore at the time of Viswanatha Nayak's accession to Madura after he defeated his father Nagama Nayaka in battle. Hence it becomes probable that there was no Chola king at the time of the appointment of Śevappa. Even the

6. 'The Aravidu dynasty of Vijayanagar' by Rev. H. Heras, p. 170 and p. 124 and Note 3.

7. Father Heras believes the first part of the traditional story but would not give his reasons for discarding the rest of it which refers to the establishment of the Madura Nayak by Krishnadēvarāya.

8. 'The Nayaks of Madura', Madras University Historical Series No. 2.

9. The 'Tanjāvūri Āndhra Rājula Charitamu' edited by V. Prabhakara Sastri, Vavilla Press; also "Sources," Dr. S. K. Aiyangar.

Achyutarāyābhyudayam of Rājanātha Diṇḍima¹⁰ which describes in detail the early conquests of Achyutarāya in the South, does not mention the existence of a Chōla king of Tanjore at the time. Tirumalāmba, in her *Varadāmbikaparinayam*, refers to the defeat and imprisonment of a Chōla at the hands of Achyutarāya's father, Narasa Nayaka, and says that the Chōla is said to have escaped for his life to the sea coast.¹¹ The name of this Chōla is not known. If there was any Chōla king at the time of Achyutarāya's *digvijaya* in the south, the *Achyutarāyābhyudayam* would have at least made mention of him. It is only the *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājula Charitamu* and the *Tanjāvūri Vāri Charitamu* that refer to Virasēkhara Chōla who was responsible for the coming of Nāgama Nayaka and Viswanātha Nayaka to the south.¹² The *Karnāṭaka Rājakkal Śavistāra Charitam* says that Krishnadēvarāya who conquered eastern Karnāṭaka and derived therefrom a revenue of three crores of rupees, had to divide his empire into three parts and to appoint three viceroys over them. Thus, according to this chronicle, Tubāki Krishnappa Nayaka was placed in the administrative charge of that strip of land which is bounded by Nellore on the north and the river Coleroon in the south, with Gingee as the capital. Vijayarāghava Nayaka was appointed to rule the Chōla country from the capital city of Tanjore; and Venkatappa Nayaka was commissioned to administer the land further south.¹³ This account would suggest that these three vice-royalties were founded about the year 1518 A.D., the date of Krishnadēvarāya's return from his northern conquests. There is no other internal or external evidence to support the *Karnāṭaka Rājakkal Savistara Charitam*; and if too much stress is laid on this statement then it would antedate the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship and bring in other anachronisms and conflicts. Moreover, the inscriptions of Krishnadēvarāya in the south show that there was one Vira Narasingarāya who was in charge of the Tondaimaṇḍalam and Chōla countries as the king's

10. Sources. P. 159. Achyutarāya is said to have entered the Chōla country unopposed. A Chōla king is mentioned on p. 164 and this was Śellappa, who rebelled against him.

11. The '*Varadāmbikaparinayam*' by Tirumalāmba. Edited by Mr. Lakshman Sarup, Lucknow. Also sources, p. 174.

12. 'The Nayaks of Madura,' Introduction, page 9. 'It is just possible that complaints reached head-quarters in some number and one complainant with more pretentious claims even waited upon Krishnarāya in person. The only flaw in the story as given in the chronicles is that we have so far come upon no epigraphical evidence of the existence of a Chandrasēkhara Pāndya in Madura or of a Virasēkhara Chōla in the Chōla country though neither case is impossible.'

13. 'The Aravidu Dynasty', p. 112.

deputy.¹⁴ Contemporary Telugu and Sanskrit literature and the traditional accounts recorded in the *Mackenzie Manuscripts* and in the *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājula Charitamu* and the *Tanjāvūri Vari Charitam* clearly show that the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship took place only in the reign of Achyutarāya. The epigraphs also point to the same conclusion. As the internal evidence regarding the Tanjore Nayaks has been well established, we need not hesitate to subscribe to the view that Achyutarāya nominated Śevappa as governor over the Tanjore principality. If this is agreed upon, another date, 1549 A.D., given by Mr. Kuppuswamy Sastri in the *Tanjore Gazetteer* and accepted for the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship will have to be abandoned, since the reign of Achyutarāya came to an end in 1542 A.D.¹⁵ and there was Sadāsivarāya ruling over Vijayanagara in A.D. 1549. Mr. T. S. Kuppuswami Sastri tells us of Śevappa's appointment by Achyutarāya; but he is more inclined to believe the version of *Sāhityaratnākara* that Śevappa got Tanjore by the strength of his own arm. Relying on this evidence, he ascribes 1549 A.D. as the date of Śevappa's accession to power and adds support to it by saying that the Samasarupalli epigraph of this Nayaka which is dated in the year 1549 (S. 1471) is the earliest record issued by him. The *Tanjore Gazetteer* (1906), following Mr. Kuppuswami Sastri, assigns 1549 A.D.; and in support of this date it advances arguments that Achyutarāya died in A.D. 1542 and there was Rāmarāja Viṭhaladēva, the able co-adjutor and general of Sadāsiva, who remained in the south till 1544 A.D. So it is concluded that Śevappa must have come to power only after the retirement of Rāmarāja Viṭhala from the south. Following Nelson, the *District Gazetteer* would also assign A.D. 1559 as the date for the foundation of the Madura Nayakship. That this date is untenable is proved by Achyutarāya's inscription which refers to his gift made for the merit of his agent, Viswanātha Nayaka, as early as A.D. 1535.¹⁶ This epigraph is important as it definitely proves that Madura was under Viswanātha Nayaka even in that year.¹⁷ The *Tan-*

14. 'The Nayaks of Madura,' Intro. 8. The period 1520-5 seems to be a period of activity in organisation and may be regarded as the time when he appointed Viranarasimha as viceroy of the Chōla country and gave the commission to Nāgama to organise the province of Madura; and the appointment of Vira Narasimha to the Chōla country would indicate the appointment of a similar officer of high standing for Madura.

15. 373 of 1911.

16. 113 of 1908 Tirupattur, Ramnad District.

17. 'The Nayaks of Madura,' pp. 44 and 296, Appendix C. All that we know of Viswanātha Nayaka from inscriptions, chronicles and other sources further confirms our contention that the Nayakship of Madura under him was an accomplished fact

javūri Andhra Rājula Charitamu says that Viswanātha who was appointed by Krishnadēvarāya was for some time governing the Chōla country as well, after the death of Krishnadēvarāya until Śevappa was specially appointed to Tanjore by Achyutarāya.¹⁸ This would prove that the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship could not have been far removed from the date of the foundation of the Madura Nayakship. Prof. Sathianatha Aiyar has proved that 1529 A.D. must be the initial date of the Madura Nayakship and that it was created in the last days of Krishnadēvarāya. In this connection his remarks on the validity and reliability of the statements contained in the *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājula Charitamu* may be quoted :—‘The facts contained in this account which are capable of verification are so singularly correct that the whole narrative compels conviction as a faithful description of the transactions’. Equally apt is the observation made by William Taylor regarding the *Tanjāvūri Vāri Charitam* when he says: ‘I consider the document very valuable as a contribution towards the history of the Tanjore country during the whole of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.’ According to these accounts the Tanjore Nayakship was founded by Achyutarāya shortly after the foundation of the Madura Nayakship, and it also proves the impossibility of a Chōla ruling just previous to the time of Śevappa’s nomination to its charge, when it says that Viswanātha was then in charge of both the principalities. Mr. Venkasami Rao’s¹⁹ date, A.D. 1530 assigned for the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship is a little early as it shows that the same had happened towards the end of Krishnadēvarāya’s reign. The reason for his discountenancing the account of the chronicles in general and of the *Tanjāvūri Vāri Charitam* in particular is given out to be that after the death of Krishnadēvarāya the empire began to sink and hence no intervention in the affairs of the south could

before the death of Krishnadēvarāya in 1530. John Nieuhoff also refers to the rule of the Madura Nayaks in the year 1533.

18. ‘T. A. R. Charitam,’ p. 17. Also ‘Sources,’ p. 323.

19. *The Tanjore Manual*. 1883 p. 748-9. Mr. Venkasami Rao relying on Dr. Caldwell’s List of Vijayanagar kings as is given in his History of the Tinnevely District pp. 45-6 says that the “Varicharitra mentions the name of a Raya who appointed the first viceroy of Tanjore as Achyuta” and adds “that the intervention of Vijayanagar in the affairs of Madura and Tanjore took place during the reign of Krishnadēvarāya than that it took place after it when the power of Vijayanagar was sinking. At the same time the interval between Nāgama Nayaka’s expedition and the appointment of the first viceroy to Tanjore by Achyuta assuming the latter to be a fact could not have been long. On the whole, in the absence of more satisfactory data, the date of the subversion of the Chola dynasty and the commencement of the Nayak rule in Tanjore may, it seems, be safely fixed about A.D. 1530.” He would also assign a period of about 132 years for the Nayak’s rule.

have been possible. He believed then that the accession of Achyutarāya saw only the beginning of the rapid decline and downfall of the empire. And so he concluded safely that all the changes that might have taken place in the politics of the south, must have happened only during the reign of Krishnadēvarāya and more probably about the time when he commissioned his general, Nāgama Nāyaka, to effect a complete conquest of the south with a view to reorganising it. But subsequent researches into the then unexplored fields of epigraphy and other literature, have brought to light that Achyutarāya was not after all the craven that he was supposed to be, but was as good and powerful a ruler as his predecessor, and also the fact that the empire did in fact survive for more than a century after the death of Krishnadēvarāya. The *Achyutarāyabhydayam* bears evidence to the successful *digvijaya* led by Achyutarāya into the south and also the victories won by his general Śalakam Tirumalarāja. And from other pieces of evidence it is quite possible to surmise that Tanjore was not under any separate governor or ruler at the time of Achyutarāya's invasion. Thus it becomes clear that the date does not seem to be quite settled and needs revision in the light of subsequent accumulation of material. The inscriptions of the period also refer to the same state of affairs.

South India came under the influence of Vijayanagar as early as 1358 when Kumara Kampana began his victorious campaign into the south.²⁰ The presence of numerous epigraphs that are found scattered all over the country bears ample testimony to the overlordship of Vijayanagar Empire from about the 3rd quarter of the 14th century. Narasa Nayaka's expedition to the south and his victories over the Chōla and Pāṇḍya kings were referred to already.²¹ That South India continued under Vijayanagar for long without any interruption and the fact that the old principalities continued for some time under their old hereditary rulers like the Chōlas and the Pāṇdyas who became feudatories of the new power, are established by the testimony alike of literature and inscriptions.

With the accession of Krishnadēvarāya a new epoch began in the history of South India. Hitherto the Vijayanagara emperors could not devote much of their time to the consolidation of their authority and the organisation of their hold over the southern principalities, as their

20. Madhurāvijayam or Kamparāya Charitam by Gaṅgādēvi edited by Pandit Srinivasachari, Trivandrum. Also 'Sources'.

21. The 'Varadāmbikāparinayam'.

Muhammadan enemies on the north were engaging much of their attention. Krishnadēvarāya, having defeated his enemies in the north completely, found the necessary leisure to reconstitute and reorganise the southern principalities; and he set himself to this task soon. According to the chronicles, Madura and Tanjore which were then ruled by scions of the old lines of the Pāṇḍyas and the Chōlas respectively, caused some trouble, and a Chōla ruler is said to have risen in revolt and captured Madura, setting aside the claims of a Pāṇḍya and this led to the latter's appeal for help to Krishnadēvarāya, their overlord.²² Nāgama Nayaka's southern expedition was the immediate result of this, and Nāgama claimed to have defeated the Chōla and reinstated the Pāṇḍya whose birth was found out to be illegitimate. About the same time parts of the Chōla and the Tondaimaṇḍalam countries were put in charge of another great general who was called Vira Narasingarāya Nayaka. His inscriptions are largely to be found in the south ranging in dates from 1510 to 1530 A.D.²³ 83 of 1923 of Achyutarāya, dated Saka 1451, gives the information

22. Dr. Caldwell (History of the Tinnevely District) says that the Chola referred to in the Chronicles was perhaps Chennaya Bālaya who figures in an inscription coming from Srirangam and dated Saka 1453 (A.D. 1531). This view is incorrect since we find Viswanatha Nayaka to be the ruler of both Madura and Tanjore for sometime about this period and the presence of epigraphs of Viswanatha in Srirangam proves this. However, there are numerous epigraphs to show that there were scions of the Chola race ruling as governors over small principalities of the land, not independently of the Vijayanagar authority. Some of them even traced their descent from the Cholas of Uraiyūr; but none of them seems to have had or enjoyed power as became an independent ruler.

23. 91 and 92 of 1908 Tiruppattur, Ramnad S1432 give him the surname Śellappa with the honorary affix swami.

361 of 1908 Māngādu, Tanjore District S 1437 says that Vira Narasinga belonged to the Agastya *gōtra* and Bōdhāyanasūtra.

256 of 1910. Urattur Achyutarāya S. 1451 mentions Śellappa alias Vira Narasinga Sāluva Daṇṇāyakar.

83 of 1923 Chingleput district: Achyuta S 1451 gift for the merit of Vira Narasingarāya.

544 of 1919. Little Conjeevaram S 1454 Achyuta i.e., two years after his coronation. Records that in the year Virodhi on the day of his coronation Achyuta directed Sāluva Nayaka to assign certain villages to Varadārāja and Ekambaranātha equally neither more or less. But as Sāluva Nayaka gave more to Ekambaranātha, Achyuta hearing this equalised the number of villages by redistribution.

545 of 1919. Same as 544 above. This inscription is very important.

390 of 1914 Tiruvarangulam 1515 A.D. gift of taxes for the merit of Vira Narasingarāya Nayakar,

that, that general was also known by the names of Śellappa and Sāluva Nayaka and another epigraph (182 of 1929-30) dated Saka 1431 in the reign of Krishnadēvarāya says that he was the son of one Taḷuvakkuḷaindān Bhattar, a dēvakanmi of the Kānchi (Conjeevaram) temple. Vira Narasingarāya Nayaka seems to have entered the Imperial service as early as 1509 A.D. The provenance of his records shows that he was ruling over the south-eastern portions of the Vijayanagara empire, comprising the modern districts of North and South Arcot, Chingleput and Tanjore and also part of Ramnad district. Vira Narasingarāya Sāluva Nayaka of the epigraphs of Krishnadēvarāya and Achyutarāya is perhaps identical with the Sālvanāyque of Nuniz²⁴ who says that "Sālvanāyque, the present minister; he has a revenue of a million and a hundred thousand pardaos. He is the lord of Coramandel (Charama-ondel) and of Negapatam (Negapatao) and Tanjore (Tangore) and Bomgrin (Bhuvanagiri ?), Devipatnam (Depatao) and Truguel, (Sewell says Tirukkivilur) and Caullin and all of these are cities: their territories are all very large and border on Ceylon. He is obliged to give a third of his revenues to the king and two-thirds remain for him for the expenses of his lascarins and horses, which he is obliged to main-

233 of 1901 Achcharapākkam S. 1450 Virodhi, mentions Vira Narasingarāya Nayaka who is called a Ubhayapradhāni of the king.

63 of 1923 Chingleput District gift to Śellappar Taḷuvakkuḷaindān Bhattar alias Vira Narasingarāya Nayakkar.

225 of 1916 Sengamal. S. 1442 Śellappar Vira Narasingarāya Nayaka is called the son of Taḷuvakkuḷaindān Bhattar.

399 of 1906. Tirumayam, S. 1444 gift by Vira Narasingarāya Nayakar.

182 of 1929-30. Chingleput district S 1431 (1509 A.D.) Sāluva Nayakkar Śellappar, son of Taḷuvakkuḷaindān Bhattar who is called a Dēvakanmi of the Kānchi temple.

390 of 1912. Dēvikapuram. 1515 A.D. refers to Vira Narasingarāya Nayaka.

487 of 1920. Singaperumāl Koil 1531 A.D. Gift by Taḷuvakkuḷaindān Bhattar for the merit of Śellappa Sāluva Daṇṇāyakar.

Dr. S. K. Ayyangar's ('Nayaks of Madura' and 'Sources', Introduction) view that Vira Narasingarāya's rebellion and Nāgama's revolt are inter-related is not tenable since the latter happened in the last days of Krishnadēvarāya and the rebellion of Vira Narasinga took place in the early years of Achyutarāya when Madura was firmly established under Viswanātha Nayaka the son of Nāgama Nayaka. Nāgama's rebellion was put an end to by Krishnadēvarāya himself before 1529 which marks the beginning of the reign of Viswanātha Nayaka. Śellappa's rebellion took place in 1531 i.e., two years after the final settlement of the Madura affairs.

24. 'A Forgotten Empire'—Sewell, p. 384. Nuniz speaks of the feudal lords of Krishnadēvarāya. Also on p. 281 he says that Krishnadēva had five kings as his subject-lords. Nuniz calls Sālvanāyque 'the present minister.'

tain for the king, viz., thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse and thirty elephants; so that he only gets the balance after deducting the expenses of this force, Nuniz calls him 'the present minister' of Krishnadēvarāya, and an inscription of the same king (233 of 1901) dated 1528 A.D. calls Vira Narasingarāya as Ubhayaprādhāni. The account of Nuniz and the epigraphical evidence taken together clearly show that Vira Narasingarāya Sāluva Nayaka must have been a powerful feudatory and minister of Krishnadēvarāya and of Achyutarāya, enjoying a big territory and a large revenue and he also maintained a well equipped army composed of elephants and horses. Achyutarāya's gift for his merit in the year 1529 A.D. shows the supreme position which Vira Narasingarāya held in the empire. Nuniz also confirms this when he says that Sālvanāyque became the minister of the kingdom and governed the country till the coming of Achetarao (Achyutarāya) from the fortress of Chandragery (Chandragiri)".²⁵

If Vira Narasingarāya Sāluva Nayaka was a powerful ruler of all the eastern parts including the Chola country in the time of Krishnadēvarāya till the end of his reign and also in the reign of Achyutarāya, then one may well ask, where was the necessity for Achyuta to appoint Śevappa Nayaka as the ruler of Tanjore or what were the circumstances that led to the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship? This question is answered by the evidence of the epigraphs and also by the contemporary literary evidence contained in the *Achyutarāyābhīṣṭam*. Vira Narasingarāya seems to have grown powerful enough to set at defiance the orders of Krishnadēvarāya in his last days.²⁶ The Tiruppanāṅgādu epigraph²⁷ says that he exacted the taxes of *jodi* (a kind of quit rent) and *sulavari* from the inhabitants of the village, contrary to the expressed order of Krishnadēvarāya, who made a remission of these taxes amounting to 10,000 pardaos in favour of the Siva and

25. 'A Forgotten Empire' by Sewell, p. 367.

26. Studies in the Third dynasty of Vijayanagara by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya, University of Madras. A good account of Vira Narasingarāya's activities is given in pages 22-32. Dr. N. V. Ramanayya, p. 23, says that it is not true to say that Vira Narasingarāya rebelled in the very last years of Krishnadēvarāya. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar says that he rebelled against Krishnadēva in his last days ('*Nayaks of Madura*,'; Introduction, p. 9). Even though the inscriptions and literature do not refer to any open rebellion of Vira Narasinga still his aim at independence very early is supported by the epigraphs.

27. 253 of 1906 dated S. 1453 Khara. Records that Vira Narasingarāya exacted *jodi* though this tax was given in favour of Tiruppanāṅgādu temple under the orders of Sāluva Timma, the minister of Krishnadēva during the latter's time.

Vishnu temples of the south.²⁸ The Tirukkadaiyūr epigraph (246 of 1925) which records the remission of the same taxes by the king, when it was brought to his notice by the *bhattars* (priests) of the temple that the remission ordered earlier was not given effect to, perhaps has some reference to Vira Narasingarāya's growing insubordination even from the year A.D. 1521. Krishnadēvarāya did not live long enough to bring back this insubordinate vassal to a sense of subordination, and so it fell to the lot of Achyutarāya, his successor. Vira Narasingarāya continued to exhibit the same recalcitrant attitude towards Achyutarāya also, and this is mentioned in a record dated 1532 A.D. (544 of 1919) coming from Little Conjeevaram. The record refers to the rule of Sāluva Nāyaka and to a gift of a number of villages made by Achyutarāya at the time of his coronation. Vira Narasingarāya Sāluva Nāyaka who was directed by Achyuta to assign this gift of villages to the Varadarāja and Ēkāmbaranātha temples equally 'neither more or less' to either, appears to have broken the royal order by assigning more villages to the Siva temple. The record continues that King Achyuta on hearing this, equalised the gifts by effecting a redistribution in 1532 A.D. Deviation from the royal provision in the order was regarded a serious crime which might result in the loss of life sometimes. Achyuta was perhaps dissatisfied with his misconduct and stubborn character and had him removed from the high offices of *pradhāni* and viceroy in A.D. 1531. An inscription²⁹ from the same place refers to one Bōgayyadēva Mahārāja of the solar race and a descendant of the Chōlas of Uraiyur who is said to have succeeded Vira Narasingarāya to the rulership of those parts and restored the gift of taxes such as *jodi*, etc., amounting to 50 *pon* to the temple in the same year (A.D. 1531).

Vira Narasingarāya who fell in the estimate of Achyutarāya and who was driven out of office, found himself in a desperate situation and so turned a rebel, perhaps with the idea of opposing the king and setting up an independent rule. In this endeavour he was not able to enlist the co-operation of the powerful Madura ruler, Viswanātha Nayak, and so he advanced further south and sought the aid of the Tiruvadi king.³⁰

28. 137 of 1927, 210 of 1917, 100 of 1931-32, 223 of 1927, 184 of 1925, 226, 235 and 251 of 1925.

29. 253 of 1906 dated S 1453 expired Khara.

30. Dr. N. Venkataramanayya, p. 27, says that the Chēra King mentioned must be the King of Quilon. Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao 'Travancore Archaeological Series,' Vol. I and Dr. Krishnaswamy Ayyangar 'Sources of the Vijayanagara History,' Introd. say that the king who joined the renegade rebel Sellappa was the king

He was joined by another rebel, Tumbichchi Nayaka, the ruler of Paramakkudi situated in the Madura country. The reason for his revolt is not known for certain; perhaps he was not in favour of Viswanātha's administration. Vira Narasingarāya *alias* Sellappa, soon gaining strength seems to have defeated the neighbouring Pāṇḍyas of Tenkāsi as a consequence of which the Pāṇḍyan king who was deprived of his kingdom sought the help of Achyutarāya for his restoration. The *Achyutarāyābhyudayam* which describes in great detail this victorious campaign of Achyutarāya in the south, and also the Pāṇḍyan restoration, does not mention either the causes for Vira Narasingarāya's revolt or the rise of Tumbichchi Nayaka but refers to the former's escape to the Chēra country and to his defeat of the Pāṇḍyas. The news of Sellappa's disorderly conduct and organised rebellion reached the king who started on an expedition with a large army under the leadership of his brother-in-law Salakarāju Tirumalarāya. Vira Narasingarāya did not suffer any defeat at the hands of the Imperial army before his escape to the Tiruvadi country.³¹ The *Achyutarāyābhyudayam* describes the marching of Achyutarāya's army and the route it took to reach Srirangam. Salakarāju Tirumalarāya with the army started on the Tiruvadi campaign under the orders of the king who having despatched the troops stayed behind at Srirangam where he is said to have led a happy life in the company of its Pandits.

of Travancore. The latter view seems to be correct. The Travancore kings were called Tiruvadis. [Āditya Varma and his brother Bhūtala Vira Sri Vira Udaya Mārtānda Varma ruled the Travancore country in the early decades of the 16th century. The latter was followed in 1535 by Bhūtala Vira Kērala Varma. They were known as Tiruvadis and enjoyed dominion in South Tinnevely. Thus Mārtānda Varma was the Senior Tiruvadi of Siraivoy and Kerala Varma was the Senior Tiruvadi of Jayasimhanād (*The Travancore Manual*: Vol. I, pp. 296-7).] [Ed.]

31. *Achyutarāyābhyudayam*; Sources, pp. 158 and 162, Slokas 47 to 59. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar says on p. 152, Sellappa who had revolted and after being defeated in battle escaped from his province and had taken refuge with the Travancore king. Also N. Venkataramanayya's "Third Dynasty of Vijayanagara," p. 29. But a careful reading of the slokas 47-59 would show definitely that there is nothing in them to refer to Vira Narasingaraya's defeat before he fled to Travancore. One of them (sloka 46) says, चक्रविग्रहतया पलायित चेद्धपो वसति चेरसीमणि। चक्रविग्रहतया- would simply mean 'under disguise.' The word पुनः which means 'again' in sloka 57 is perhaps understood by these scholars to mean a second fight. But a careful reading of that line would show that the word पुनः is an *Avyaya* (indeclinable) and does not connote its meaning but should be read along with the preceding word, मदवता। The author who expatiates on the morals has put this word to lay emphasis and this interpretation is justified by the succeeding words ननु राज लक्षणम्.

Śalakam Tirumalarāya's defeat of the Chēra king and his victorious return to Srirangam taking Śellappa and the Chēra ruler as captives are all mentioned in the *Achyutarāyābhīyudayam*. Achyuta punished the Chēra king and re-established the Pāṇḍyan king on the throne. But what happened to Vira Narasingarāya and Tumbichchi Nayaka is not at all stated, but their complete defeat is evident from the Kālahasti and the Conjeevaram Inscriptions.³² The Tiruvadi king who suffered this humiliation was Udayamārtāndavarman.³³ The inscriptions and the *Achyutarāyābhīyudayam* definitely say that Vira Narasingarāya who was in administrative control of the Chōladēśa besides others, rose in revolt and he suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Śalakarāju Tirumalarāya the able general of Achyutarāya. We learn from the same sources that Vira Narasingarāya was not reappointed to the governorship of the Chōla country. Then what became of Tanjore? Did Tanjore pass under the powerful Madura Nayak, or did it remain independent of it? Inscriptions, tradition and literary evidence prove that Tanjore remained independent of Madura and became the seat of a new government under one Śevappa Nayaka, appointed by Achyutarāya himself. The foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship was evidently the immediate result of the suppression of Vira Narasingarāya's rebellion. Tradition says that Viswanātha Nāyaka was ruling over Tanjore also for some time. Achyutarāya apprehending danger and suspecting the loyalty of Viswanātha Nāyaka who might rise in opposition to the Empire as his father Nāgama Nayaka did before if left supreme in the south, thought perhaps of making Tanjore independent of Madura and directly subordinate to himself. Besides, there was the Chōla ruler handy to be put in charge of it since Viswanātha Nayaka is said to have been then ruling Tanjore as well. Moreover, to put an end to the future troubles such as the rise of any rival Chōlas—if there should be any of them—the need for a strong ruler was also felt by the king. And the dismissal and the defeat of Śellappa left Tanjore without a ruler. Achyuta also saw for himself the difficulties and dangers in having a single viceroy to administer a large territory comprising almost the whole of the Eastern Karnāṭaka empire. These causes combined together greatly emphasised the need for the appointment of a capable governor over Tanjore. To ensure proper and good government, to check other feudatories from transcending their limits and to have a loyal supporter of the empire behind, Achyutarāya made a new settlement according to which he

32. 157 of 1924 and 'Tirumalai Tirupati Devasthanam Epigraphical Report', p. 221. Also, 'Third Dynasty of Vijayanagara,' pp. 22-23.

33. 'Travancore Archaeological series,' Vol. I, p. 55.

reorganised his southern portions of his empire entirely on a new basis.³⁴ The southern territories excluding Madura were split up into two main divisions on the traditional basis, viz., the Chōla and the Tondai maṇḍalams. Tanjore became the seat of the government by virtue of its geographical position at the head of the delta system and other natural advantages it had. Śevappa Nayaka, the powerful general and a near relation of the king, was appointed to rule over Tanjore, as he was then considered to be the most loyal and efficient man on whom the empire can rely for its support and co-operation. The Tanjore Nayaks by their unflinching loyalty and timely co-operation with the empire amply justified their choice. Political circumstances, diplomacy and statesmanship were responsible for the appointment of Śevappa Nayaka as the viceroy of the Chōla country.³⁵ If this was the arrangement made by Achyuta, then what is the date of the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship?

Vira Narasingarāya, *alias* Śellappa's inscriptions range from 1510 to 1531 A.D. and so he must have rebelled in the year 1531 A.D.³⁶ the year following the coronation of Achyutarāya. The *Achyutarāyābhhyudayam* gives no dates and regarding the rise of Śellappa it simply says that on one day after his coronation the matter was reported by the minister to the king. But there are epigraphs which come to our help in arriving at a satisfactory date. The Kālahasti and the Tirupati records of Achyuta say that his southern expedition was completed before July 27, 1532 A.D.,³⁷ as they note 'that he went on a war with the Tiruvadi and levied tribute from him, brought under subjection Tumbichchi Nayaka, Sāluva Nayaka, and also the Ummātur chiefs.' His northern conquests began about the middle of 1534 A.D. An epigraph from Little Conjeevaram belonging to Achyuta and dated Saka 1454, cyclic, Nandana, corresponding to

34. The exchange of Vallam for Trichinopoly which was effected according to the *T. A. R. Charitam* by the Madura Nayaka, must have happened about this time and the transaction must have been made by the king himself.

35. There is no inscription to refer to Śevappa earlier than 1549 A.D. The epigraphs bearing the later dates show however, the establishment of Śevappa as the first ruler. *The T. A. R. Charitam*, *T. V. Charitam*, *the Raghunāthābhhyudaya Nātakam*, *Vijayavilāsam*, *Sangitā Sudha*, *Ushāparinayam* and *Rukmani Parinayam* refer to the rule of the Tanjore Nayaks beginning from Śevappa. The Maratha records, the Factory Records and the numerous letters written by the Portuguese and the Jesuit missionaries also refer to the Nayak rule.

36. Śellappa's rebellion in 1530 A.D. is confirmed by Ferishta who speaking of the success of Adil Shah at Raichur in 1530 A.D. says that 'against this prince (Ram Raj) rebellions were excited by several Rays (Rāyas) so that the Muhammadans met with no interruption to their progress. Briggs, Vol. III, p. 66.

37. 157 of 1924.

1532 A.D. says that he gave effect to his early orders issued to Śellappa and redistributed the villages equally to the Ēkāmbaranātha and Varadarāja temples.³⁸ The *Achyutarāyābhyudayam* says that Achyuta was staying at Srirangam till the return of Śalakarāju Tirumalarāya from the Tiruvadi expedition. From Srirangam Achyutarāya is said to have proceeded against the Ummattūr chiefs. Besides, Achyutarāya was able to finish his southern campaign by the end of 27th July, 1532 A.D. the date of the Kālahasti inscription. The Ummattūr campaign would have taken him at least a period of three or four months. If we can allow this period of four months, then we arrive at the beginning of the year 1532 A.D. when Achyuta must have been staying at Srirangam. The defeat of the Tiruvadi king and the submission of Śellappa in 1531-32 would have taken place earlier, i.e., in 1531-2 A.D. Perhaps Śellappa's reduction and defeat must have made Achyutarāya finally settle the problem of reorganising his southern territories before his departure for Seringapatam from Srirangam. His bitter experience of Śellappa's disloyalty would have naturally impressed on him the need of appointing a loyal and trusted man as his deputy in the Chōla country. Probably this was the reason that weighed with him in appointing Śevappa Nayaka his close relation as the ruler of Tanjore in the beginning of the year 1532 A.D. which then is in all probability the year of the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship. This date is confirmed by the reliable traditional account contained in the *Tanjāvūri Añdhra Rājula Charitam* which says that Viswanātha Nayaka who was appointed to rule over the Madura country by Krishnadēvarāya 'became the sole ruler of the Pāṇḍya and Chōla kingdom and Krishnadēvarāya died sometime after this and was succeeded by Achyutarāya.'³⁹ Achyuta appointed this Śevappa as sole viceroy over the Chōla country which had till then continued along with the Pāṇḍya country'. Also, Prof. Sathianatha Aiyar has fixed the date of the foundation of the Madura Nayakship and the beginning of Viswanātha Nayaka's rule in 1529 A.D. He says: 'Shortly after, the Chōla country was separated from the viceroyalty of Madura and entrusted to Śevappa Nayaka.'⁴⁰ These foregoing statements clearly show that the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship followed in quick succession the foundation of the Madura Nayakship and so 1532 A.D. marks the beginning of the establishment of the feudatory rule of the Tanjore Nayaks.

38. 544 of 1919. The inscription records his gift of villages made to these two temples at Kānchi which was under the rule of Vira Narasingarāya. Vira Narasingarāya set at defiance the royal order early in 1531 A.D.

39. 'Sources of Vijayanagar History,' p. 323.

40. 'The Nayaks of Madura,' p. 52.

CHAPTER III

ŚEVAPPA NAYAKA (CIR. 1532 TO 1580 A.D.)

Śevappa Nayaka also known as Chinna Śeva¹, Śevanṛpati and Śevabhūpa in Sanskrit and Siru Seva² in Tamil, was thus the founder of the Nayak dynasty of Tanjore in the year 1532 A.D.³ He was the successor of Vira Narasingarāya *alias* Sellappa in the governorship of the Chōla country. Achyutarāya, the brother and successor of Krishnadēvarāya, was then the emperor of Vijayanagar. Śevappa was very closely related to the emperor Achyutarāya, as his wife Mūrtimāmba was the sister-in-law of the latter. The Telugu works and the *Tanjāvūri Aṇdhra Rājula Charitamu* and also the *Tānjāvūri Vāri Charitam* say that Śevappa got Tanjore from the emperor as *strīdhana* for his wife, while the *Sāhityaratnākara* mentions that Tanjore was acquired by Śevappa by his own valour. The latter view is upheld by Mr. T. S. Kuppusamy Sastri on the ground that the work is a contemporary one. Rāmabhadraṁba, the authoress of another contemporary work, the *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*, and the *Vijayavilāsam* refer to the marriage of Śevappa with the sister of Achyutarāya's queen, but do not mention the subject of *strīdhana*. So does the *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam* of Vijayarāghava Nayaka. All these statements are not mutually conflicting, but are helpful in arriving at the truth. Inscriptions⁴ show that Śevappa belonged to a noble family of powerful generals, and he might have distinguished himself in the emperor's wars. Achyutarāya was very much impressed by his valour and permitted him to marry the sister of Tirumalāmba, one of his consorts.⁵ When the question of appointing a new governor over Tanjore arose, he readily

1. 424 of 1928.

2. 259 of 1913.

3. 'Tanjore Aṇdhra Nāyaka Charitam' by K. Sitaramayya, M.A. The author assigns the date 1535 A.D. as marking the foundation of the Tanjore Nayakship, on the authority of an epigraph 271 of 1907 coming from Tiruvidaimarudur. The epigraph is said to be illegible but however, Mr. Sitaramayya says that it must refer to Śevappa. If this record should belong to him, then it will support the fact that he was established in Tanjore by the year 1532 A.D.

4. 145 of 1924 dated in the cyclic year Vikrama corresponding to A.D. 1522 registers a gift made on behalf of Tirumala Nayaka, the agent of Krishnadēvarāya by Dalaway (commander) Śevappa Nayaka. A. R. E. 1924, pp. 111 and 112.

5. The *Vijayavilāsam* says that Mūrtimāmba was the younger sister of Tirumalāmba. But Tirumalāmba in her 'Varadāmbikāparinayam', a kāvya full of romance, calls Varadāmbika as the queen of Achyutarāya and whose marriage is

thought of Śevappa, whom he deemed, by virtue of his close relationship and loyalty, as the fittest person for the post. Śevappa's rise was largely due to his own remarkable strength and to his marriage with Mūrtimāmba. Even the marriage of Śevappa with Mūrtimāmba is doubted by some scholars, who speak of the impossibility in those days of a Nayaka having marital relations with the royal house that claimed its descent from the kshatriyas. Mr. V. Prabhakara Sastri has laboured hard in his Introduction to the *Tanjāvūri Añdhra Rājula Charitam* on this question and comes to the conclusion that Tirumalāmba was not the queen consort of Achyutarāya, but only a courtesan, since the emperor a kshatriya could not marry a lady of a lower caste. A relatively lower caste status is ascribed to Tirumalāmba on the basis of her sister marrying Śevappa Nayaka who belonged to the fourth varṇa, i.e., a Sūdra.⁶ Unfortunately, these wrong assumptions regarding their caste status have no validity since the epigraphical⁷ and literary evidences clearly show that Achyutarāya and his well-known ancestors, Īswara Nayaka and Narasa Nayaka, were all only Nayakas and not Kshatriyas.

Śevappa's parents were powerful nobles and they played a prominent part in the Vijayanagara wars with the Muhammadans. His epigraphs are few and far between and are also found outside the Chōla country proper. From a study of the provenance of his records he seems to have enjoyed jurisdiction over the whole of the present Tanjore district and part of the North Arcot district. His records are remark-

the theme of this work. The epigraphs also refer to Varadāmbika as his queen, and Kumāra Venkatādri was his son by this queen. Perhaps, Varadāmbika was the senior queen *Pattamahishi*. Tirumalāmba calls herself as the 'be all and end all of the deepest love of Achyutarāya.' (Introduction to '*Varadāmbikāparinayam*,'—Edited by Prof. Lakshman Sarup. Varadāmbika is called the daughter of one Salaka Kshitipa. (Mahishipadē Salaka Kshitīsaturvarajātma-jāh sit Varadāmbikā Vadūh). Tirumalāmba therefore appears to have been one of his queens. राजाधिराजाच्युतराय सार्वभौम प्रेम सर्वत्र विश्वास भुवा. The *Vijayavilāsam* and the *Subhadra Parinayam* call her a queen of Achyuta and a talented poetess.

6. The literary works trace his origin from the feet of Vishnu. The *Raghunāthābhyudaya Nātakam* and the *Vijayavilāsam* by Ch. Venkata-kavi and the epigraphs say that Śevappa belonged to the fourth caste.

'Vanajākshu padamula varalu vāhiniki
Anujayai mintsu Nālava jāti jagati
Ajātilōs thāla, Adikulainatti
Rājulu Kondaru Prakyātiganiri.'

Also *Vijayavilāsam*, Introduction, p. 8. Also 497 of 1907.

7. 195 of 1913. The *Varāhapurāṇam* by Mallayya refers to Īswara Nayaka and others as the ancestors of Krishnadēvarāya. Also of 497 of 1907 from Nedu-gunram. The *Achyutarāyaabhyudayam* and the *Varadāmbikāparinayam* speak of Achyutarāya's ancestors.

able for the absence of the customary valuable historical introductions found in the Chōla and the Pāṇḍya inscriptions and also the indication of the regnal years of their issue. The absence of these two important aspects in the Tanjore Nayaks' epigraphs in general and of Śevappa Nayaka in particular, present insurmountable difficulties in our attempt to correctly understand the sequence of the events of his rule. They do not give us any clue as to when Śevappa began to rule or as to when his power came to an end. Such literary evidence as will help us in our understanding of the epigraphs in their true historical perspective, is unfortunately wanting in these particulars also. The contemporary works like the *Sāhityaratnākaram* and the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the other work of the same name by Vijayarāghava Nayaka also do not help us with regard to the chronology. Hence a study of the history of the Tanjore Nayaks is beset with innumerable difficulties in spite of an abundance of traditional accounts and chronicles. The literary evidence presents differing versions regarding the ancestors of Śevappa's family. The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Rukmaṇipariṇayam*⁸ by Rāja-chūdāmani Dikshita say that Śevappa was the son of Timmappa Nayaka or Timmabhūpati by his wife Bayyāmbika. Vijayarāghava Nayaka in his Telugu *Raghunāthābhyudayam* gives a genealogical list which begins with one Krishna whose son was Timma, the husband of Bayyāmbika; and he had four sons, viz., Peḍḍa (elder) Śeva, Chiṇṇa (younger) Śeva, Peḍḍa Malla and Chiṇṇa Malla. Raṅgājamma, a courtesan and a poetess of Vijayarāghava's court, in her *Maṇṇārudāsavilāsam* and *Ushā-pariṇayam* introduces another Timmappa, with his wife Gōpamāmba, between Krishna and Timmappa Nayaka, the husband of Bayyāmbika. She says that the Nayak's belonged to the Maṇṇāru gōtra (Maṇṇanāru gōtra vibhudēndrunin Vijayarāghava Chaṇḍruṇi).⁹ Since all the works quoted above are contem-

8. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VI, Sl. 1 to 10. Edited by Dr. T. R. Chintamani, Bulletins of the Sanskrit Department, Madras University.

It is said from the feet of Vishnu was born the Cauvery river. She had a sister who gave birth to many sons. One of them was Timmabhūpa whose wife was Bayyāmbika. Vide also 'Sources,' p. 284. The translation reads 'In the śūdra caste born from the feet of Vishnu was born a king called Timma'.

9. *Rukmaṇipariṇayam*, since published by the Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam.

Raṅgājamma speaks of Vijayarāghava as belonging to the Maṇṇāru gōtra. This will mean that the presiding deity Maṇṇāru (Vishnu) of the Maṇṇārgudi temple (Tanjore district) was their Kula dēvata (family god) and not to any gōtra, since the śūdras cannot claim any such thing. The śūdras are even now called as belonging to Siva and Vishnu gōtras according to their religious persuasion.

porary it is difficult to say which is correct and which is not, until further light should be thrown on this question. But all of them say that Śevappa Nayaka was the son of Timmappa Nayaka by his wife Bayyāmbika. The inscriptions of Śevappa confirm this statement¹⁰; and it may not be improbable that he had three brothers for the existence of whom we have, however, no direct evidence from the epigraphs.¹¹

Timmappa Nayaka, *alias* Timmabhūpatī, must have been a powerful noble and also a ruler of some importance as the epithet bhūpati would indicate. Perhaps, he was the ruler of the North Arcot District with his capital at Neduṅgunram, a place thirty miles north of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. The epigraphs of all the Tanjore Nayaks show that they, belonged to Neduṅgunram¹² and indicate that they must have had some connection with it. This finds further confirmation from their records found at Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. One of Krishnadēvarāya's epigraphs mention a Timmappa who had the high privilege of serving him as his door-keeper (vāśal) and who took part in the Raichur campaign.¹³ Perhaps he was the father of Śevappa Nayak,¹⁴ who himself is described in an epigraph as the emperor's *dalavāy* (commander).¹⁵ Thus we see that Śevappa and his father were both serving the Vijayanagar emperors, Krishnadēvarāya and Achyutarāya, before the former was appointed to Tanjore. Śevappa himself had the high honour of serving Achyutarāya

10. 497 of 1907 dated Saka 1495 expired. Kuttalam, Tanjore district. Śevappa Nayaka was the son of Timmappa Nayaka of the fourth caste (Chaturtha gōtra) and who was a native of Neduṅgunrm in Tōḍaimaṇḍalam. Also 424 of 1928 which says Chinna Chevva of the family of Timmabhūpa.

11. 376 of 1912 from Dēvikapuram and dated in the cyclic year Sārvari, refers to the arrangements made for the supply of ghee to the temple by Mallappa and Śevappa Nayaka for the merit of Achyutarāya. Sārvari would correspond to A.D. 1541-2. Also 383 of 1912 dated Saka 1464.

12. 497 of 1907 cited above and 75 of 1925 dated S. 1471. Śevappa Nayaka of Neduṅgunram.

13. 455 of 1906, Pirānmalai, Madura District, dated S. 144. 182 of 1932 dated S. 1436 from Kālahasti.

14. This Timmappa must be different from the other Timmappa Nayakas of the inscriptions of Krishnadēvarāya. 13 of 1927-28 refers to Timmappa Nayaningarū of Kundūrpisime. Krishnadēvarāya's epigraphs refer to more than one Timmappa Nayaka. 404 of 1913 mentions a Timmappa Nayaka. The record is found at Salem. He is called the ruler of Nadunādu. 4 of 1930 mentions a Timmappa and is said to be the son of Eramānchi Chikka Timmappa Nayaka. 60 of 1934 from the North Arcot District dated 1526 A.D. refers to a Timmappa as the son of one Annāchi Nayaka.

15. 145 of 1924 dated S. 1433 from Neduṅgunram mentions one *dalavāy* Śevappa Nayaka who is called an agent of Krishnadēvarāya cited before.

as his 'betel-bearer', equivalent to the office of Aḍappam in Tamil and Tāmbūla Karaṇḍavāhin in Sanskrit.¹⁶

Śevappa's rule was not marked by any notable event or wars; and his reign was one of peace and comparative prosperity and this is best seen in his works of charity and magnificent buildings. Śevappa remained a loyal feudatory of the emperor; and his epigraphs bear ample testimony to this fact. His inscriptions recording his gifts are dated in the reigns of his overlords, viz., Achyutarāya, Sadāsivarāya and Tirumala. An epigraph of Śevappa from the Tanjore district is recorded in the reign of Sadāsivarāya.¹⁷ The Vijayanagar kings had full control over their feudatory Nayaks, right from the beginning; and the presence of a number of epigraphs of Krishnadēvarāya and Achyutadēvarāya in the Chōḷa country confirms their supremacy.¹⁸ The great minister Gōvinda Dikshita, in his introduction to the *Sangīta Sudhā*, speaks of Śevappa's loyalty and interest in the affairs of the empire when he gives him the *biruda*—*Karṇāta śimhāṣana kārya ḍuryaha*.¹⁹ On account of his relationship with the emperor under whose patronage the Tanjore Nayakship was founded, Śevappa must have been held in high esteem and regard by the neighbouring Nayak rulers of Madura and Gingee; and there apparently existed happy and friendly relations between them.

One of the earliest features of Śevappa's reign was the transfer of Trichinopoly which was then comprehended in the Tanjore governorship, to the Madura Nayak, in exchange for Vallam.²⁰ Viswanātha Nayak is said to have fortified Trichinopoly by building a double-walled fort therein and by constructing a big tank inside it. The necessity for fortifying the place, it is said in the chronicles, was due to the predatory ravages and hardships from which the country suffered at the hands of robbers who swooped down on the pilgrims bound for Rāmēswaram and caused much injury to them, both bodily and materially. Taylor says that

16. 380 of 1919 from Little Conjeevaram. Achyutappa Nayaka is called the son of Aḍappam Chinna Śevappa Nayaka.

17. 72 of 1925 (Māṇḍai, Tanjore District). The cyclic year Sādhārana will correspond to 1549 A.D. and another from Tiruvaṇṇamalai 427 of 1928 dated 1569 A.D. refers to the same overlord.

18. 39 of 40 of 1897 of Achyutarāya are found in the Tōppūr Pillayar temple at Tanjore and are dated S. 1454 and S. 1401 respectively. 271 of 1907 from Tiruvadamārudur is dated S. 1456. 261 of 1917 from Tirumakkōttai. 116 of 1931-32 is dated S. 1459, Paṇḍanallūr, Tanjore District.

19. 'Sangīta Sudhā' Introduction, sloka 28. Published in the Journal of the Madras Music Academy.

20. Taylor, 'Oriental Historical' Mss., Vol. II, p. 109.

Viswanātha Nayaka effected this transfer by giving over Vallam to the king of Tanjore. He was the ruler of Tanjore also besides Madura before the establishment of Śevappa Nayaka as the governor of the Tanjore country. Hence the ruler of Tanjore mentioned in the chronicles was no other than Śevappa himself, whose rule began in 1532 A.D. Both Viswanatha and Śevappa were feudatories of Achyutarāya. Śevappa who was just then appointed to Tanjore could not have effected this arrangement of his own accord. Evidently, the transfer was arranged by Achyutarāya himself while he was staying at Srirangam and also before he appointed Śevappa to Tanjore. This looks probable since the emperor reconstituted his southern territories and put them on an enduring basis needed for making full arrangements.²¹

Śevappa continued the same loyal and friendly attitude towards Sadāsivarāya, the Vijayanagara emperor and his general Rāmarāja Viṭhaladēva Mahārāja, when the latter came to the South on an expedition against the Tiruvaḍi Raja about the year 1545 A.D. and remained for about a decade at Trichinopoly as the viceroy of the south. Śevappa in all probability might have offered his help to Rāmarāja Viṭhala in his wars against the Tiruvaḍi king as well as against the Paravas of the Fishery Coast.²²

21. 'Nayaks of Madura' p. 52. Prof. Sathianatha Aiyar says that 'this must have been an imperial arrangement, for the empire was yet too strong to allow so much independence to the provinces.' The transfer of Vallam has been given different dates. *The Tanjore District Gazetteer*, p. 38 gives 1623 A.D. *The Tanjore Manual*, p. 751, has 1560 A.D. Mr. K. Sitharamayya Garu, 'Tanjore Andhra Nayaka Charitamu, p. 95 says, that the whole transaction must have been made during the time of a Chōla king and strangely enough, he speaks at the same time also of the possibility of Achyutarāya making this arrangement. Father Heras, *Aravidu Dynasty*, p. 129, says that this happened after 1539 A.D. 1532 A.D. satisfies all the circumstances and is also supported by evidence. We need not go into an examination and criticism of the various discrepant dates mentioned above. That Vallam and Trichinopoly were exchanged between Tanjore and Madura by Achyutarāya looks fairly satisfactory.'

22. Rāmarāja Viṭhala's imposing expedition into the south was due to two causes which were of vital importance to the empire. The efforts of Udaya Mārthānda Varma, the king of Travancore to extend his dominion in the east and the appointment of a viceroy by him over the newly acquired territories in the present Tinnevely District asked for the imperial intervention. "Udaya Mārthānda Varma, whose surname according to epigraphs was Maṅkonda Bhūtala Vīra Sri Vīra Udaya Mārthānda Varma, was a famous warrior who conquered almost the whole of the Tinnevely District. He married a princess, known as Chōlakulavalli, who brought with her the district of Kalakād as dowry. The king made Kalakād his capital and built in it a new palace, called Vīra Mārthānda Chaturvēdimangalam Pudumāligai. He was the first of the three Bhutala Viras whose names occur in

Viṭhaladēva's viceroyalty did not contribute anything materially to the rule of the Tanjore Nayaks and his authority was above those of the Nayaks in general.²³ It was during this period that the famous battle of Talikota was fought between the armies of Rāmarāja on the one side and the Muhammadans on the other.²⁴ We read from Ferishta that Rāmarāja on the eve of this war issued an order summoning all his dependents and rāyas from the banks of the Krishna as far as the island of Ceylon.²⁵ Muthukrishnappa Nayaka of Madura (1564-72) is said to have despatched an army under the captainship of Ariyanātha Mudaliar.²⁶ But there is nothing to refer to the part played by Tanjore

the coins of Tinnevely. He gave grants of land as paḷlichchandam to the god of the temple of Nagercoil at the special request of Guṇavīra Panditan and Kamalavāhana Panditan, probably Jains. He protected the Christian Paravas of Kumari-muttam near Cape Comorin from being harassed by taxation at the hands of their Hindu brethren (Pillar Inscription of 20th Minam 701 M.E.=1526 A.D.). The Christians were evidently those converted by Father Miguel Vaz. The Travancore ruler was described by St. Francis Xavier in one of his letters of 1544, as "the great king having authority all over South India." [Ed.]

The more important cause seems to be the growth of a powerful influence as a result of missionary enterprise in the Fishery Coast. 'The coast region was open to Portuguese enterprise and the chief ports of the south contained Portuguese factories'. 'The advent of Francis Xavier in the southern region created a new and powerful influence the political aspects of which have not received adequate attention among the historians of this period. The Paravas, the fisherfolk along the coast were being rapidly converted to Christianity, and such conversion was interpreted as involving a change of allegiance of the inhabitants from their Indian rulers to the king of Portugal. This wholesale conversion of a class of industrious inhabitants of the coast, including among them those engaged in the valuable pearl-fishing, made them ipso facto subjects of the king of Portugal.' The Empire could not look on with indifference this transference of territory from his allegiance to that of the king of Portugal by the peaceful efforts of Portuguese missionaries. Rāmarāja Viṭhala's invasion resulted in the reduction of the Parava Coast 'to its normal sense of political allegiance.' See '*Nayaks of Madura*,' Introduction, pp. 13-14. Also p. 90 foot-note. Father Heras gives a detailed account of this invasion in his '*Aravīdu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*,' pp. 159-162.

23. 140 of 1895 from Tiruvadamardur belongs to Sadāsiva Rāya and it records a gift of two villages by Rāmarāja Viṭhaladēva. The record was issued by Rāmarāja in the Tanjore country while Śevappa was the ruler. 104 of 1911 from the Tanjore country dated S. 1482 (1560 A.D.) refers to a settlement made by Krishnamarājayyan the son of Aliya Rāmarāja. He appointed a certain Gñānaprakāsar Paṇḍāram of Tiruvārur as the supervisor of the temples at Sikkil, Vadagudi and Vōdachēri. The epigraphist says that 'Krishnamarājayyan was evidently a ruler of some portion of Tanjore.' A.R.E., 1911.

24. For an account of the battle, see Heras, Chapter IX.

25. Briggs, Ferishta, Vol. III, pp. 413-4.

26. 431 of 1928 from Tiruvannāmalai, records Śevappa Nayak's loyalty to Tirumalarāya I in 1570 A.D., a few years after the battle of Talikota 1565 A.D.

in this war. The chronicles do not mention Śevappa's help rendered to the empire, but all of them speak of his loyalty and faithfulness. As a loyal subordinate, Śevappa Nayaka must have helped the emperor in this hour of need, along with the ruler of Madura and others.

Nothing more is known of Śevappa's reign except his works of charity and public utility. He constructed temples, repaired numerous tanks and founded agrahāras. He repaired the Sivagaṅgā tank at Tanjore and to ensure full supply of water he caused to be dug a feeder tank which was called after him. Even to-day the tank goes by the name of Śeppanēri a contracted form for Śevappanēri. The Sivagaṅgā fort also was repaired by him.²⁷ He also built the magnificent tower (gōpura) composed of eleven storeys of the Arunāchalēswara temple at Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. 419 of 1928 from Tiruvaṇṇāmalai says that in the year 1572 A.D. the gōpura was built at the request of one Sivanēsa and his brother Lōkanātha.²⁸ This great achievement of Śevappa Nayak was much appreciated and extolled by the people who recorded their praise in beautiful verses which are still to be found.²⁹ The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Sangīta Sudhā*, besides mentioning his building the Tiruvaṇṇāmalai gopura, refer to his other works.³⁰ Śevappa is said to have constructed the massive prākāras in the temples at Vriḍḍhāchalam and Conjeevaram and covered the vimānas of both the Tirupati and Śrisaīlam temples with gold. In the Chōla country his benefactions impartially extended to both the Siva and Vishnu temples situated on either side of the holy river Cauvery. Besides, he made gifts of villages³¹ and precious jewels to the gods and provided for the feeding of the Brahmans. The *Vijayavilāsam* and the *Rājagōpalavilāsam* refer to these gifts and speak of his pious deeds. The *Tanjāvūri Añdhra Rājula Charitamu* also mentions his building of the gōpura and the prākāras of the Tiruvaṇṇāmalai and Vriḍḍhāchalam temples, respectively. The gifts made to these temples and the large contributions made to Siva and Vishnu temples show Śevap-

27. Of the two forts at Tanjore the small fort is said to have been built by Śevappa and the bigger by Vijayarāghava. *Annual Report of Archaeological Department, S. Circle, 1912-13.*

28. 419 of 1928. Śevappa is called Timmappa Chinnaśevvanrpati

29. The verses are said to have been composed by one Srinivasa Dikshita of Satyamangalam, A.R.E., 1928, Pt. II. An account of this composer is also given.

30. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VI, Sl. 7-10. *Sangīta Sudhā*, Introd., Sl. 28-33.

31. 421 of 1928 registers a gift of villages to the temple at Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. 27 of 1925 dated S. 1497 comes from Mūvaḷūr in the Tanjore district. It records a *sarvamānya* gift of land ten *vēlis*, for the maintenance of a choultry attached to the temple.

pa's patronage of these two leading religions. A spirit of toleration was largely developed by the Tanjore Nayaks who were Vaishnavas by religious persuasion. His benefactions were extended to the other religious faiths such as Buddhism and Muhammadanism. An epigraph coming from the Kumbakōnam Taluk (292 of 1927) and dated 1579 A.D. refers to a Buddhist temple to which lands were allotted by the people in exchange of lands that belonged to the temple and which were used by them for other purposes.³² An inscription (425 of 1924) found on the wall of the Samuśarupalli mosque in Tanjore registers a grant of seven *vēlis* of land made to the faqirs of the mosque by five Maṇṇaiyārs of Naṇjikkōttai at the instance of Śevappa in the year 1550 A.D. The patronage given by him to the Mādhvā religion is also seen in his grants made. In 1574 A.D. the great Mādhvā teacher, Vijayindra Tirtha Sripāda, received a grant of a village from the Nayaka.³³ Śevappa also

32. The record states that the people of Tirumalairājapuram having had to cut a channel through the land that belonged to the Buddhist temple at Tiruviḷandurai, they made compensation by assigning $2\frac{3}{4}$ *velis* of land in Tirumalairājapuram. 'The Leyden grant refers to a Buddhist temple at Negapatam as early as the 18th century. The Buddha images within a radius of five miles of Kumbakōnam, one at the entrance into the Tiruvaḷanjuli temple and another within the temple at Pattiswaram and a third miscalled Bhārgavarishi in a Gānēsa shrine in Kumbakōnam itself testify to the prevalence of the Buddhist religion though perhaps in a fugitive condition in the heart of the Tanjore district in mediaeval times. The present record is of interest in that it mentions a Buddha temple in the Kumbakōnam taluk till so late as the time of Śevappa Nayaka. A. R. E. 1927, part II, p. 116.

33. The Arivīlimangalam plates. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XII, p. 357. Śevappa Nayaka was also responsible for another grant made to the same maṭha by Srirangaraya. (Mysore Archaeological Report, 1917, p. 17). Here the king is called Vīrachevva Bhūpa and he is described as 'a moon to the ocean of Timmappa.' The record which is dated in A.D. 1575 registers the gift of Nāvalūr and Pūkkudi villages to the great teacher Surēndra Tīrtha, the spiritual guru of Vijayindra Tīrtha. Besides, these two grants, the Rāghavēndraswāmi maṭha at Nanjangūd is in possession of three copper plate grants referring to the Tanjore Nayak's benefactions. One of them, dated 1580 A.D. belongs to Śevappa and records a grant of villages in the Mayavaram Taluk, made to Vijayindra Tīrtha at Kumbakōnam. The record bears the emblem of a boar which was the *lāncana* of the Vijayanagar kings and is signed Sri Rājagōpāla. The plates give an account of Śevappa's ancestors beginning from Vishnu, Ganga, Earth and Dēvarāja. The last mentioned person is said to have been a minister of Krishnadēvarāya and to have captured the fort of Udayagiri. His son was Chinṇarāja by his wife Maṅgalāmbika; and Chinṇarāja was Rāmarāja's minister. He had two sons Śevappa and Chinṇa Śevappa. The plates say that Chinṇarāja was the founder of the Tanjore Nayaks. He was succeeded by Śevappa whom his brother Chinṇaśevappa regarded as his father. The record says that Vijayindra and Tātāchārya, the great Vaishnava scholar and Appayya

made provision for the celebration of festivals. One Kālāttinātha Mudaliar who appears as the signatory of a record (245 of 1927) of Śevappa which relates to a gift of lands, must have been an officer of the king.

Śevappa Nayaka's patronage extended even to Europeans like the Portuguese who had then captured the maritime trade of South India from the Arabs. The Portuguese came to India and landed on the west coast towards the close of the 15th century. Soon their power increased and this was made possible by the complete absence of European rivalry and the impotence of the Mussalmans to resist their guns and ships. They carried on a large volume of trade with Ceylon, having established themselves both on the west coast as well as in the neighbourhood of the Fishery Coast. Their missionaries converted the Paravas of the Fishery Coast of Tinnevely and soon grew powerful. It was their objectionable activities and mass conversions that stimulated the expedition of Rāmarāja Viṭhaladēva. The Portuguese soon came to possess factories on the Coromandel Coast the earliest being those of San Thome de Meliapur and Negapatam. Ferishta, speaking of the Christians in the year 963 A.H. (1556 A.D.), says 'that the Christians held the ports of Mangalore and Negapatam in the extreme south of the Peninsula.'³⁴ By 1586 A.D. Negapatam had become a flourishing centre and came to possess a governor of its own.' Diogo Fernandez Penoa from Negapatam is said to have helped the Portuguese against the attacks of the Ceylonese king Rājasimha.³⁵ The Portuguese, either in the beginning of Śevappa's reign or even a little earlier, had settled at Negapatam and carried on trade between the outside world and the kingdom of Tanjore. An anonymous life of St. Xavier says that the Portuguese 'were greatly favoured by the lord of that country who is a very powerful captain of the king of Bisnaga.' Soon the Portuguese

Dikshita, the Advaita scholar used to meet in the court of Śevappa. The other two records dated 1614 A.D. in the reign of Chinnaśeva refer to further grants made to the same Vijayindra Tirtha. Śevappa, the brother of Chinnaśeva, is said to have been residing at Kumbakonam leaving the kingdom in the hands of the latter. The records in question were prepared at the instance of the king by his minister whose name is not mentioned. It is said that Chinnaśeva may be identified with Achyutappa ('Sāhityaratnākara' Canto III, Sl. 28). This view is not correct since the verse referred to speaks of him as Chinnaśeva Achyuta and not Chinnaśeva as is surmised. However, the genealogy contained in these plates differ in all essential respects from that of the literary and epigraphical evidence. One would like to know more about these plates and their paleography in particular before giving them their due importance and proper consideration. Already a note of warning is sounded in the same report regarding the authenticity of the grants of Sriranga given to the maṭha.

34. Briggs, Ferishta, Vol. IV, p. 534.

35. F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, p. 32 and 76.

acquired royal favour in the Nayak's court. The Portuguese fortified the place and erected a fort and two churches, one dedicated to St. Francis of Assisi and the other to Our Lady of Health. It is recorded that in the very first year of the Portuguese occupation of Negapatam about 300 Hindus were baptized. Cesare Federici wrote of Negapatam in 1567 A.D. 'as a very great city and very populous of Christians of the country and partly gentile'.³⁶ St. Xavier visited the town about 1550 A.D. Śevappa appears to have given them protection and permitted them to trade in his land. The erection of buildings could not have been possible but for the royal favour.³⁷

Śevappa Nayaka, had a long reign and lived to a ripe age, having spent the major part of his life in his newly acquired kingdom. An inscription of his from Kumbakonam (Tanjore District) mentions A.D. 1579-80 and it is the latest date so far known.³⁸ The *Sāhityaratnākara*³⁹ says that he appointed his son Achyutappa Nayaka as Yuvarāja and put him in charge of the administration. Achyutappa's earliest epigraph is dated in the year 1560 A.D.⁴⁰ Śevappa ruled for about twenty-one years from A.D. 1532 to A.D. 1563 as king and spent the rest of his life in performing acts of piety,⁴¹ till his death in 1580 A.D.⁴² In his last days he appointed one Gōvinda Dikshita as his minister who later on became famous as a good administrator and a wise counsellor. Gōvinda Dikshita's name is still remembered by the people of the Tanjore country. 422 of 1928 from Tiruvannāmalai dated Saka 1502 (1580 A.D.) contains two verses by one Gōvindasūri who styling himself as a dependent of Śevappa Bhūpa expresses gratitude for favours received, by composing verses in praise of him. In all probability the author is identical with Gōvinda Dikshita who became the minister of Śevappa's successors.⁴³ Mr. Sitaramayya speaks of two images of Śevappa, one in the big Temple at Tanjore and the other in the Venkataramaṇaswāmī temple. However, they are not labelled Śevappa and Mr. Sitaramayya himself says that nothing definite could be said about them.

36. Heras *'The Aravidu Dynasty'*, pp. 174-175.

37. 'Tanjore Gazetteer' p. 244 says that Śevappa was opposed to the Portuguese.

38. 292 of 1927 contains the cyclic year Vikrama, Ādi. It corresponds to 1579-80 A.D.

39. Canto III, Sloka 17.

40. 536 of 1904. The cyclic year Rudrōdgāri and the Saka year 1480 do not agree. The cyclic year must be Raudri.

41. His epigraphs from Tiruvannāmalai and other places recording his works of building gōpuras, etc., are dated only after 1563 A.D.

42. Mr. K. Sitaramayya supposes that Śevappa must have lived till 1580 A.D. T. S. Kurupuswami Sastri assigns 1572 A.D. as his last known date.

43. A.R.E. 1928, Part II, p. 86.

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Nathamuni : His Life and Times

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I

THE Viśiṣṭādvaita system associated with the name of Bhagavān Rāmānuja advocates, on the philosophical side, a specific type of Absolutism, a kind of organic conception of Reality and inculcates, on the religious side, belief in a single Supreme God, who, from His unbounded mercy, saves those who are His ardent devotees. Though, in its final form, the system owes not a little to Rāmānuja, it is well to remember that both the theoretical and the practical teaching which have been so successfully synthesized in his system claim a venerable ancestry, each being traceable to the Vedas themselves. Of course, priority or posteriority is not a valid determinant of the philosophical soundness and the religious and moral satisfactoriness of a system. Even if it be granted, for the sake of argument, that the doctrine which goes by the name of the Rāmānuja school was initiated by him that would not in any way detract from its value. But, as a matter of fact, the system which was built up with such logical elaboration is of very ancient date. As Vedānta Deśika puts it.—

यतिक्ष्माभृद्दृष्टं मतमिह नवीनं तदपि किं

ततः प्रागेवान्यद्ब्रूत तदपि किं वर्णनिकषे ।

निशाम्यन्तां यद्वो निजमतिरिस्कारविगमा-

निरातङ्गाः टङ्कद्रमिडगुहदेवप्रभृतयः ॥

Vedānta Deśika's *Yatirāja-Saptati*, St. 57.

A careful study of the ancient religious literature of the country will support the conclusion that the central philosophical teaching of the Upaniṣads as understood in early times, long before the *Vedānta-Sūtras* were composed, resembled Rāmānuja's view rather than that of Śaṅkara. There is a general consensus of opinion among scholars that the *Vedānta-Sūtras* themselves favour the interpretation put on them by Rāmānuja. In his interpretation of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, Rāmānuja was influenced not a little by the views of several teachers of old (*pūrvācāryas*) and more particularly by those of Bodhāyana, Ṭanka, Dramiḍa and Yāmuna.

The religious doctrines associated with Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta trace their ancestry to the ancient Bhāgavata school, whose fundamental text was the *Ekāyana śākha*, a branch of the White Yajur Vēda. The Bhāgavata cult, known also as the Sātvata or Pāñcarātra school, flourished in times long anterior to Jainism and Buddhism;¹ and it has exercised considerable influence on the shaping of those heterodox systems also.² An elaborate account of its doctrines is found in the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *Mahābhārata*. The *Bhāgavad-Gītā* is a classical exposition of the doctrines of the Bhāgavata school.³

Till about the first or the second century B.C., the Bhāgavata religion was widely prevalent in the country, as is evident from the inscriptions found at Ghasundi, Besnagar and Nānāghāt Cave. But when Buddhism became a power in the land, for a time, the Hindu faiths suffered a set back. But the essentially atheistic and ascetic

1. Dr. Bühler says ". . . . the ancient Bhāgavata, Sātvata or Pāñcarātra sect devoted to the worship of Nārāyaṇa and his deified teacher Kṛṣṇa-Devakī-putra, dated from a period long anterior to the rise of the Jains in the 8th C. B.C." *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XXXII, p. 248. The worship of Kṛṣṇa seems to have been popular during the first centuries of the development of the Jaina creed." Prof. Jacobi. *SBE*. Vol. XXII, p. xxxi n.

2. "No one will claim to derive from Buddhism Vaiṣṇavism or the Yoga. Assuredly, Buddhism is the borrower." 'To sum up, if there had not previously existed a religion made up of the doctrines of Yoga or Vaiṣṇavite legends of devotion to Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa, worshipped under the title of Bhagavat, Buddhism would not have come to birth at all.' *The Indian Interpreter*, Jan. 1910, pp. 177-8.

3. एवमेष महान्धर्मस्सते पूर्वं नृपोत्तम ।

कथितो हरिगीतासु समासविधिकल्पितः ॥

Mahābhārata, Śānti Parva, 346, 10.

See also *Gītā-Rahasya* p. 11 : "Considering the similarity between the tradition of the Bhagavad-Gītā doctrine and of the Gītā religion, one is forced to admit that the Gītā is a book which supports the Bhāgavata religion . . . "

creeds of Buddhism and Jainism and their elaborate systems of scholastic philosophy could not appeal to men's minds for long.

In the early centuries of the Christian era there arose, side by side, the Vaiṣṇavite Saints, known as Ālvārs, persons immersed in the rapture of the love of God, and the Śaivite Saints, known as Nāyanmārs, who revealed in exquisite strains their characteristic religious experiences. In these saints we see Indian bhakti at its best. To save mankind from atheism and religious indifference and to throw open the doors of wisdom to all, without any distinction of caste, creed or sex, these stalwarts of the spirit tried the novel but effective experiment of expounding divine mysteries in Tamil, the speech of the common folk, the language which they knew best and which spoke to their hearts.

While these Tamil saints sought to quicken the religious sentiments of the common people and to reclaim them from rank atheism and the morass of asceticism, eminent Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and great exponents of Vedānta philosophy like Śaṅkara dealt deadly blows at the philosophical teaching of the Buddhistic schools. Unable to withstand this onslaught, Buddhism gradually declined.

Hinduism procured this victory over heretic schools at an enormous cost. For a time the Mīmāṃsakas who had helped to overthrow the enemy enjoyed great prestige; they attached much more importance to the sacrificial rites than to the gods themselves whom they were intended to propitiate. This meant the spread of the evils of ritualism and blind formalism and the drying up of the fresh springs of spiritual life. The ritualistic Mīmāṃsaka relegated the really philosophical portions of the Vedas, namely the Upaniṣads to a position of unimportance. The excessive emphasis which he laid on the Vedic ritual as a means of obtaining supreme blessedness promoted an illiberal spirit which kept out large sections of the people from either reading the Vedas or performing the ritual enjoined therein.

Advaitins like Śaṅkara, who with their vast learning and matchless dialectical skill were largely responsible for defeating the enemy, incorporated into their system many of the doctrines of their opponents. Their victory was, in a sense, pyrrhic, because they absorbed many of the doctrines of their opponents into their own system. By advocating the belief in a god who is but a phenomenal entity, and by describing the jīva as merely an appearance of the truly Real, the Advaitins were perilously near adopting the atheism and scepticism characteristic of Buddhistic thought. The doctrine that the world is illusory (*mithyā*) reduces ethics and religion to the level of useful fictions. 'There was no

room for truly religious experience in the icy cold thought-system of the Advaitins. The view that the final state is beyond good and evil is an invitation to moral indifference. While the Mīmāṃsakas laid undue stress on rituals, the Advaitins went to the opposite extreme and insisted upon the need for the renunciation of all action (*karma-saṁnyāsa*). Speaking of these two extreme positions, Vedānta Deśika compares them humorously to Rāhu and Kabandha Mīmāṃsakas. The ritualistic Mīmāṃsaka rendered the Vedas headless by subordinating the Upaniṣads to the Karma-Kāṇḍa; while the Advaitins cut out the trunk of the Vedas by ignoring the importance of the Karma-Kāṇḍa.

मीमांसायाः कबन्धं कतिचन जगृह् राहुकल्पं शिरोऽन्ये ।

किन्तैरन्तर्विरोधप्रमुषितमतिभिर्बाह्वकल्पैर्भ्रमद्भिः ॥

Vedānta Deśika's *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī*, st. 10.

The outlook for Hindu thought was not at all pleasant. It was at this juncture that Nāthamuni (9th Century) appeared upon the scene. His was indeed a difficult task. He had to contend against two classes of enemies—those who repudiated the Vedic authority and those who accepted the Vedas but interpreted them in devious ways. On the one hand, he had to fight against the atheism and scepticism of the Buddhists and the relativism of the Jains. On the other hand, he had to combat the doctrine of the absolute identity of the jīva with Brahman along with the view that God is merely a phenomenal entity. The soul caught up in the wild-fire of illusionism must be saved from extinction. The upaniṣadic view of Reality and the intensely religious conception of the world characteristic of the *bhakti* cult had to be synthesised. Further, the Pūrva and the Uttara Mīmāṃsās should, as of old, be brought together to form a single śāstra. While it was necessary to give a death-blow to ritualism in the form of sacrifices which had outgrown its original purpose and begun to deny God, it was equally necessary to insist upon the importance of moral endeavour. If devotion, service to humanity and selflessness should be permanent values in human life, and not wither away like the abstract moralism of the Buddhists, the firm foundation on which they are based must be made known.

In the ancient social system, certain sections had been excluded from the privileges of religious thought and teaching. The axe had to be laid at this religious exclusiveness which denies to women and the lower castes the privilege of knowing God and attaining the highest goal of life. The reconstruction of Vaiṣṇava thought and religion that Nāthamuni effected was as timely as it was sublime. A characteristic feature of this new phase of Vaiṣṇavism is that it drew nourishment from the

outpourings of the Ālvārs, which have been justly called the Tamil Veda. From this time onwards, the sources of authority for this system have been described as being two-fold, *Ubhaya-Vedānta*—the Vedas including the Upaniṣads and the songs of the Ālvārs.

Another important feature of Nāthamuni's system is the popularisation of the *prapatti-mārga*⁴ (the path of absolute self-surrender), which is conceived as demanding no caste status.

By his insistence on the importance of the Tamil hymns of the Ālvārs, his invitation to women and the lower castes to partake of the essence of Hindu religion and philosophy, and his exposition of the doctrine of self-surrender (*prapatti*), Nāthamuni contributed a great deal to the development of the new system as a universal religion.

Nāthamuni holds a very high place in the development of Viśiṣṭādvaitism. The debt it owes to him cannot be adequately estimated. In consideration of his manifold services to this system, Vedānta Deśika often describes Nāthamuni as its founder.

दृष्टेऽपहुत्यभावादनुमिति विषये लाघवस्यानुरोधा-
 च्छास्त्रेणैवावसेये विहतिविरहिते नास्तिकत्वप्रहाणात् ।
 नाथोपज्ञं प्रवृत्तं बहुभिरुपचितं यामुनेयप्रबन्धै-
 स्नातं सम्यग्यतीन्द्रैरिदमखिलतमः कर्शनं दर्शनं नः ॥

Vedānta Deśika's *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, Adraavyasara, st. 136.

"Our system of philosophy was started (on a new phase of its career) by Nāthamuni; it was considerably developed by the works of Yāmunācārya, and was greatly strengthened (*i.e.*, rendered proof against assaults) by Rāmānuja. It is competent to dispel all kinds of ignorance (*tamas*); for it does not contradict perception. In its inferences, it has the great merit of economy of thought. It is in no way antagonistic to the spirit of the scriptures."

II

Ranganāthācārya or Nāthamuni, as he is more usually known, was the first of the illustrious line of Vaiṣṇavite reformers who carried for-

4. ".....முன்னுதவ நெறி முட்டிய நாதமுனி கழலே
 நாணும் தொழு தெழுவோ நமக்கார் நிகர் நானிலத்தே".

ward and completed the work started by the Ālvārs of an earlier epoch. A native of Vīranārāyaṇapuram, the modern Mannargudi of the South Arcot district, he spent a great part of his life at Śrīrangam, the stronghold of Vaiṣṇavism in those days. He must have lived from about the middle of the 9th century A.D. to the middle of the tenth. The traditional account which assigns to him an incredibly long life extending over three hundred years is evidently a device to fill up the gap between the age of the Ālvārs and that of the Ācāryas.

The Anbil plates⁵ belonging to the reign of the Cola king, Parāntaka II, record the grant of land which the king made to a minister of his, Aniruddha by name, a native of Anbil. This officer and his ancestors are stated therein to have been famous for their learning, piety, philanthropy and intense devotion to God Ranganātha of Śrīrangam. The author of the Sanskrit verses which form the first part of these plates mentions himself as Mādhava Bhaṭṭa, son of Bhāṭṭa Datta "who was an ocean for the rivers of knowledge, a treasure of the gems of spotless qualities, who was a moon to the ocean of the family of Parāśara, and who was a bee at the lotus, namely the feet of Śrī Nātha."⁶ The late Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao⁷ has suggested that this Śrī Nātha may be identified with the Vaiṣṇava Ācārya, Nāthamuni. Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri⁸ appears to be inclined to accept the suggestion. It must be said, however, that the word Śrīnātha would seem to mean rather the Lord of Lakṣmi than Nāthamuni.

Tradition has it that Nāthamuni once heard some visitors to his native place from the southern part of the presidency recite a hymn of ten verses composed by Saint Śaṭhakopa in praise of the Deity (Ārāvamudan) in the Vaiṣṇavite temple of Kumbakonam. He was captivated by the charm of their language and the grandeur of their thoughts. Finding from the concluding verse of the hymn that these constituted only ten out of a thousand verses composed by Saint Śaṭhakopa, Nātha-

5. *Epigraphica Indica*, Vol. XV, No. 5.

6. विद्यानघम्बुराशिर्विमलतरुणव्रातरत्नाकरो यः

पाराशार्यान्व(वा)याम्बुधिशिशिरकरो मद्दत्तोमिधानः ।

तस्य श्रीनाथपादाद्बुरुहयुगलिकाष्टपदस्य प्रशस्ति

पुत्रश्चित्रा(र्धे) रम्या समरचयदिमा माधवो मद्भयज्वा ॥

Ibid., p. 70 (Plate 8).

7. T. A. Gopinatha Rao: *The History of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas*, p. 30.

8. Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri: *The Colas*, Vol. II, p. 477.

muni went to Kurugūr, the birth-place of the Saint and recovered all the works of Śaṭhakopa as also the compositions of other Ālvārs, set them to music and arranged them into four collections of about a thousand stanzas each. He instituted the practice of reciting these poems as part of the regular service in Viṣṇu temples, a practice which obtains to this day.

About his son, Īśvaramuni, we know little; but his grandson, Yāmunācārya, was a worthy successor of Nāthamuni in the task of systematising Viśiṣṭādvaita thought and rendering it proof against attack.

Two of the disciples⁹ who were whole-heartedly devoted to their master Nāthamuni, were his own nephews. It was to them that he first taught the Tamil hymns of the Ālvārs, having settled their musical modes. With a dialectical skill that was unsurpassed, they were able to vanquish their philosophical opponents and thus assist Nāthamuni in the task of consolidating Vaiṣṇavism.

There is an interesting anecdote connecting the life of Nāthamuni with the celebrated poet Kamban. The story is that Kamban, the future *Kavi-cakravarti* (Prince of Poets) composed his great poem, the Tamil *Rāmāyaṇa* at the residence of his patron Śadaiyappavallal, and published it at Śrīrangam before an assembly of pandits presided over by Nāthamuni. It would appear that the latter highly appreciated the great poetical qualities of that composition. It is also believed that, on this occasion, Nāthamuni composed a poem of over a hundred stanzas in honour of the Vaiṣṇavite Saint, Śaṭhakopa. It is extremely unlikely that this work *Śaṭhakoparandādī*, which bears the stamp of mediocre talent, was composed by Kamban. The story will have value only if there is truth in the tradition embodied in a Tamil verse to the effect that Kamban wrote the *Rāmāyaṇa* in Ś 807, corresponding to A.D. 885. But all available information goes to show that Kamban flourished at a later epoch and that he was a contemporary of Oṭṭakūttan and Sekkilār, the author of *Peria Purāṇam*.

Another story has it that sometime after Nāthamuni recovered the works of the Ālvārs and set them to divine music, a musician sang some

9. காளம் வலம் புரியன்ன நற்காதலடியவர்க்கு
தாளம் வழங்கித் தமிழ் மறையின்னிசை தந்த
வள்ளல் முருஞ் தவநெறி மூட்டிய நாதமுனி கழலே
நாளும் தொழு தெழுவே நமக்கார் நிகர் நானிலத்தே:

Rahasya-traya-sūtra.

of these hymns in the prescribed tune in the court of the Cola king of the day at his capital town, Gangaikondra-Colapuram, a city near Nāthamuni's birth-place. The king was not appreciative. But the musician went to Viranarayanapuram and sang in the same tune before the God of that place. Nāthamuni was delighted at the performance. On hearing this the Cola King was eager to know how what he considered an outlandish tune could have evoked so much appreciation from Sage Nātha. He paid a visit to the sage and sought an explanation for his preferring this tune. It is said that Nāthamuni showed to the king how the tune to which the hymns of the Ālvārs had been set was superior and incidentally gave evidence of his own capacity to tell the weights of bronze cymbals by hearing their sounds alone. A great difficulty in the way of accepting this story as genuine is that Gangaikonda-Colapuram was founded only in the time of Rajendra, who bore among other titles that of Gangaikonda-Cola. But we may take it that though the city was not known by that name it was even then an alternative capital of the Colas.

III

Though an eminent Tamil scholar, Nāthamuni has left no Tamil work of his own excepting a few memorial verses prefixed to the works of Śaṭhakopa, Viṣṇucitta and Mathurakavi. But the practice of reciting the works of the Ālvārs furnished an impetus for a critical study of the works of Śaṭhakopa and caused religious truths to percolate into the minds of the masses.

Nāthamuni composed two works *Nyāya-tattva* and *Yoga-Rahasya*, neither of which is now extant. As an adept in Yoga, he must have set forth the secrets of Yogic concentration in the *Yoga-Rahasya*. *Nyāya-tattva* was an authoritative, masterly and exhaustive treatise on Nyāya establishing views entirely in harmony with the Vedānta,¹⁰ but often at variance with those of Akṣapāda (Gautama)¹¹ and his followers. This treasure-house of philosophic wisdom has furnished the basis for the epoch-making writings of his grandson and spiritual suc-

10. उक्तं खलु नाथमुनिभिः वेदान्तानुकूलं न्यायशास्त्रं न्यायतत्त्वामिधानेन ।
तच्च परिगृहीतं यासुनाचार्यादिभिः ॥

Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, p. 499.

11. भगवन्नाथमुनिभिः न्यायतत्त्वसमाह्वया ।
अवधीयाक्षपादादीन्यबन्धि न्यायपद्धतिः ॥

Nyāya-paribuddhi, p. 8.

cessor, Yāmunācārya. The latter's *Ātmasiddhi* has been described as a concise exposition¹² of the views expounded at great length in the *Nyāya-tattva*.

A few extracts from this work found in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* and *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, and in Bhagavān Rāmānuja's *Śrī-Bhāṣya* are all that we now have of this philosophic masterpiece. Even the few fragments that are now available bear eloquent testimony to Nāthamuni's philosophic acumen, dialectical skill and the encyclopaedic range of his learning. They also indicate that Nāthamuni advocated doctrines that are associated with the Rāmānuja school of Vedānta. He exposed, for example, the difficulties of the doctrine of *māyā*, which is the most vulnerable point in Advaita philosophy, in the following verses :—

ज्ञानरूपं परं ब्रह्म तन्निवर्त्यं मृषात्मकम् ।
 अज्ञानं चेत्तिरस्कुर्वात्कः प्रभुस्तन्निवर्तने ॥
 ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति चेज्ज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम् ।
 ब्रह्मवत्तत्पकाशत्वात्तदपि ह्यनिवर्तकम् ॥
 ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानमस्ति चेत्स्यात्प्रमेयता ।
 ब्रह्मणोऽननुभूतित्वं त्वदुक्त्यैव प्रसज्यते ॥

Nyāyatattva, quoted in *Śrī-Bhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

"If ignorance (*ajñāna*) which is illusory and which is to be dispelled by knowledge (*jñāna*) is said to cloud the Supreme Brahman who has consciousness for His essential nature, is there anyone competent to dispel *ajñāna*? Should it be argued that what dispels ignorance is the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of consciousness (and that Brahman and *ajñāna* may co-exist), (it is replied) that such a knowledge being non-different from Brahman, cannot, anymore than the latter can, dispel ignorance. If it be contended that there may arise a knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of consciousness, then Brahman would be an object of knowledge; and it would follow, from your own account, that Brahman is mere (subjectless, objectless) consciousness."

That Nāthamuni advocated *Yathārtha-khyāti* in solving epistemological problems is learnt from *Ātmasiddhi*¹³ and from *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, *Buddhisara*, verse ten commencing with the words—

नाथैरुक्ता यथार्था विमतमतिरपि न्यायतत्त्वे ।

12. न्यायतत्त्वप्रकरणं शास्त्रमसिद्धिः । *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, *Buddhipariccheda*, p. 274.

13. Journal of the Annamalai University, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 34.

One of the doctrines peculiar to Viśiṣṭādvaita is its conception of *jñāna* *Jñāna* is conceived as being both a substance and a quality—a substance, since it is subject to change; a quality, since it is incapable of standing by itself, and since it is an attribute of finite souls and the Supreme Self. Hence it is called *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* (meaning literally ‘attributive *jñāna*’) and marked off from substantive *jñāna*. Finite souls and the Supreme Self are *jñāna* in the latter sense. That Nāthamuni subscribed to this view is learnt from the following passage :—

तत्र धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वं न्यायतत्त्वात्मसिद्धिभाष्यादिसिद्धमनुसरतां तन्निष्ठस्मृत्याख्यविकारोत्पादकसंस्कारोऽपि तन्निष्ठः प्राप्तः अन्तरङ्गत्वादवाधाच्च ।

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 366.

“On the view of those who, following *Nyāya-tattva*, *Ātma-siddhi*, *Śrī-Bhāṣya* and the like, maintain that *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is a substance, impressions (*vāsanās*), leading to remembrance (*smṛti*), which is but a modification of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*, must be said to dwell in *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* itself.”

Discountenancing the view that *anubhava* (presentative cognition) has validity (*prāmāṇya*), while representative cognition has no *prāmāṇya*, Nāthamuni says, “Both of us alike maintain that presentative cognition (*anubhava*) and representative cognition (*smṛti*) agree in not being based on invalid sources of knowledge. There is no point in restricting the term *pramāṇa* to that which makes known what is hitherto unknown (and thereby denying validity to memory); for this qualification “what is hitherto unknown” does not serve to ward off any defect that would otherwise afflict the definition. Where is the illustrative example to bear out the contention that valid knowledge cannot arise in respect of what is already familiar? If you cite *smṛti* as an example, (we reply that) it cannot be, since that is the very thesis you have to establish (i.e., “*smṛti* lacks *prāmāṇya*”). If you adduce as example some other kind of knowledge, (we reply) we know of no such knowledge (i.e., a knowledge other than *smṛti*, not characterised by novelty and devoid of *prāmāṇya*).”

अप्रमाणमूलत्वं तूभयोरपि नास्ति; व्यभिचाराभावेनानधिगतार्थप्रमाणमिति विशेषणस्यायुक्तत्वात् । प्रमिते प्रमित्यनुपपत्तिः क दृष्टा ? स्मृतौ चेत्, प्रतिज्ञैव दृष्टान्तः स्यात् ज्ञानान्तरे चेत्, ननु (न तु ?) जानामि ।

Nyāyatattva, Caturthādhikaraṇa, quoted in *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, pp. 305-6.

As against the Buddhistic doctrine that pleasure and pain are modes of knowledge and the Vaiśeṣika view that they are the special qualities (*viśeṣaguna*) of the soul, Yāmunācārya advocates the view that pleasure and pain are nothing more than the flourishing (*prauṣkalya*) and the decaying (*vaikalya*) states of the internal sense (*manas*). In support of the view that pleasure and pain are respectively the tranquil and the disturbed states of the mind (*manas*) Yāmunācārya refers in his *Ātma-siddhi*¹⁴ to the sixth section known as *sukha-duḥkhādhikaraṇa* in *Pramātrpāda* of *Nyāyatattva*.

यस्तु सुगतमतावलम्बी विज्ञानाभिन्नेहेतुजतया तयोरपि तदन्तर्भावमभिमन्यते कण-
भक्षपक्षाश्रयणेन वा तयोरात्मविशेषगुणत्वं, ताभ्यां सुखदुःखाधिकरणं व्याचक्षीत ।

14. Journal of the Annamalai University, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 90. For a fuller discussion see *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, Buddhīpariccheda, p. 272.

Syntax—What it Means ?*

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Syntax is interpreted in different ways. The root meaning of the word seems to be “arranging together” (Syn=together; taxein=to arrange, in Greek, Latin and French).¹ There are several scholars who divide syntax into separate departments viz., order, concord, government and cross-reference. Among such scholars is that famous Professor of Germanic Philology of Chicago, Mr. Bloomfield.² Mr. J. C. Nesfield, on the contrary, has devoted his entire attention in his English Grammar to the order of words in a sentence. He has besides remarked that divisions into concord and government are not useful in modern English, for it has lost several of its old inflexions.³ We ought therefore to be guarded in our use of the expression “syntax” in relation to any language. Professor A. H. Sayce,⁴ for instance, said “where there is elaborate formal grammar there may not be a rich syntax.” In a similar manner, Professor Earle also said “syntax varies inversely in richness or poverty as accident is poor or rich.” Considered in this way Tamil should not have a rich syntax, for there is elaborate formal grammar in it. It is said that in Sanskrit there is no rich syntax because of this reason.⁵ But writers such as Rhenius and Arden have given an elaborate syntax in their books relating to Tamil grammar. How then are we to reconcile the practice as we find in these grammarians with the theory that has been formulated by Sayce and Earle? There are two ways of reconciling this. They are either by means of saying that just as Greek in spite of its possession of elaborate formal grammar is still rich in syntax, Tamil despite its formal grammar possesses an elaborate syntax or by means of saying that what Sayce and Earle meant by “syntax” is “order” alone of words.

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1. SKEATS: An Etymological Dictionary of English.

2. Language, p. 191.

3. Idiom, Grammar and Synthesis, Book IV, p. 150.

4. The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 428.

5. SAYCE: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 392.

Tamil is not rich in syntax in the sense in which Mr. Sayce would say English is; that is to say, in the matter of the order of words in a sentence there are not many sanctions and taboos in Tamil. It is the order of words in English and Chinese that decides the meaning of words. For instance if the sentence "The Italian defeated the Ethiopian" is changed so as to read "The Ethiopian defeated the Italian," the contrary assertion is the result. Even so, if the Chinese sentence "ngō tá ni" is changed into "ni tá ngō," the inversion in order amounts to a reversal in meaning; for whereas the former means "I strike you," the latter means "You strike me."⁶ In Tamil a change in the order in similar connections would not interfere with the meaning of the sentence. For instance, "Āṅkilēyar Indiyāvai Aḷukirār" and "Indiyāvai Āṅkilēyar Aḷukirār" carry the same meaning (the Englishmen are ruling India). These Tamil sentences seem to run on parallel lines with the Latin expressions "pater filium amat" and "filium pater amat" which mean 'the father loves the son'.⁷ We might therefore say that if syntax means order alone Tamil is not rich in it.

But if syntax means, as is held by Leonard Bloomfield, concord, government and cross-reference, Tamil has it. Let us now see whether we have all these sub-divisions of syntax in Tamil. Tolkāppiyar in his rules in 'Kīḷavi ākkam' has given certain injunctions regarding the order of words. In one rule (No. 38) he has said that demonstrative pronouns should not precede "iyarpeyar" or real names to which they refer. In another rule (No. 41) he has said that surnames should precede real names (e.g. "munivan Ahattiyā"). As some other instances of requirements of order we might mention the following:—

(1) The adjective should precede the word it qualifies (e.g. "nalla paḷam"=good fruit).

(2) The adverb should precede the verb it modifies (e.g. nanṛāy uṇṭān=he ate well).

(3) The verbal participle should precede the finite verb (e.g. Vantu pōṇān"=After coming he went).

The normal order of words in a Tamil sentence is supposed to be subject—object—verb—(so^v). This is different from the English order⁸ which is subject—verb—object (so^vo). It is English, Scandinavian and Romanic that place the verb in the medial position. On the contrary, Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and Dravidian put the verb at the

6. cf. Dr. T. G. TUCKER: *Natural History of Language*, p. 121.

7. Vide BLOOMFIELD, p. 197.

8. OTTO JESPERSEN: *Language, its nature, development, etc.*, p. 345.

final part of the sentence. We are told that if a deaf-mute is trained to communicate his ideas he puts the verb always at the end.⁹ This method therefore seems to be very natural.

As regards concord, the verb in Tamil must agree with the subject or the nominative in the matter of gender, number and person (e.g. "avaṇ pōkirāṇ," "avaḷ pōkirāl," "avar pōkirār"). This corresponds therefore to the concord we find in English "he goes" and "they go" and in Sanskrit "saha apataḥ" (=he fell) and "tē apatan" (=they fell). Government seems to be the predominating part of Tamil syntax. The first and second personal pronouns govern a plural verb of the first person (e.g. nāṇum nīyūm pōvōm=you and I will go). The second and third personal pronouns govern a plural verb of the second (e.g. nīyūm avaṇum pōṇir=He and you went). The first, second and third personal pronouns take a plural ending of the first (e.g. nāṇum nīyūm avaṇum pōṇōm=He, You and I went). Two or more singular nominatives of the rational class govern an epicene plural (e.g. Kapilaṇum Paraṇaṇum vantaḥ=Kapila and Paraṇa came). It is in respect of cases that government appears to be the most important feature in Tamil. The first and the eighth cases govern a verb (e.g. avaṇ vantaṇ=he came; makaḷē vā=Daughter, come). The fourth and the sixth cases take a noun (e.g. nōyḱku maruntu=medicine for disease; eṇatu kai=my hand); but the dative case can govern a verb too, as in "avaṇukkuk koḍuttāṇ" (=he gave him). In the fifth case, the ablative of direction takes a noun (e.g. Chidambarattin kiḷakku Aṇṇāmalainagar=Annamalainagar lies east of Chidambaram). The ablative of motion however as in "ūrin nīṅkiṇāṇ" (=left the city) takes a verb. The seventh case can govern either a verb or a noun (e.g. ūriṅkaṇ chēri=hamlet in the city; ūril vāḷḱiṇrār=They live in the city).

There is no cross-reference in Tamil. "Puella cantat" in Latin literally means 'the girl—she sings.' In English it would be rendered thus: the girl sings. The Latin expression cantat can mean either 'she sings' or 'he sings' or 'it sings.' That it is 'she' and not 'it' or 'he' is brought out by the cross-reference 'puella.' There is no need in Tamil for such cross references.¹⁰

Thus out of the four sub-divisions of syntax, cross-reference could be easily eliminated in respect of the Tamil language. Order and concord do not appear to be totally essential. Tamil can dispense with 'order' because it is rich in cases. If English cannot dispense with it, it is because of the circumstance that it has lost the case—endings ex-

9. Vide SAYCE: Vol. I, p. 436.

10. cf. BLOOMFIELD, p. 193.

cept probably that of the genitive. We shall now see that in the following instances there is no order insisted upon in Tamil. We can indifferently say either “mūvar makaḷir” or “makaḷir mūvar”; but the order of the corresponding expression in English is strict: ‘three women’ and not ‘women three’. English writers, being accustomed to a strict order in their language, imagine there is such an order in the languages they look at. That must be the reason why certain things, which do not constitute order, have been mentioned by Rhenius and Arden under the head of order in Tamil. For instance, the comparative is said to precede that which is compared¹¹ and as an instance “ivaṇiṇum avaṇ nalla-vaṇ” is given. This is only imaginary because we could very well say “avaṇ ivaṇiṇum nallavan” (=That man is better than this man). That is to say, that which is compared could precede the comparative. It is again said that the similitude precedes that which is similar.¹² “Sūryaṇaip pōla avaṇ pirakāsikkirāṇ” is given as an instance. If the order is changed so that the sentence would read “avan sūryaṇaip pōla pirakāsikkirāṇ,” there should be no change in meaning. Thus, that which is similar can precede the similitude. These then should indicate that there is not much of “order” to talk of in Tamil.

As regards concord, we find that it exists in Tamil only so far as the verb is in agreement with the nominative in point of number and person. Other concords known to other languages are not found in Tamil. For instance, in Sanskrit “Kūśalaha Ramaha” would mean ‘happy Rama’ and “Kūśali Sītā” ‘happy Sita’. Here the adjective is in concord with the substantive. There is no such concord in Tamil, for the corresponding expressions would be *makiḷcciyāṇa Rāmaṇ* and “*makiḷcciyāṇa Sītai*.” That congruence, which plays a great part in many languages of the Indo-European family, has no place in Tamil is evident from the retention of the same form of adjectives all through the several genders, cases and numbers. In German, different congruence—forms are demanded in certain kinds of accompanying words. For instance the German expressions for ‘cold wine,’ ‘cold milk’ and ‘cold water’ are respectively “*kalter wein*”, “*kalte milch*” and *kaltes wasser*”. Since *wein*, *milch* and *wasser* are respectively masculine, feminine and neuter noun-forms, variations in the adjectival form affixed have taken place. Corresponding to all the three forms of the word for ‘cold’ there would stand in Tamil only one form, namely, *kuḷirnta*. Congruence forms because of considerations of number are found in English (e.g. this man; these men). There is no such concord in Tamil, for we say “*inta maṇitaṇ*” and “*inta maṇitarkal*.” Whereas again in English there is concord bet-

11. The Rev. A. H. ARDEN: A Grammar of the Tamil Language, p. 86.

12. *ibidem*.

ween the relative pronoun and that which it governs as in "he who spoke" and "that which cried," there is none in Tamil, for we say "pēciya maṇitaṇ" and "aḷuta kuḷavi." In Sanskrit we find that there is concord through every case between the adjective and the substantive; witness for instance the singular adjective "pāpa" (=evil) changing its form through every case even as the singular substantive "kāma" (=love) changes in the following paradigm :—

Nominative	pāpas	kāmas
Accusative	pāpam	kāmam
Instrumental	pāpena	kāmena
Dative	pāpāya	kāmāya
Ablative	pāpāt	kāmāt
Genitive	pāpasya	kāmasya
Locative	pāpe	kāme
Vocative	pāpa	kāmā

In the Tamil, on the contrary, the corresponding adjectival expression would be retained as it is :—

Nomi.	tīya	Viruppam
Accu.	tīya	Viruppattai
Instru.	tīya	Viruppattāl
Dat.	tīya	Viruppattukku
Ab.	tīya	Viruppattiṇ
Gen.	tīya	Viruppataḍu
Loc.	tīya	Viruppattiḷ

Thus it is evident that there is no congruence in Tamil of the adjective with the various sub-classes of the noun.

In conclusion therefore we should say that of the four sub-divisions of syntax, "government" alone plays an important role in Tamil, that the range of "concord" is much less, that it is customary to talk of a certain "order" in Tamil and that "cross-reference" has no place.

The Indo-British Trade Agreement, 1939

By

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In accordance with the resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly in 1936 the Government of India gave notice to terminate the Ottawa Agreement and started negotiations for a fresh and favourable one. A body of unofficial advisers was constituted and for nearly three years talks dragged on. The divergence between the point of view of the Indian commercial interests and that of the British could not be easily bridged. But the Ottawa Agreement which should have ceased to exist long ago was allowed to operate until the conclusion and adoption of a new Indo-British trade agreement on the basis of Imperial preference. Indian industrialists and merchants were indignant that the Ottawa Pact was allowed to exist three full years after the explicit disapproval of the Legislature. The failure of several preliminary talks between India and England roused further suspicions. It was feared that political forces would operate to impose on India a new disadvantageous agreement. It was only during the early months of 1939 that an understanding could be finally arrived at. Yet, unfortunately, the new pact was introduced into the Legislative Assembly in a hurry and the public felt that enough time was not given for a detailed examination of the provisions of the Agreement. The new agreement is therefore born in an atmosphere of distrust and discontent. The criticisms levelled against it followed the similar lines of the debate when the Ottawa Pact came in for ratification. Amidst the controversies and criticisms one feature of this new pact is generally admitted i.e., the new Agreement is an improvement, however slight it may be, upon the old one which it displaces.

I. Concessions to India

India's exports of lac, raw jute, myrabolams, mica and Indian hemp—items which enjoyed free entry into the British market till now—are to continue to enjoy the privilege.

Bones, castor seed, coir yarn, cotton yarn, goat skins (raw and dried), gram, groundnut, hides and skins (undressed) linseed, magnisite, oil seed cake and meal, paraffin wax, sandalwood oil, soya beans and

spices etc., are to receive preferences at the rate of 10% *ad valorem* over foreign imports into United Kingdom market.

The pact secures for India a 15% preference for castor oil, linseed oil, cocoanut oil, groundnut oil, rape oil, sesamum oil, undressed leather and jute manufactures.

A 20% preference is granted to our coir mats, cotton manufactures, blankets, shawls, sacks and bags.

Preferences at specific rates are offered on magnesium chloride at 1sh. per cwt., on coffee at 9sh. 4d. per cwt., on tea at 2d. per lb., on rice husked and in the husk at 2sh. 3d. per lb., on hand-made carpets and rugs at 4sh. 6d. per sq. yard and on other kinds of carpets and rugs at 20% *ad valorem*.

Regarding tobacco the preference that existed before is to be continued. But if United Kingdom reduces the import duty on foreign tobacco below 2sh. 0½d. the margin of preference shall be equivalent to the full duty.

British textile imports into India are to receive the benefit of a lowered customs duty on condition that United Kingdom takes not less than 450,000 bales of India's cotton.

The British system of granting drawbacks is to be abolished with regard to groundnut, and modified regarding linseed, so that the real value of the preference enjoyed by Indian groundnut and linseed may be increased.

Before one examines the export side of the Pact the following must be kept in mind:—(1) The bulk of India's exports to United Kingdom is raw materials needed by any industrial country in the world. (2) Many items of export, like lac etc., are India's monopolies and hence free entry and preference may not be of any direct help to them. (3) If a foreign commodity imported into the United Kingdom market is very much different in quality from the Indian commodity and consequently sells as a non-competing one preference on such an item of India's export is not of any value. There are many commodities which India exports to United Kingdom, but which do not feel the direct competition of foreign imports into United Kingdom market. (4) Many of India's exports to United Kingdom suffer from keen competition from the British Empire countries and preference on these can only be useful in averting a possible danger and not in accomplishing some fresh and solid advantage. (5) Further, a large percentage of the British market is already captured by some Indian commodities and preference cannot be of any avail to such items in India's exports.

If one bears these ideas in mind it can be easily seen that only a few items in India's exports to United Kingdom normally require any

special treatment. Especially when United Kingdom and other European countries are engaged in huge armament programmes the need in those countries for Indian raw materials must be really great. It is evident therefore that as war clouds gather thick in Europe the necessity of safeguarding and cultivating external markets for India's raw materials can only be less. This is an important bargaining point in India's favour which was overlooked.

Some important articles examined. From the point of view of the above facts what do we find when we examine the concessions granted to India? The Commerce Member insisted that whatever preferences under the Ottawa Pact are retained, wherever unscheduled items are brought over to the scheduled list India has gained. No doubt some exports, e.g. goat-skins and chrome leather, have to be thankful to the Agreement but the fact remains that the advantage secured is only based on an implied threat by United Kingdom that duties on them may be raised at her will and as she likes. Actually the advantage accruing to India from this kind of concession is very little.

Now, a few important articles may be examined in the light of the present Pact.

Chrome leather has enjoyed the full benefit of exemption from a 30% duty levied upon the imports from foreign countries into United Kingdom markets. The new Pact secures the continuation of this advantage but guarantees only to the extent that the duty on foreign leather will not be reduced lower than 15%. No one can say that fresh gains have been secured here.

Regarding goat skins it can be found that since 1932-33 the British market has been favourably expanding. From 49 lakhs the value of India exports has risen to 95 lakhs in 1937-38. The safe-guarding of the United Kingdom market may be reckoned as an advantage to India's credit.

Tea accounts for 21 crores of India's exports to United Kingdom in 1937-38. Under the International Tea Restriction scheme export quotas were fixed (in 1933) for India, Ceylon and the Netherlands. Even if India is not given the preference of 2d. per lb. it will be the British people who suffer in consequence. Further, since the tea interests in India are predominantly British United Kingdom cannot be interested in cancelling the preferential treatment accorded. Preference for tea is therefore not a special achievement scored by India's bargainers.

Pig-iron enjoys free entry in United Kingdom. Since it is the most important raw material for the armament industries Britain would never

choose to levy duties on it. It is clear therefore that free entry for pig iron is as much an advantage to United Kingdom as it is for India.

In groundnuts, United Kingdom has been an expanding market in the recent past. British Empire countries are India's chief competitors and yet India's share in United Kingdom's groundnut imports has increased from 63% in 1936 to 80% in 1938. In 1935 India exported only 90,000 tons. The figures for the subsequent years are as follows : 110,000; 138,000; 253,000. This shows that under the operation of the Ottawa Pact United Kingdom has become a valuable market and the retention of preference is of substantial value. The withdrawal of the drawback on groundnut oil strengthens the concession obtained.

Linseed is another instance where India has scored an advantage. Since 1932 our linseed has made much headway in the British market. That Argentine has fallen back is clearly shown by the fact that from April 1938 to February 1939 United Kingdom has imported 251,000 tons of linseed from India while Argentine could send only 12,000. The gain is undoubtedly important for linseed.

Regarding jute manufactures the existing duty of 15% on cordage, cables, ropes and twine and 20% on sacks and bags are retained. In view of the persistent clamour from the Dundee manufacturers the retention of the existing status itself constitutes an advantage.

In 1932 Indian woollen carpets and rugs were allowed to enter the United Kingdom market free while the prevailing duty was 10%. In 1934 the duties were raised to 4/6d. on a square yard on hand knitted carpets while 20% *ad valorem* duty was imposed on others. The new Pact allows the 1934 modification to exist and to continue. India's chief competitors in carpets and rugs are Iran, Turkey, China and Belgium. It is possible to argue that the prices of Indian products are so high over those of other products that a 20% preference cannot operate in India's favour and that fashion and taste determine the prospects of carpets and rugs and not mere changes in the tariff. But since competition is getting very keen in the item the real potential value of a 20% cannot be neglected.

For tobacco, United Kingdom is the single largest market and in recent years the market was rapidly growing. India's exports of tobacco since 1935-36 are as follows :—

1935-36	.. 11,700,000 lbs.
1936-37	.. 13,200,000 lbs.
1937-38	.. 41,700,000 lbs.

While the great importance of the United Kingdom market is to be recognised it should be remembered that tobacco from Empire and

non-Empire countries have also made much headway in the United Kingdom. Yet in view of Empire competition and the growth of United Kingdom market the retention of concession is a gain for India.

The existing preference on Indian rice, *i.e.*, 1d. per pound, has been reduced to $\frac{2}{3}$ d. a pound. India's exports of rice to United Kingdom is not considerable and after the separation of Burma, India's concern in rice export to United Kingdom is less. Indian rice which is sent to United Kingdom is of superior quality and it has an established place in that market. Therefore the decrease in the preference might not disturb India's position.

India is not a wheat exporting country, and in view of the enormous production in the world and accumulation of stocks India cannot even hope to become a wheat exporting country. The abolition of preference on wheat, in order to facilitate a trade agreement between United Kingdom and the United States of America, cannot affect us adversely.

Raw Cotton.—The Pact gives concession to the British textiles in Indian market in the form of reduction of import duties in return for a guarantee by United Kingdom that she would take not less than 450,000 bales of India cotton. Provision is made for exporting 500,000 bales in the year ending December 1939, 550,000 bales in the year ending 31st December 1940 and 600,000 bales for every subsequent year. Penalties are attached if United Kingdom failed to take the required quantity of cotton. The Pact empowers India to raise the duties on British piecegoods if United Kingdom failed to purchase the stipulated quantity of cotton. If United Kingdom takes more than the specified quantity she gets a reward by way of reduction of duties.

The crux of the present agreement is undoubtedly the link between the export of raw cotton and the import of British piecegoods into India on the basis of sliding scales and quotas. That Indian cotton requires a guaranteed market is unquestionable. In view of the fall in the off-take of our cotton by Japan it is indeed necessary to secure a safe market in United Kingdom. But the present agreement has actually secured very little to the cotton growers. According to the note submitted by the unofficial advisers and also according to the calculation of the Indian Central Cotton Committee, United Kingdom can easily take $6\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs to 10 lakhs of bales per year while the Pact stipulates of United Kingdom only 400,000 bales which is less than the average off-take by United Kingdom for the past three years. Further there is no provision for the disposal of that variety of Indian cotton which really required a good market, *viz.*, Bengal, Oomras, Berars, etc. The quality that United Kingdom agrees to take under the present arrangement requires no special guarantee and can find a favourable market any-

where in the world. The anxiety to find markets for Oomras, etc., still remains to be faced.

Taking India's exports as a whole, the value of preferential items is nearly 42 crores. Of this nearly 32 crores worth of exports do not require any special treatment in United Kingdom. At best only an insurance value can be claimed for them. The items which can be said to have benefited by the present pact are: Groundnut, the seeds group, chrome leather, tobacco, woollen carpets and rugs.

The value of the exports in benefited items can only be about 9 crores.

II. CONCESSIONS TO UNITED KINGDOM.

Turning to the concession given to United Kingdom, one should remember that the unofficial advisers rightly laid down certain fundamental principles to be adhered to in the conclusion of any trade agreement with United Kingdom. They are as follows:—(1) The Pact should not jeopardise any of India's domestic interests; (2) The preferences granted should be consistent with Indian tariff policy; (3) The Agreement should not injure India's trade relations with foreign countries; (4) The revenue of the Government of India should be properly safeguarded.

Since India is under no restriction to keep the import duties at their present level the concessions granted to United Kingdom cannot be operating against India's revenues. We must see how far the other principles have been remembered by the framers of the Pact.

Textiles.—The Pact calls upon the Indian Textile Industry to sacrifice its growth by guaranteeing a minimum market in India for British piecegoods in return for a minimum market in United Kingdom for India's cotton. It should be noted however, that while the concession granted to raw cotton falls far below the legitimate demands of India, the benefits given away to United Kingdom are very great. The reduction of import duties to 17½% *ad valorem* on printed goods, 15% on grey goods and 15% on other goods is indeed a heavy blow to Indian aspirations, and is not in any way compensated for by other advantages accruing to Indian agriculture. In 1936 the prevailing import duty on British piecegoods was 25%. It was then reduced to 20%. The present pact puts it at 15%. If the lowering of duties failed to help United Kingdom in capturing the guaranteed portion of the Indian market a further reduction of 2½% is also promised. And hence the duty may come even to 12½%. Thus within a brief period of three years the protection granted to Indian cotton industry is sought to be nullified by drastic reduction of import duties. While, on the one

hand, the minimum raw cotton to be taken by United Kingdom is fixed much lower than the average for the past three years, the minimum yardage granted to Britain is nearly 150 to 225 million yards more than the present imports. Recently United Kingdom has been fast losing the Indian market in textiles and so the high level of yardage allowed to United Kingdom, especially in the absence of an enquiry by the Tariff Board, implies a serious menace to Indian cotton manufacture. Further, Indian mills have also been engaged in the manufacture of those varieties of cloth where the competition from United Kingdom is keen. The present Pact closes the door against the expansion of manufacture of superior cloth in India.

Injustice to Japan.—If the link of raw cotton with piecegoods imports incorporated in the Agreement is compared to the off-take of our cotton by Japan and our consumption of Japanese textiles it is seen very clearly that Japan is made to take nearly thrice as much of our cotton as United Kingdom for a given yardage of cotton manufactures allowed into our market. This injustice in our treatment of Japan will displease her and troubles may arise when the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement comes to be renewed or modified.

Non-Textile Groups.—A 7½% preference is granted to British motor cars and accessories, motor cycles, chassis of omni-buses, motor vans and lorries. A 10% preference is given to certain classes of chemicals, drugs and medicines, cement, paints, colours, woollen carpets and rugs, shawls, iron and steel barbed wire, copper manufactures, refrigerators, sewing machines, electric appliances, wireless reception instruments, cycles, scientific and surgical instruments, loud-speakers and amplifiers, etc. A preference of Rs. 3 to Rs. 4 per gallon is allowed on drugs and medicines containing spirit.

Though the number of heads under preferential list has been reduced considerably the position is still unsatisfactory from the point of view of Indian industrial aspirations. Preferences are withdrawn with regard to hardware, aluminium, brass, bronze, zinc, and other non-ferrous metals except copper, rubber manufactures, provisions, paper, stationery, some electrical appliances, some items under iron and steel, etc. The withdrawal of preferences for the above leaves room for Indian industries to grow and thrive. But the preferences given to British chemicals, paints, cement, iron and steel, drugs and medicines are bound to militate against the already advancing Indian industries.

Regarding the effect of the Pact on India's trade relations with non-Empire countries, it can be said that greater bargaining power is secured than was allowed by the Ottawa Agreement. Now, only 12%

of the total imports come into the preferential field and the rest may be used for the conclusion of bi-lateral trade agreements with foreign countries. In machinery, hardware, iron and steel and paper India can give room for Germany while France may be negotiated with by giving room for her wine and spirits. The Pact allows a trade agreement with Ceylon and safeguards India's trade with the British colonies, protectorates, etc., though these are comparatively unimportant.

Another advantage worth mentioning is that the supplementary Agreement to the Ottawa Pact concluded in 1935 which laid down a number of restrictions on India's fiscal freedom is now cancelled. Hereafter British manufacturers cannot claim the right to appear before the Indian Tariff Board and demand a hearing.

CONCLUSION

It is never easy in a Trade Pact to balance the value of the benefit accruing to the two sides concerned. A policy of give and take has to be pursued with patience and wisdom. The present Agreement concedes enormously to British textiles and in return secures gain in the non-textile group of our imports. The Government's claim that Indian exports have gained phenominally is obviously exaggerated. In fact, for a debtor country like India a trade agreement with a creditor like the United Kingdom must procure a minimum favourable balance in merchandise trade. The present Agreement is not calculated to obtain the required favourable balance with United Kingdom. The real gain reaped by her is much greater than what is suggested by the lowering of import duties on textiles because she enjoys exclusive privileges in Indian economy while India has no such advantages in United Kingdom. The invisible exports of United Kingdom to India by way of banking, insurance and shipping services are operating in United Kingdom's favour. The crying needs of India's shipping, banking and insurance interests are not met in the present Pact.

But whatever the advantages or the handicaps arising out of the new Pact it should be admitted that the present Pact is an improvement on the one it replaces. The Commerce Member has done his best under the limitations of India's constitutional position. If one has to choose between accepting this agreement and allowing the Ottawa Pact to continue for further years to come the choice is simple. Things may be bad to-day but they were worse yesterday. This is the chief merit and justification of the Indo-British Trade Agreement of 1939.

The Nayaks of Tanjore

By

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EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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CHAPTER IV.

ACHYUTAPPA NAYAKA (A.D. 1560, A.D. 1614)

Achyutappa Nayaka,¹ the son of Śevappa Nayaka, ascended the throne in A.D. 1580 on the death of his father. But his early connection with the administration of the kingdom and his joint rule as co-regent with his father which must have started, at least, from A.D. 1560 are best seen in his epigraphs; and the literary evidence records that he was appointed as Yuvaraja by his father in the latter part of his rule. He seems to have been named after Achyutarāya, the Vijayanagara emperor, by Śevappa, in gratitude to the Raya who was responsible for the foundation of the Tanjore Nayak line. Achyutappa Nayaka was also known as Chiṇṇa Śeva Achyuta² and Śevappa Achyuta.³ His queen was also called Mūrtimāmba. He had for his minister the famous Gōvinda Dikshita who had been appointed to that high office by his father in his last years. Gōvinda Dikshita played a prominent part in the administration of the country during the reigns of both Achyutappa and his son; and it may be said that his achievement was similar in character and effect to that of Mādhava Vidyāranya, in shaping and laying the foundations of the internal and foreign policies of the Tanjore Nayaks.

Achyutappa Nayaka had a long reign of fifty-three years including the period of his joint rule with his father which lasted for about twenty years. In his last days, following the foot-steps of his father, he also abdicated the throne in favour of his son; but this time the abdication and retirement were largely due to the advice of his minister. Achyutappa was a powerful ruler endowed with a keen intellect and a faculty for quick decision. He was ably assisted in his administrative work by his minister who was equally noted for his deep learning, wise diplomacy and statesmanship. If Achyutappa was a past-master in the art of warfare and in the use of weapons (śāstra) his great minister was equally so in his knowledge of the śāstras and when the

1. The inscriptions call him Achyutappa Nayaka with the epithet Ayya added to it, while the literary evidence refer to him as Achyuta.

2. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto III, Sl. 38.

3. 425 of 1928.

former won a name by his success in wars, the latter attained renown by his performance of sacrifices.⁴

The Nayak was deeply religious; and the *Sangīta Sudhā* says that even from his boyhood he had been a great devotee of Lord Raṅganātha; and he had become the ruler even in his youth.⁵ However, this single-hearted devotion to Raṅganātha did not deter him from extending a liberal measure of his patronage to other creeds; and his numerous gifts made to Śiva and Viṣṇu temples and to the Madhwa teacher, Vijayindra Tirtha, are remarkable instances of the catholicity of his religious outlook and his broadmindedness.

Achyutappa's reign was not one of continued peace, as his later years were marked by internal troubles and by wars with his neighbours and foreigners. The *Sāhityaratnākara* and the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* refer indirectly to his wars against the Muhammadans and the Portuguese which he waged on behalf of his overlord, Venkatapati Raya (1584-1614), and the chief of Jaffna respectively.⁶ His epigraphs do not throw much light on his military achievements; but his reign on the whole seems to have been an eventful one. Achyutappa came to the throne when there prevailed peace and calm around, but abdicated at a critical time, when the land became involved in the throes of the great war of succession to the imperial throne, that broke out on the death of Venkatapati Raya.

Achyutappa continued the loyal policy of Śevappa Nayaka and maintained an attitude of unflinching loyalty to and co-operation with the Vijayanagara Emperors, viz., Śadāsivarāya, Tirumalarāya and his successors Srīranga and Venkatapati Raya.⁷ And it was this staunch

4. The *Tanjāvūri Aṇḍhra Rājalu Charitamū*, edited by Mr. V. Prabhakara Sastri, Vavilla Press. In the Introduction it is said

त्रीणामाद्यन्तनुमाणौ महीक्षिदीक्षितावुभौ ।

शस्त्रे शास्त्रे च निपुणौ आहवेषुहवेषु च ॥

Achyutappa the king, and Gōvinda Dikshita the first and the last names of Trināma, i.e., Achuta, Ananta and Gōvinda were noted for their knowledge of the śāstra and the śāstras.

5. *Sangīta Sudhā*. Introduction by Gōvinda Dikshita.

आरम्यबाल्यादतिमक्तिशाली मुदासदाऽऽवतरङ्गनाथम् ।

अवाप्यतञ्जापुरमप्रदीपः कौमारयेवाहतराज्यमारः ॥

6. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, VII, Sl. 49 and 50; *Sāhityaratnākara*, VII, Sl. 68-74.

7. 567 of 1902 dated 1567 A.D. and coming from Tiruvannāmalai records a gift made by Achyutappa Nayaka in the reign of Śadāsivarāya.

loyalty of Achyutappa towards his suzerains and his active co-operation with them in their wars that were responsible for the future hatred, enmity and warfare between Tanjore and Madura. He was mainly responsible for thwarting the schemes of the disloyal Madura and Gingee Nayaks and preventing their combination against the Raya. But for Achyutappa Nayak's hearty co-operation with Venkatapati Raya in the latter's war with Madura, while he was the viceroy of the South under Srīrangarāya, the southern viceroyalty would have broken away altogether from the Vijayanagara overlordship. Achyutappa was the mainstay of the integrity of the Vijayanagara Empire in the south; and the Raya largely relied upon the resources of the Tanjore Nayak for help at times of need. After the battle of Talikōta (Rakhastagdi) in A.D. 1565 which shattered the strength of the Hindu Empire, the southern feudatories took advantage of the crisis to aim at independence, withdrew their allegiance and withheld their tribute.⁸ However epoch-making the battle of Talikōta was, it did not mark the end of the empire as assumed by Mr. Sewell and others, but indicated only the beginning of a long process of decline. It took roughly another fifty years for the empire to be totally disintegrated; and in this period of decay sporadic attempts were made by the Rayas to recover their lost dominion and prestige and also to check the steady Muhammadan advance into South India. The Raichur Doab was no more the bone of contention between the Muhammadan and Hindu powers and the scene of action now shifted to the territories lying immediately to the north of the North Pennar river.⁹ The success of the Hindus in this period was mainly due to the exertions of Venkatapati Raya I. In the extreme south, however, the battle of Talikōta encouraged the Nayaks to entertain ideas of independence. Tanjore alone remained firm and unflinching in her loyal attitude throughout this period and she contributed in a large measure to the military successes of Venkatapati Raya. What Venkatapati Raya did to the cause of the Vijayanagara Empire in the north, that Achyutappa did in the south, in maintaining the unity and supremacy of that Empire. Both Venkatapati and Achyutappa ruled at a critical time and contributed to the maintenance of the strength of the empire, postponing the days of its disruption and the spread of Muham-

8. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar, *"The Nayaks of Madura,"* Introduction.

9. *The Climacteric of Talikōta* by Prof. R. Sathianatha Aiyar, *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. VI (1927). The Muhammadan authorities support the view that the post-Talikōta history of Vijayanagar for half a century was not fundamentally different from its history before 1565.

madan dominance into the south. In all these wars, Achyutappa had the co-operation of his able minister, Gōvinda Dīkshita; and in his later struggles he had also the willing assistance of his illustrious son, Raghu-nātha Nayaka.

Achyutappa Nayaka's early years of rule did not witness any Imperial expedition to the southward, nor the superimposition of a viceroy like Rāmarāja Viṭhaladēva Maharaya. Since the Raya was intensively engaged with the Muhammadan armies of Bijapur and Golkonda, the South was practically left without any serious intervention till the appointment of Venkatapati Raya as its Viceroy by Srīrangarāya.

Venkatapati had his capital at Chandragiri. In the north, Srīrangarāya was carrying on the struggle for Hindu independence against great odds from Penukonda (the Ghanagiri of the epigraphs), which had then become the capital. The powerful viceroy of Madura, it appears, did not send any help to the Emperor; and evidence is not wanting to prove his attempts at independence following the siege of Penukonda by the Muhammadan armies in A.D. 1579.¹⁰

It was the Adil Shah that first marched against Penukonda and blockaded it for three months in 1577. He was then forced to retire from the siege, though the Raya himself had retreated for safety to Chandragiri. In 1579 he advanced for a second time against Penukonda and began its siege. But he failed owing to a combination of the armies of Sriranga and Golkonda.¹¹ Tanjore's part in this imperial struggle is not known in detail; and in the absence of any contradictory evidence, we can safely conclude that her moral support at least was extended to the Raya at the time.

Achyutappa Nayaka had no difficulties to encounter so long as his father was alive. The first important event of his independent rule

10. *The Climacteric of Talikota*. This was the second time when Penukonda was besieged by the Muhammadans. The first took place in 1577; and the third in 1587.—Ed.

11. The Raya had deputed an envoy with magnificent presents to the Kutb Shah, 'soliciting his aid against their common enemy'; and it had always been "an understood principle with the Mahomedan Kings of the Deccan, not to invade the Beejanugger territories without the general consent of the whole." The Kutb Shah sent a general to skirmish and plunder the borders of the Bijapur territory and himself moved to the southward to the support of the Raya: "Their junction induced Ally Adil Shah to raise the siege of Beejanugger (Penukonda) and return to Bijapur." (Brigg's *Ferishta*, Vol. III, p. 435).

was the part, which he played in the war of Venkatapati Raya¹² in the battle of Vallamprākāra (the modern Vallam near Tanjore) against the Madura ruler, Virappa Nayaka (1572-1595). However, none of the records of Achyutappa Nayaka nor the literary evidence of the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara*, refer to this important war except the Pudukottai (Srīvilliputtūr, Ramnad District) plates of Ati-vīrarāma Srīvallabha and his cousin Varatungarāma.¹³ The omission of this important battle in the Tanjore literature was perhaps due to the fact that both the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* which give an account of the Tanjore Nayaks, were written during the reign of Raghunātha only and in obvious praise of his victorious wars.¹⁴ Moreover, Tanjore's part in this war was not due to any hatred or personal grudge between her and the Madura ruler, Virappa Nayaka, but was only necessitated by the fact, that Tanjore being loyal to the Raya, she had to assist her imperial overlord in the latter's war upon another disloyal feudatory. And Tanjore could not but join Venkatapati I against Madura, as her own dominions were imperilled, and the battle at Vallam suggests the possibility of the Madura Nayak's attempts made to get possession of that place, as it was of strategic importance to Tanjore. The causes for this imperial invasion under Venkatapati Raya are not known; but it may be opined that Virappa Nayaka's victories over the Mābalivānāḍirāya chieftains of the extreme south, which might have excited in him a desire for independence, and his consequent refusal to pay the usual tribute to the Emperor Srīrangaraya consequent on the siege of Penukonda by the Bijapurians in A.D. 1579, were sufficient causes for the Raya's attempt to restore his authority over the south.¹⁵ Virappa Nayaka's epigraphs point to his early subordination to Srīrangarāya only till the year A.D. 1578¹⁶ and his inscriptions upto the year A.D. 1586 do

12. Venkatapati Raya I is called the II by some on the ground that Achyuta rāya's son also was called Venkatādri. But others call him the I, since he was the first man of that name to assume the crown of the Empire and to have ruled as emperor.

13. 7 of Appendix A, 1906. *Report on South Indian Epigraphy and The Travancore Archaeological Series*, Vol. I, pp. 61-68.

14. Both Rāmabhadhrāmba and Yagnanārāyana Dikshita were concerned in extolling the qualities and achievements of Raghunātha Nayaka who was their hero. However, a passing and indirect reference to the help rendered by Achyutappa is made by Rāmabhadhrāmba when she speaks of Tanjore's early help to Venkatapati Raya, (Canto VII, Sl. 49).

15. *The Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 78-79 and foot notes No. 100 and 103. Also *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, pp. 285-6.

16. 663 of 1916.

not refer to his recognition of any overlord at all, as they were issued in his own name.¹⁷ Also, the battle itself being fought on the outskirts of the kingdom of Madura, suggests the open insubordination on the part of Madura Nayak and his consequent attack upon Tanjore.

The Pudukottai plates, dated Saka 1505, and the cyclic year Subhānu, corresponding to A.D. 1583, refer to a gift of villages made by Ativirarāma Srivallabha and Varatunṅarāma at the request of one Tirumala Nayaka, an agent of Virappa Nayaka, after obtaining the latter's permission.¹⁸ Towards the end, the plates contain a reference to Tirumala Nayaka's achievements of killing a Basavarāja, a former refugee of his, and of his capturing the horses and elephants that fought on the battle field of Vallampṛākāra. In this war the armies of Venkatapati, Viraraja and Achyutaraja are mentioned, and Venkatapati must undoubtedly refer to Venkatapati Raya since, in the preceding lines, the great Aliya Rāmarāja, the *de facto* ruler of Vijayanagar under Śadāsivarāya, and who had died on the battle-field of Talikōta is mentioned. Besides, there was no other person called Venkatapati except this member, who had then been appointed by Tirumalarāya as the viceroy of the south. His contemporaries were Virappa Nayaka of Madura and Achyutappa Nayaka of Tanjore and the mention of these two, lend support to the assumption that the reference is to Venkatapati and to his victory over the Madura Nayaka. The validity of the plates has been questioned by some on the ground that, in A.D. 1583—the date of the plates under reference—there was no Venkatapati Raya on the Vijayanagar throne as his accession took place only in A.D. 1586. This argument is untenable since we find Venkatapati Raya ruling from Chaṇdragiri as the viceroy of the south in A.D. 1583, and the Pudukottai Plates themselves contain references to this fact, when they call Aliya Rāmarāja of Talikota fame, as Emperor and Venkatapati by his simple name alone without any royal attribute.¹⁹ This ordinary reference to

17. Absence of the name of overlords in the epigraphs of subordinates cannot be taken *ipso facto* to mean the independence of the latter. For instance the Tanjore epigraphs of Raghunātha Nayaka and his successor Vijayarāghava do not mention their overlords. But at the same time Tanjore's loyalty cannot be doubted as internal and external evidence are agreed on this point.

18. The Pudukottai plates : T. A. S. Vol. I. Virappa is called 'Virappa Kshōnī-pāla' here. Tirumala Nayaka calls himself as the right hand of Virappa. Verses 65 to 68.

19. The verses have विख्यादलिय रामराजनृपतौ व्यापादिते etc., and ऋद्धेयोधकुलेन वेङ्कटपतेर्युद्धे etc.

Venkatapati shows that at the time of Vallam battle, he was not the Emperor, but only a viceroy.

Since the plates²⁰ are dated in the beginning of (Chitrai) April A.D. 1583, the events referred to, must have happened in the previous cyclic year Chitrabānu, i.e., in the beginning of the year A.D. 1583. The record referring to the death of one Basavarāja, who was perhaps a commander of Venkatapati, says that in that battle of Vallamprākāra, the armies of Viraraja were destroyed, while those of Achyutappa Nayaka (Achyuta Dharaṇipati) fled from the field out of fear. Naturally the question would arise as to why Achyutappa's army should have taken to its heels while there was present, on the field of battle, Venkatapati, the victor. This is explained in the succeeding lines of the verse 164 which refer to Tirumala Nayaka's capture of the horses and elephants. The plates suggest that both Virappa Nayaka and Tirumala Nayaka were engaged in the battle and the latter must have

20. The Pudukottai Plates are dated Saka 1505 (Subhānu, Chitrai). See *Madras Report on South Indian Epigraphy* 1906, p. 54. 1909, p. 84. 1910, p. 91. 1912, p. 66. *The Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 101-2 and footnote on p. 101. *The Pāṇḍyan Kingdom* by Prof. K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, p. 251. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara* by H. Heras, pp. 285-6. The plates contain some discrepancies. Verses 19 and 20 say that Srivallabha was crowned after the death of his brother Ativīrārāma and V. 42 mentions that the gift was made in the 21st year of Ativīrārāma Srivallabha which corresponded to Saka 1503. Ativīrārāma is identified with Ativīrārāma Srivallabha of the Tenkāsi Inscriptions which give him A.D. 1561 for his accession. But in A. D. 1583 there was no Varatungarāma, his cousin as his accession took place in A.D. 1586. Prof. Sathianatha Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 101, says that these plates must belong to Muttu Virappa Nayaka I (1603-1623) and not to Virappa Nayaka (1572-1595) as the latter continued the policy of subordination and loyalty towards the Vijayanagara emperors On page 81, he says in connection with Virappa's supremacy over the Tenkāsi Pāṇḍyas, 'If the Pudukkottai Plates of Sri Vallabha were issued in 1583, his relation towards the Pāṇḍyas as overlord is clear.' But he is inclined to assign the plates to Muthu Virappa Nayaka when he says (page 101) 'Perhaps the expression armies of Vira Raja and Achyuta Raja' were loosely used for the forces of the loyalist party and of Raghunātha Nayaka. 'If the date (1583) is correct it is difficult to explain such a combination of contending parties in 1583 or before. Thus he would take the Vallam battle to refer to the Tōppūr engagement, in which the loyalists fought against Jaggarāya and the Madura ruler. However, casting doubt on the date of the Plates, he has assigned them to the reign of Virappa Nayaka, p. 344, No. 76. That the battle of Toppūr is distinctly different from the Vallam battle is proved by the literary and internal evidence and Dr. S. K. Ayyangar's view that 'it is clear from this that the battle of Vallamprākāra referred to in the Pudukottai plates (of date 1582-3) cannot be taken to refer to the battle of Toppūr' (p. 102, Note) will hold good until it is proved to the contrary by future research.

put up a strong and valiant fight. When Virappa's army was completely destroyed and when victory was won by Venkatapati, the Tanjore army must have retreated instead of advancing upon the enemy that might have escaped the disaster, and Tirumala Nayaka would have taken possession of the horses left behind. Otherwise, the flight of the Tanjore forces will mean that they must have also opposed Venkatapati along with Madura. For such an interpretation there is nothing to support even in the traditional accounts.

These foregoing facts show that there was a battle at Vallamprākāra in which Venkatapati and the Tanjore Nayaka took part against Virappa Nayaka, whom they defeated in the end. Thus the earliest attempt at independence on the part of the Madura Nayak was nipped in the bud with the hearty co-operation and timely help rendered by the loyal Tanjore ruler, Achyutappa Nayaka, but for whom, it may be said that the south would have had a different history in the 17th century. Perhaps it was to this timely help of Achyutappa, reference has been made in the work of Rāmabadrām̃ba.²¹ Achyutappa continued the same loyalty and co-operated with Venkatapati in all his wars waged against Madura. It appears that Venkatapati had to teach the recalcitrant Nayak of Madura the salutary lesson of subordination and allegiance at least on two occasions.²² The exact nature of the part played by Tanjore

21. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*, cited before. Canto VII, Sl. 49.

बहुप्रकारैर्नृपतिप्रवेक प्रत्यर्थिपृथ्वीपतयो मदीयाः ।

संप्रामभूमीषु जगत्प्रसिद्धं खण्डीकृतास्ते खरखड्गवद्भया ॥

This verse is addressed to Achyutappa Nayaka by Venkatapati.

22. Prof. Sathiayanatha Aiyar (*The Nayaks of Madura*) says that there is nothing to doubt regarding the loyalty of Virappa Nayaka and his successors till the accession of Muthu Virappa Nayaka in A.D. 1609 and all the Vijayanagara wars must have happened in his reign i.e., 1609-1623. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar says that there were two more Vijayanagara invasions upon Madura besides the Vallam campaign in the reign of Venkatapati and in one of them, Venkatapati himself took the command in person. (*Sources of Vijayanagar History*, Introduction, p. 19 and *Chikkadēvarāya Vamśāvali* of Tirumalarāya, p. 302 and *Sources*, 248). According to him the second campaign was led by himself. (*The Nayaks of Madura*, Introduction, p. 17). He would place the victory of Mātla Ananta mentioned in the Sidhout Inscription dated A.D. 1605 either in A.D. 1583 or a little later (*Sources* p. 248 and foot note 2). Father Heras discountenances the value of the *Chikkadēvarāya Vamśāvali* and says that there were three invasions of Venkatapati, (1) Before 1595 (2) about 1599 when Venkata marched personally and another (3) about 1610 when Mātla Ananta defeated the Madura ruler. Father Heras quotes evidence from the letters of Anquetil du Perron, Father Du Jarric, Father Pimenta, Father Vico and Father Laerzio. (*Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagar*, Chapter XVII).

on these occasions is not known for certain, but there can possibly be no doubt as regards Achyutappa Nayaka's co-operation with the imperial forces. And this co-operation developed the germs of mutual distrust and hostility, growing between Tanjore and Madura; and evidently the latter was looking out for an opportunity to wreak vengeance upon Tanjore. But Virappa Nayaka could not effect any harm to his rival, so long as there was Venkatapati Raya to take up her cause. And so, even the second attempt made by Virappa in his last days (*circa* 1595) proved fruitless.²³ These two defeats sustained by Virappa had their natural consequences and for about a decade following his death, there occurred no open hostilities between Madura and Tanjore. Krishnappa Nayaka II (1595-1601) the successor of Virappa, and Muthu Krishnappa Nayaka (1601-1609) of Madura remained loyal to the empire; and besides, they had their own troubles in the Travancore and Marava countries respectively; and the reorganisation of the Marava country under the Śētupatis was made by Muthu Krishnappa Nayaka after bringing that territory to subjection and allegiance. Since troubles nearer home demanded their continued attention, it was not possible for the Madura Nayaks to indulge in hostile manifestations against Tanjore and the Empire. Two Jesuit letters, dated A.D. 1606 and A.D. 1608, refer to Muthu Krishnappa Nayaka's loyalty to the Empire and to his remittance of the usual tribute.²⁴

Muthu Virappa Nayaka, the son and successor of Muthu Krishnappa Nayaka, was the first ruler to exhibit his hostility towards Tanjore openly. He was a powerful ruler;²⁵ and he was the forerunner of Tirumala Nayaka in his policy of defying the imperial suzerain. He also appears to have pursued the aggressive policy of independence right from the beginning, since a Jesuit letter dated 25th November 1611²⁶ refers to a war which he waged with Tanjore. The letter says that Father Alberto Laerzio, in his tour on an inspection of the missionary centres of the

23. Father Heras (*Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagar*, p. 342) says that this war was the result of Virappa Nayaka's refusal to pay the tribute as mentioned by Anquetil du Perron.

24. *The Aravidu Dynasty*, p. 358. 'Moreover in September, 1604, Venkata II received in audience a special envoy of the Nayak of Madura, as a Jesuit letter of the year 1906 (mistake for 1606) tells us.' The letter of Father Coutinho dated October 11th, 1608 refers to the tribute paid by both Madura and Tanjore.

25. Father Vico's letter speaks of him as the powerful prince of the country. Bertrand: *La Mission*, Vol. II, 254, quoted in the *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 111.

26. Bertrand: *La Mission du Madure* II, p. 108. Letter from Father A. Laerzio to Father C. Aquaviva, Cochin, December 25th A.D. 1611. Also Father Heras, p. 361.

land, was at San Thomē on the 22nd September 1611. When he was about to leave that place, the letter says that he was prevented from going, the reason being that there was a war then raging between the Nayaks of Madura and Tanjore. Since the letter is dated the 25th of November 1611, it is probable that the war also must have come to an end sometime earlier, as otherwise, it is difficult to explain how he could have reached Cochin in full safety. We have no other evidence to refer to this war, in which Tanjore was directly involved. Neither the causes nor the results of this war are noticed or indicated in any of the Tanjore literature. Father Heras suggests, on the evidence of two Jesuit letters, that Achyutappa Nayaka's help to the Emperor in the previous year, i.e., A.D. 1610, against Madura must have been the cause for this feud between the two houses.²⁷ He thus notes the significance of this war:—"We

27. Father Heras says that Venkatapati's last war upon Madura took place in A.D. 1610 when Mātla Ananta might have held the supreme command, (*Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, p. 360) as the latter is called 'the conqueror of the territory called Panchapāndya, i.e., the kingdom of Madura in an Inscription dated A.D. 1612-13 (Butterworth and Venugopaul Chetty): *Inscriptions of the Nellore District*: Vol. I, p. 246). From the Sidhout Inscription of Mātla Ananta, (*Sources*), we know that his victory over the Nayak of Madura must have happened sometime earlier than A.D. 1605 the date of the epigraph. And so this inscription dated A.D. 1612-13, on which reliance is made by Father Heras must also refer to the same battle fought sometime before A.D. 1605 as there is no evidence to prove another war upon Madura by Venkatapati Raya in his last days. Moreover even the evidence contained in the Jesuit letters on which Father Heras bases his views, is not definite and conclusive if careful attention is bestowed upon their general meaning. Father Heras places two letters as evidence in support of a war in A.D. 1610. One of the letters written by Robert de Nobili is dated 12th December, A.D. 1610 (*Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, p. 361) and it says 'A certain notable Pandāra said to one of my Christians *these last days* that the coming of the king of Bisnaga was the destruction of the Naiche, just as my stay in this country was the destruction of the Pandaras.' Father Heras says that 'the saying referred to in his letter proves evidently both that the war was over at the end of the same year, and that its result was satisfactory to the Vijayanagara Emperor,' and in support of this he quotes Father Vico's letter dated 30th August A.D. 1611. (*Bertrand's La Mission du Madure*, Vol. II, p. 124 and the *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 293). Again this letter says "The great Nayak of Madura and those of Tanjore and Gingee are themselves tributaries of Bisnagar, to whom they pay or have to pay each an annual tribute of six to ten million francs. But they are not punctual in paying it; often they postpone the payment; sometimes they even refuse it with insolence. In that case (the king of) Bisnagar comes or sends one of his generals, at the head of hundred thousand men, to make them pay all the arrears with interest. On these occasions which are frequent, it is again the poor people who pay for the fault of their princes; all the country is devastated, and the people are plundered or massacred." Father Heras concludes from this letter that 'the same (war) is meant by Father Vico' and quotes the last portion of the letter in support of his argument.

shall see that this feud between the two houses, that came to a head and burst in Venkata's reign, continued unabated till the extinction of one of them; and that very soon, just after the death of the Emperor, the Madura and Tanjore Nayaks again came to blows."

A careful and critical reading of the Jesuit letters quoted by Father Heras and the epigraphs²⁸ of the Madura Nayaks would clearly prove the impossibility of an imperial war with Madura in A.D. 1610 and so Achyutappa Nayaka's part in that war and against Madura as mentioned by Father Heras, is very highly improbable. Hence it is clear that the causes for a war between Tanjore and Madura mentioned in Father Laerzio's letter A.D. 1611 are to be traced somewhere else.

But a close reading of the contents of these two letters will show that the conclusions based upon them are not warranted and are baseless. They do not contain anything definite to show either a war or the refusal of the tribute by Madura in A.D. 1611 or even earlier. The *italicised* words clearly show that the statements made therein are only general observations made regarding the political situation. Father Nobili's letter embodies the observations made by a native to one of Nobili's followers regarding the general state of affairs then prevalent in the land. And Father Vico's letter contains his own personal observations and the loose words 'often' and 'sometimes' clearly indicate the possibility of only this interpretation. The phrases that 'they (the Nayaks of Madura, Tanjore and Gingee) are not punctual in paying it' and 'they postpone the payment' speak of the attitude of these Nayaks in general and they lend support only to this interpretation. Apart from this, too much stress cannot be laid upon the validity of these statements as they cannot withstand internal criticism. If Father Vico's letter is to be considered an authentic summary of the political history of the country, then it will mean that all the Nayaks were opposed to the Emperor in that year and not Madura alone as is surmised by Father Heras. And Prof. Sathianatha Aiyar's view, (*Nayaks of Madura*, p. 99) that Vico's letter refers to the Madura Nayak's withholding the tribute in that year, needs revision. The literary evidence proves the loyalty of Tanjore to the Empire and Tanjore's part in the Toppūr battle fought a few years after, only confirms their loyalty. The foregoing explanation shows that there could not have been any war between Venkatapati Raya and the Madura ruler in or about A.D. 1610.

[Father Heras says that Muttu Virappa of Madura, who succeeded Muttu Krishnappa in 1609, continued on good terms with Venkata II during the first years of his rule. An inscription of 1609 records that Venkatapati Raya made a gift of the village of Nagenalluru, on the north bank of the Kāveri, to Brahmans, at the request of Muttu Virappa and that in the records of the next year (1610) these friendly relations do not seem to have continued. This however, cannot mean that there was any open manifestation of hostility by the Madura Nayak towards his suzerain.—[Ed.]

28. Muthukrishnappa Nayaka's epigraphs show his loyalty to the Empire till his death in A.D. 1609 and "two records of Venkata I prove his authority in the Nayak dominions.'

Muthu Virappa Nayaka's earliest attempt at independence probably began in the year A.D. 1610; and his first measure towards this aim was directed against Tanjore, the immediate neighbour, as she had always supported the cause of the empire to the detriment of the particular interests of the Madura Nayaks. Achyutappa Nayaka's part in the Vallam battle in A.D. 1583, in co-operation with Venkatapati Raya and against Madura, and his continued rancour must have been sufficient causes for this outbreak of hostilities. Perhaps Erumaikatti Nayaka's capture of some fortress and his victorious return to Madura, mentioned in a Jesuit letter dated 12th June, 1610, has reference to this note of a war.²⁹ The letter shows that Erumaikatti must have been a feudatory or subordinate of Muthu Virappa, and he must have captured some of the forts that belonged most probably to Tanjore. And it is said, that for this act he was shown favours by the Madura Nayaka. Since the capture of the forts and the consequent reduction of the Tanjore territories happened in A.D. 1610, there was evidently enough reason for Tanjore to enter into war with Madura in the following year, and it must have ended about October, A.D. 1611³⁰. But it is not known how the war was brought to a close. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar says that in this war 'the Empire government had taken no part, probably because it was involved in one of those periodical struggles against the aggressions of the Muhammadans from the North.'³¹ Achyutappa Nayak's plan to conquer the lands held by various rulers through his son, as mentioned by Yagnanārāyana Dikshita³² perhaps has a reference to this war.

Achyutappa's loyalty towards and co-operation with the Emperor have been mentioned already. The *Raghunāthābhyaṅga* confirms this, and refers to the help given by Achyutappa's son, Raghunātha to

29. The letter says (*Nayaks of Madura*, p. 100) 'that Hermecatti (Erumaikatti Nayaka).....distinguished himself by his bravery took some fortress by assault and returned victorious from the war. The great Nayak (of Madura) loaded him with honours and new favours.'

30. The letter is dated 25th November, A.D. 1611 and it refers to the stay of Father Laerzio in the College at San Thomé in September, on account of this war (also quoted above).

31. '*The Nayaks of Madura*', p. 102, Note.

32. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto VI, Sloka 63.

जातुक्षमामथ विजापयितुं समस्तां नाना नरेन्द्रविधृतां निजनन्दनेन ।

संचिन्तयन्सन्तपतिः श्रवसोरतानीत् कोलाहलं भूपकुलाङ्गनानाम् ॥

Venkatapati Raya, in the latter's wars with the Muhammadans.³³ The authoress refers to the marching of the Tanjore army and to Raghunātha's arrival at Penukonda, visiting on his way the capital city, Chandragiri. Raghunātha won the battle and the Muhammadan army was completely routed. Venkata is said to have acknowledged his services in open court and praised him for his great valour and courage, presenting him with numerous gifts.³⁴ This account is confirmed by the accounts of the Muhammadan historians, which refer to Venkatapati Raya's

33. Venkatapati appeared to have in breach of the treaties existing between his predecessor and the Sultan of Golkonda, removed according to Ferishta, his seat of Government from Chandragiri to Penukonda "situated on the Kootb Shahy frontier" and likewise made incursions into the latter territory. The Raya deputed Goparaj Timma, his minister, and Pavia Chetty his general, to the Kutb Shah, who had commenced a siege of Penukonda and now consented to an armistice. The Hindus took advantage of the consequent absence of the Muhammadans from the vicinity of the fort and contrived to introduce into it a large quantity of supplies and a large number of troops, horse, foot and musketeers under the famous Jadev Rao, Gulrang Chetty, Manup Raj and Papiiah Samywar. The subsequent siege operations of the Mussalmans were not effective and the Kutb Shah raised the siege and retreated to Golconda leaving his garrisons in Gandikotta, Nandyal and other places (1589). Venkatapati took advantage of this situation to keep the Raja of Udayagiri to make an incursion into the realms of the enemy and to plunder all the neighbouring districts as far as Kondavidu and the Krishna river. After some desultory operations, Venkatapati sent his whole army, amounting to about 100,000 troops under Yeltum Raj, Gulrang Chetty, Manup Raj, and others to recover Gandikotta from Sanjar Khan. Meanwhile a Golconda army under Murtaza Khan advanced to Cuddapah sacked the town and destroyed its temple. He defeated Yeltum Raj and Manup Raj in a severe action and forced them to fly. But the Hindus gathered up their forces once again and the Muslims found it impossible to engage them in a regular battle. At last, taking advantage of the encampment of the Muslim army in a black clayey soil (noted as lying between Cuddapah and Cumbum by J. Briggs, the translator of Ferishta) and of a momentary panic that seized them completely defeated them and destroyed their cavalry almost to a man; and only the bravery of Murtaza Khan could cover the retreat of the Mussalman army. In revenge the Kutb Shah despatched a large force under Etibar Khan Yezdy, the Governor of Kondavidu (hereafter called Murtaza-nagar) to advance against Penukonda. He was opposed by Narasa Nandaraj of Anantagiri (one of the most famous hill forts) but the latter had to retire from the field with a considerable loss. The Muslims advanced to Kālahasti and plundered its shrine and ordered prayers to be read in its halls. Venkatapati, nothing daunted, invited the jaghirdars of the country around Kondavidu to revolt, while the Kutb Shahi Court was shaken by the appearance of a pretender. This is the gist of the narrative of the operations of the Mussalmans against Venkatapati Raya. On the whole the Hindu resistance proved itself to be well organised, formidable and successful.—[Ed.]

34. *Raghunāthābhyaṇam*, Canto VIII, Sl. 43-70.

invasion of the Golkonda territories and the siege of Penukonda in A. D. 1589. The Muhammadan armies under Muhammad Kuli Qutb Shah is said to have suffered a defeat and the Muhammadan historian himself notes that the Hindu forces became so numerous that the Muhammadan armies 'found it impossible to give them battle but confined their operations to plundering and cutting off supplies.'³⁵ The *Raghunāthabhyudayam* says³⁶ that the Muhammadan armies on hearing the news of the coming of Raghunatha, got terrified and fled into the jungles; and it³⁷ also notes that the losses on the Muhammadan side were great. Raghunātha besides this, claims victory over a Murasa King, who was in possession of numerous forts like Ballālapura.³⁸ This decisive victory over the Muhammadans was so important as it gave the much needed relief for the Hindus, and for about a decade to come, the Hindu Empire was enjoying comparative peace under Venkatapati Raya, the last great monarch of Vijayanagar. It is not known whether Tanjore took any part in the subsequent invasions of the Emperor against Kondavīdu which is held to have taken place in the period between A.D. 1591 and A.D. 1603.

Raghunātha Nayaka before his return to Tanjore, is said to have performed a meritorious act of chivalry in securing the release of Krishnappa Nayaka of Gingee from imprisonment with the sanction of the Emperor.³⁹ Krishnappa Nayaka is said to have given away his daughter in marriage to Raghunātha in appreciation of his services and out of gratitude.⁴⁰ Raghunātha's co-operation in this war of Venkatapati is clear proof of Tanjore's loyalty and she must have pursued the same policy throughout. But some of the letters of the Jesuit missionaries say that Tanjore was vacillating in her policy towards the empire, and she was not also punctual in her payment of tribute. Anquetil du Per-

35. Briggs' *Ferishta*, Vol. III, p. 454. Also '*Aravīdu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*', p. 327.

36. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VII, Sl. 63.

37. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VII, Sl. 65. It is curious to note that the *Sāhityaratnākara* does not mention this event at all.

38. *Sources*, p. 285. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar says 'the people of Morasanādu the district embracing the northern side of the North Arcot and the adjacent parts of the neighbouring districts. Can it be Bellary? Golkonda by the end of A.D. 1580 had conquered Guntur and parts of Bellary, Kurnool, Cuddapah and Nellore. *Climacteric of Talikota*.

39. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VII, Sl. 72 and 73.

40. Subsequent events however, do not show that this marriage alliance could have been possible.

ron⁴¹ says:—"Before 1595 the Naique of Tanjore, Madura and Gingi gave up all allegiance as they did not want to acknowledge as their sovereign one who had dethroned the legitimate king of Bisnaga." Father Coutinho in a letter dated 11th October, A.D. 1608 says that "the Naiques of Tangior and Madura sent their tribute consisting of 500 thousand cruzados and many sorts of presents to the king. In order to receive these the king dressed himself as on the days of great celebration with many ornaments of gold and precious stones." Father Coutinho says that he was present at the capital and witnessed this ceremony. He again mentions in another letter the insurgent attitude of Achyutappa Nayaka and says "that the rumour was that the king warred upon the Naichus of Tangaor, called Astapanaichus, (Achyutappa)" and the original says that "Venkata has a large army with many good generals in order to reconquer Kanchipuram, which city along with all the country around had surrendered to Astapanaichus the king of Tangior."⁴² This letter is dated 17th July, A.D. 1600 and it again says that there was no war and adds that "It is quite certain that the King does not think of that expedition any more, and Venkata's designs were checked by the death of Achyutappa Nayaka."⁴³ Father Heras says that since this letter is dated in A.D. 1600, the quarrel mentioned therein, must have taken place in A.D. 1598-9. Again Father Vico's letter dated A.D. 1611 speaks in general terms of the unpunctual remittances of the tribute of the Nayakas. The validity and faithfulness of these letters cannot be taken without adequate proof, since all the internal evidence supports Tanjore's loyalty.⁴⁴ The Jesuit letters, some of which were probably written by persons with a superficial knowledge of the political affairs, must be utilised only as a corrective to the internal evidence and not as superseding the latter since they were written by men who could not

41. 'Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara,' p. 308.

42. Purchas, 'His Pilgrims,' Vol. X, p. 222.

43. Purchas, 'His Pilgrims,' Vol. X, Ibid.

44. 'The Aravidu Dynasty,' p. 398. Father Heras says that Perron's reference to a war is misplaced. Tanjore's co-operation with the Emperor, Venkatapati, has been established fully by the literature of the Tanjore Nayaks and her prominent part in the war of succession that took place soon after the death of Venkatapati, also proves the same. Such being the circumstances, it is not possible to speak of Tanjore as obstinate and disobedient in the interim period. Father Coutinho's letter must in all probability refer to the revolt of the Nayak of Gingee and not to that of Tanjore (*The Aravidu Dynasty*, pp. 404-408) as there is nothing in the Tanjore literature to support the conquest of Kanchi which never belonged to Tanjore. However, Father Heras, who speaks of Tanjore's disloyalty on the basis of these Jesuit letters, produces the same evidence to prove the disloyalty of the Gingee Nayak as well.

have been, in all circumstances fully conversant with the inner politics and intrigues of the state. However, Venkatapati Raya's supremacy and hold over his southern viceroys are established by the numerous epigraphs found in the South.⁴⁵

The *Sāhityaratnākara* speaks of Achyutappa's victory over the Pārasikas at Negapatam.⁴⁶ The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* does not mention this war with the Portuguese, but refers to the later wars waged by Achyutappa Nayaka's son, Raghunātha against these Pārasikas. Nothing more is known about this event from the Tanjore literature, and the epigraphs of this ruler. What were the circumstances that led to this war upon the Pārasikas, who are called Paṇṇis by Rāmabhadra and who could have been no other than the Portuguese. The Pārasikas cannot be taken to mean Muhammadans or Moors since, the subsequent happenings that took place at Jaffna show that it was the Portuguese, who suffered a defeat at the hands of the Tanjore Nayak. The Portuguese were the first European settlers in India and they undertook missionary and proselytising work comparatively early in their Indian career. The conversion of the Paravas of the Fishery Coast to Catholicism by St. Francis Xavier, was their great achievement in this direction on the east coast. They had to encounter strong and continued opposition from the Vijayanagara rulers and their representatives, who disliked their missionary zeal. They also indulged in political intrigues and sometimes made use of their missionaries for this purpose. On the Coromandel Coast, San Thomē was next occupied, about the middle of the 16th century. San Thomē was for long associated with early Christianity and with the tradition of the activities of the Apostle Thomas in the Coromandel Coast. The Portuguese formed a settlement at the place in 1522, first with the object of rebuilding the chapel. Ferishta writing of the Portuguese says that in the year 963 A.H. (A.D. 1556) the Christians (Tarsas) were in possession of the forts of Hormuz, Muskat, Sumatra, Malacca, Mangalore, Negapatam, Barcelore, Ceylon and Bengal to the borders of China. They had also forts.⁴⁷ The settlement of Negapatam was an accomplished fact by the time of Śevappa Nayaka. The Portuguese, who had grown to considerable strength on

45. 334 of 1913 from Chidambaram, 91 of 1928 from Aḷagarkōil (Madura District), 36 of 1908 from Madura, 389 of 1918 from Shiyali (Tanjore District), 258 of 1916 from Srimuṣṇam (South Arcot District) and 177 of 1926 from Pattukōttai. Robert Sewell says that Tanjore became independent in A.D. 1602.

46. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Sloka 68.

47. Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 584.

the Malabar Coast, and who had captured all the ports of Ceylon and Jaffna, had Negapatam as a halting place on their way to San Thomē. By the year A.D. 1586 the Portuguese had gained in strength and power and was put in charge of a separate governor. In that year Diogo Fernandez Penoa, the chief of that place, sent men and provisions to the help of his countrymen, who were then waging a war in Ceylon.⁴⁸ Father Pimenta, who visited Negapatam in A.D. 1597, says that 'many Portugals dwell there and many winter there, which come from the Coast of China, Bengala, Pegu and Malacca.' Du Jarric, another missionary, notes that Father Pimenta was invited by Achyutappa Nayaka and was given permission to build a church at Negapatam 'while another one was already started at Tranquebar'. Father Pimenta himself says that while he was at Negapatam, 'a place for five hundred ducats for a new residence of ours was purchased;' and he is said to have sent priests to Negapatam which was situated 'by the river side, having the sea to the west and was fitter for the functions of the Society.'⁴⁹ This information contained in the Jesuit letters and the internal evidence, though very meagre, make it clear that Negapatam was under effective Portuguese authority during the rule of the Nayaks. Achyutappa Nayak's victory over them has been referred to already but no detail is known about the war and the Portuguese sources do not give us any date. The Portuguese records refer to their interference into the affairs of Jaffna, whose king was opposed to them and their religion. The Portuguese became rulers of Ceylon on the death of Don Juan Dharmapala in A.D. 1597⁵⁰, who bequeathed to them by a deed executed in their favour, the whole island except Jaffna, whose ruler was not only opposed to, but inflicted much injury on the Christians. The Portuguese had to war with the Jaffnese ruler on a number of occasions till A.D. 1617 when the place finally passed into their hands. The *Sāhityaratnākara* and the *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam* refer to the Tanjore intervention on behalf of the Jaffnese ruler and against the Portuguese during the reign of Raghunātha Nayaka. And Achyutappa Nayaka's war with the Portuguese was in all probability undertaken on behalf of the Jaffnese in the

48. 'The Portuguese in India' F. C. Danvers, Vol. II, p. 76.

49. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, pp. 397 and 398.

50. A convention of Sinhalese delegates met after Dharmapala's death and agreed to recognise Philip II as the king of Ceylon, provided the Portuguese would guarantee on his behalf that the laws and customs of the Sinhalese should be maintained inviolable for ever"—Ed.

beginning of the 17th century; and the Pārasikas⁵¹ defeat at Negapatam perhaps refers to the beginning of the hostilities between the Nayaks and the Portuguese. The methods adopted by them in converting the people of the country to Christianity, and their generally bad treatment of the natives had made them very unpopular. The Dutch records show that both the rulers of Ceylon and Tanjore sought their help to drive away the Portuguese from the land.⁵² The Dutch in the beginning of the 17th century had established themselves at Tegnapatam between the mouths of the Gadilam and the Pennar rivers (*circa*, A.D. 1610) situated in the kingdom of the Nayak of Gingee; and the Dutch had made a request even earlier for the port of Triminipatam from the Nayak of Tanjore to which no reply was received upto 7th April, A.D. 1609.⁵³ However, the Dutch were rapidly growing in their strength and resources and their records prove their friendly attitude towards the Emperor, Venkatapati Raya from A.D. 1612 onwards.

The provenance of his epigraphs shows that Achyutappa kept intact his hold over the kingdom, as it was left to him by his father. His records are also found at other places as Tiru-uṭṭarakōśamaṅgai (Ramnad District) and Tiruvaṇṇāmalai and Neduṅguṇram (North Arcot District). We have seen already that Śevappa's epigraphs also, are found both at Tiruvaṇṇāmalai and Neduṅguṇram. The presence of the records

51. Father Heras says that the defeat was sustained by the Dutch. Mr. Sitaramayya, 'Tanjore Andhra Nayaka Charitramu' says that Raghunatha was sent against the Portuguese by Achyutappa Nayaka even on this occasion also.

52. However, Negapatam was held by the Portuguese till 1658 A.D.

53. The Dutch were carrying on negotiations with the Nayak of Tanjore seeking permission to carry on trade with Tanjore and to settle at Triminipatam (the modern Tirumalairājānpattanam) and the Portuguese maps (*Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*) also locate this port between Negapatam and Tranquebar. The Dutch wanted to get hold of this port since 'much was expected of the cloth trade of this place.' (Poonen, 'Dutch Beginnings,' Chapter VII). [The Dutch sought the permission of Krishnappa Nayaka of Gingee to build a fort at Dēvanampatnam; and the necessary order was granted in 1608 (30th November). On receipt of the Nayaka's *olla* (cadjan leaf embodying the grant) the Dutch began to build a small fort. The Portuguese persuaded Venkatapati Raya to send a messenger to the Nayak ordering him to expel the Dutch from his territory. Undaunted by this failure, the Dutch again sought permission from Krishnappa Nayaka to settle at Dēvanampatanam and at Krishnapuram (Porto Novo) then recently founded by the Nayaka. Again they were refused permission on account of the dissuasions of the Portuguese. Venkata had always ordered the Nayaka to act according to the demands of the Fathers and expel from his territories "the foes of the Portuguese who are better friends than the Dutch."—[Ed.]

of these two Nayaks at these places, and particularly at Neduṅṅuṇṇam show that there must have existed some connection between the Nayaks and the latter place the exact nature of which is not known. The epigraphs of Śevappa Nayaka show that Neduṅṅuṇṇam was their native place and the epigraphs point to their close associations and love for the place of their birth, and the temple there was enriched by their large gifts. 567 of 1902 from Tiruvaṇṇāmalai records the remission of some taxes in the villages belonging to the temple by the order of Achyutappa during the reign of Sadāsivarāya in A.D. 1567. The Tiru-uṭṭarakōśamaṅgai inscription which records a gift⁵⁴ made to the temple, must have been issued by the king in commemoration of his holy pilgrimage to Rāmēswaram. The ruler is said to have made a gift of a village in the Chōla country while he was at Rāmēswaram, and the Tanjore literature speaks of Achyutappa Nayaka's annual visits to Rameswaram (Sētu).

Achyutappa Nayaka's reign was one of comparative peace in spite of wars. The country, it appears, did not suffer either from the bad effects of prolonged warfare or from the evil consequences of invasion from outside. He seems to have been a patron of learning and devoted much of his resources to works of public utility, besides the building and repairing numerous temples. Achyutappa added to the gifts of his father made to the Tiruvaṇṇāmalai temple by setting up golden kaṣāsās on the gōpura built by his father.⁵⁵ The Siva temple at Tiruvidaimarudūr received a gift of a village, the income from which was to be utilised in celebrating the car festival of the goddess on the Ādipūram day⁵⁶. The Mārgasahāyēswarar temple at Mūvalūr (Mayavaram Taluk) where Śevappa made a gift of lands for the maintenance of a choultry, was also a recipient of a gift of lands from Achyutappa, the proceeds of which were to be spent in burning lamps in its shrine. Private benefactions also were encouraged and a record from Viḷanagar (Mayavaram Taluk) refers to the building of the *ardha* and the *mukha maṇṭapas* (the central hall and the hall adjacent to the *sanctum sanctorum*) in stone, the expenses of which were met partly out of the palace funds and partly by private contributions.⁵⁷ This record is of interest as it refers to the Nayak's subsidy granted in favour of the temple. Another record dated in the year A.D. 1566⁵⁸ mentions a gift by Achyutappa

54. 84 of 1905, dated A.D. 1583.

55. 425 of 1928.

56. 84 of 1905 dated A.D. 1583.

57. 259 of 1913 dated Saka 1488.

58. 416 and 423 of 1918.

Nayaka of the village called Tiruvēṭkaḷam.^{58a} (South Arcot District) to the Tirumūlasthāna temple at Chidambaram, for the merit of the Vijayanagara king Tirumalarāya. The same temple received further endowments during his own life time; and two other epigraphs⁵⁹ refer to a gift of land and taxes accruing from the village called Perumangalam, made by one Aḷagapperumāl Pillai to Chidambārēswara for the merit of Achyutappa. Another record registers a gift of five villages made for the merit of the same Nayaka called here as the son of Aḷappam Chinna Śevappa Nayaka, to the temple at Little Conjeevaram during the reign of Srirangarāya.⁶⁰ 389 of 1928 dated A.D. 1588 refers to another gift of land made to the Panaipākkam temple (North Arcot District) by one Sēshagiri Ayyan, son of Giriappayyan who calls himself an agent of Achyutappa Nayaka.

Besides these royal gifts, the famous minister, Gōvinda Dīkshita (called Dīkshitarayyan, out of respect in the epigraphs), also made large gifts and additions to temples. He is said to have constructed the Turaikāṭṭuvār maṇṭapa in Viḷanagar temple in the year A.D. 1608.⁶¹ The intimate and happy relations between the minister and the king and the high regard which the latter had for the former are best seen in two epigraphs⁶² which record a gift in money for the merit of Gōvinda Dīkshita made by Achyutappa himself.

Inscriptions also refer to the gifts made to communities apart from the temples. 22 of 1897 is the record of a charter given by the king to the community of goldsmiths in Tanjore exempting them from the payment of certain taxes in A.D. 1577. 426 of 1928 from Tiruvaṇṇāmalai dated A.D. 1590 registers the taxes fixed on the maṇṛādi living in the eastern street of that place at the rate of two *paṇams* for each *taḷaik-kāṭṭu* (groups of men) and one *paṇam* as *kudippanam* per annum on them. These inscriptions mention Venkatapati Raya.

Of all the temples that received large benefactions and gifts from him, the great Vishnu temple at Srirangam stands first and foremost. Gōvinda Dīkshita in the *Sangīta Sudhā*, Yagnanārāyana Dīkshita and Rāmabhadraṁba, all speak in glowing terms of Achyutappa's lavish gifts to Srirangam. He is said to have constructed the golden *vimāna* of the inmost shrine and presented the image of the god with a golden

58a. Part of the site of the village is now occupied by Annamalai University.

59. 380 of 1919 dated Saka 1493.

60. 380 of 1919 dated S. 1493.

61. 164 of 1925.

62. 119 of 1930 and 710 of 1904 dated A.D. 1588 and A.D. 1596 respectively.

crown studded with precious stones, a jewelled armour and a golden *simhāsana*. He is also said to have added to the gōpuras on the east, west and north of the temple, along with the construction of the 8th prākāra and several maṇṭapas. The flight of steps leading to the Cauvery and the garden attached to the temple were his other gifts. His inscriptions also confirm these presents.⁶³ He performed the great ceremony of gifts known as *Tulāpurushas* and *Hiraṇyagarbha dānas*⁶⁴ every year. He is said to have paid annual visits to Rāmēśwaram and built the gopuras of that temple. He claims to have fed a thousand Brahmans everyday. He built the Pushyamaṇṭapas, with steps leading to the Cauvery at Mayavaram, Tiruvidaimarudur, Kumbakonam and Tiruvādi. He also founded numerous agrahāras.⁶⁵ One remarkable act of public utility by which the Tanjore country has benefitted largely was the construction of a dam across the Cauvery near Tiruvādi⁶⁶ by which the irrigation facilities of the neighbourhood were largely improved. The *Raghunāthābhyaṇyam* and the *Sāhityaratnākaram*

63. 410 of 1924 refers to a gift of a garden to Srirangam.

64. 426 of 1924 refers to his several gifts. Also *Saṅguta Sudhā*, Slokas 38-44. It refers to his alms given to Gorayis (Bairugis) and to his gifts made to the temples at Kālahasti and Tirupati.

65. Rājachūdāmani Dikshita in his *Rukmaniparinayam* says:—

मायूरमध्यार्जुन कुम्भघोण श्रीचंपकारण्य मुखस्थलेषु ।
महत्तरं मण्डपमाततान भक्त्यामहत्या परमच्युतेन्द्रः ॥
अग्रियाननेकानपि चाप्रहारनसौ व्यतारीदवणी सुरेभ्यः ।
शौर्ये च धैर्येपि च दानकेल्यां समेनकश्चिधरणी भृतस्य ॥

quoted by Mr. V. Prabhakara Sastri.

Rangājamma in her *Maṇṇārudāsa Vilāsa* refers to his gifts to Srirangam, Rāmasētu and Śrīmushnam. 'Srimushna mukhya Visēsha sthalambula śakala vaibavamula sagamjēse.' and mentions his charitable acts done to all the Vishnu temples of the Pāṇḍya and Tundira countries as well.

66. 426 of 1924 dated cyclic Maṇmatha corresponding to A.D. 1596:—

कैकर्याणि कृतानियेन सकलान्यासंश्च रङ्गेशितु-
भूयः सद्यमहीधरेन्द्रतनया सेतुश्च येनोदधतः ।
कृत्वा मन्मथवत्सरे वृषभगे सितद्रादशी तिथ्यां
येन हिरण्यगर्भमवनी श्रेष्ठत्वमासं महत् ॥
तत्ताद्रक्षगुणोयमच्युत विभुः चेवप् भूपात्मजः
श्रीमणिवष्णु विरिञ्जितार्थ महिते कल्याणसिन्धोस्तटे ।
वामेपञ्चनदौ.....

(Inscription in the Pushyamaṇṭapa, Tiruvadi).

devote special chapters to the description of the land and its fertility under him, the land being termed a paddy forest (Śālivanam).

Achyutappa's patronage was impartially and generously extended to the three prominent faiths of the land, viz., the Saiva, Vaishnava and the Madhwa, and this is mentioned in the epigraphs and in the literature as well. The gift made to Vijayindra Tirtha by Srirangarāya on the request of Śevappa Nayaka appears to have been made by Achyutappa himself very early, perhaps soon after his appointment as Yuvarāja.⁶⁷

Achyutappa's last years saw the beginning of troubles caused by the rise of a powerful chief, Sōlaga, who was a subordinate of the Gingee Nayak and the ruler of Kōttaitivu situated at the mouth of the Coleroon and also by the Portuguese settlers on the coast. The king of Jaffna, who was opposed to the Portuguese was driven out of his country and he had to take refuge at the Nayak's court. To crown all, the great Emperor of Vijayanagara, Venkatapati Raya died leaving the throne to be disputed by two parties in a terrible civil war; and in this struggle, the loyalist party supporting the cause of

67. The Aruviḷimangalam plates. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. 12, p. 342. The plates record a gift of the village called Ariviḷimangalam (also known as Achyuta-samudram and situated in the Nannilam Taluk of the Tanjore District) to the great Madhwa teacher Vijayindra Tirtha. Verses 40 to 45 say that this gift which was made by Achyutappa Nayaka earlier, was now ratified by the Vijayanagara Emperor, Srirangarāya at the request of Śevappa Nayaka, the father of Achyutappa. Vijayindra, the donee is said to have given away this village which was composed of sixty *vrittis* to Brahmans for his own merit and for the merit of Śevappa and Achyutappa. Vijayindra Tirtha is said to have occupied the pontifical seat 'for fifty-five years, five months and sixteen days, i.e., from Saka 1461 to Saka 1517 (A.D. 1539 to 1595). His death in the cyclic year Maṃmatha would correspond to A.D. 1595-6. The importance of these plates consists in the fact that Achyutappa was closely associated with the administration of the government of his father and both of them were loyal feudatories of the Vijayanagara Empire. They also explain the royal patronage extended to the Madhwa religion. Vijayindra is said to have been a contemporary of the great Advaita scholar, Appayya Dikshita. The plates are dated in the cyclic year Dhātri and in the month of Āshāda. The chronogram Ratna, griha, payōdhīndu ganitē Sakavastarē is taken to mean Saka 1499 equal to A.D. 1577-8 by Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao and Mr. T. S. Kuppaswamy Sastri (*Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XII, p. 342).

Sl. 40. कुमारच्युतभूपेन दत्तपूर्वं विशेषतः ।

Sl. 41. वीर श्रीचैव्यभूपस्य विहसिमनुपालयन् ।

Achyutappa is called here Kumāra Achyuta Bhūpa.

Chikkadēvarāya, the emperor's nephew who was nominated by Venkatapati himself, and the other taking up the cause of a putative son of Venkatapati. The former was led by Yāchama Nayaka, while Gobburī Jaggarāya, the Emperor's brother-in-law became the organiser and head of the disloyal group of chieftains. And the Tanjore Nayak, as a loyal feudatory was naturally drawn into this struggle. All the Tanjore literary evidence are unanimous in mentioning that Achyutappa, who was then old, thought it proper and best to leave the administration in the hands of his son Raghunātha, who had already won fame as a warrior in the Penukonda campaign and so he abdicated the throne in favour of his son so that he might take part in the campaign as a faithful vassal. It is also known that in this course the king was well advised by his minister, Gōvinda Dīkshita, who played a prominent part in the administration of the country.

Achyutappa's abdication and Raghunātha's consequent assumption of the rulership of Tanjore are well established facts; but the question of the exact date of these events remains to be settled. The two historical poems of *Sāhityaratnākara* and the *Raghunāthābhīyudāyam* written during the reign of Raghunātha Nayaka contain different versions and so present us with some difficulty. Rāma-bhadrāmba would place the installation of Raghunātha as the Yuvarāja sometime before his participation in the campaign against the Kutub Shah, made on behalf of Venkatapati Raya, i.e., before A.D. 1589.⁶⁸ But her speaking about Raghunātha Nayaka's holding a war council at the capital soon after his return⁶⁹ would make us believe that Raghunātha was then the ruler. The *Sāhityaratnākara* would place the same appointment of Raghunātha as Yuvarāja some years later, i.e., about A.D. 1614 since its author says that this installation was made by Achyutappa Nayaka only on his hearing the news of the death of Venkatapati Raya and the war of succession.⁷⁰ All are agreed that Achyutappa lived on in retirement for sometime after this event. To add to these there are the Jesuit letters, which are definite in their assertions, regarding this question. Anquetil du Perron records that Achyutappa had resigned and given up the affairs some years before A.D. 1600.⁷¹ Father Pimenta who passed through the Tanjore country a little earlier (A.D. 1597 says that Achyutappa 'has lately renounced the world and prepared himself for death.'⁷² Father Heras concludes there-

68. *Raghunāthābhīyudāyam*, Canto VII.

69. *Raghunāthābhīyudāyam*, Canto VIII, Sloka 1

70. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto XII, Slokas 45-47.

71. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, p. 399.

72. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, p. 399 and Purchas X, p. 219.

from thus :—"Hence there can be no longer any doubt about the date of Achyutappa's renunciation and the year 1597 witnessed the coronation of Raghunātha"; and he tells the reader further that the account given in the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* agrees fairly with that given by Father Pimenta and Anquetil du Perron, and 'according to this poem, Raghunātha was crowned Yuvarāja long before the civil war and the war with Ceylon.' Both Father Pimenta and Father du Jarric say that Achyutappa Nayaka retired to Srirangam "accompanied in that devotion by his seventy wives, all which were to be burned in the same fire with his Carkasee". And Father Coutinho writing from Chandragiri on July 17th, A.D. 1600 reports:—"This (Achyutappa Nayaka) died lately. His corpse, along with 370 wives still alive, was burnt in a big fire of sandalwood".⁷³ Father Heras relying exclusively on the evidence of these letters and denouncing the facts mentioned by Yagnanārāyana Dikshita says that in order 'to give some dramatic interest to his poem, he placed the renunciation of Achyutappa after the outbreak of the civil war, and the death of Venkata. Nothing could be farther from the truth'.⁷⁴

Turning to the evidence of epigraphy, we find that 'Raghunātha Nayaka had been associated with the administration of the kingdom at least from A.D. 1600. The Achyutamangalam inscription (Tanjore District)⁷⁵ dated in the cyclic year Śārvari and corresponding to A.D. 1600 is the earliest record which mentions Raghunātha Nayaka. Another record from Lālgudi bearing the same date refers to a gift made for the merit of Raghunātha Nayaka and Gōvinda Dikshita.⁷⁶ These two epigraphs show that the commencement of Raghunātha's part in the administration of the land must be placed in A.D. 1600. This date seems to be fairly settled since one of the epigraphs of Achyutappa bears the latest date A.D. 1596⁷⁷ and moreover the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* says that Raghunātha was installed as Yuvarāja before the Penukonda war, that is, before A.D. 1589; and it is also mentioned that Achyutappa received him on his victorious return, in great pomp and splendour. The epigraphical evidence confirms the testimony of the Jesuit letters that Raghunātha took charge of the government in A.D. 1600. But the epigraphs do not throw full light with regard to

73. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, p. 400.

Father Coutinho says that the Nayaka went to Srirangam followed by 370 wives, while Father Pimenta mentions that they numbered only 70.

74. *The Aravidu Dynasty*, p. 400.

75. 412 of 1925.

76. 151 of 1928.

77. 426 of 1924.

the abdication of Achyutappa. The Jesuit evidence that he abdicated in or before A.D. 1600 and died at Srirangam, cannot be accepted in the light of authentic contemporary indigenous evidence contained in the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara*, which definitely say that Achyutappa lived long after the installation of Raghunātha as the Yuvarāja. The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* says that Raghunātha was made Yuvarāja (canto VII, slokas 34 and 40); but it does not speak of Achyutappa's abdication nor is there any implication that he died shortly afterwards. In fact a careful reading of a passage would show that Achyutappa must have lived on till A.D. 1617, since the passage refers to Raghunātha's paying his respects to his father after his return from the Tōppūr battle.⁷⁸ The *Sāhityaratnākara* contains no reference to Raghunātha's help given to Venkatapati Raya in his Penukoṇḍa campaign, but it records that Achyutappa's abdication was necessitated by the political circumstances of the times, such as the outbreak of a civil war following the death of Venkatapati in A.D. 1614 and the rise of Sōlaga and the Portuguese on the eastern coast. Achyutappa it is said here, was advised by his minister Gōvinda Dikshita to raise Raghunātha to the throne and the appointment of Raghunātha as the ruler must have taken place about A.D. 1614, when Achyutappa abdicated, on the receipt of the news of the death of the Vijayanagara emperor and its immediate consequences.⁷⁹ The *Sāhityaratnākara* says that Achyutappa retired after his abdication to Srirangam where he spent the rest of his days in the company of pandits.⁸⁰ These two different versions of the two contemporary works offer some difficulty. Mr. K. Sitaramayya says that these two versions are contradictory and in order to get over the difficulty he has glibly assumed that the account of *Sāhityaratnākara* is the more correct and reliable of the two. He says that the account given by Rāmabhadraṁba is not accurate and adds that she, being a mere courtesan of Raghunātha's court, might not have had the opportunity of knowing things in their correct historical sequence.⁸¹

78. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto XII, Sloka 83.

इति वादिनीषु हरिणेक्षणामणीष्वथ राममद्रममिषूज्यमानसे ।

विनतिं तदाच्युत विमोः प्रकल्पयन्तुदतिष्ठदेष शयनादुदारधीः ॥

If Achyutappa was dead the authoress would not have made mention of his name.

79. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Sloka 55. The news was communicated to Achyutappa while he was holding a war council with his minister and son in order to punish Sōlaga.

80. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto XII, Sloka 94. The reference to his retiring to Srirangam in the Jesuit letters earlier than this date, might refer to his annual visits made to Srirangam and Rāmēswaram.

81. *The Tanjore Andhra Nayaka Charitam*, p. 174.

If this view should be correct then one will have to leave out of account the part played by Raghunātha in the Penukonda campaign and which is confirmed even by the Muhammadan historians, on the ground that it is mentioned only by Rāmabhadraṁba and not by Yagna nārāyana Dikshita. And so his preference of the *Sāhityaratnākara* as the better source does not seem to be well established and so requires modification.

The facts mentioned in these two historical poems are not contradictory in reality, but on the other hand may be seen to be only complementary to each other, and the gaps left by the one are ably filled up by the other. Taking these two accounts together, it is possible to suggest that Raghunātha was made a Yuvarāja very early and that he ascended the throne only soon after the declaration of the war of succession to the Karnātaka throne. Rāmabhadraṁba referring to Raghunātha's appointment as Yuvarāja does not speak of Achyutappa's retirement. The *Sāhityaratnākara* refers to Achyutappa's desire early in his reign⁸² to appoint Raghunātha as the Yuvarāja; but the actual celebrations took place after the lapse of a number of years and just before Raghunātha Nayaka's starting on his *digvijaya*.⁸³ Achyutappa's retirement seems to have taken place immediately after that. But Rāmabhadraṁba does not refer at all to Achyutappa's retirement following the Yauvarājyābhishēka whereas Yagnanārāyana Dikshita places this immediately after the celebration. The aged king's retirement would be possible only after Raghunātha's coronation as king and not before that. Yagnanārāyana's mention of Raghunātha's great gifts like *Tulāpurushadāna* and *Mahābhūtaḍāna* said to have been performed in connection with this ceremony and the absence of any reference to the same in Rāmabhadraṁba's account, show clearly that the former speaks of his actual coronation alone, while the latter mentions his appointment as Yuvarāja and then passes on in silence, only without making any reference to his coronation.⁸⁴ Hence the reference to

82. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto V, Sl. 49. The actual ceremony is mentioned only in Chapter XII.

83. Raghunātha's invasion against Sōḷaga is mentioned only after his coronation, i.e., after A.D. 1614 and *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Slokas 61 and 62 show Achyutappa's determination to appoint Raghunātha, as his successor on the receipt of the Karnātaka news.

84. These discrepancies are easily understood if one thinks of the authors and their purposes in writing these poems. It was not their object to chronicle the events, but both of them were bent upon pleasing their hero and patron, the famous Raghunātha Nayaka.

Raghunātha's coronation in the *Sāhityaratnākara* is loosely worded and miscalled *Yuvarājyābhishēkam* instead of *Pattābishēka*. Subsequent events, like the invasion of the Sōḷaga's territory and of Jaffna mentioned in these two works, support this conclusion. The way in which both have treated these two events, again gives support to the view already taken, that Rāmabhadrāmba and Yagnanārāyana speak of Raghunātha's installation as Yuvarāja and his coronation respectively.⁸⁵ As the other particulars agree in the main, and since the foreign policy of Achyutappa mentioned in them is confirmed by the Muhammadan historians like Ferishta, and the foreign evidence of Barradas, it is impossible either to overlook their importance or to accept the one at the expense of the other. The two, taken together give us a clear picture of the state of affairs then prevalent, and in the light of that evidence, it is not possible to give weight to the Jesuit letters. Since the internal evidence is well based with regard to the coronation of Raghunātha and the abdication of Achyutappa in or about A.D. 1614; the reference to Achyutappa's death in A.D. 1600 in the Jesuit letters stands condemned and cannot be taken seriously in the absence of further support.

Thus, it becomes clear that Raghunātha became Yuvarāja (heir-apparent) sometime before A.D. 1589; but his coronation which was accelerated by the political circumstances of the revolution after Venkata's death, took place about A.D. 1614 and this would prove that Achyutappa remained at Tanjore at least till the outbreak of hostilities between the loyalists and the rebel factions.

85. *Raghunāthābhīyudayam* describes his appointment as Yuvarāja in 5 ślokas (Canto VII, Sloka 35 to 40) while Yagnanārāyana devotes two full chapters (Cantos XI and XII).

CHAPTER V.

RAGHUNĀTHA NAYAKA, A.D. 1600 TO A.D. 1634 (I)

Raghunātha Nayaka was the most illustrious of the Tanjore line of Nayaks, as well as the main prop of their fame and glory. His rule was one of peace as it marked the revival and development of the many-sided, cultural activities for which Tanjore had been famous through the ages. Literature and art flourished side by side; and Tanjore became under him the greatest seat of learning and culture of the time in South India and as well as the home of Carnatic music. The Nayak himself was a great scholar and the author of numerous works in Telugu and also a musician of high repute. He was given the distinguishing epithet of Abhinava Bhōja.¹ Several poets flourished at Tanjore under his royal patronage. His victories in war brought him great renown and honour and much prominence to Tanjore. Yagnanārāyana Dīkshita, eulogising his reign, says that poverty left the country and Tanjore became the abode of Lakshmi (the goddess of wealth). The poets of the age have left behind glowing accounts of his rule and it is from them that we get incidentally some information about his ancestors also. It is certainly not an overstatement if it is said, that but for him, the history of the Tanjore Nayaks would have remained obscure and insignificant. But for him and his patronage of learning, the period of the Nayak rule in Tanjore would have been as mediocre as it was in Gingee. All the same, these accounts of Raghunātha's rule are not full and do not detail all the events of his reign, as they mostly stop with the description of his early conquests. He is called the establisher of the Karnāta and the Nēpāla (Jaffna) kings,² and a *Nēo Dāsa-ratī* (Rama) in building a bridge of boats across the ocean between the mainland of India and the Jaffnese coast of Ceylon, in his expedition against his Portuguese enemies.

Raghunātha by virtue of his victories and benefactions fully justified the high expectations of his grandfather, Śevappa. Gōvinda Dīkshita says that Śevappa on seeing Raghunātha, then a boy, playing, expressed the idea that he was the fittest person to rule and it was through

1. *Vijayavilāsam* ; padyam 53 has Abinava Bhōja birudānkudu.

2. *Sāhityaratnākara* : Canto II, Sloka 71.

Vijayavilāsam ; Padyam 62 has 'Nēpāla Nripāla sthāpana.'

him the fame of the Nayak's rule would be established.³ The same high praise is given to him by Achyutappa also, his father. The latter says that by his (Raghunātha's) birth alone he himself had attained to great honour and adds that his own birth did not bring anything of that kind to his own parents.⁴ The literary celebrities of his time also speak of Raghunātha in the same praiseful strain. These remarks and the sketches of his personal beauty and charm, given in their works, go to show that Raghunātha was a great and powerful ruler who may be favourably compared with the great Emperor of Vijayanagar, Krishnadēva Rāya.

Achyutappa appointed his son Raghunātha as Yuvarāja even early in his own reign, as he was fully convinced of his intelligence and capacity. It is sometimes held that Achyutappa had two sons and that Raghunātha, the more favoured of the two, got the throne by having his brother murdered.⁵ Father Heras, relying too much on the Portuguese letters and at the same time underrating the internal evidence, adduces some arguments to prove, not only the existence of a brother of Raghunātha Nayaka; but also the treacherous part played by him, in getting the throne. He says further, that 'Govinda Dikshita implies that Raghunātha was the eldest son of Achyutappa Nayaka', and cites Anquetil du Perron and Father Coutinho for additional support. Of these two, the former says 'that the eldest son of Achyutappa had been imprisoned by order of his father,' and this information is confirmed by Father Coutinho in his letter of July 17th, A.D. 1600 addressed to Father Pimenta. Father Heras adds that 'no reason for such an imprisonment is given; what is clear is the extreme predilection of Achyutappa for Raghunātha.'⁶ He also draws instances from the *Raghunāthābhyaṣya* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* to prove this extreme predilection of Achyutappa and Śevappa for Raghunātha, but he does not cite the authority from which he drew the conclusion, that 'Gōvinda Dikshita implies that he (Raghunātha) was the eldest son.' This view is untenable in the light of a critical study of the contemporary works; and the information contained in the Jesuit letters is rather curious and comes almost a surprise. There is no evidence to show either that Achyutappa had two sons or Raghunātha had his brother murdered just before or after his accession to the throne. Father Heras, however, holds that both Rāmabhadra and Yagnanārāyaṇa Dikshita had concealed

3. *Sangīta Sudhā*:—"This child will become great and rule the whole kingdom and we shall become famous on his account."

4. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto VI, Sloka 34.

5. *The Aravidu Dynasty*; Heras, p. 402.

6. *Ibid*, p. 401.

this fact. Nothing could be farther from the truth ; and it is here that the full value of contemporary internal and external evidence which lies buried, becomes obvious. *The Raghunāthābhyaṣya* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* alike say that Achyutappa was for long, without a child and add that he even did penance before Raghunātha was born to him and to Mūrtimāmba.⁷ Gōvinda Dikshita, in his introduction to the *Sangīta Sudhā*, speaks of Raghunātha only, as the son of Achyutappa and there is nothing even in the Telugu works as well, to imply or indicate that he had a brother. Vijayaraghava Nayaka in the genealogy given in his work, makes no reference to the existence of another son of Achyutappa, besides Raghunātha. Even the traditional accounts do not mention at all any brother of Raghunātha ; and hence, in the face of these hard facts, the reference to Raghunātha's brother in the Jesuit letters is wholly misleading and unreliable and should have been based on a misconception.

The *Raghunāthābhyaṣya* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* devote special chapters to detail his early life and education in the Sāstras, in Rājanīti, in the art of warfare, and in the use of various weapons. They give also a good pen-picture of the king's person, his broad forehead, long arms, broad chest, piercing eyes, pearl-like teeth and long moustaches (śmaśru) as dark as the clouds.⁸ Rāmabhadra says that he was married to a Pāṇḍyan princess,⁹ while the *Sāhityaratnākara* says that he married a number of princesses. The *Ushāpariṇayam* says that his queens were Cheṇcha Lakshmaṃma and Kaḷāvati. Vijayarāghava Nayaka was his

7. *Raghunāthābhyaṣya*; Canto VI, Sloka 29 to 51. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto IV. Achyutappa Nayaka's pilgrimage to Rāmēswaram perhaps has reference to this.

8. *Raghunāthābhyaṣya*; Canto VII, Slokas 1 to 33: *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto VI, Sloka 39 to 69.

9. The reference to Raghunātha's marriage with a Pāṇḍyan princess is given much weight in the *Tanjore Gazetteer*, as it tries to connect this marriage with a Pāṇḍyan war in A.D. 1610. The Pāṇḍya who waged a war with Tanjore is said to have been Ativīrārāma, the feudatory of Virappa Nayaka of Madura. The *Gazetteer* (page 39) says that Tanjore suffered a defeat; and the Pāṇḍya in order to commemorate his victory named a port on the sea coast after him, and called it Adirāmpatnam (Ativīrārāmanpatnam) in the south-east corner of the Tanjore district. The Pāṇḍyan victory over Tanjore is not possible in the face of Tanjore's victory over Virappa Nayaka at Vallamprākāra; and besides, there was Venkatapati Rāya on the Vijayanagar throne wielding the strong arm of his suzerainty over all his vassals. Even assuming a Pāṇḍyan victory one cannot adequately explain the marriage of the Pāṇḍyan princess with the defeated Tanjore Nayak. The *District Gazetteer* speaks definitely of a defeat and not even of a peace. Mr. K. Sitaramayya rejects this and says that Adirāmpatnam must be the shortened name of Ādi-

son by his chief queen Kaḷāvati. The *Raghunāthābhyudaya Nātakam* by Vijayarāghava Nayaka calls Kaḷāvati as Pattampurāni. That Raghunātha had a number of wives, is mentioned in all the literary works and Rāmabhadraṁba calls herself as one of his numerous consorts. The reference to Kaḷāvati as the senior queen would imply the possibility of only one wife being the chief consort, while the rest must have been attached to the royal harem, and Rāmabhadraṁba perhaps means this, when she speaks of his other wives as *Kāṇṭa* and not *Mahishī* or *Rāni*.¹⁰

Raghunātha Nayaka's appointment as Yuvarāja, even while he was a youth, has been noticed already, and he was the joint ruler of the kingdom, along with his father, for a number of years. In that period, he distinguished himself in the wars of the Emperor, Venkatapati against Golkonda (1589), and even obtained laurels and high praise from the Raya, for the valuable help rendered to him. Raghunātha's fame as a great warrior came to be established soon after his victory at Penukonda. In the subsequent wars of Tanjore with Madura (*circa* A.D. 1611), Raghunātha should have played a prominent part; but of these we have no direct or detailed evidence. And Achyutappa's nomination of Raghunātha, as his successor and co-ruler, was the direct result of the troubles that were happening then. The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Sāhitya-ratnākara* both refer to the atrocities committed by one Sōḷaga and the troubles caused by the Portuguese, besides describing the war of suc-

rājēndrapatnam. The Pāṇḍyan marriage must evidently be taken as nothing but poetic.

[Further Note by the Editor.]

F. R. Hemingway, the editor of the *Gazetteer* says that the Pāṇḍyan king destroyed the Cauvery dam at the western end of the Tanjore dominion and that his power seems to have extended some distance into the south of the Tanjore district at this time. The attack was manifested on two flanks, one near the dam, and the other on the coast country round Point Calimere. He accepts the view that the war was followed by a marriage between Raghunātha and a Pāṇḍyan princess. Ativirarāma Pāṇḍya, surnamed Śrīvallabha (1563—1605) and his cousin, Varatunga Rama (1588—1609?) were in subordinate alliance generally with the Nayaks of Madura and seem to have acknowledged the suzerainty of the Araviḍu Rayas as well. Their jurisdiction seems to have been more in the southern part of the Madura Nayak dominion; and their active operations on the northern frontier of Madura should require more evidence before deserving acceptance. Achutarāya seems also to have married a Pāṇḍyan princess. The marriage of Raghunātha to a Pāṇḍyan princess is at the best doubtful.

10. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Canto III, Sloka 5. Raghunātha is described as Krishna in the company of a thousand wives. '*Sahasra Kāṇṭājana*.'

cession consequent on the death of Venkatapati in A.D. 1614. And so, Raghunātha's association with his father and his subsequent coronation on the latter's abdication, were the outcome of political factors, but for which, Achyutappa might have continued on the throne for some time more. Moreover, Achyutappa having been in power from about A.D. 1560, should have also become feeble and so resigned the administrative charge of the land in the hands of his son.

Raghunātha, when he assumed the reins of government directly, had to face some difficulties that demanded his immediate attention, and the literary evidence shows that he set himself to this task without any delay. Good, but slightly discrepant, accounts of his military exploits are given both by Rāmabhadhrāmba and Yagnanārāyana Dikshita; and to understand the sequence of the events aright, a close study of their conflicting accounts is useful. Rāmabhadhrāmba says that a war council for concerting measures for immediate action was held by Raghunātha himself.¹¹ She further says that Raghunātha was informed of the atrocities committed by Sōḷaga, by the Brahmans who had then assembled at his court, of the affairs of the Nēpāḷa kingdom by the Nēpāḷa ruler himself, who, it is said, had just then arrived at Tanjore and lastly of the Karnāṭaka war of succession by some loyal feudatory nobles (*Karnāṭa bhūpa srayibhihi*) of the deceased Raya, Venkatapati.¹² Raghunātha, it is again said, promising his help to the Karnāṭa nobles, started at once on his campaign against the Sōḷaga and other enemies, who were nearer home. Reference is made to his march first towards Kumbakonam on his way to the island fortress of Sōḷaga at the mouth of the Coleroon; from there to the town of Jaffna and lastly his advance towards Toppūr near the Grand Anicut, before he returned to his capital. News of the arrival of the rebels led by Jaggarāya, near Toppūr and their breach of the great dam across the Cauvery, which were conveyed to him were the immediate causes for his onward march to Toppūr. Rāmabhadhrāmba describes in great detail the battle of Toppūr and Raghunātha's part therein; and also his victorious return to Tanjore therefrom, crowned with laurels. Raghunātha is said to have planted a pillar of victory also on the field of battle, and his troops claim to have taken possession of the fort at Bhuvanagiri (in the Chidambaram taluk).

Yagnanārāyana Dikshita's account is not so full as it stops with Raghunātha's leaving his capital on a march upon his enemies; and it gives another version of the events, which differs in certain respects from

11. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VIII, Slokas 1 to 7.

12. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, Canto VIII, Slokas 7, 14 and 23.

the account of Rāmabhadraṁba. According to him, a war council was held by Achyutappa Nayaka and it was attended both by Gōvinda Dikshita and Raghunātha, besides others. This summoning of the war cabinet was the direct outcome of the Nēpāla king's complaint; he had already arrived at Tanjore, having been driven away from his kingdom by the Portuguese.¹³ Gōvinda Dikshita is said to have informed his master of the atrocities of Sōlaga, the rise of the Pāṇḍya and the Tundīra rulers and lastly the war of succession following the death of Venkata-pati.¹⁴ According to the author, these news were conveyed to the minister by a spy who was sent out to gather information.¹⁵ The author refers to the murder of Venkatapati's successor by Jaggarāya and his arrival at Srirangam. Reference is also made to Yāchama Nayaka's desire to come to the south,¹⁶ along with the rescued prince Rāma, who was the only survivor of the massacre and who was the second son of the murdered king of Vijayanagar; in order to receive help from Tanjore, as against the rebel Jaggarāya and his partisans. Jaggarāya is reported, in the meanwhile, to have reached Srirangam, where he was preparing for battle along with the Pāṇḍyan King. Yagnanārayana Dikshita then only describes the abdication of Achyutappa and the accession of Raghunātha. Again, another spy is introduced, who is said to have informed the new Nayak (Raghunātha) for a second time about the murder of Chikkadēvarāya by Jaggarāya and the latter's arrival at Srirangam, where he was joined by the Dramida, Chēra and the Pāṇḍya kings. Yāchama Nayaka is mentioned again for the second time, but this time it is said, that he was then actually coming to the south accompanied by the Aravidu prince Rāma.¹⁷ Immediately after, Raghunātha was informed of Yāchama Nayaka's arrival and of the damage done to the Cauvery embankment by the enemies.¹⁸ Raghunātha, who was enraged at this news, is said to have resolved that he should first restore and instal the young prince Rāma, as the emperor of Karnāṭaka, by his marching towards Kumbakōnam; and then to crush Sōlaga and other enemies.¹⁹ Yagnanārayana Dikshita stops at this place in his account but he gives a full description of the Tanjore army and its equipment. Thus Yagnanārayana Dikshita's narration of events

13. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto VI, Slokas 66-72.

14. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Slokas^a 54-60.

15. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Slokas 33, 36 and 55.

16. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Sloka 56.

परिग्रह्य तदात्मजं सयाचप्रभुरन्येष्ट समायियासतीह ।

17. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Sloka 76.आयातिसयाचभूपतिः

18. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Sloka 78.त्वामभ्यागमदेष सयाच महिः

19. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Sloka 80 and 81.

differs in important respects from that of Rāmabhadraṁba. The latter says that the king guaranteed his help to the loyal Karnāṭaka nobles and marched upon Sōḷaga and the Nēpāḷa enemies. This is just possible and the expedition against these might have been undertaken by him. But it will be seen from the account of Yagnanārāyana Dikshita, that Raghunātha first installed prince Rāma, as the legitimate emperor at Kumbakōnam, then marched against Sōḷaga, leaving at the sametime the powerful combination of the enemy forces under Jaggarāya, on the west of his dominion thus risking their attack on his own kingdom. When Rāmabhadraṁba says that Raghunātha passed through Kumbakōnam on his march against Sōḷaga, Yagnanārāyana would make us understand that he went there to effect a junction with Rāma and to proclaim him as the King of Karnāṭa. Both of them refer to the damages caused to the Cauvery dam by the rebels led by Jaggarāya. Raghunātha's hastening to Toppūr from Jaffna was the result of his hearing this news according to Rāmabhadraṁba; and so, the victory over the Sōḷaga and the Portuguese must have happened before the Toppūr battle. But according to the Dikshita, the same news was the cause of Raghunātha's leaving the capital for Kumbakōnam.

These two accounts are not, however, really so very contradictory as they appear to be at first sight, but are merely complementary to each other. And the historical sequence of these incidents can best be understood, if these narratives are studied in the light of internal evidence as well as of the facts contained in the letters of Barradas and the Portuguese missionaries. We have already referred to Yagnanārāyana Dikshita's confusion regarding the regular coronation of Raghunātha as ruler with his *Yauvarājyābhishēkam* and his omission of his participation in the Penukonda campaign. And this confusion may be said to continue throughout his narrative, which appears to have been compiled in a slipshod manner without due regard for historical sequence or the regular order of events. His account resembles more that of a mere chronicler of events, while Rāmabhadraṁba's version seems to be the more historically accurate and sequentially probable. However, the former's account gives greater detail and hence only a rearrangement in the sequence of facts alone is needed. The absence of unity and agreement in sequence in these two accounts, are largely due to the fact, that the compilers had in view different objects and motives²⁰. Of course, both are agreed in their attempt to praise their patron-king, but the methods employed by them differ.²⁰

20. Their object was not essentially to write a history of the period. Rāmabhadraṁba wrote her account mainly to exhibit her love and regard for Raghu-

The murder of Chikkadēvaraya, the rescue of his second son Rāma who was smuggled out of the prison in a bundle of washerman's clothes by the loyal Yāchama Nayaka, and the rise of Jaggarāya are all mentioned by both Rāmabhadrāmba²¹ and Yagnanārāyana and their accounts are confirmed by the narrative of Barradas. The latter says that both the armies of Yāchama Nayaka and Jaggarāya were assembled in the spacious plains surrounding Trichinopoly on December 12th, A.D. 1616.²² The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* of Vijayarāghava Nayaka says that Raghunātha was then camping at Paḷamānēri, a village near Tanjore, in the month of August A.D. 1616 before he began his march upon Toppūr.²³ It is stated that Rāma, the prince, also accompanied him to the battle field. The Portuguese chroniclers of Ceylon refer to the success of the Tanjore forces in Jaffna, in the beginning of A.D. 1616. As both Rāmabhadrāmba and Yagnanārāyana place the invasion against Sōḷaga as the first part of the campaign it is evident that the latter's defeat must have been effected before A.D. 1616. Barradas speaks of the loyalist party led by Yāchama and the rebel combination led by Jaggarāya and to their fight before they reached Trichinopoly.²⁴

nātha; while Yagnanārāyana Dikshita wrote his work with a different object altogether. He says that his attempt was to write a work on Sāhitya with particular reference to Alaṅkāras, so that it may serve as a guide for others to follow (Canto I). The author also complains that poets with no knowledge of literature and its conventions had attempted works of this kind before and had received large presents from the king. Secondly, as a pupil of Raghunātha (Canto I, Sl. 62), he thought of showing his gratitude and indebtedness by writing this work; and above all he wanted to exhibit his own scholarship and literary attainments. Hence we find more than two chapters being devoted to the description of the seasons. Dr. T. R. Chintamani says that the treatment of this *kāvya* is largely modelled on the Tamil Kāvya (Sāhityaratnākara, Introduction). A reading of the work would show that the author, who complains of others' faults, is himself guilty of a 'dōsha' known as Puṇarukti.

21. Rāmabhadrāmba does not mention the name of Yachama Nayaka. Yagnanārāyana calls him Yācha bhūpa and Yāchamahīpa.

22. *A Forgotten Empire*; pp. 222-230.

23. *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, p. 259.

24. *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 229. Yāchama Nayaka is said to have won a decisive victory over Jaggarāya and Barradas says that 'after this victory many of the nobles joined themselves to Yāchama Nayaka.

[Further Note by the Editor.]

Barradas explicitly states that "all came to him (Sriranga) to offer their allegiance except three," and these latter persons joined together and "swore never to do homage to the new king, but on the contrary to raise in his place the putative

Rāmabhadraṁba's account of Raghunātha's advance towards Toppūr must refer to this period (in 1616) when Yāchama had already arrived in the Cauvery Valley. Yagnanārāyana Dikshita's mentioning Yāchama Nayaka's arrival at last, must also refer to the same time, since he speaks of the breach of the Cauvery dam effected by the enemies merely to prevent Yāchama from effecting a junction with his ally. The *Bahulāsvacharitam* of Dāmarla Veṅṇaḷabhūpāla, gives an account of the route of Yāchama's march towards Toppūr,²⁵ but even from that it is

son of the deceased king." Sriranga or Ranga II had, before his enthronement been in Tanjore where he made the acquaintance, according to Queyroz, of several Balalas of Jaffnapatam. He raised these latter to various posts in his administration, shortly after his accession. Gobbūri Jaggarāya, the maternal uncle of the putative heir, Tima Nayaka and Makaraja were the chiefs who were opposed to Śrīranga. They were joined by the Dalavoy, and a minister who were alienated from Ranga and also by one Narparaju, also by Ravilla Venka and three others named Chenchu, Virappa and Yāchama. Then followed the coup by which the Dalavoy and Jaggarāya seized possession of Ranga and his family. This took place after Ranga had ruled for some time—a few months at the most. The coronation of the putative nephew was celebrated by Jaggarāya, who first treated Ranga with consideration; but put him into rigorous confinement when he tried to rise against the usurper. Barradas says that Ranga was now deserted by "all save one captain whose name was Echama Nāique" and who was attempted to be cajoled and won over by Jaggarāya. Yāchama Nayak was unable to obtain any access to the imprisoned Ranga, but contrived to have one of his sons concealed in a bundle of soiled linen taken out to wash and thus brought over to his side, probably hoping to encourage his troops with the presence of the boy prince and also "perhaps in order to save the royal offspring in the case of a prospective regicide". After two futile attempts at escape, poor Ranga and all his other children were slaughtered though there is a discrepancy as to the method by which this holocaust was brought about. The Viceroy of Goa heard in December 1614 that Ranga had been killed in a short time before, perhaps in November. According to Barradas, Yāchama Nayak was infuriated by this atrocious crime and openly challenged Jaggarāya, offering battle to him. In the fight that followed, Yāchama attacked the enemy with such valour that Jaggarāya had to retreat, abandoning all the royal insignia. Yāchama Nayak proclaimed the surviving son of Ranga the rightful heir and king and soon he got the support of many of the nobles; while Jaggarāya fled to the jungles with 15,000 men only. The Nayak of Madura joined the army of Jaggarāya after this defeat. According to Barradas this first victory of Yāchama resulted in many of the captains joining Yāchama Nayak, so that in a short time his army had augmented to 50,000 fighting men; while Jaggarāya's forces had diminished to 15,000 (see Heras: *The Great Civil War of Vijayanagara in the Journal of Indian History*, Vol. V, pp. 164-88). Here Father Heras says that Sri Ranga himself had vainly renounced his rights on Venkata's death-bed as he was not willing to become the cause of bloodshed and the Portuguese Viceroy foresaw the coming civil war some years before.

not known whether Yāchama ever came to Kumbakonam at all. If reliance is based upon the *Sāhityaratnākara* then, it would mean that Yāchama Nayaka reached Toppūr from South Arcot, marching through the western portions of the Chola country; and the breach of the Cauvery dam which was effected by the rebels, in order to prevent his entry into the Tanjore country, easily explains this.²⁶ If this is correct, Raghunātha's going to Kumbakonam to instal Rāma as emperor, must be taken to mean his march from Tanjore eastwards to the same place on his way to the campaign against Sōlaga. Otherwise how could Raghunātha start on an expedition against his eastern enemies when there were enemies on the west prepared for battle? Diplomacy and prudent statesmanship would not justify such a course of action. Yagnanārāyana's references to Yāchama Nayaka's 'desire to come' (समायियासति) to 'his coming' (आयति), and lastly to 'his arrival' in the Tanjore country (अगमत्) exactly fits in with the account of Barradas. Yāchama Nayaka's arrival at Trichinopoly is dated towards the end of A.D. 1616, that is, two years after the declaration of hostilities between Jaggarāya and Yāchama Nayaka in the Karnātaka country. And Barradas says 'that the war continued these two years, fortune favouring now one side now the other.' Raghunātha's joining the army led by Yāchama Nayaka and Rāma, must be placed sometime before August A.D. 1616 when he was encamping near the village of Paḷamānēri.

Raghunātha Nayaka's first expedition began only after A.D. 1614, since the contemporary works say that he was informed of the news of the Karnātaka war of succession before he actually left his capital.²⁷

26. Sources: *Sāhityaratnākara*; p. 274.

27.

[Note by the Editor.]

The loyalist chiefs sent envoys to request the Nayak of Tanjore; and these demanded of Raghunātha "to rescue the empire *once more* from destruction, as he had done before in his youth, and to destroy the party of Jaggarāya" (Sarga VIII of the *Raghunāthābhyudayam* of Rāmabhadraṁba, tells us that Raghunātha then told his ministers that the three tasks of destroying Sōlaga in the island, driving out the enemies of the Nēpāla (Jaffnese) king and celebrating the coronation of the new Karnāṭa emperor would constitute his *digvijaya*) Yāchama Nayak himself had wished to go to Tanjore for the same purpose. The *Sāhityaratnākara* (Sarga X) says that "after the Karnāṭa emperor had thus been murdered in his capital, his only surviving son, a child, had been rescued by the nobleman, Yācha, who, with other chiefs, was proceeding to Achyuta for help. Achyuta had to effect a junction with Yācha and the young emperor before the Pāṇḍya (the Nayak of Madura) and his allies met the troops of Jaggarāya at Srirangam as arranged

His victories over Sōḷaga and the people of Jaffna were accomplished before the middle of A.D. 1616. In the meanwhile, the loyalist party led by Yāchama Nayaka and the rebel group led by Jaggarāya were both fighting, and Barradas tells us of the success won by Yāchama Nayaka and to his crowning of Rama as emperor before he came to the south. Jaggarāya's coming to the south, was the result of his earlier defeat sustained at the hands of Yāchama Nayaka. Raghunātha Nayaka's attention was first directed against the rebellious chief Sōḷaga who is said to have been the ruler of an island (*Āntarīpagataha*)²⁸ and *Āntarīpavāsam*.²⁹ Sōḷaga was causing much

between them. Then followed the abdication of Acyuta on the advice of Gōvinda Dikṣita and the coronation of Raghunatha, performed by the latter and the retirement of Achyuta to sacred Srirangam (*sarga* XII). Raghunātha heard from his spies of the news descriptive of the troops of the Pāndya and his confederates and was told that "the noble Yācha....requests to be assisted by you in the cause of your common master, the Karnāṭa emperor..... Hearing that Yācha and his army are proceeding towards you with the emperor's (Ranga's) son, (Rama) and that they may not effect a junction with your troops, the Pāndya King (Nayak of Madura) at the instance of Jaggarāya has cut the great anicut across the Kaveri On hearing this news, King Raghunātha decided to proceed to Kumbakonam to effect a junction with the emperor's son, Rama Raya, and celebrate his coronation at the place. The king then vowed that he would proceed against Sōḷaga in his island and destroy him along with his relations. He would then proceed against the Pāndya and his allies.....would also destroy in battle Jaggarāya and his other allies, and with their skulls, reconstruct the anicut (*śētu*) across the Kaveri and put up there an inscription in memory of his great triumph there. Speaking thus, Raghunātha entrusted the whole management of the kingdom to his minister, Gōvinda Dikshita and in great anger ordered his army to get ready for the march. (*Sahityaratnākara*: Sources: pp. 273-4).

Barradas implies that, in the course of the civil war the partisans of prince Rama were gaining strength; also a Jesuit letter of Malabar of 1617 would show an advance of the loyalists into the Madura kingdom, as its Nayak ravaged the whole country before retiring; and Father Heras adds:—"It was then most likely that at the instance of Jaggarāya, the Nayak of Madura cut the great anicut across the Kaveri in order to prevent their enemies to advance further south, as related in the *Sāhityaratnākara*." At the end of 1616, when Barradas finished his account, though some time previously the Nayak of Madura had mustered more soldiers and his enemies had to retreat northwards owing to scarcity of water, "the Naique of Tanjore though not so great, was, with the aid of the young king, getting the upper hand..... Indeed they are now assembled in the field in the large open plains of Trichinepali which may contain not only a hundred thousand soldiers as each of the parties has, but several millions of people."

28. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto VI, Sloka 24.

29. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Sloka 18.

trouble to the wayfarers and women and disobeyed the king's³⁰ orders. It is said that he forced thirsty people to drink heated lead and that he used to throw his prisoners to be devoured by well-trained crocodiles in his moat and to pass sharp needles into their bodies. He is compared to Rāvana of the great epic for his misdeeds, the only difference being that Sōlaga had only one head instead of ten. Rāmabhadrāmba adds that he was a worshipper of the god Bhairava and even Viṭhala himself could not conquer him.³¹ Gōvinda Dikshita told Raghunātha that he was backed up by the Portuguese as well (Parangis).³² Sōlaga was a feudatory of Krishnappa Nayaka of Gingee and he is identified with Sālavaccha³³ by Father Heras. He was one of the two principal feudatories of Gingee, according to Father Pimenta, who also refers to Sōlaga's son visiting Krishnappa Nayaka and to the former's friendship with the Jesuits, on the evidence contained in a letter of Father Du Jarrić. Sōlaga was the ruler of the south eastern portions also of the kingdom of Gingee and his capital was Dēvikōttah (Tivukottah, also called Jalkōta by the Muhammadan historians meaning, surrounded by water) an island fort at the mouth of the river Coleroon. According to Father Du Jarrić, he must have been an old man aged about eighty years and 'was a man of great authority among his subjects feared by everybody.' Father Pimenta who visited the Coromandel Coast about A.D. 1597, speaks of his trained crocodiles which were 'put in his river for his security' and this description agrees admirably with the account of Rāmabhadrāmba.³⁴ Father

30. The name of the king whose orders he defied is not mentioned. As Sōlaga was a feudatory of the Gingee Nayak, Raghunātha Nayaka could not claim any supremacy over him. Perhaps it refers to the Nayak's order not to trouble the people often.

31. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar suggests that Viṭhala must refer to Rāmarāja Viṭhala the foremost general of Sadāsivarāya who came to the south in 1546. *Sources of Vijayanagar History*; p. 286. Also *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Canto VIII, and *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto X.

32. *Sāhityaratnākara* refers to the Portuguese as Pārasikas by mistake while *Raghunāthābhyudayam* has Parangis.

33. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*; p. 407.

34.

[*Note by the Editor.*].

According to Yagnanārāyana Dikshita, Sōlaga was giving great trouble to the people of the neighbourhood and used to inflict inhuman punishments on the innocent people of the land; he would bind them up in empty sacks and after having them well beaten with pestles, would throw the sacks containing the men into the waters of his rivers to be devoured by the crocodiles. He would also subject the Kālamāl (perhaps Kallamārs) of Achyuta's territory to unheard of atrocities by passing sharp needles into the roots of their hairs. "These do not cover even a

Pimenta also speaks of his son³⁵ as a great supporter and friend of the Jesuit missionaries. The *Sāhityaratnākara* also refers to Raghunātha Nayak's march from his capital against Sōḷaga with a huge and well equipped army composed of infantry (Batās), cavalry and elephantry leaving the administration of the kingdom in the hands of Gōvinda Dikshita.³⁶ The elephants were all well caparisoned and were also equipped with iron howdahs,³⁷ while the horses were mounted upon by soldiers who wore long turbans and carried with them bows and arrows. Camels are also mentioned as a component part of his army (उष्ट्रपङ्क्तयः). There were besides, a large number of Muhammadan soldiers in his train and also *Yavanas* who were perhaps Sinhalese troopers. The Tanjore army carried with them bows, arrows, swords and a weapon called *Nālikāyudham* having an *anaḷavarti* (fire wick).³⁸ The king was in armour and rode on a white elephant. Rāmabhadrāmba and Yagnanārāyana Dikshita give a picturesque account of the Tanjore army and they also speak of a number of palanquins that accompanied the king. The former speaks of the materials used in erecting tents, besides provisions for the army and also vessels that were carried to the field of battle.³⁹ Boxes containing precious jewels were also removed from the capital and were taken along with the king, for safety. Yagnanārāyana speaks of the camp followers, who carried along with them besides their

small portion of the cruelties practised by Sōḷaga. If Achyuta were to subdue him and put an end to his atrocities, then the Portuguese (Pārasikas) could be easily subdued and the Nēpāla king once more raised to his throne." For these reasons Achyuta was told that since the Nayak of Madurā had concluded alliances with Sōḷaga and the king of Tundira (Nayak of Gingee) it would not be advisable on his part to fight with them at once.

Father Pimenta thus describes the Sōḷaga:—"He is old and severe and hath caused crocodiles to be put in his river for his security charging them not to hurt his own people. They nevertheless killed a man; whereupon I know not by what arts he took two of them which were the malefactors and put chains round their necks and cast them into a miry place, there to be stoned by the people and to die of famine." His son, a boy of 14, became greatly attached to the Jesuits during Father Pimenta's stay at Gingee; and he took them from that place to the castle of his father who received them very kindly.

35. Yagnanārāyana Dikshita refers to the sons and relatives of Sōḷaga (Canto XIII, Sl. 81).

36. *Sāhityaratnākara*; XIII, Sl. 84.

37. *Sāhityaratnākara*; XIII, Sl. 86.

38. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto XV, Sl. 20.

39. *Raghunāthābhhyudayam*; Canto VIII, Sl. 68-70.

weapons, medicinal herbs which had a good healing property of the wounds.⁴⁰ The army left the capital in full battle array and soon reached the town of Kumbakōnam⁴¹ and Raghunātha crossing the river Cauvery⁴² advanced towards the territory of Sōlaga. This rebellious chief was helped by the Portuguese and also by Krishnappa Nayaka of Gingee.⁴³ Raghunātha crossing the river Coleroon, is said to have offered a severe fight and laid siege to his fort. The smoke emanating from the firing of the guns (*Agniyantrās*)⁴⁴ is said to have enveloped the whole island. Sōlaga, finding that he could not withstand the attack, quickly yielded. And Raghunātha Nayaka, after a short but sharp fight, took Sōlaga and his family as captives and threw him into prison. The Gin-

40. *Sahityaratnākara*; Canto XVI, Sl. 23.

41. Yagnanārāyana Dikshita also refers to his march upon Kumbakonam but mentions it in connection with (XIII, Sl. 80) Raghunātha's assurance given to the Karnāta nobles. This was undertaken according to the author to instal Rāma as the emperor of Karnāṭaka. We have seen earlier that this must refer to his expedition against Sōlaga.

42. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Canto VIII, Sl. 76 and 77.

43. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Canto VIII, Sl. 78 and 79 mention *Krishna Bhūpa*, as the king of *Tundira*. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar identifies Krishna Bhūpa with Krishnappa Nayaka of Gingee.

[Further Note by the Editor.]

This Krishnappa was perhaps related to the chiefs, Sūrappa and Pōta Bhūpāla who were the Nayaks of Gingee before him. Anquetil du Perron states that he was a contemporary of Venkatapati and succeeded his father whose name, however, he does not mention. He escaped from prison, having been confined by his uncle and in the sequel, imprisoned the latter after putting out his eyes. In 1586 he rebelled against Venkata, who captured him and had him put in prison. Raghunatha, after his Pēnukonda campaign, interceded with Venkata on his behalf and secured his release. Krishnappa scaled his gratitude to Raghunatha by giving his daughter in marriage to him. During his imprisonment, Gingee was ruled by one Venkata, who was sent against him by Venkatapati Raya. Krishnappa was a wise and able ruler and his court and capital were well described by Father Pimenta who visited Gingee in A.D. 1597. He built Krishnapatam near Porto Novo. His feudatories were Sōlaga, the chief of Tiruvati and Lingama Nayak of Vellore. Krishnappa rebelled for a second time against the Raya in 1600 and war broke out between them in 1607. He had close relations with the Portuguese and the Dutch on the coast. He was also a staunch Vaishnava. For an account of his rule see *Histoire du Gingi* by C. S. Srinivasachari—traduit de l'anglais et annoté par Edmond Gaudart, Gouverneur en retraite (Pondicherry and Paris, 1940)—pp. 43-63.

44. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Canto VIII, Sl. 80.

gee Nayak, Krishnappa, is said to have fled from the scene of battle having become disheartened and terrified on Raghunātha's approach. The expedition against Sōlaga was a complete success for the Tanjore army which occupied his fort. This was the first victory for Raghunātha Nayaka; and Dr. S. K. Ayyangar says that this may be dated in A.D. 1615.⁴⁵

From Dēvikōttah, Raghunātha marched south along the sea-coast, towards Jaffna, whose king is mentioned by both the authors as having accompanied the Nayaka from the very beginning of his expedition. Passing through the modern Kāvēripattanam, where the Cauvery joins the sea⁴⁶ and crossing the sea (the gulf of Manaar) by means of a chain of boats (ṛāṭi), the Nayaka landed on the Jaffnese coast. Rāmabhadraṁba says that the army also crossed the channel with the aid of wooden floats. Raghunātha offered battle to the Portuguese, who, finding themselves exhausted in spite of the furious charge of their guns, fled for their lives; while a large number of them escaped by the sea in small ships. Raghunātha inflicted another crushing defeat upon the Portuguese and reinstated the Jaffnese ruler on his throne. This victory over the Portuguese of Jaffna must have happened before the battle of Toppūr and immediately after the capture of the fort of Dēvikōttah and hence the date of this campaign may be fixed approximately towards the close of A.D. 1615 or in the beginning of the year A.D. 1616.

Nothing more is known about this expedition and the internal evidence does not throw any light as to who was the Jaffnese King that sought the help of Raghunātha in his endeavour to regain his lost throne. Rāmabhadraṁba says⁴⁷ that a Nēpāla⁴⁸ king along with his relatives and assistants came to Raghunātha's court and represented to him his misfortune in being driven away from his capital. The Nēpāla ruler also seems to have narrated how Raghunātha Nayaka's ancestors were great supporters of his kingdom. We saw how some Balalas of Jaffna had been in Tanjore even before this time. 'The Parangis (Portuguese) had on several occasions been defeated by his ancestors and they had been waiting to wreak their vengeance upon the king of Nēpālā.' Rowing the

45. *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, p. 286, footnote.

46. *Raghunāthābhyaṣya*; Canto IX, Sl. 7.

47. *Raghunāthābhyaṣya*; Canto VIII, Sl. 13 to 22.

48. Nēpāla is identified with Jaffna as it is said that the country was surrounded by ocean and other particulars of the description of this country satisfy this identification.

seas in their ships, they now attacked his capital while he was away and captured the city called Vārdhikēya. And Raghunātha promised him help. The *Sāhityaratnākara* gives some additional information.⁴⁹ It refers to the arrival of the wives of the Jaffnese ruler at Tanjore, besides the latter; and here the enemies of the fugitive are called the Pārasikas by which term the Portuguese are meant. In another place, the same author calls the Jaffnese ruler as the Yavana king.⁵⁰ His name is mentioned as Pararājabhayaṅkara and his kingdom is said to have been surrounded on all sides by the ocean. That the Tanjore army was composed of Yavana soldiers will mean that it was composed of men from Jaffna.⁵¹ Raghunātha Nayaka's defeat of the Portuguese and his reinstallation of the Jaffna ruler on his throne are established beyond a shadow of doubt; but the question, as to who was the king that was re-appointed by him is not clear. The references to the city, called Vārdhikēya and the king Pararājabhayaṅkara do not take us far as they are not definite.

The literary evidence refers to the help given to the rulers of Jaffna during the time of Achyutappa Nayaka, and so, Raghunātha's intervention must refer to the help rendered a second time. To understand the Tanjore relations with Jaffna aright, it is necessary to have a grasp of the trend of the Jaffna politics of this period. A fair account of these political troubles is given in the Portuguese chronicles and also in the *Yālpāṇa Vaibava Mālai* of Mayilvāhana Puḷavar, composed in the beginning of the 17th century. They refer to the help given by the Nayak of Tanjore to the rulers of Jaffna even from the middle of the 16th century.⁵² In all

49. *Sāhityaratnākara* ; Canto VI, Sl. 65-72.

50. *Sāhityaratnākara* ; XV, Sl. 50 and 52. Yavana Bhūpati.

51. *Sāhityaratnākara* ; XV, Sl. 35.

The above work says that the Jaffnese ruler stayed at Tanjore for sometime and he is said to have accompanied Raghunātha in his war upon Sōlaga. Sloka 50 has the word *Upaiti* which means "follows."

52. *Ancient Jaffna* in Tamil, by Mr. C. Rasanayagam, p. 96.

[Further Note by the Editor.]

Mr. Rasanayagam thinks that the Jaffnese king who went for help to Achyutappa of Tanjore must have been Saṅkili Kumara, who had murdered Arasakēsari, the regent uncle of the minor king and usurped the regency. The Portuguese drove him out and he returned with an army of Tanjore and established himself on the throne. The Portuguese then recognised him as king, but ultimately dethroned him and occupied Jaffna. Again, under Raghunātha Nayaka there was another personal appeal from the Jaffnese King for help.

these wars the powers on the Coromandel Coast do not seem to have fared well at all. In 1547, Śankili, Śegarājasēkharan, who is said to have joined the Sinhalese ruler Māyādunnē, the ruler of Sitawāka and the younger brother of Bhuvanēka Bāhu VII, and fought against the Portuguese; appears to have secured help from the Tanjore Nayaka. This must have happened during the reign of Śevappa Nayaka and the Portuguese seems to have won a victory on that occasion. Tanjore again interfered between A.D. 1570 and A.D. 1582, when Peria Pillai, Śegarāja-sēkharan was the king of Jaffna. He came to the throne with the help of the Portuguese general, De Castro, in A.D. 1570, but soon exhibited his innate hatred and hostility towards his allies by attacking their colony at Maṇṇār with the help of the Tanjore forces. The Tanjore army sustained a defeat for a second time. Peria Pillai's successor was one Puvirāja Paṇḍāram who, on his accession assumed the title of Pararajasēkharan. He was also opposed to the Portuguese and is said to have persecuted the Christians; and his attempts to capture Manaar from

Raghunātha crossed the sea by a bridge of boats, placed his own garrison in the island of Jaffna and celebrated the coronation of his ally. It is not certain whether Śankili went over to Tanjore for help for a second time and had himself crowned before Oliveira's forces came up and captured him, or "whether the story is a confused account of the help given to the prince of Ramēsvaram on whose behalf the people of Jaffna revolted against the Portuguese." (*Ancient Jaffna*, pp. 386-87).

THE KINGS OF JAFFNA

According to the Rev. S. Gnānaprakāsar, O.M.I., of Jaffna (*Kings of Jaffna in the Portuguese Period*, 1920) the following kings reigned at Nallūr in Jaffna :—

- (1) Kanagasūriya, Segarājasēkaran 1467 A.D.
- (2) Pararājasēkaran—1478 A.D.
- (3) Śankili, Segarājasēkaran, 1519 A.D.
- (4) Puvi Rāja Paṇḍāram, Pararājasēkaran, 1561 A.D.
- (5) Kachi Nayinar—Pararājasēkaran (usurper) C. 1565 A.D.
- (6) Periya Pillai, Segarājasēkaran, C. 1570 A.D.
- (7) Puvi Raja Paṇḍāram, Pararājasēkaran, C. 1582 A.D.
- (8) Hendarmana Singa, (Edirmaṇṇa Singha), Pararājasēkaran, 1591
- (9) A minor son under the regency of
 - (1) Arasakēsari—1615 A.D.
 - * (2) Śankili Kumāra—1617 A.D.
- (10) Oliveira, the Portuguese Governor—1620 A.D.

* There was some confusion between the two Śankilis in the *Yalpāṇa Vaibhava Mālai*.

them, on two occasions also ended in failure. The second attempt which took place in A.D. 1591 resulted in serious consequences. For then, he was attacked by the Portuguese general, Andre Furtado de Mendoza, who invaded Jaffna in October 1591, and quickly brought it under his control. Puvirāja Paṇḍāram was killed in the battle and the Portuguese installed the son of Peria Pillai, as the new ruler of Jaffna. This prince was known as Edirmanna Śinga with the title of Pararājasēkharan. He is said to have ruled from A.D. 1591 to 1615,⁵³ as a feudatory of the Portuguese and to have paid them an annual tribute. He was 'as might be expected, was extremely punctilious in showing his gratitude to the Portuguese, conferring many favours on them and treating them with much familiarity. Quite naturally, the latter were having it all their own way in the land.' This state of things did not satisfy the Mudaliars and chiefs of the kingdom and they soon formed a plot for placing on the throne a prince who was then at Ramancor (Rāmēswaram) and who was backed up by a select army of Moors, Badagas and Maravas under the protection of the Naique of Tanjore and the renegade Dom Joas Wimalaḍharma, King of Kandy.⁵⁴ The Portuguese on the other hand wanted to depose Wimalaḍharma, who, on ascending the throne of Kandy is said to have renounced his former religion of Christianity, oppressed his allies and persecuted the Christians.⁵⁵ The king of Jaffna Pararājasēkharan, on hearing of this intended attack and insurrection by the prince of Rāmēswaram, soon communicated it to the Portuguese captain of Manaar and the latter at once sent Manoel de Athaide with a body of men in seven ships to meet the Tanjore army. On the 26th of October A.D. 1592 Athaide charged the Tanjore forces and in the end was able to defeat them near Talaimannār.⁵⁶

From A.D. 1592 to A.D. 1615 there was peace in the land and Pararājasēkharan was allowed to rule without further trouble. The Portuguese had their own suspicion about his attitude towards them. Edir-

53. *The History of Jaffna under the Portuguese Period*, by Rev. S. Gñānaprakāsar O.M.I. He says that his death took place in A.D. 1615 while Mr. C. Rasanayagam would place it in the following year. *History of Jaffna in Tamil*, p. 120 and 116.

54. *Ibid.*, Rev. S. Gñānaprakāsar, pp. 49 and 50, and *History of Jaffna in Tamil*, pp. 118 and 119.

55. *The Portuguese in India* by F. C. Danvers, Vol. II, p. 98.

56. Rev. Gñānaprakāsar says that 'in all 400 Badagas were slain and 200 taken prisoners.'

maṇṇasiṅga Ārya *alias* Pararājasēkhara—for that was his full name—shortly before his death, made his three-year-old son as his successor and appointed his own brother Arasakēsari Paṇḍāra as regent, until the time, the boy should come of age. This arrangement was communicated to the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa for ratification; but he died all on a sudden before the confirmatory order could reach Jaffna. The death of this ruler is dated A.D. 1615.⁵⁷ It is said that immediately after his death, one Saṅkili Kumāra of the royal family who was longing to usurp the throne, captured the government by putting an end to the lives of Arasakēsari Paṇḍāra the Regent, and Peria Pillai Arāchi a powerful chief. Saṅkili then became the Regent. The people of Jaffna became dismayed at the unexpected success of Saṅkili Kumāra, grew restless and rose in revolt. Chinṇa Migāpillai Arāchi, the son of Peria Pillai who was murdered by Saṅkili, went over to the mainland to seek the aid of the Portuguese against the usurper, who however managed to stay on. When Joao de Cruz Girao of Manaar came to Jaffna to give effect to the will executed by the late king Ediramāṇṇa Śiṅga, Saṅkili is said to have denied the truth of the will and to have proved it to be a fraud. Saṅkili was thus left undisturbed ruler, on his promise to pay the Portuguese the due tribute and to rule according to their wishes. Saṅkili kept up his word for some time; but soon internal troubles arose which enabled him to set at nought the Portuguese claim to overlordship by allowing the Badagas (people from the mainland) to pass through his kingdom on their way to Kandy. Again, he also became unpopular by his atrocities and cruel exactions. The news of his proposal to appoint his son-in-law as his successor, was received by the Jaffnese with indignation and they consequently rose in revolt. Even the intervention of the Portuguese captain of Manaar to bring about a truce between Saṅkili Kumāra and his subjects was of no use; and Saṅkili, being very much opposed by his own men, had to take refuge at Ūṛṭṭurai, a port on the Jaffnese Coast. It is said that his womenfolk had, in the interval, made their escape to the court of Tanjore to seek the Nayak's help in putting down the revolt of the Jaffnese people and the Portuguese, who had then joined them. At last Saṅkili seems to have regained his kingdom with the aid of the Tanjore Nayak's forces sent under one Khēm Nayak and of five thousand *lascarins*. (Sinhalese warriors) led by one Varunakulat-

57. *The Portuguese in India*; by F. C. Danvers. The author places his death in 1617, Vol. II, p. 194. Mr. Rasanayagam (*History of Jaffna*) says that the confirmatory order from the Viceroy was issued on 13th May 1616, but it actually reached Jaffna towards the end of August of the same year.

tān.⁵⁸ Yagnanārāyana Dikshita's reference to the presence of the ladies of the Jaffnese king at the court of Raghunātha, perhaps indicates this appeal made by Saṅkili's women and Raghunātha Nayaka's claim to have re-established a king of Jaffna on the eve of the Toppūr battle must also refer to this victory won by his forces on behalf of Saṅkili, though the Portuguese chronicles do not refer to the part said to have been played by the Nayaka himself in person, but record the victory of the Tanjore forces.

Since Raghunātha Nayaka is said to have been in camp at Paḷamā-nēri in the cyclic year *Naḷa* and in the month of *Ādi* (Ashāda) corresponding to August A.D. 1616 on his way to Toppūr, the invasion of Jaffna must have taken place sometime before that date. The Rev. Gnānaprakāsar's date (1615) for the death of Edirmaṇṇa Śinga Pararājasēkharan the predecessor of Saṅkili, confirms A.D. 1616 as the date of the Jaffnese expedition.⁵⁹ The only point of conflict between the Tanjore and the Portuguese chronicles is that, while the former speaks of Raghunātha's presence in Jaffna in person, the latter mentions only his despatch of troops under one Khēm Nayak. Hence it is known for certain that it was Saṅkili Kumāra, who came to Tanjore for the Nayak's help and got subsequently back his lost kingdom through the latter's intervention. The reference made to the Jaffnese King as Pararājabhayanka (dread of enemy king) by Yagnanārāyana Dikshita, refers to Saṅkili himself. Pararājabhayankara could not be taken as referring to Pararājasēkhara on the ground that the Jaffnese rulers called themselves

58. *History of Jaffna*; p. 124. Also *Ancient Jaffna*; by Mr. C. Rasanayagam; Danvers, Vol. II, p. 206. The account given above is mainly drawn from the *History of Jaffna under the Portuguese, The Portuguese in India, History of Ceylon*, by H. W. Codrington, *Ceylon and the Portuguese Era*, by Dr. P. E. Pieris.

59. The dates of 1616 and 1617, given by Mr. Rasanayagam and Mr. Danvers will have to be abandoned in the light of Tanjore evidence. Raghunātha Nayaka's installation of Saṅkili as King, however, did not prove to have settled the matters finally. The Portuguese chronicles of Quieroz, Menezes and Faria Y Sousa refer to the sporadic attempts made by the Tanjore Nayak to regain Jaffna from the Portuguese, in whose hands the land has fallen about A.D. 1620. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar (*Sources*, p. 287, Footnote) fixes the date of Pararājasēkharan's death in A.D. 1617 following Mr. Danvers. Mr. C. Rasanayagam refers to the Tanjore help, on two occasions and he places Saṅkili Kumāra's reappointment during the reign of Achyutappa Nayaka. As regards the second which happened during the time of Raghunātha Nayaka according to him, the author himself is not sure whether it was made on behalf of Saṅkili for a second time, or in favour of a prince of Ramanacor, on whose behalf the Jaffnese revolted against the Portuguese. (*History of Jaffna* by C. Rasanayagam).

Pararājasēkharans and Śegarājasekharans in the order of their accession. In that case we cannot adequately explain the title of Pararājasēkharan for Saṅkili, since his predecessor Edirmannasinga was called a Pararājasēkhara⁶⁰ but there was one predecessor, Arasakēsari, in the regency.

Raghunātha Nayaka is said to have marched to Toppūr⁶¹ from Jaffna as he was informed, at the latter place, of the troubles caused by the enemy chiefs led by Jaggarāya and the damage done to the Cauvery dam.⁶² The causes that led to this momentous war are mentioned both in the Tanjore literature and in the letter of Barradas.⁶³ Venkatapati Raya's death in A.D. 1614 saw the beginning of a crisis which soon assumed greater magnitude and began as a regular war of succession to the Karnatāka throne. Venkatapati Raya having no male heir to succeed him, appointed his nephew Sriranga *alias* Chikkadēvarāya as his successor at the time of his death, setting aside the claims of a child who was fraudulently palmed off on him as his son by one of his queens. It is said that Venkatapati could not do anything to proclaim the real origin of this putative son as he was very fond of his queen, who was the sister of Gobbūri Jaggarāya, the then governor of Kolar and its neighbouring parts under Venkatapati. Jaggarāya, who had already entertained an ambition to acquire the throne for himself, naturally took up the cause of this young child, whom he declared to be the rightful son of the deceased emperor, and proclaimed him king by putting an end to the life of Chikkadēvarāya and his family. Only the second son of Chikkadēvarāya called Rāma, was saved from this wholesale disaster by the skilful exertion, of a washerman who had the boy smuggled out from the prison along with his bundle of dirty linen, with the connivance of Vēlugōti Yāchama Nayaka, a loyal feudatory of the

60. The Jaffnese rulers had these titles added to their names on their accession. A Pararājasēkharan was usually succeeded by a Segarājasēkharan like the Pāṇdyas of the Second Empire who called themselves Jatāvarmans and Marāvarmans on their accession and the Cholas, Parakēsaris and Rājakēsaris.—See Dynastic List of the Jaffnese Kings in the Portuguese Era given above.—(Ed.)

61. *Sources*:—Dr. S. K. Ayyangar identifies this place with the modern Tōvūr or Tōhūr which is about two miles from the Grand Anicut on the southern bank of the Cauvery.

62. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto IX, Sl. 24 and 25.

63. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto XIII. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto XI and XIII. Barradas; *A Forgotten Empire*, pp. 222-230.

late king and the founder of the present Venkatagiri royal house. Yāchama Nayaka as the sponsor of the claims of Rāma, the legal claimant to the throne, soon gained strength and opposed Jaggarāya. According to the account given by Barradas it appears that both the parties had come into collision in a series of engagements with varying success.⁶⁴ Jaggarāya's going over to the south was the result of a defeat which he sustained about the beginning of A.D. 1616; and he perhaps had the object of securing the co-operation of the southern governors to make a final bid for victory.⁶⁵ In this he was joined by the Nayaks of Gingee and Madura besides the Chēra king, who was a tributary of the Madura Nayaka. Tanjore alone remained loyal; her Nayak took up the cause of the legitimate successor, Ramarāya, along with Yāchama Nayaka. The Tanjore literature has no reference to this first success of Yāchama Nayaka referred to by Barradas. However his advance towards Tanjore was made probably with the object of destroying the coalition of rebel chiefs under Jaggarāya.

The Madura ruler who joined Jaggarāya was Muttuvirappa Nayaka (A.D. 1609 to A.D. 1623) and he, far from being loyal to the Empire, aimed at independence even very early; but he was not allowed to have a free hand in his attempt at independence as Venkatapati was a fairly strong ruler and was effectively helped by his loyal ally, the Tanjore Nayaka in maintaining the Imperial overlordship. By A.D. 1616 Muttuvirappa had grown powerful enough to rise in opposition and as a first mark of his hostile attitude, he changed his capital from Madura to Trichinopoly.⁶⁶ Father Leon Besse says that 'the Nayak of Madura removed his court and army to Trichinopoly in A.D. 1616 with the object of making war with the King of Tanjore' and Dr. S. K. Ayyangar says⁶⁷ that his change of capital seems to have been 'the direct result of the combination that culminated in the battle of Toppūr; and by A.D. 1616 the hostility between Madura and Tanjore had settled into a habitual kind of relation between the two Nayakships.' And it was this perpetual enmity with Tanjore that made Muttuvirappa join the rebels.⁶⁸

64. *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 229.

65. *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 230.

66. *La Mission du Madura*, p. 3 and
The Nayaks of Madura; p. 103; Foot-note.

67. *The Nayaks of Madura*, p. 103, Footnote.

68. Tanjore's loyalty to the empire and her co-operation with Venkatapati in the battle of Vallam against Madura, were sufficient causes for Madura's distrust and hatred.

Gōvinda Dikshita is said to have told his master that the Pāṇḍyan ruler (Nayak of Madura) and others were bearing ill-will and hatred towards Tanjore out of ignorance;⁶⁹ and Dr. S. K. Ayyangar again says that this combination of the Madura and Gingee Nayaks with Gobbūri Jaggarāya against the loyalists, was effected mainly with the object of overthrowing the Imperial control at this favourable juncture and this could be done only if the loyalists were crushed.⁷⁰ They seem to have done all they could to prevent the junction of Yāchama Nayaka, who was then coming towards Tanjore with Prince Rama to join Raghunātha Nayaka and the reference to the breaking off the Cauvery dam was perhaps their first act of destruction towards this aim. Rāmabhadra says that the damage to the dam was caused by the rulers of the west, while *Sāhityaratnākara* says that some one did it at the instigation of Jaggarāya.⁷¹ And Raghunātha is said to have remarked that he would reconstruct the dam with the skull pieces of his enemies.

An account of the battle of Toppūr is found in the *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, the *Raghunāthābhyudaya Nātakam* by Vijayarāghava, the narrative by Barradas and the *Bahulāsvacharitam*.⁷² Barradas says that "Yachama Nayaka had with him fifty thousand men in his camp, while Jaggarāya with only fifteen thousand followers, fled into the jungles where he was joined by more people, so that the war has continued these two years, fortune favouring now one side, now the other. But the party of the young prince has always been gaining strength; the more so because, although the great Nayak of Madura—a page of betel to the King of Bisnagar—who pays a revenue every year of some say 600,000 pagodas and has under him many kings and nobles as vassals, such as he was of Travancore—took the side of Jaggarāya and sustained him against the Naique of Tanjaor. Yet, the latter though not so powerful is, with the aid of the young king, gradually getting the upper hand." Both Rāmabhadra and Yagnanārāyaṇa Dikshita speak of the union of the Madura and Gingee rulers and the Pāṇḍyan chief of Tenkāsi with Jaggarāya, while the latter mentions also the Chēra

69. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto X, Sl. 26.

70. *The Nayaks of Madura*; p. 104, Footnote.

71. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Canto IX, Sl. 26. *Pāśchātyabhūmipatayaha* and *Sāhityaratnākaram*; Canto XIII, Sl. 78 and 83. Father Heras considers it likely that the Nayak of Madura did it at the instance of Jaggarāya—see Note by (Ed.).

72. *Sources of Vijayanagar History*; p. 305.

King⁷³ as among the rebel allies. The reference to the Dramida and the Maghadha kings is nothing but mere poetical rhetoric. Mysore seems to have held aloof from this war of succession.⁷⁴ The *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* give a detailed account of the preparations made by Raghunātha Nayaka.⁷⁵ The Tanjore army was composed of elephantry, cavalry and infantry besides a corps of troopers. The elephants were all equipped with iron howdahs⁷⁶, each containing soldiers and the well caparisoned horses were all mounted by high-turbaned riders who carried with them bows and arrows. The soldiers also had with them broad swords and matchlocks (*Agniyantrās*).⁷⁷ The infantry troops which were composed of Pāraśikas and Yavanas besides the natives, were armed with bows, arrows, spears and a deadly weapon called *Nālikāyudha*.⁷⁸ Yagnanārāyaṇa Dikshita also refers to a small batch of young soldiers, who were recruited from the class of nobles of the land.⁷⁹

The reference to the Pāraśikas and Yavanas is rather inconclusive. Yagnanārāyaṇa Dikshita uses the word Pāraśika to mean the Portuguese and the word Yavana must refer to the Jaffnese or Sinhalese since he speaks of the Jaffnese ruler as Yavanabhūpati.⁸⁰ Dr. S. K. Ayyangar⁸¹ and Mr. K. Sitaramayya following him say that the Pāraśikas must be taken to mean the Dutch and not the Portuguese, since Raghunātha had already shown his hostility towards them by driving them away from their coastal settlement in his kingdom. The

73. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; IX, Sl. 25 and 26. *Sāhityaratnākara*; X, Sl. 57 and XIII, Sl. 78. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar says 'the Nayak of Madura, the Nayak of Gingee, the Pāṇḍyas of Tinnevely, the Portuguese and perhaps even distant Travancore stood ranged on the side of the traitor.'

74. *The Nayaks of Madura*; Introduction, pp. 19 and 105, Note.

75. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; IX and X; *Sāhityaratnākara*; XIII and IV.

76. *Sāhityaratnākara*; XIII, Sl. 86 and 88.

77. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Sl. 8-10.

78. *Sāhityaratnākara*; XI, Sl. 20 and 21. The whole of Canto XIII is devoted to a description of the Tanjore army and the preparations made on the eve of the war. Unfortunately this description is taken to mean the enemies by Dr. S. K. Ayyangar. *Sources*, p. 273. However, a close reading of the Canto would show that it was the spy, who had arrived at Tanjore, saw these things before he met Raghunātha.

79. *Sāhityaratnākara*; XIII, Sl. 37.

80. *Sāhityaratnākara*; XV, Sl. 35 to 52.

81. *The Nayaks of Madura*; p. 124, Note.

employment of Dutch soldiers by the Tanjore Nayaka seems improbable in the light of the evidence furnished by the Dutch records. The Dutch at Pulicat to whom Venkatapati had issued a charter on the 24th April, A.D. 1610 permitting them to build a factory, were friendly with the Karnāṭaka Emperor. A second charter of the same Raya dated the 9th of June, A.D. 1612 was issued from Vellore to the Dutch in ratification of the first; and its last clause refers to a *cowle* granted by Jaggarāya, who was then the chief minister of Venkatapati and as well as the governor of Kōlar. Bāyammā or Vayyāmbika, Jaggarāya's sister and the chief consort of Venkatapati, is said to have given the Dutch, facilities for building the fort called Geldria at Pulicat. Moreover, the Dutch were not on unfriendly terms with the ruler of Gingee as they had established themselves at Tegnapatam by this time; but their hostility towards the Portuguese remained unabated. Above all, Hans de Haze, who came to Masulipatam on the 12th of November, A.D. 1616 to improve the Dutch prospects on the Coromandel Coast, is said to have followed a policy of strict non-intervention in the native affairs and in the war of succession that followed the death of Venkatapati. It is said that 'Haze thought it wise to remain neutral.' The English Factory Records tell us of the unsuccessful attempts made by the Dutch to found a factory in the kingdom of the Tanjore Nayak and these show the obvious improbability of the Dutch joining Tanjore against Jaggarāya.⁸²

The *Raghunāthabhyudayam* of Vijayarāghava says that Raghunātha was encamping at Paḷamānēri near Tanjore before he started for Toppur, the scene of the historic battle. It also gives a detailed account of the king's march towards Toppūr accompanied by bodies of officers and numerous followers. Raghunātha is said to have been mounted on an elephant under a white canopy, accompanied by his son, Rāmabhadra Nayaka. Puruṣhōttamayya and Narasappa (the two town Madālasis) rode on the second elephant while Aṣṭappa (or Hastiappa) and Aḷagappa, the two other officers rode on the third elephant. They rode respectively before and behind Raghunātha. Rāmarāya the legitimate ruler is said to have also accompanied Raghunātha to the battle field. Vijayarāghava gives a long list of thirty-two officials and chiefs who went out to fight in company with Raghunātha. Among them Ōbala Rāju the uncle of the king,

82. *Sardesai Commemoration Volume*. The last days of Vijayanagar; by Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri. Also *The Dutch Beginnings in India* by T. I. Poonen, Madras University.

the chiefs of Kaluva, Cuddapah, Palēla, Panta, Balamuri, Māṇḍva and the Reddis of Kambam figure prominently.⁸³

83. Barradas refers to the Karnātaka nobles, who joined Yāchama Nayaka and supported the cause of Rāmarāya.

[Further Note by the Editor.]

The chiefs mentioned in the list given in the *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam* of Vijayaraghava Nayaka, are interesting as showing the distribution of feudal power in the country at the time.

- (1) Kōnētī Kondarāju.
- (2) Kaṭṭa Rangapa Rāju.
- (3) Kastūri Rāju.
- (4) Sampeta Nāga Rāju of Mittāpālem.
- (5) Rāma Rāju.
- (6) Raghunātha Rāju of Owk.
- (7) Māma, Obala Rāju.
- (8) Manuboli Rāju.
- (9) Srīrangapati Rāju.
- (10) Srīgiri Rāju.
- (11) Virarāghava Rāju.
- (12) Viṭhala Rāju.
- (13) Chitrāju of Nandela.
- (14) Nārāpa Rāju.
- (15) Kandanavol Rāju.
- (16) Gaḍi Timma Rāja.
- (17) The Chiefs of Kālurva.
- (18) The Chiefs of Cuddapah.
- (19) The Pālela Chiefs.
- (20) The Panta Chiefs.
- (21) Srīpati Rāju and his mercenaries.
- (22) The Jūpalli people.
- (23) Dēsūr Reddi clans.
- (24) Mūrteppa.
- (25) Kumāra Rangayya.
- (26) Pāmināyanivāru.
- (27) The Balumūri chiefs.
- (28) The chiefs of Manduva.
- (29) The Reddis of Kambam, Koṇḍaviḍu and Koṇḍapalli.
- (30) Mallappa.
- (31) Mādana.
- (32) Perumāl Mudaliar.

These were the chiefs, who had joined the rightful prince after seeing his cause supported by the Nayak of Tanjore.

CHAPTER VI.

RAGHUNĀTHA NAYAKA (*Continued*).

Rāmabhadrāmba speaks of the matchless and gallant fight put up by the Tanjore forces. It is even said that Raghunātha himself took the field in person, when it was brought to his notice that his troops were not faring well at all.¹ In the battle, Jaggarāya fell dead, and his allies Mākarāju,² Rāvilla Venka and his general (Rāya Dalavāy) Chencha took to their heels.³ The Nayak of Gingee and the disheartened Madura Nayaka are also said to have fled from the field, in order to save their lives. Rāmabhadrāmba again says that the losses on the enemy's side were great and Raghunātha generously pardoned the Madura ruler,⁴ when he and his allies surrendered to him. Raghunātha after winning the battle, is said to have proclaimed prince Rāma as the Emperor of Karnāta⁵; and it is further said that he planted a pillar of victory on the site of the battlefield in memorial thereof.⁶ From the subsequent account of Rāmabhadrāmba it is known for certain that the Toppūr battle did not bring to a close the hostilities between the loyalists and the rebels, as she says, that soon after this decisive engagement intelligence was received by the Tanjore Nayak, of the intended counter-combination of Krishnappa Nayaka of Gingee and Yatirāja, the brother of Jaggarāya. Krishnappa is said to have collected together and reorganised his forces immediately after his flight from Toppūr, and once more advanced to fight the loyalists. Raghunātha now despatched his commander with a large army, to fight the Gingee Nayaka; and he himself was encamped at Tiruvaiyār awaiting the issue of this new advance. Soon Raghunātha was informed of the success of his army, which captured the fort of Bhuvanagiri on the N. Vellar river near Chidambaram and forced Krishnappa and his ally, Yatirāja, to retire from their positions. The Tanjore Nayak, thus

1. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; X, Sl. 25.

2. Mākarāju is identified with the chief of Kārvētinagar by Mr. H. Krishna Sastri. *Report of the Archaeological Survey of India* (1911-12).

3. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; X.

4. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; X, Sl. 60 to 64.

5. *Raghunātha Vilāsa Nātakam*; 4th Anka.

6. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*, X, Sl. 62. The *Rāmarājīyam* (*Sources*, pp. 243-44) also refers to this war and the success won by Yāchama Nayaka and Raghunātha Nayaka. The war is compared to the great Mahabharata War and Raghunātha is likened to Lord Krishna.

crowned with success and immortal glory, now returned to his capital where he was received with all honours by his loyal subjects.

From the references contained in the literary sources, the date of this important battle may be fixed within reasonable limits. Vijaya-rāghava, in his *Raghunāthābhīyudayam*, says that Raghunātha was encamped at Paḷamānēri in the month of *Āshāda* (Ādi) of the Cyclic year *Nala*, corresponding to August A.D. 1616, before he started for Tōppūr.⁷ Barradas writing on December 12, A.D. 1616, says that both the armies of Jaggarāya and Yāchama Nayaka 'are now assembled in the field in the large open plains of Trichinopoly not only the hundred thousand men that each party has, but as many as a million soldiers.' It is evident from these two records that the Toppūr battle must have been fought sometime earlier in A.D. 1617⁸; and the interval between August and December 1616 was probably spent in reconnaissances before the final struggle.

The important and far reaching consequences of this historic battle can hardly be over-estimated. His victory at Toppūr made Raghunātha supreme among his fellow Nayaks and the most powerful ruler of the southern kingdoms, and the crushing defeat sustained by the rulers of Madura and Gingee was so signal that it took years for them to recover their normal strength. The death of Jaggarāya shattered their fond hopes of achieving independence; and Muttu Virappa Nayaka of Madura never again entertained, either an openly hostile or even an impliedly aggressive attitude towards Tanjore till his death in A.D. 1627.⁹ Even Tirumala Nayaka, the brother and successor of Muttu Virappa, who ruled from A.D. 1623 to A.D. 1659 and who was the arch fomenter of disloyalty towards his suzerain, found himself helpless so long as there

7. Anchita Nalavatsarāshāda Suddha pañchami Pushyārka Parigayōga muna Swamivaru Paḷavā(mā)nēri Nagara Nāmatīrtamu, Purānasravanāmbu Rāma vīgraha Pūja Rāmajapambu Śrī Mūrti dānādhyā sēśhadāna muluga viñchi Vijayambugalu Kanakshatāha Śrī Vaishnavulo saṅga sīra muna dālchi Āditya hridaya japānantara muna, etc., *Raghunāthābhīyudayam Nātakam*. Raghunātha is said to have left Paḷamānēri and offered battle the next day.

8. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar also places this battle early in 1617 A.D. and the accession of Rāmarāya took place in the latter part of that year. Rāmarāya of Vijayanagar by Dr. S. K. Ayyangar. *Sardesai Commemoration Volume*, p. 203. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, p. 484. Father Rubino, the master of the College at San Thomé, in a letter dated 29th November, 1617 says that the war had not come to an end by that time. Perhaps he had in mind the subsequent operations against Krishnappa and Yatirāja.

9. *The Nayaks of Madura*: p. 112.

was Raghunātha ruling at Tanjore.¹⁰ The Toppūr battle was the last great war of Raghunātha; and the immediate result of it was the re-establishment of the diminished power of the Hindu Empire under Rāmarāya, with the consequent check it gave to further Muhammadan advance for the time being. Tanjore's victory once more asserted the supremacy of the Raya and helped to keep the disruptive and disintegrating forces of insubordination and disloyalty in complete check for a time.

The successful termination of these wars, however, did not prove, in fact to be the end of all troubles for Raghunātha, since the Portuguese accounts of Queiroz, Faria Y. Sousa and Sa. Y. Menezes refer to the subsequent invasions made by the Tanjore Nayak upon the Portuguese of Jaffna.¹¹ Śaṅkili Kumāra, who had been placed on the throne of Jaffna by Raghunātha Nayaka in the beginning of A.D. 1616, was not allowed to rule in peace for long. There were internal risings among the Jaffnese themselves, as they were not satisfied with his administration. They could not also reconcile themselves to Śaṅkili's coming to power with the help of the foreign Nayak of Tanjore. In addition to this, Śaṅkili, perhaps relying too much upon the Tanjore Nayak's support, began to defy the Portuguese supremacy by withholding the tribute due from him.¹² The accounts of the Portuguese say that he even went to the extent of helping the Kaṇḍyan king in the latter's efforts to drive away them from his land. The Kaṇḍyan king, who received this help must have been Māyādunnē who, it is said, was for sometimes a refugee at the court of Tanjore before he returned to Kaṇḍy towards the end of A.D. 1617¹³ and successfully overcame his rival, king Sēnāret. The Portuguese after defeating Māyādunnē and capturing his capital Meddegāma, turned upon Jaffna to punish Śaṅkili. De Sa Noronha was then the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa; and in A.D. 1619 he despatched his captain, Major Philippe de Oliveira, to deal effectively with the insubordi-

10. Tirumala's policy of conquest and insubordination began only after A.D. 1634, since in that year his subordination to Venkata II, is recorded in the Kūniyūr plates. Prof. Sathianatha Iyer says that his allegiance to Venkata 'could have only been nominal.' *Ibid.*, p. 126.

11. There is no reference to these wars of Tanjore in the internal literary evidence. Perhaps the defeats sustained by Tanjore are the reasons for this omission.

12. *History of Jaffna*, p. 124. Mr. Rasanayagam referring to the year of 1619 says that 'Śaṅkili had not paid it (tribute) these three years.'

13. *The Dutch power in Ceylon*; Dr. P. E. Pieris, p. 52. *History of Ceylon*; by H. W. Codrington, p. 111. Also *The Portuguese in India*; F. C. Danvers, Vol. II, p. 203,

nation of Jaffna with an army of 130 Portuguese and 3000 *lascarins* (Sinhalese soldiers). Śaṅkili suffered a complete defeat at Oliveira's hands; and when he tried to escape, he was taken prisoner and sent to Goa where he was subsequently put to death. Jaffna was immediately taken possession of by the Portuguese and Oliveira was appointed the first governor of the place, with the titles of Captain General and Major in A.D. 1619-20. However, a few attempts to recover the kingdom from the Portuguese were made in the following two years by the chief of the *Kareas* (Karaiyar—a class of fishermen on the Coromandel Coast to the south of the Gulf of Manaar) with the help of the Tanjore troops. Portuguese accounts refer to six such attempts made in the years 1620 and 1621; and we learn that in every one of these, the Tamil army sent by Tanjore seems to have sustained defeats.¹⁴

At first, the chief of the Karaiyars rose in revolt and offered resistance to the Portuguese, with the help of a large body of men from Tanjore. Oliveira is said to have defeated him near Nallūr and the Portuguese chronicles say, that the defeated Tamils 'fell like mosquitoes.' The second attempt was made by Dom Luis (*alias* Chinṇa Migapillai Arāchi), who tried to enthrone a prince of Ramanaṣōr in Jaffna. He obtained the help of a thousand men, who went out in twelve *dhonies* from the Tanjore coast and landing at Talaimannār, offered battle to the Portuguese in its neighbourhood. On this occasion the Tanjore Nayak claims to have sent his captain, Khēm Nayak 'who had not long before assisted Śaṅkili'.¹⁵ He is mentioned by the name of Varuṇakulattān by Queiroz. Varuṇakulattān has been identified by the Rev. S. Gnānaprakāsar with Khēm Nayak and he says that it was perhaps his caste name. According to the *Tolkāppiyam*, the fisherfolk of the coast country worshipped the God of the Sea; and Varuṇakulattān (he of the tribe of Varuṇa's descendants) means evidently a chief of a clan of fishermen and sailors. Oliveira sent Antonio de Mota Galvao, with a body of two hundred men and secured another victory over the Tamils. In the meanwhile, the Captain General of Colombo viewed these developments with a great deal of concern and in all haste, he sent Luis Teixeira de Mecado 'of the Seven Corlas' with four companies and five hundred *lascarins*, to Oliveira's help. Teixeira's

14. This and the following account of Jaffna are largely based upon the *History of Jaffna*; by Mr. Rasanayagam, pp. 124-130; *History of Jaffna under the Portuguese period*; by Rev. S. Gnānaprakāsar, pp. 64-75; *The Portuguese in India*; by F. C. Danvers, pp. 204-207 and *A Short History of Ceylon*; by H. W. Codrington.

15. Faria Y. Sousa, c. IV, p. 151; and *History of Jaffna under the Portuguese*; by Rev. S. Gnānaprakāsar, p. 66.

advance, which 'was more like a race than a march,' was marked by many barbarous deeds and atrocities. It is said that 'he clove men with axes like trees, opened the wombs of women and put in their children snatched from their arms.' Chinna Migappillai Arāchi and the prince of Ramanaçōr were defeated and the latter is said to have surrendered to the visitors. The attempt made by a Mudaliar, nicknamed Das Maminhas (the heavy breasted) in this connection, was also a failure. Dom Luis, *alias* Chinna Migappillai Arāchi, escaped to India and persuaded the Nayak of Tanjore to make himself King of Jaffna. The Nayak again seems to have taken advantage of this opportunity of acquiring Jaffna, and so he sent a force consisting of two thousand Badagas across the waters. Hostilities were resumed in November 1620 with the determination 'to conquer the kingdom for the Nayak of Tanjore.' Oliveira, meeting the Tanjore army, was able to defeat it for a third time. 'The Tamils were driven back after a severe fight in which, Oliveira himself was wounded.' The Nayak of Tanjore, unmindful of these reverses, made a fresh attempt to take Jaffna 'by raising more Badagas still hoping to make himself master of Jaffnapatam'; and here again, the Tamil army 'met with a disastrous defeat from Oliveira's troops.' On the 2nd February A.D. 1621, Oliveira was at Nallūr. Soon intelligence was received that the Nayak of Tanjore 'was sending out a powerful army—this time not only to conquer Jaffna, which he claimed as his tributary fief, but also to colonise it with Indians.' Galvao, waited for the arrival of the Tanjore army at Point Pedro (Paruttiṭurai). The Tamil army was once again defeated by the Portuguese, who fell on the enemy and massacred them 'until they were weary of it.' This proved the last and the final attempt made by Raghunātha Nayaka to conquer the kingdom of Jaffna; and the Jaffnese, finding themselves helpless finally submitted to Portuguese domination.

Thus, it will be seen from the Portuguese accounts that Raghunātha Nayaka had to pursue a vigorous, but very unsuccessful foreign policy, in his attempts to recover the kingdom of Jaffna from the Portuguese hold for his protege, the prince of Ramanaçōr. The series of defeats sustained by his army at the hands of the Portuguese, must have compelled him to abandon all idea of overrunning Jaffna, after the failure of the last attempt that he made in A.D. 1621.

Nothing more is known regarding his foreign policy, as there occurred no more wars with the neighbouring kingdoms till the end of his reign. Raghunātha continued his old attitude of loyalty and co-operation towards his new suzerain Rama, as he pursued in the reign of Venkata-pati Raya. He was the most powerful upholder of the unity of the Hindu Empire. The evidence of the Jesuit letters, on which Father

Heras bases his conclusion that 'Raghunātha's relation with Venkata are a little suspicious', is not easily sustainable, as it goes against the basic ideas of the Nayak's policy.¹⁶ The Jesuit letter in point says that Raghunātha was not only disloyal, but was actively engaged in opposing the Emperor, since it is recorded that about A.D. 1610 when Venkata was besieging the city of San Thomé, Raghunātha helped the Portuguese inhabitants of that place; and Raghunātha is also said to have received a letter in appreciation of his services to the Portuguese at San Thomé, from Dom Philip III, King of Spain and Portugal. The letter which is dated 20th February A.D. 1614, is said to have been sent to the Portuguese Viceroy, Azeveda, directing him to forward it to the Nayak. Father Heras continues :—'Unfortunately neither this letter nor a copy of it has hitherto reached our (Jesuits') hands. We know only that it was sent to the Bishop of Mylapore by whom it had to be despatched to Tanjore. "The letter of your Majesty to the Nayak of Tangaor (Tanjore)" says the Viceroy in his reply to the king, "is being sent to the Bishop (of Mylapore), who will hand it over to him." This letter of the Viceroy in reply to King Philip's letter, is dated 21st January A.D. 1613 and Father Heras asserts that the king's letter was sent to Mylapore. Evidently there must be a mistake in the transcription of the dates of these two letters; otherwise how could the Viceroy write a reply to the King some twelve months before, in anticipation of a letter from the latter, and which letter he is said to have actually received only after 20th February A.D. 1614. Moreover, the contention of Father Heras will not hold good in the light of internal criticism for, if Raghunātha Nayaka should have been hostile in his attitude towards Venkatapati in A.D. 1610, then how could he have taken part in the Toppūr battle which had for its avowed object, the restoration of the Vijayanagara throne to that line of heirs, which was nominated for succession by Venkatapati? But there is evidence to show that the Nayak of Gingee was not on friendly terms with Venkatapati and since the siege is said to have taken place at San Thomē, it is possible that the Gingee Nayak might have assisted the Portuguese. Besides, the Viceroy's despatch of the King's letter from Goa to the Bishop of Mylapore, instead of sending it to Negapatam (then a Portuguese settlement) to be delivered to the Nayak of Tanjore, might also lend support to the fact that the reference contained in the Jesuit letters, was largely due to the misconception and confusion of the political affairs prevailing in the Gingee country with those of the Nayaks of Tanjore. Above all, the subsequent wars of Raghunātha with the Portuguese in the years A.D. 1614 to A.D. 1621, clearly show that he could not have been so friendly at all towards them as to offer

16. *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*; pp. 402 and 448.

free assistance. On either side, the evidence shows that Raghunātha's supposed insubordination and opposition to his overlord is only a figment of the misconceptions in the minds of the Jesuit fathers.

There is no doubt that his wars would have cost him a great deal of money and men; and the English Factory Records very naturally speak of his greed for wealth. What became of those conquered territories such as the dominion of Śōḷaga, whether they were annexed to the Tanjore kingdom or not is not definitely known. Dēvikōttah was most probably annexed to the Tanjore kingdom, since a letter dated 1664 refers to the Tanjore Nayak's refusal to allow the English to establish a factory at Dēvikōttah.¹⁷ The Chronicles which refer to the imprisonment of Śōḷaga and the Pāṇḍyan king, say that the latter alone was released. What became of Śōḷaga is not mentioned in them.¹⁸ In Negapatam the Portuguese continued to carry on their trade and it is surprising to note why they were not dislodged from the place on account of Raghunātha's obvious hostility towards them. Perhaps some sort of truce might have been effected between them, by which, security must have been assured to the Portuguese by the Nayaka; and this suggestion will remain tentative in character till we detect further evidence in this respect.

Raghunātha Nayaka's reign also witnessed the arrival of other European merchants like the Dutch, the Danes and the English on the coast. The Dutch, who had already made their appearance in the Eastern Seas and made a bid for a share in the trade of the Indian Ocean towards the close of the 16th century, were soon followed by other nations such as the Danes and the English. The Portuguese had already established themselves at San Thomé and Negapatam, while the Dutch had acquired Tegnapatam about A.D. 1610. There was keen rivalry between the Portuguese and the Dutch, who 'worked havoc to the Portuguese ships in the sea but on land the latter endeavoured by clandestine efforts to prevent the Dutch from getting a foothold.' However, the native powers sought the Dutch help to drive away the Portuguese; and the Dutch chronicles record that 'similar supplication for help from the Dutch of

17. *The English Ractory Records*, 1661-64, p. 365.

18. An Inscription coming from Nodiyūr (Tanjore District: 200 of 1932) registers an annual grant of 30 *pon* made to one Vēdaṇḍichōḷan of Śengilinādu as remuneration for the latter's services in having captured and killed a certain Pērichchi Śōḷagan. Since the record contains only the Cyclic year Sōbakrit, the exact date is not easy to calculate. If Pērichchi Śōḷagan can be identified with Śōḷaga of Dēvikōttah, whom Raghunātha defeated and imprisoned, then the epigraph would have us understand, that he escaped from prison and fled for life. Vēdaṇḍi Chōḷan might have captured this culprit while he was roaming about, and put an end to his life.

South Coromandel Coast against the Portuguese were made by the rulers of Jaffnapatam, Cochin and the Nayak of Tanjore.' The Dutch finding themselves much opposed by the Portuguese, made attempts to get a footing in the South. Bourgonji, the Dutch factor at Tegnapatam says in a letter dated 26th July A.D. 1610 that negotiations were carried on with the Nayak of Tanjore for securing a place called Triminipatam (Tirumalarāyanpattinam) and even though a *cowle* was expected from Tanjore to that effect 'no reply was received up to 7th April A.D. 1609.'¹⁹ He also says that 'much was expected of the cloth trade at Triminipatam situated in the Tanjore Nayak's country between Tegnapatam and Negapatam. It appears from this, that the earliest attempt of the Dutch to found a factory in the kingdom of Tanjore, proved unsuccessful. The English Factory Records also show that the Nayak of Tanjore was not for according permission to erect forts in favour of the Dutch 'who were earnest suitors to the Naick to his country'. The Nayak refused to have them 'live in his country' and had demolished 'what they had begun, saying he had heard how they encroached upon other princes' dominions and countries and therefore should not live in his.'²⁰

The annual return of the Portuguese and Dutch ships laden with large quantities of gold and commodities got as profits in the Eastern trade, stirred up the other enterprising nations of Europe to take to oceanic enterprise. The Danes and the French were the most important of them. The Danes appear to have visited the court of the Tanjore Nayak a few years earlier than the English. The first Danish settlement of Dansborg (Tranquebar) on the Coromandel Coast and in the kingdom of Raghunātha Nayaka, was founded on the 19th of November A.D. 1620 by Ove Geede, who was sent out to India as the commander of the first Danish fleet of four ships by King Christian IV of Denmark. But the first arrival of the Danes had already taken place sometime earlier when Roelant Crape, a Dutchman, in the Danish service 'was received with thirteen of his men graciously by Ragnādo (Raghunātha Nayaka) of Tanjore.'²¹ The foundation of the Danish settlement

19. *The Dutch Beginnings in India*, T. I. Poonen, Chapter VII.

Triminipatam is the modern Tirumalairājanpatnam situated in the Nannilam Taluk of the Tanjore District. It is located between Tranquebar and Negapatam in Linschoten's map. See also the map of India by Sanson d'Abbeville (1652).

20. *The English Factory Records*, Vol. II, (1622-23) p. 337.

21. J.R.A.S., 1898, p. 625. The Danish settlement of Tranquebar—Donald Ferqussou. The author disproves the date of 1612 assigned for the foundation of the Danish settlement of Tranquebar and mentioned in the *Imperial Gazetteer* as it is too early for it.

of Tranquebar took place by mere accident as it were. The Danish East India Company was started in Copenhagen (Denmark) under the patronage of King Christian IV, as early as A.D. 1616 but it took two years for the Company to fit out an eastern expedition. In their early voyages the Danish Company, for want of their own men with sufficient knowledge of the trade routes in the Indian Ocean, had to employ the services of the Dutchmen, who were available; and the sending out of two of their ships in the course of A.D. 1618 was largely due to the exertions of a Dutchman, Marcellus de Boschowver, who went on a political mission to Holland.²² Boschowver finding that he could get no help from the Dutch, as the Batavian government was preoccupied with their schemes regarding the acquisition of Moluccas, turned to Denmark in November 1617 which was now determined to set out an expedition in order to trade with the East, consequent of the successful end of their war with Sweden in A.D. 1603.²³ Boschowver on behalf of the Kandyan king negotiated a treaty with the king of Denmark with forged credentials. As a result of this treaty the 'Oeresund' started first with Roelant Crape on August A.D. 1618 and this was followed after three months by Ove Geede, who set out with four vessels, the 'David' and the 'Elephant' provided by the King and the 'Christian' and the 'Copenhagen' belonging to the Company. Roelant Crape reached the coast of Ceylon and informed the Kandyan King of the news of the forthcoming arrival of Ove Geede. Roelant Crape being persuaded by King Sēnāret of Kandy to enter into hostilities with the Portuguese, captured a number of small Portuguese junks laden with rice and arecanuts. The news of Crape's success soon reached the ears of Andre Boetelho de Costa, who was the Portuguese Governor of Jaffnapatam; and becoming enraged at this, he at once despatched six galleys 'to chastise the interlopers'. Crape, who was then anchoring near Karikal was suddenly attacked by the Portuguese fleet, and in his attempt to escape he was stranded near the coast. Crape taking along with him the remaining thirteen of his crew, swam across to the shore and made his way to

22. Boschowver, the Dutchman who was in Ceylon promised help to King Sēnāret of Kandy in the latter's attempt of driving the Portuguese out of his kingdom. He sailed to Tegnapatam A.D. 1613 to get help from the Dutch Factors there, but finding no help forthcoming, he sailed to Holland. Even there he could not get help from the Government and so to fulfil his promise given to Sēnāret, he negotiated with the King of Denmark using forged credentials since Sēnāret never gave him power to negotiate with the Danes. Boschowver, who sailed along with Ove Geede to the East, died on his way and the dead body was interned in Ceylon.

23. J.R.A.S., Vol. 30, p. 169. *The Danes in Ceylon*; Dr. P. E. Pieris.

Tanjore, where they were given protection by the Nayak. Ove Geede, landed in Ceylon in May A.D. 1620 and found to his great disappointment that the king of Kandy was then in friendly relations with the Portuguese and besides, Boschowver's credentials were also discovered to be unauthorised fabrications made, on his visit to king Sēnāret. However, Geede made use of the king's desire to win the Danes to his side, and made a treaty by which Trincomali was formally ceded to the Danish Crown. Geede then sailed towards the Coromandel Coast to know more about Crape of whose previous misfortune, he had heard already in Ceylon. Geede visited the court of Raghunātha Nayaka and concluded a treaty in November 1620 as between the Danish Company and the Nayak by which, Raghunātha permitted the Danes, without any objection on his part to supply materials, to build a fort at Tranquebar and to trade freely with his subjects. Geede appointing Henrick Hess to be the commandant of the fort and Crape to an equally important post, then sailed away.²⁴ The fort at Tranquebar constructed by Geede 'is a quaint old structure in the Gothic style and quite baronial in appearance in spite of modern restoration.'²⁵

The foregoing account clearly shows, that the arrival of the Danes in Tanjore and their founding a settlement in the Nayak's country happened without any previous plan; and the Nayak's help to Crape at the hour of distress when his life was in danger, his offering them help and permission to build a fort, are not without significance and importance in the history of the Eastern Commerce in general and in the Nayak's relation with the Portuguese in particular. Within a short time the Danes were able to gain ground and compete effectively with other European nations in the eastern market; and an English letter dated A.D. 1621²⁶ refers to their prosperity in trade. The letter records that 'this coast is not yet freed of all the Danes' and the building of a small fort at Tranquebar is also mentioned. By August 27, A.D. 1622 the fort at Tranquebar had been strengthened and fortified and President Fursland writing to the Directors of the English East India Company says 'that the Danes trade under the name of the English and are marvellously well used. He

24. Fenger: *The Tranquebar Mission*. This little book gives detailed information about the founders of Tranquebar which was known in an inscription of a Pandya, as Sadangapadi and subsequently as Tarangampadi (wave-village) —[Editor].

25. *The Annual Report of the Archaeological Department, Southern Circle, 1912-13*, p. 69.

26. Letter from Methwold to the Company. *The English Fastory Records*, Vol. I, Introduction and p. 266.

(Nayak of Tanjore) has given them a town and a place to build a castle which is finished and hath thirty-six pieces of ordnance mounted therein.²⁷

A similar attempt to establish a factory in the Nayak's territory was made by the English in the year A.D. 1624. But their negotiations ended in failure consequent upon the Nayak's demanding a large sum and a heavy rent as well, for their proposed factory at Karikal. About A.D. 1622 The English had their factories at Masulipatam and Pulicat on the Coromandel Coast; but the unprofitable trade carried on at the latter place led the Presidential Council at Bantam to order the dissolution of the Pulicat factory, on July 11, A.D. 1623.²⁸ Another reason that contributed for the immediate abandoning of Pulicat was the fact 'that Coromandel cloth will not be required in future as long as they discontinue their trade with Moluccas'. Another letter refers to the wrongs done by the Dutch to the English at Pulicat, as they were also in possession of that place under the patronage of the local governor Yatirāja, the brother of the rebel Jaggarāya, the victim of the Toppūr battle. The Dutch and the English at Pulicat made joint efforts to procure Indian cloth in sufficient quantities for purposes of export, but the Dutch appear to have insisted 'on the strict dividing of the cloths received in accordance with the respective proportions of the two Companies' investments, but making the English pay their full share of the expenses.' In A.D. 1622 information was sent to the Superior Council at Bantam that the Nayak of Tanjore was very desirous of opening trade with the English and this news was communicated to the Directors in England by Brockedon, the President of the English settlements in the East and also of the Council at Bantam, towards the close of A.D. 1623.

Brockedon in his letter²⁹ says that "the prince of Tanjore of those parts has often invited us to live in his country promising great privileges and favours and now by the *Ruby* (which reached the coast on November 23, from Batavia) there is come an Englishman Johnson, who came out master of one of the first Danish ships, who has lien about 18 months at the Nayak's court as a pawne for the pepper first sent home by the Danes, who reports the Naick having heard the English to be a peaceable nation that seek not to encroach on other men's territories was earnest with him to move into us the favourable opinion he had for our nation and great desire that we should trade in his dominions

27. *The English Factory Records*, edited by Sir Foster, Vol. II, p. 117.

28. *The English Factory Records*, Vol. II, Introduction, pp. 37 and 38.

29. Letter from President Brockedon from Batavia to the East India Company dated, December 14, A.D. 1623 *The English Factory Records*, Vol. II, p. 337.

wherefore understanding that better cloth of all sorts is made there than at Pulicat and Masulipatam and pepper likewise to be gotten in reasonable quantities ; we have resolved to send a ship thither within these three months to make trial what good may be done in those parts. The Portugals have lived long in his country but without fortification, he taking their protection upon him and offers the like to us or to fortify as the Danes have done. The Dutch have been earnest suitors to the Nayak to fortify in his country and had begun a fort at Tegnapatam,³⁰ but the Nayak refuses to have them live in his country and has demolished what they had begun saying he had heard how they encroached upon other princes' dominions and countries and therefore should not live in his." The decision to send a ship to the coast of Tanjore was arrived at on the strength of a letter written by an Englishman, John Johnson of whom we have again an account preserved in a letter dated 4th March A.D. 1622,³¹ and written by Johnson himself. John Johnson came out to India in A.D. 1620 as a sailor in the *Christian* of the Danish fleet and found his way to the court of the Tanjore Nayak along with the Danes, when the latter negotiated with Raghunātha for obtaining Tranquebar. Soon, Johnson and another Englishman Richard Hatfield by name, found themselves stranded alone with no money or provisions to find their way home or to reach the nearest English factory. Johnson himself says in a despatch to the President that he was staying at Tanjore quite against his own will. In the same letter he wrote for money, giving information regarding the possibility of founding an English settlement in the Tanjore Nayak's country. He says 'the great Naick demands of men what the reason is that the English do not desire to trade in his land as well as the Portugal, saying that they shall have pepper and anything the land doth afford and likewise buy those commodities that they do bring with them as tin, lead, iron and red cloth is well sold. Little does our nation know how they are expected all this land, therefore the Danes do trade under the name of the English and are marvellous well used. . . .'. In the following year, Johnson seems to have made his way from Tanjore to Masulipatam and thence reached to Batavia.³² He moved the President at Bantam to send a ship to Tanjore where the English, he said, would soon have a prosperous trade in pepper and large quantities of excellent calico. He also mentioned the Dutch attempts to establish a factory in Tanjore Nayak's territories and the refusal of the Nayak to allow them that freedom. These representations and the Nayak's anxiety to receive

30. Tegnapatam, the modern Fort St. David, belonged to the Nayak of Gingee and not to Tanjore.

31. *The English Factory Records*, Vol. II, p. 51.

32. *The English Factory Records*, Vol. III, Introduction, p. 39.

them and grant them favourable terms tempted the English Council at Batavia to send a ship, the *Hart*, to the Nayak's port of Karikal under the captaincy of Thomas Bickley with Joseph Cockram, a member of the Council as 'chief factor' and four assistants.³³ The stock was fixed at 52,000 rials, 4/5 of which was to be invested in pepper and the rest in calicoes. A letter was also sent to the Nayak requesting his gracious treatment of the factors and the concession of necessary privileges. John Johnson went as pilot.³⁴

President Brockedon wrote on January 17, 1624 to the Company, of his intention to send the *Hart* to the place which the Danes have fortified on the Coast of Coromandel, saying that good clothes and paintings and store of pepper may be had in abundance. He had also referred to the invitation of the prince of that country and to the fact that the Danes in a week's time had laden 3 or 4 hundred tons of pepper, and that the Portuguese bought almost all their clothes in their country (Tanjore). Regarding the ruler of that country, he says 'he is accounted the most warlike prince in all those parts, an observer of justice and will protect all those that trade in his country.'³⁵ The *Hart* left Batavia on March 27, 1624 accompanied by the *Unity*, which was to go to Masulipatam. The President wrote also a personal letter to the ruler of Tanjore, which runs as follows:—"They trust that His Highness's letter to their agent at Masulipatam (lost by the latter's negligence) will excuse this abrupt coming to him before they could commend his gracious favours into their own sovereign and since they have learned by Mr. Johnson's relations his good inclination towards their nation, they have despatched the bearer Mr. Joseph Cockram with the aforesaid Johnson to offer their service in the accommodation of the commerce, that it may for ever remain inviolable a band of amity between the houses of Tanjore and Great Britain. Their intent is only to transport such commodities of his kingdom as can conveniently be spared to furnish, in return for such English and other goods as one wanted and one in their power to supply. They

33. They were George Brewen, John Cartwright, Richard Robinson and Edward Powell. George Brewen was to be left behind as principal of the proposed English factory on the Tanjore Coast.

34. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 39. Also *Consultations held at Batavia*, March 2, A.D. 1624.

35. *Consultations at Batavia*, Vol. III. The letter written by Raghunātha Nayaka inviting the English was conveyed to Thomas Mills at Masulipatam by Johnson. That the letter was not sent to Batavia is seen from the reprimands made by the President to Mills for keeping that letter.

do not doubt his Majesty's gracious favour for the grant of necessary privileges on which point the bearer is empowered to negotiate."³⁶

On the same day, the President also issued instructions to Joseph Cockram and others for setting up a factory at Tanjore. The letter containing those instructions is as follows :—"On arrival at Serical (Kari-kal) a *caul* (cowle for safe conduct) is to be procured from the governor before landing. Mr. Johnson or some other should next be sent to the Nayak to procure a farman 'that you may come safely unto him,' which being granted, you shall present him with our letters and such presents as we have sent and demand the grant of suitable privileges. The *Unity* is to be sent on to Masulipatam within 5 or 6 days of their arrival with advice of cloth likely to be procured at the new settlement. No attempt should be made to build a factory house until they should be satisfied that the trade is worth pursuing. 'The chief thing we aim at is the procuring of large quantities of pepper wherefore if pepper be extra ordinary dear or but little to be gotten, we hold it unfitting to remain there unless the place afford extraordinary good cloth and good cheap and that there be hopes to vend quantities of our English commodities which you are especially to inquire after.' 'To be cautious in landing goods until well assured of the Nayak's affection ; also in giving credit to the Natives. We are informed there is a great *committie* (kōmati) in the Naick's country named Malaya³⁷ which we make account will be your merchant and will undertake great matters. He showed himself very honest in his dealings with Mr. Mills at Pulicat, yet by dealing with inferior komatis, You shall better understand the market and know how to bargain with Malaya with more certainty.' To be especially careful in choosing good colours as there is much deceit in the red (the most usual colour); also in seeing that the goods correspond with the sample. Packing should not

36. *The English Factory Records*, Vol. III. A copy of this letter is found in the *Factory Records* at Java.

37. Mallai or Mallaya *alias* Chinniah or Chenana Chetti, was an influential merchant through whom the Dutch had been conducting their transactions with Indian traders, weavers, etc. The Dutch assisted Mallai, who had been made to supersede Damarla Venkatappa Nayak. some years later, i.e., after the founding of Madras; and he became after 1644 the effective master of the coast country round Madras. Mallai played the decayed Raya against the Dutch and *vice versa*. Mallai had a large body of soldiers under him and took part freely, frequently changing sides, in the struggles of the Raya, the advancing Muhammadans and the Europeans of the coast. One of his dependents was Seshadri Chetty of Porto Novo who subsequently rose to be the chief Indian merchant at Madras. Mallai had even a small fort at Tegnapatam. He was a prominent figure in the politics and trade of the coast for nearly half a century.—[Editor].

be carried on in moist weather while the clothes are still damp.³⁸ They must look vigilantly to the delivery of the goods at the time appointed, and must have packing materials prepared in time. Should the Nayak be very earnest for a piece of ordnance, they may spare him one of the ship's guns 'with all his furniture'. Keep good correspondence with the Danes and the Portugals, but trust them not and have as little conversation with the Portuguese as may be for, they are exceeding treacherous and will poison you if you eat with them. As our people by oweful (woeful) experience in Siam have made trail (trial) with the loss of their lives. Mr. Johnson may be left at the new factory or not as may be found expedient; but he is not to be trusted with the Company's cash. Two Portugal women and men sent in this ship are to be landed at Negapatam or San Thomé and an endeavour to be made to procure the release of Mrs. Forbisher. Should it be decided to leave a factory Mr. Brewen is to be chief, John Cartwright second and Richard Robinson third with four or five Englishmen. If sufficient pepper be not obtained the *Hart* should be despatched to the West Coast of Sumatra for a supply and so to Batavia. While in port the sailors are to be allowed 'four fresh meals the week either fish or flesh and if butter be dear let them have salt fish to eat with their rice.' You may entreat the Nayak's favour to bring from thence 15 bricklayers that have skill to lay 'plaster of Paris' (chunam) and fifteen coolies to labour which you shall buy though they cost 20 rials per piece or upward. And lade as much plaster of Paris (pallist) and tiles-aboard the *Hart* as she can conveniently take in for, we shall have great occasion to use them. Private trade is to be rigorously suppressed." The same day John Bicklay also received instructions for the voyage from the President which says, that the ship must stop at the Sunda Islands to cut wood for the intended factory at Serical (Karikal). "Mr. Johnson would guide them to the latter port. Authority to help the mariners and to help the merchants. Not to meddle with the Portuguese while in the ports of the Nayak but in going or coming he is to endeavour to capture any Portuguese vessels he may meet. A piece of ordnance to be given to the Nayak if necessary. The ship to go to Sumatra if lading of pepper cannot be obtained at Karikal. Thirty (blackmen) to be procured at the latter place. Not to remain beyond the end of September except in an emergency. To stand always on his guard. The sailors etc. are not to buy any goods at Karikal until the merchants have agreed with the kōmatis as to price." The President sent also presents, which were to be made over to the Nayak and they included two *Demiculverins*.

38. This clause was necessitated by the fact that the Factors at Jambai complained about the bad condition of the goods got from the coast. Vol. III, p. 12.

On May 21, A.D. 1624, the ships sighted Tegnapatam and the *Unity* shortly after, set sail to Masulipatam. The *Hart* coasting along the south, passed the Danish fort of Tranquebar and anchored at Karikal on May 23 1624. On the next day the Captain went ashore and was received by the governor of Karikal, who at once despatched to Tanjore the news of the arrival of the English ship. While the English were awaiting a reply, the Danes made two attempts to frighten them away, alleging that they held an exclusive concession from the Nayak for all the ports between Negapatam and Pulicat. Joseph Cockram and Bickley with courage returned defiant answers and the Danes themselves, immediately afterwards, sailed away quietly when the English captain hoisted the British flag. On June 8, in response to an invitation from the Nayak the English departed for Tanjore, where they were all given a warm reception both by the Nayak and his nobles and were 'by the Nayak by his own mouth promised free trade and that they should have the port of Karikal at an easy rate. But the Portuguese and the Danes were greatly against it and most cruel enemies.' The latter it is alleged gave the Nayak great bribes and when Cockram was confronted with a demand for a yearly payment of 7000 rials of eight, for permission to use the port of Karikal, he could not accept the outrageous demand and broke off the negotiations and returned to the *Hart* on July 9. The English were the less disposed to satisfy the Nayak's greed for money as they found the pepper of the country to be limited in quantity and of 'a very sort and that always much wet with fresh water in portage from the upland mountains.'

The *Hart* visiting Tranquebar and calling at Tegnapatam, anchored off Pondicherry on July 19. The Governor of the District came on board and invited Cockram to settle a factory in that port. Cockram is said to have told him, that the English would visit Pondicherry next year with the necessary permission to found a factory. The *Hart* sailed again on August 3 and four days later reached Masulipatam where the *Unity* lay, being condemned and not fit for further voyaging. Remaining there till October, the *Hart* reached Batavia on November 20, 1624. Johnson was blamed for deluding the English in the business of Tanjore and he was mulcted of his wages. But Johnson on his going to England and on making an appeal to the Board of Directors, got back his wages by justifying his action.³⁹

39. The foregoing account is drawn from the *English Factory Records* Vol. III, 1623-29. The English decided to send a ship to Pondicherry on January 12, 1625 but the troubles that ensued prevented further attention. A letter received by the Company in 1626 states that the Danes had intercepted for paintings (painted cloths). A Dutch letter from Pulicat written towards the close of 1625 mentions that the

From this account, it becomes evident that the first attempt of the English to get a foothold in the Tanjore Nayak's country for purposes of trade proved a lamentable failure. The causes that led to the despatch of the *Hart* to Tanjore, were to procure large quantities of pepper which was reported to be in abundance and to purchase cloth only if it is of 'good quantity and sort and also cheap.'⁴⁰ According to the report of Johnson 'sufficient quantity of pepper to lade the *Hart* may be had in three months at 18 rials per *bahar* (Bāram ?) of about 330 lbs.' And the reasons for the abandoning of the settlement at Karikal are recorded in John Goring's Diary, which refers to the country's yielding 'but little pepper of a very small sort and that always much wet with the fresh water in portage from the upland mountains.' The Nayak also, was found to be 'very covetous expecting very great presents yearly', besides the payment of 7000 rials as rent for the port of Karikal, which 'he would appoint for us.'⁴¹

Berckley's account of the same voyage contains valuable and interesting information. He says that the failure of the English was largely due to the intrigues of the Danes, who bribing the Nayak, poisoned his mind against them. Berckley adds that the Nayak's demanding 7,000 rials as rent was due to 'the Danes being the cause thereof.' 'As for the king, he cares not who it be that has his ports to rent so he may have them what he will demand for he is for all what you will give him and so are all his great men.' The rivalry of the Danes, who were enjoying a considerable amount of influence with the Tanjore Nayak, was the main cause for the failure of the English and the records show that the Danes had even gone to the extent of influencing the governor of Pondicherry, under the Nayak of Gingee, as to prevent the English from founding a factory there. The Factory Records of this period show that the trade of the Coromandel Coast was carried on in a large measure by one Malaya Chetti, a rich *kōmati*, who had his house and godown at Tegnapatam.

Raghunātha Nayaka's later years of rule were a period of comparative peace and tranquillity, marked by the absence of bloody wars and internal troubles. The kingdom did not seem to have suffered any dimi-

Danes had endeavoured to procure calicoes at *Pouls Cera* (Pondicherry) and *Porto Novo* and a subsequent letter says that the Danish merchants left at both places, had been imprisoned by the Nayak.

40. *The English Factory Records*, Vol. III, p. 12.

41. The English agreed to pay 3,000 rials of eight as rent for the port of Karikal.

nution in its extent and the presence of Raghunātha's epigraphs beyond the limits of the Tanjore district, show his rule and supremacy over the neighbouring territories. His powerful hand seems to have extended as far as Tirukkōshtiyūr in the Ramnad District,⁴² Lālgudi in the Trichinopoly District,⁴³ Gōvindavādi in the Chingleput District⁴⁴, Neduṅṅunram and Nārattampūdi in the North Arcot District.⁴⁵ His records at Neduṅṅunram where his ancestors and now his agent Śonādiriayyan are said to have made gifts to the local temple show again the close association of the Tanjore Nayaks with that place. The presence of the Tanjore Nayaks' epigraphs and especially those of Raghunātha at Neduṅṅunram has led the Government Epigraphist to suppose that Raghunātha 'was a governor under Venkata in some portions of the North and South Arcot Districts.' There is also another inscription⁴⁶ found at Neduṅṅunram and it is dated in the cyclic year Tārana. The record which registers a gift of land to the temple of Dharmaputtirar at Neduṅṅunram by the inhabitants of the village and by one Tiruvambala Pillai, who is termed as the deputy of Timma Nayak and the agent of the king, is issued in the name of Vijaya Raghunātha Nayaka. If Vijayaraghunātha Nayaka can be identified with Raghunātha Nayaka, then the cyclic year would correspond to A.D. 1584. In that case this record will be the earliest of Raghunātha's epigraphs. The Government Epigraphist has assigned this record to A.D. 1644 and in that case, it will refer to Vijayarāghava Nayaka. Since it is not known whether Vijayarāghava was also called Vijaya Raghunātha, the supposition of the Government Epigraphist, that Raghunātha was viceroy under Venkata would require further confirmation before it can be safely accepted. However, epigraphs of both Achyutappa and Raghunātha show that they had agents at Neduṅṅunram.⁴⁷ Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, where we have Śevappa and Achyutappa's records has none of Raghunātha Nayaka.

The inscriptions of Raghunātha Nayaka refer to a number of agents, who were, in all probability, in charge of small administrative divisions. His great minister Gōvinda Dikshita, figures largely in his epigraphs and in one of them he is called Pradhāni and in another he is termed as the agent of the king.⁴⁸ Ellappa Nayaka, son of Mādaiya Nayaka is mention-

42. 308 of 1923 dated Saka 1529. Tirukkōshtiyur.

43. 151 of 1928 from Nattamāṅgudi (Lalgudi Taluk).

44. 40 of 1923. Gōvindavādi.

45. 705 of 1904 from Neduṅṅunram and 379 of 1925 from Nārattampūdi.

46. 112 of 1924. Also A.R.E. 1924 and 1925.

47. 705, 706 and 709 of 1904.

48. 331 of 1923 and 290 of 1927.

ed as one of his agents, in an inscription found at Achyutamangalam.⁴⁹ Achyutamangalam is perhaps the same village called Achyutasamudra *alias* Arivilimangalam which was given away as gift to Vijayindra Tirtha by Achyutappa Nayaka. One Naraṅgarāja, who made an assignment of thirty *pon* to the Nodiyūr temple from the amount payable to the palace by the villagers for worship of god, was another agent.⁵⁰ Kolundappar was a third agent of Raghunātha and he is said to have made provisions for feeding Brahmans and celebrating some festivals in the Tirukkōshṭiyūr temple in A.D. 1607.⁵¹ Mādayya Nayaka, son of Mallappa Nayaka, was also his agent at Srīvāṅṇiyam. He is said to have made a gift of certain taxes in favour of the dancing girls (*dēvaradiyār*) attached to the temple in lieu of services.⁵² Tattapillai was another agent⁵³ besides one Narasinga Dikshita, who is mentioned in an epigraph coming from Nārattampūndi and dated in A.D. 1614.⁵⁴ A record from Nāchchiārkoil⁵⁵ dated Saka 1540 is interesting as it refers to an official of the king called *Aṭṭavaṇai* (accountant). *Aṭṭavaṇai* Rangappayyan built a mantapa to the goddess, for the merit of Raghunātha Nayaka. Apart from these gifts made by the King's agents, the numerous benefactions made by the Nayaka himself are also known. An Inscription from Nārattampūndi (North Arcot District) dated A.D. 1604 and issued in the name of Venkatapati Raya, refers to a *sarvamāṇya* gift (free of all taxes) of an entire village called Kailāsapuram to god by Raghunātha, for his own merit.⁵⁶ Another record coming from Kōttūr (Mannargudi Taluk) registers a gift of ten *velis* of land by the same Nayaka and the purpose for which this grant was made, is not to be traced since it is damaged.⁵⁷ The epigraphs also stand testimony to his impartial patronage of Śiva and Vishnu temples and other religious faiths. Raghunātha is said to have honoured the great Madhwa teacher Sudhīndra, the successor of Vijayindra, with Kanakābīshēkam (bathing in gold).⁵⁸ The patronage extended to Christian Frang merchants and their being allowed to settle at Negapatam and Tranquebar, show his broadmindedness and tolerance.

49. 412 of 1925.

50. 194 of 1932.

51. 308 of 1923.

52. 77 and 78 of 1911.

53. 57 of 1923.

54. 371 of 1925.

55. 286 of 1927.

56. 379 of 1925.

57. 465 of 1912.

58. Sources: *Rāghavēndra Vijayam*; Canto II, Sl. 53.

The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* refer in glowing terms to the numerous gifts made by him. Rāmabhadraṁba says that the water poured as libations in giving away the numerous gifts by the king (*dānōdhaka*) flowed down like a river, and she adds that the water thus poured out collected in the moat round the Tanjore fort. Yagnanārāyaṇa Dikshita gives a detailed account of the many and costly gifts made by the Nayaka on the day of his coronation.⁵⁹ He says that he performed the *Tulāpurushadāna* (weighing against gold) twice and distributed them among the Brahmans. Gifts of precious stones and jewels were distributed even among those who were disabled. In addition he performed the great gifts called *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *Mahābhūtagata*: Cows made of gold were also given away as gifts and all paraphernalia that go to make kingship were also gifted away. Apart from this he also founded numerous *agraharas*, where he settled learned Brahmans well-versed in all the Vedas. The author says that his gifts even surpassed the presents mentioned in Hēmādri's *Dhānakāṇḍa* (a work enumerating the gifts to be made). Rāmabhadraṁba says that on every day he gave large and rich presents as soon as his morning prayer and worship were finished. Gōvinda Dikshita in his introduction to the *Sangīta Sudhā* says that Raghunātha often performed the *Tulāpurushadāna* and with his gifts the Brahmans felt happy. He also speaks of the *agraharas* founded by him and each was composed of a thousand families. Raghunātha is said to have fed countless Brahmans daily.⁶⁰ The temples also were carefully looked after. The *Sangīta Sudhā* and the *Tanjāvūri Andhra Rājula Charitam* give credit to Raghunātha for building the Rāmaswamy temple at Kumbakonam.⁶¹ And the former adds that he also built temples for Rāma at Rāmēswaram and Srirangam. The gopura of Lord Kumbhakōṇēswara (Kumbhēswara) at Kumbakonam and a maṇṭapa also are said to have been built by him. Raghunātha is praised for his interest in the celebration of Rathōtsavams (car festivals) to the gods Jalpēsa at Tiruvaiyar and Dhēṇunātha at Paśupatikōil.⁶² It is also claimed that he added buildings to the temples of Srinivāsa sthala (identified with Uppiliyappan koil in the Kumbakonam Taluk) and Champēsa (Mannargudi).⁶³ He continued all the charities established by his predecessors and instituted many new ones.

59. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto XII, Sl. 62 to 93.

60. *Sangīta Sudhā*; Sl. 57 to 60.

61. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar says that the temple was built in commemoration of his victory and of the anointment of Rāmarāya as the rightful emperor.

62. *Sangīta Sudhā*; Sl. 54 to 56.

63. *Sources*; 268.

The literary works give a fine picture of Raghunātha Nayaka's towering personality,⁶⁴ his military exploits and literary attainments. Raghunātha was an expert in the art of sword play,⁶⁵ a fine marksman and a skilled master in the art of horse riding.⁶⁶ The remarkable skill with which he handled the various weapons of war is also spoken of very highly. His victories over his enemies stand as testimony to his military accomplishments. He was also a great scholar in letters (*sāhitya*) and music (*sangīta*) and a renowned poet in Sanskrit as well as in Telugu. He had also a profound and deep knowledge of Daṇḍanīti⁶⁷ (political science). The *Sāhityaratnākara* refers⁶⁸ to his early education when Raghunātha is said to have learnt the alphabets, by writing them on a board strewn with precious stones. Yagnanārāyaṇa Dīkshita says that Achyutappa Nayaka's putting Raghunātha to study at a very tender age was not very much liked by his queen Mūrtimāmba.⁶⁹ Raghunātha exhibited wonderful scholarship and learning and became famous as an author as well very early, and it is said that he was able to compose a Kāvya called *Pārijāthāpaharaṇam*, within two *yamas*. He is said to have written a good number of Kāvya, Prabhandas and Yakshagānams in Sanskrit and Telugu. Rāmabhadraṁba says that he was unequalled in the art of verse-making and poetic composition and his knowledge of the various vrittās (meters) and prasthāvanas was well-founded.⁷⁰ The most important of his works in Telugu are *Pārijāthāpaharaṇam*, *Vālmīkicharitam*, *Rukmaṇīpariṇaya* *Yakshagānam*, and *Rāmāyaṇam* while his Sanskrit works include *Sangīta Sudhā* and *Bhārata Sudhā*.⁷¹ He was also a great authority on the science of Music and is deemed to be the founder of Karnatic Music. The *Sāhityaratnākara* refers to his skill in playing different tunes on the Veena and which he learnt while a youth.⁷² The *Sangīta Sudhā* says that he was the author of new *rāgas* like Jayantasēna and new *tālas* like Rāmāṇḍa, and he also taught music to others. The authorship of the *Sangīta Sudhā*, an important work on Music, has not been definitely settled. Raghunātha is held to be the author of this work to which Gōvinda Dīkshita wrote an introduction. Verses 71 to 76 of the introduction to the *Sangīta Sudhā* refer

64. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto VI, Sl. 43 to 60.

65. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto III, Sl. 27.

66. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto V.

67. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*, Canto VIII, Sl. 35 to 46.

68. *Sāhityaratnākara*, Canto V, Sl. 1 to 40.

69. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto IV, Sl. 66.

70. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto III, Sl. 13 to 16.

71. *Sangīta Sudhā*; Sl. 62 and 63. Also *Tanjavūri Aṇḍhra Rājula Charitam*; Introduction by Mr. V. Prabhakara Sastri.

72. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto V and VI, 10 to 28.

to Gōvinda Dikshita's request made to Raghunātha to write this treatise in *dvipada* metre and publish it so that, all might enjoy it. Veṅkata-makhi's reference in his *Chaturdaṇḍiprakāsika*, that *Sangīta Sudhā* was written by his father, Gōvinda Dikshita, at the request of Raghunātha, has led some to think that the whole was the work of the Dikshita himself,⁷³ but was given out in the name of the Nayaka. Neither of these views is impossible since both Raghunātha and Gōvinda Dikshita were reputed musicians and taking the two versions together it may be said without much fear of contradiction that the work was written by Raghunātha in collaboration with his minister, Gōvinda Dikshita. The work can claim the joint-authorship of the Nayak and his minister.

As Raghunātha himself was a renowned scholar, it is but natural that he should extend his patronage to other scholars and poets. The *Raghunāthābhyaḍayam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* speak in laudable terms of his patronage shown to men of letters. Numerous poets and poetesses flourished in his court. Raghunātha is called an ocean of learning where, the learning of pundits who were equally renowned; is said to have formed the rivers that flow into that ocean. Rāma-bhadrāmba says that Tanjore became the seat of Vāṇi (goddess of learning) and even the small children of the royal harem were noted for their versatility and keen intellects. Yagnanārāyana Dikshita refers to the king's gifts and costly presents to the poets and musicians (*Kavi budha gāyakābhimata Kalpataru*) and the Nayak is likened to the Kalpa tree noted for its large bounty. His benefactions to learning and patronage of pundits must have made his name so familiar in the land, as to attract other learned men to his court. Among them the visit of Koṇḍa Kōṇangi Kavi Chowdappa, the court *vidwan* of Mātla Anantarāja, to the court of Raghunātha is important⁷⁴ and the poet is said to have expressed his surprise and admiration of the remarkable talents of the literary men who fitted his court. Among the galaxy of his famous poets, the names of Gōvinda Dikshita, his two sons, Yagnanārāyana Dikshita and Veṅkatamakhi, *alias* Veṅkatādhwari, Rāja Chūdāmaṇi Dikshita, Bhāskara Dikshita and Kumāra Tātācharya,⁷⁵

73. *Chaturdaṇḍiprakāsika*.

74. *Taṇjāvūri Andhra Rājula Charitamū*, Vavilla Edition, Introduction, p. 28.

75. His active life extended from about A.D. 1575 to A.D. 1630, as gleaned from lithic records. He was the grandson of Tōlappācharya. He was the Rajaguru of the Imperial family and perhaps crowned Venkata II in 1630 (Saka 1552). He had also to his credit the gilding of the Anandanilaya Vimana of Sri Venkatesvara at Tirumalai and also the Kalyānakōti and Pūpyakōti Vimānas at Conjeevaram (see The Tirupati Davastanam Epigraphical Report by S. Subrahmanya Sastri (1930)—pp. 312-13).—[Editor].

Rāmabhadhrāmba and Madhurāvāṇi are important and they figure more prominently. Each has written a number of works. Yagnanārāyaṇa Dīkshita says that his master was the Nayaka himself and the *Sāhityaratnākara* was written to record his gratitude and regard for his master from whom he learned the *Sāhityaśāra*.⁷⁶ He was well versed in Vēdānta, Tarka and Mīmāṃsa.⁷⁷ Rāmabhadhrāmba the poetess, was also an equally gifted and talented scholar and writer, who was much favoured by the king. She bore the distinguishing titles of Śatalēkhini (one who could write a hundred verses) Samaśamayalēkhini and Aṣṭabhāṣhā lēkhini (one who knows and one who could write in eight languages) and one who had ascended the seat of literary domain (*Chaturvida Kavitaṇu pranīta Sāhitya Sāmrajya bhadra pitārūdaha*).⁷⁸ She was the pupil of one, Kālayya.⁷⁹

This revival of literary activities must have reached its zenith in the latter part of Raghunātha's reign, when the country returned to peaceful conditions after a series of wars. Most of the works must have been written only after A.D. 1617. At any rate that the *Sāhityaratnākara*, the *Sangīta Sudhā* and the *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam* were written only during this period is evident from their contents. Rāmabhadhrāmba referring to Raghunātha's return to Tanjore after the battle of Toppūr speaks of his durbar that was held and was attended by numerous poets who were proficient in eight languages.⁸⁰ Mention is also made of the fact that the king sent regular despatches and news-letters from the field of battle to the capital, regarding the progress of his operations⁸¹ The poets and poetesses are mentioned as writing the history of his wars in all possible languages.⁸² Since these works record his victories over the Pāṇḍya and other enemies, it is certain that they were composed only after 1617. Even though the *Sāhityaratnākara* is not available in its complete form, yet evidence is not wanting to prove that portions of the complete work were lost. Chēmakūru Veṅkata Kavi,

76. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto I, Sl. 62.

77. *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto I, Sl. 52. The author calls himself as one well versed in the Vēdas and Sāstras and belonging to the school of literature nurtured by the grace of Raghunātha Nayaka. (*Prauda Śrī Raghunāthabhūpati Kṛipāspārīta bavōtsāhita sāmrajya nigamāgamārta nipunaha Śrī Yagnanārāyaṇaha*. (Colophon).

78. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Colophon.

79. Kālayya refers to his pupil in his *Rājagōpālaviṇāsa*.

Also *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Introduction, by Dr. T. R. Chintamani.

80. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto XI, Sl. 24 to 28.

81. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto XI, Sl. 54.

82. *Raghunāthābhyaṇḍayam*; Canto XI, Sl. 55 to 79.

the author of *Vijaya Vilāsam* dedicated to Raghunātha Nayaka, tells us that the great Nayaka took interest in theatricals and there was also a theatre in the royal palace in which plays were enacted in the Nayak's presence. The *Raghunāthābhyudayam* of Vijayarāghava Nayaka tells us that such plays were enacted in the palace theatre before the king, who was in the habit of holding very frequently pandita parishads, at which learned men as well as women, competed with one another in exhibiting their attainments. It is said that on those occasions, the king asked the poets to set śmasyas (the art of verse making with given words) to the young ladies assembled in the court. Rāma-bhadrāmba seems to have come out successful on one occasion.⁸³ It was during his glorious reign that the southern school of Telugu literature noted for its special contribution of the Yakshagāna type of drama had its origin. A great impetus was given to learning in all languages and in particular to Telugu and Sanskrit.

Raghunātha Nayaka was a great ruler, a profound scholar and a liberal patron. By his learning and patronage, wars and victories, he earned an immortal name and lasting glory. The *Vijayavilāsam* and the *Sāhityaratnākara* give him numerous titles and distinguishing birudas such as *Abhinava Bhōja*, *Sōlaga māna baṇjana*, *Nēpāla Nripāla sthāpana samara niṣṣanka*, *Karnāṭaka prabhu sukha pradaha*, *Saurya dairyaha* and *Sāhitya Bhōja*.⁸⁴ If indigenous works give him so much praise for his learning and patronage of arts, contemporary foreign evidence gives him an equally high place among the powerful rulers of the land and praise his even handed administration of justice and protection of foreigners. If a foreigner should speak of Raghunātha 'as the most warlike prince in all those parts, an observer of justice and (one who) will protect all those that trade in his country,' no further testimony would be needed to show his greatness.⁸⁵ The same high praise is given to him by a later writer on Tanjore, who calls Raghunātha Nayaka as the 'Solomon of his age in wisdom and the Absalom of his time in personal beauty.'⁸⁶ An image bearing a torch in the Chakrapāniswāmi temple at Kumbakonam is taken to represent Raghunātha Nayaka, but this identification will have to remain provisional since authorities are not agreed. Some hold it that it represents

83. *Raghunāthābhyudayam*; Introduction.

84. *Vijayavilāsam*. Also *Sāhityaratnākara*; Canto II, Sl. 71.

85. *The English Factory Records*; Vol. III. Consultation at Batavia. Letter from President Brockedon to the East India Company, dated January 17, A.D. 1624.

86. *The Maratha Principality of Tanjore; the Eden of the South* by W. Hickey.

Achyutappa Nayaka, while still others conclude on a closer examination, that it must represent a Vaishnava devotee and nothing more.⁸⁷ The end of his reign will be considered in connection with the accession of Vijayarāghava Nayaka, his successor.

87. *The Tanjore Gazetteer*, p. 218 says that it resembles Achyutappa. See also V. Rangacharya; *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency*, Vol. II, 1235.

THE NAYAKS OF TANJORE

A. U. J. in (Vol. IX No. 2)

ERRATA

<i>Page.</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
229.	28.	Madura District: A Manual	Madura Country: A Manual.
230.	29.	and in the sequence of events	and the sequence of events
	33.	La Mission de Maduré	La Mission du Maduré
	36.	of the letters of of	of the letters of
234.	22.	Coromandel coast	Coromandel Coast
239.	30.	accession to Madura	accession at Madura
241.	10.	Kuppuswami Sastri in the Tanjore Gazetteer and accep- ted.	Kuppuswami Sastri and accepted in the Tanjore Gazetteer
244.			
Foot Note 23			
	Line 2	honorary affix	honorary suffix
Foot Note 23			
	Line 12.	neither more or less	neither more nor less.
247.	16.	Do.	Do.
248.			
Foot Note 31.			
	Line 13.	ननुशजलक्षणम्	ननु राज लक्षणम् .
249.	26.	Besides, there was the Chola ruler	Besides, there was no Chola ruler
251.	22.	probabilty	probability
252.	15.	Raghunāthabhyudayam,	Raghunāthabhyudayam ;

NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

NĀRĀYANĀRYA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

PREFACE

In preparing the text of *Nītimālā* for the press the following manuscripts have been collated :—

1. R. No. 3744—Paper—Devanāgarī script, belonging to the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.
2. A manuscript in Telugu script kindly supplied to us by Panditaraja D. T. Tatachariar, M.O.L., and Tarkarnava T. Viraraghavachariar .
3. A manuscript in Telugu script, belonging to the University Library, Annamalainagar.

These manuscripts are in fairly good condition and contain no lacuna. Suggestions of better readings have been given in brackets.

We wish to acknowledge our deep sense of gratitude to our friends, Panditaraja D. T. Tatachariar, M.O.L., and Tarkarnava T. Viraraghavachariar of the Śrī Venkateswara Sanskrit College, Tirupati, for securing us a manuscript copy of *Nītimālā* and making many valuable suggestions. Sri T. E. Viraraghavachariar, Professor, Raja's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Trivadi, has throughout taken a very kindly interest in this work and helped us in manifold ways. Sri P. S. Ramanujachari, Nyaya Siromani, has assisted us most willingly in copying the manuscript for the press, reading the proofs and preparing the index. To them we express our sincere thanks. We are very grateful to Professors M. R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, M.A., L.T., K. R. Applachariar, M.A., L.T. and V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar, M.A., for having read the Introduction and made several useful suggestions. We are thankful to Mahāmahopādhyāya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., L.T., I.E.S. (Retd.) for writing a Foreword to this work. Our grateful thanks are due also to our colleague Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A., B.Com., Ph.D., Bar-at-Law, Editor of the Journal of the Annamalai University for the very helpful interest he has evinced in the publication of this treatise in the Journal.

We cannot adequately thank Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar of Chettinad, Kt., LL.D., Founder Pro-Chancellor of the Annamalai University, for the kind permission he has given us for dedicating this book to him.

Annamalainagar,
May 25, 1940.

R. R.
K. S.

FOREWORD

By

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA PROF. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI, M.A., I.E.S., (Retd.)

The handbooks on Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vedānta, which were hitherto available in print, are either too scrappy or too difficult. Śrī Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasaṁgraha* and Śrī Vedānta-Deśika's *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, though they come under the category of *Prakaraṇas*, are difficult classics not quite suitable as introductory primers on Viśiṣṭādvaita. The *Yatīndra-matadīpikā* and the *Tattvatraya* are scrappy and are designed more as Primers of Viśiṣṭādvaita theology than as Primers of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

By publishing the *Nītimālā* of Nārāyaṇārya, with summaries in Samskr̥t as well as English, Pandit Sri K. Srinivasacaryar of the Sanskrit department and Professor R. Ramanujachariar of the Philosophy department of the Annamalai University, have supplied a longfelt desideratum to all serious students of Vedānta-darśana. A sound knowledge of any one of the Vedāntic schools would be impossible without a critical and comparative study of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita systems. In this connection, Śrī Nārāyaṇārya's *Nītimālā* would be of very great value as a reliable and easy introduction to the distinctive doctrines of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system in contrast with the comparable doctrines of the Advaita system. The characteristic features of the *Nītimālā* are that it is written in a lucid style and that, under ten convenient heads arranged in logical sequence, the crux of each important question at issue between the exponents of Advaita and of Viśiṣṭādvaita is brought out and explained in a masterly manner.

This work is now critically edited for the first time. The author—Śrī Nārāyaṇārya—is a high authority on Viśiṣṭādvaita, who flourished before Śrī Vedānta-Deśika, about the end of the twelfth or the beginning of the thirteenth century A.D. The two learned editors of this work deserve warm commendation for making the *Nītimālā* and such other Viśiṣṭādvaita works available in handy and carefully prepared editions, with all the up-to-date accompaniments of introduction, summary and index; and the world of scholars interested in Indian philosophy and Samskr̥ta learning would have very good reason to feel highly gratified that the enlightened academic facilities provided in the Annamalai University have made it possible for such good editions of good Samskr̥ta works to appear in rapid succession.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

Brahman is the Supreme Object of Enjoyment and is Infinite.

This description of Brahman has the sanction of the scriptures. Upaniṣadic texts, such as 'Raso vai saḥ,' proclaim that Brahman is the supreme object of enjoyment (*sarvānukūla*). That Brahman is not limited by space, time or objects (*deśa-kāla-vastu-pariccheda-rahita*) is evident from texts, such as "He is eternal, infinite and all-pervasive, and extremely subtle". That Brahman is possessed of infinite perfections and is not, therefore, limited by objects follows from passages like "He from whom speech turned back, along with mind (*manas*) without reaching Him." *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* declares that the Lord's qualities cannot be described even though all the divinities may gather together and attempt for years on end to describe them.

It may be contended that the description that Brahman is not limited by objects (*vastu-pariccheda-rahita*) really denies the existence of other objects besides Brahman; for, if objects existed apart from Brahman, they would be referred to as "This is a jar," "That is a cloth" and so forth; and Brahman would come to be marked off from these objects. In other words, Brahman would be limited by them. Further, as two or more objects cannot occupy the same space, Brahman cannot exist where other objects exist; and it would follow that Brahman is limited by space. But Nārāyaṇārya dismisses this contention as being unsustainable. He points out that the mere presence of other objects does not necessarily mean that Brahman is marked off from them. The presence of a balance or touchstone, for example, does not necessarily mean that a given lump of gold must have been weighed or assessed. There is little force in the argument that if objects existed apart from Brahman, He would be limited by space; for Brahman exists in those objects and also in the space occupied by them. Thus, the statement that Brahman is not limited by objects does not mean that He does not preclude the existence of other objects.

Brahman is Free from Evil.

Further, Brahman is free from all evils (*nirmala*); for the scriptures proclaim, "He is the Inner Ruler of all beings, is devoid of all evils, and is the one Supreme Deity, Nārāyaṇa", "He is greater than the great; no sorrows of any kind touch Him, who is the lord of all beings, high and low." *Nirmalatva* (the character of being free from evil) signifies either that Brahman is pure in Himself or that He is not tainted even though He is in contact with imperfect objects. Or it may mean that he is so holy that even the most impure purify themselves by listening to discourses on Him, by reflecting on His nature and singing His praises.

Brahman is Self-luminous Consciousness.

The ultimately real is a self-luminous consciousness; for the Upaniṣads describe Him as consciousness (*viññāna*), and as the light of all

lights (*jyotiṣām jyotiḥ*). To say that He is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) is to assert that He possesses *ananyādhīna prakāśa* (i.e., a *prakāśa* which does not depend upon anything other than itself). This *prakāśa* is not *prabhā* (rays of light); for, in that case, the lamp cannot be treated as self-luminous, since here the *prabhā* depends upon the lamp and not upon itself. *Prakāśa* cannot be treated as *prākāṭya*; for the Vedāntins do not admit the existence of *prākāṭya*.²⁶

Nor can *prakāśa* be identified with *jñāna*; since, in that case, Brahman would have to be at once the subject (*kartā*) and the object (*viṣaya*) of thought and discussion (*vyavahāra*) concerning Himself. Hence *prakāśa* must be defined as the quality of being conducive to thought and discussion. For its own sake, Brahman becomes, by its very existence, conducive to thought and discussion concerning Himself. In this sense, the *jīva* also is self-luminous. And knowledge may be described as self-luminous in the sense that it becomes, for the sake of its possessor (*āśraya*), and by its very existence, conducive to thought and discussion regarding itself.

Brahman Possesses Innumerable Auspicious Qualities.

Brahman possesses an infinity of auspicious qualities, such as knowledge (*jñāna*), strength (*bala*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*). This is evident from scriptural passages, such as "His wonderful power (*śakti*) is described as being manifold; *jñāna*, *bala*, *kriyā* and the like are His essential nature." It has already been shown that the Upaniṣads do not teach that Brahman is without qualities (*nirguṇa*). If Brahman had no qualities, the scriptures would not take pains to enumerate His qualities. Vedāntic texts declaring that He is free from evils (*apahata-pāpmā*) furnish the clue to the proper interpretation of the *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* texts. Passages denying qualities to Brahman teach the absence of evil qualities; while texts attributing qualities to Brahman emphasise the presence of auspicious qualities. It is only on this basis that these two sets of texts could be satisfactorily harmonised.

The Cosmos is the Body of Brahman.

All the sentient and non-sentient objects constitute the body of Brahman. This doctrine that the world forms His body and that He

26. According to the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, when cognition of an object arises, the latter is affected in a particular way; it becomes illumined, manifested or is made known (*prakāśa-viśiṣṭa*). It is from this illumination or manifestedness (*prākāṭya* or *jñātātā*) that we infer that knowledge has previously arisen. Thus, it is held that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its results. For a refutation of this view see Vedānta Deśika's *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, p. 394. See also *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

is the Inner Ruler of the world is unambiguously set forth in the celebrated *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*, *Subāla Upaniṣad* and elsewhere. The *smṛtis* also support this view. "O Lord! this entire world is your body."²⁷ "All these form His body."²⁸ "All form the body of the Lord Viṣṇu."

The External World.

The nature of sentient beings is explained at length in the next chapter. Here the author examines non-sentient objects and classifies them under three heads—time (*kāla*), unmanifest matter (*avyakta*) and *paramākāśa*. Though time is infinite, it is divided into shorter durations, such as night and day. It is subject to modifications; and it is also responsible for the change of place and form found in all objects.

Avyakta possesses the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. At the time of *pralaya*, it is in an extremely subtle state, devoid of names and forms and is inseparably bound up with Brahman. At creation, on account of the will of the Lord, it becomes separate from Him and assumes diverse forms such as intellect (*mahat*) and egoity (*aḥam-kāra*), and thereby, acquires different names.

Paramākāśa partakes exclusively of the *sattva* quality. It is eternal and free from even the slightest trace of evil. It is the abode of enjoyment (*bhoga-bhūmi*) for the Lord, the released souls (*mukta*) and those who have been ever free (*nitya*).

Objections to the View that the World is the Body of Brahman.

Objection may be taken to the view that the world composed of sentient and non-sentient objects constitutes the body of Brahman on the following grounds. For one thing Brahman is not subject to karma. Again, the scriptures assert that He is devoid of a body (*apāṇi, apāda*). Further, the world consisting of men and matter does not answer to the definition of body; for the body is usually defined either as the place wherein the soul experiences pleasure and pain (*bhogāyatana*), or as the seat of the senses (*indriyāśraya*). Moreover, though certain material objects may answer to this definition of body, they cannot be regarded as the body of the Infinite Self; because they are the outcome of the past deeds of finite souls.

The objector may add that, on the view that Brahman has the world of matter and souls for this body, He would, like the *jīva*, be subject

27. *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, 120, 29.

28. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*.

to pleasurable and painful experiences which are the inevitable consequences of the possession of a body.

Nārāyaṇārya's Reply.

Nārāyaṇārya meets these objections by saying that the scriptural texts which describe the world as His body are so clear on this point that they do not bear any other interpretation. Passages which say that Brahman has no body really assert that, unlike the body of the jīva, His body is not born of karma. Further, the definitions of the body as the place where the soul experiences pleasures and pains or as the seat of the senses are logically defective. The first definition is too broad; for the house wherein the person experiences pleasures would have to be treated as the body. The second is too narrow, since it excludes immovable objects which are described as the bodies of certain sinners. A proper definition applying equally to the bodies of all beings, gods, men, beasts, and birds, runs as follows. The body is that which a conscious entity controls, supports and uses for its own ends. Since the Supreme Self controls and sustains the world and since the world exists for His sake, He is proclaimed to be the Soul of the Cosmos, and the Cosmos is described as His body. Hence the scriptural statement, "He enters all beings and controls them from within; He is the self of All."

To the objection that if Brahman possessed a body, He would be subject to pleasures and pains, Nārāyaṇārya replies that Brahman is not afflicted by miseries, since He is free from karma. The oft-quoted *Muṇḍaka* text (III. i. 1) referring to the two birds sitting on the self-same tree declares that, while the jīva tastes the fruits of karma, the Lord merely looks on and shines as a resplendent being. Thus, it is subjection to karma, and not the mere association with a body, that accounts for miseries. It is significant that this passage not only declares that Brahman is not entangled in sorrows, but goes on to assert that He shines as a resplendent being (*abhicākaśīti*), by distributing pleasures and pains to the jīvas in accordance with their past deeds. Bhagavān Rāmānuja explains this point very clearly in his *Vedārthasaṅgraha* with the aid of a telling analogy. Though contact with the whip is common to the individual holding it and the person beaten therewith, it is a source of pain only to the latter. Even so, though contact with the body is common both to the Lord and to the finite self, it occasions misery only to the latter.

Reality is Threefold.

Since sentient and non-sentient objects constitute the body of Brahman, and since He is the embodied Self, it follows that men,

material objects and God are three distinct realities. As indicated already, *bheda* (difference) is no other than special features, such as *jāti* (generality).

The Nature of Difference.

The objector may ask: If the difference (*bheda*) of one object from another is *jāti* itself (e.g. if ghaṭa-*bheda*, distinction from pot, found in the cloth is clothness itself, paṭatva), how is the difference of one *jāti* (pot-ness) from another (cloth-ness) to be accounted for? In other words, the objector thinks that this view would land one in an infinite regress, since the distinction of one *jāti* from another must be the *jāti* of that *jāti*.

To this Nārāyaṇārya replies that, in regard to *jāti*, its very essence (*svarūpa*) constitutes *bheda*; for *jāti*, unlike its substrate, possesses no qualities. In other words, cow-ness (*gotva*) noticed in the cow marks it off from the horse and other animals. But what distinguishes 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) from 'horse-ness' (*aśvatva*) is not the presence of some feature in 'cow-ness'. Just as colour renders visible the object possessing the colour and also makes itself visible without the aid of some other colour, even so *jāti*, by itself, is responsible for thought and reference (*vyavahāra*) concerning itself and other entities.

Nārāyaṇārya proceeds to point out that *jāti* is nothing but configuration (*saṁsthāna*). There is little warrant for positing a separate entity called *jāti*, which is eternal and which is different from the several particulars, though present equally in each of them; for such an entity is never cognised. Further, there is little value in the contention that the cognition of a given feature (*ākāra*) persisting alike in several instances necessitates belief in *jāti* as a distinct entity. For at no time do we meet with a feature persisting in the several particulars. When the first instance of a class is met with, obviously, there cannot be cognition of a persistent feature, and when the second and subsequent instances are perceived, only the particular and a given shape are cognised. Moreover, as the particulars come and go, it is difficult to conceive of a *jāti* which is eternal, which is without parts and which resides in its fullness in each of the instances. Hence, it follows that there is no *jāti* distinct from configuration (*saṁsthāna*).

It may be objected that *saṁsthāna* cannot be treated as *jāti*. For the configuration (*saṁsthāna*) varies from instance to instance, and cannot, consequently, account for the identical cognition (*ekabuddhi*) and the use of the same term (*śabda*). Though no two cows agree in regard to their configuration, there arises the same cognition (*ekabuddhi*): "This is a cow," "That is a cow," "That other is a cow"

and so forth ; and the same term 'cow' is applied to the several instances. The real explanation for the rise of this identical knowledge when several instances are observed must be sought in the nature of the instances themselves. There can be no difficulty in maintaining that different instances generate an identical knowledge; for it is commonly admitted that divergent factors, such as the visual apparatus, colour, light and mind (*manas*) produce a single result, viz., *jñāna*. Thus the nature of *jāti* is far from being clear. When that is so, *bheda* cannot be identified with *jāti*."

Nārāyaṇārya's reply to this line of argument is as follows :—Configuration (*saṁsthāna*) is itself *jāti*. Though the configuration is different in each of the particulars, on perceiving the second and subsequent instances we cognise a *saṁsthāna* similar to that previously known. It is this *saṁsthāna* which has been recognised to be similar to the one apprehended already that is responsible for the rise of identical knowledge (*ekabuddhi*) when the particulars possessing the *saṁsthāna* are met with. The persistence (*anuvṛtti*) of the *saṁsthāna* in the several particulars is apprehended when the second and subsequent instances are perceived.²⁹

By persistence (*anuvṛtti*) of *saṁsthānas* is meant the presence of closely similar configuration. Even those who accept *jāti* as different from *saṁsthāna* have to admit the similarity of *saṁsthānas* (i.e., *anuvṛtti*). For in explaining why cow-ness is not present in the *gavaya* which bears a resemblance to the cow, they must say that the *jāti* of the *gavaya* is not altogether similar to that of the cow perceived already. But it would be far simpler to say that there is no similarity of *saṁsthānas*, and hence no *gotva*. Therefore, *saṁsthāna* is the same as *jāti*, which, again, is identical with *bheda* (difference). Once this identity is proved, it readily follows that Brahman which has the world for His body is really different from it.

All Words Denoting Souls and Matter Refer to Brahman.

Since Brahman has souls and matter for His body, all words denoting the several souls and material objects ultimately signify also the Supreme Brahman, the Inner Self of all things. In the judgments—"The man knows," "The deva knows"—the words 'man' and 'deva' referring to the physical body ultimately refer to the soul ; for the body cannot be a knower.

The opponent may contend that the instances cited would scarcely prove that all words referring to bodies also denote, as a general rule, the souls residing therein. If, in the present case, they are taken to

signify the soul it is only in a secondary sense, the primary meaning being unintelligible. Nārāyaṇārya's reply is that, since the essential nature of a body is to be an inseparable mode of the soul, words denoting the body must, even in a primary sense, denote the soul; even as terms referring to *jāti* and *guṇa* refer to their substrate.

The opponent may again urge that, if the body is an invariable mode, it must be always apprehended along with the soul; and since it is not so apprehended, in interpreting these words to mean the soul we are taking the secondary sense.

The reply is that if *jāti* and *vyakti*, *guṇa* (quality) and *guṇin* (substrate) are apprehended together it is not because they are invariably connected, but because both of them are visible. But in the case of the body and the soul, the former is perceptible while the latter is not. That is why they are not known together. Instances can be adduced in plenty to show that entities which are invariably connected need not be perceived together. Take, for example, earth (*pṛthvī*) and odour. Though they invariably go together, they need not be perceived together; for different sense organs are involved in their perception.

Exception may be taken to the view that souls (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) are the modes (*prakāra*) of Brahman on the following ground.—When a substance is the mode of another, the suffix *matup* must be employed to indicate the fact of the latter having the former as its mode. For example, when Devadatta wields a stick, he is spoken of as *danḍin* (the person wielding a stick) and not as *danḍa*. Similarly, if Brahman has *cit* and *acit* for His modes (*prakāra*), the suffix *matup* must be used to indicate that they are His modes. But scriptural statements like “Sarvam khalu idam Brahman” do not employ the suffix *matup*. On the contrary, Brahman is equated with the world. Therefore, it cannot be maintained that souls and matter are the modes of Brahman.

This objection is not insuperable. As Nārāyaṇārya pertinently points out substances like stick, ring and so on are perceived sometimes as modes of other objects, and sometimes independently. Hence the need, in their case, for the suffix *matup* whenever it has to be shown that they are modes. But in respect of *cit* and *acit* which are the inseparable modes of Brahman, there is no need of this suffix. Since souls and matter constitute the body of the Supreme Self, and since their essential nature is to be His invariable modes, all words denoting them do ultimately signify Brahman also. Hence the equation of all words denoting the several objects of the world with those signifying Brahman.

It is unreasonable to contend that while words have been learnt to denote several objects, this view rejected the primary sense of words and accepts the secondary meaning ; for this view does not reject the significance of words. It merely states that these words refer to Brahman also.

Since non-sentient objects are said to acquire names and forms (*nāmarūpa*) on account of Brahman entering into them (*anupraveśa*) through the individual selves, words referring to material objects may well denote the Supreme Self who has entered into them. The *smṛti* passage—"Brahman is the ultimate meaning of all words."—clearly suggests that, while different words convey different meanings, their ultimate significance (*uttamam vācyam*) is Brahman Himself.³⁰ Bādarāyaṇa expresses the same idea in *Vedānta-Sūtra*, II. ii. 17:—*Carācaravyapāśrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeśo bhāktāḥ tadbhāvabhāvit-vāt*. All terms referring to objects that move and those that do not move denote Brahman in a primary sense in so far as He has entered into all things and invested them with names and forms.

Thus, even though souls, matter and God are distinct realities, souls and matter are equated with God. Passages like "Tat tvam asi" and "Aham Brahma asmi" equate souls with God ; while the text: "Sarvam khalu idam Brahma"—identifies matter with Brahman. Such an identification is wholly justified because Brahman has souls and matter for His body.

Brahman is Abinna-nimitta-upādāna-Kāraṇa.

Souls and matter are sometimes in a subtle state (*sūkṣma-avasthā*), devoid of distinctions of names and forms. Brahman, in association with *cit* and *acit* in a subtle state, is spoken of as the cause of the universe. Since the Upaniṣads declare that Brahman made the resolve "May I be many, and be born," it follows that Brahman is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the world. Passages like, "He made Himself manifold" assert that He is also the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the universe.

The Nyāya View.

The Naiyāyika may object to this view and argue as follows:—"Brahman associated with *cit* and *acit* cannot be the material cause of the cosmos ; for what is considered as the material cause must be an entity subject to change ; but souls and Īśvara are without change.

30. "Vacasām vācyam uttamam." Compare also "Vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyah" Bh Gītā.

Therefore, matter alone must be the material cause of the world. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin cannot argue that, when Brahman is described as the material cause of the world, what is really meant is this:—Matter which constitutes the body of the Lord is the material cause; for in that case his position would contradict the upaniṣadic texts describing Brahman as the *upādāna-kāraṇa*. Further, it would go against the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory that the efficient and the material causes of the world are identical. Hence, it has to be maintained that, while *cit*, *acit* and Īśvara are distinct realities, Brahman is the efficient cause of the world, while matter is its material cause. This view is in conformity with everyday observation; for everywhere the material and the efficient causes are noticed to be different entities (e.g. threads and the weaver; clay and the potter; and so on). Besides, it is observed that the effect is produced by several factors which are smaller than itself in magnitude (e.g. the cloth is composed of many threads which are individually smaller than the cloth in size). Therefore, there is nothing strange in maintaining that countless infinitesimal atoms (*paramāṇūs*) are the material cause of the world.”

There are two great difficulties in the way of the Nyāya theory.

(i) So long as the infinitesimal atoms are not conjoined, no effect can be produced; and yet the *paramāṇus*, being partless, cannot come into contact (*saṁyoga*) with one another. To obviate this difficulty, it has to be admitted that the atoms are composed of parts. But such an admission leads to a fresh difficulty; for the parts, being themselves effects, must, in their turn, depend upon the combination of parts; and so on *ad infinitum*.

(ii) Even if it is granted that partless atoms may combine together, they cannot account for this wide expanse of the world; for atoms which are indivisible and without dimensions cannot produce a world of vast dimensions.

To the first of these objections, the Naiyāyika replies that, just as the soul and the mind (*manas*) which are recognised as being partless, enter into contact, even so partless atoms may combine with one another. As for the second objection, the Naiyāyika thinks that the question: How can partless atoms produce a world which is of great magnitude? is meaningless. For it is directly perceived that the world which is the product of *paramāṇus* is of great magnitude.

Refutation of the Nyāya View.

Nārāyaṇārya dismisses the Nyāya theory as being wholly unsatisfactory. For one thing, there is no warrant for positing the existence of infinitesimal atoms. The Naiyāyika may urge that in

infinitesimal atoms have to be posited as the ultimate cause of all objects; for causal factors which are small in magnitude produce an effect which is fairly large (e.g. several threads which are individually small in size produce a cloth of large dimensions); and these causal factors are themselves traceable to still smaller factors, and so on, until the process stops at the stage of *paramāṇus*. This argument, says Nārāyaṇārya, is unsound; because the effect is non-different from causal factors. In fact, the causal conditions themselves go by the name of the effect, when they assume a certain state (*avasthā*). The cloth, for instance, is merely an arrangement of threads. Popular judgments, such as "The cloth is merely the threads," and "The pot is only clay," establish that the cause and the effect are non-different.

Next Nārāyaṇārya points out that partless atoms cannot combine together and produce the world; for, if there is to be conjunction (*saṁyoga*), there must be its cause, namely, *karma*. Karma, in its turn, presupposes *adṛṣṭa* (unseen factor) residing either in souls or in the atoms. Since *adṛṣṭa* is eternal, its effect, viz., *saṁyoga*, must be eternal, and not occasional. In other words, there should be perpetual creation. The Naiyāyika may urge that, although *adṛṣṭa* is not occasional, yet it could produce its result only when it attains fruition. To this Nārāyaṇārya replies that it is too much to imagine that the countless *adṛṣṭas* of souls (or for that matter, of *paramāṇus*) attain fruition (*paripāka*) simultaneously and thus account for the conjunction of atoms resulting in the creation of the universe.

The Naiyāyika may again urge that, although *adṛṣṭa* is eternal, its result (i.e., *saṁyoga*) is occasional, since it is dependent upon God's will (*saṁkalpa*). Such a contention, says Nārāyaṇārya, has no force; for the Nyāya conception of an Īśvara whose existence is proved by reason has already been refuted. If the Naiyāyika could bring himself to accepting the view that God's existence is learnt from the scriptures, he ought also to accept the scriptural account of creation, and not root out the theory that material particles create the world.

Nārāyaṇārya further points out that the Naiyāyika has not explained how infinitesimal atoms could produce the wide expanse of the world. To escape this difficulty it may be admitted that atoms possess parts; but this admission would only lead to a fresh difficulty. The parts of the atoms would, in their turn, possess parts; and the latter, their parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. In that event, there would be no distinction between Mount Meru and the mustard seed; since all objects, big or small, would possess an unending series of parts.

Besides, since Brahman is possessed of infinite and wonderful powers, He could well be at once the material and the efficient cause

of the world. Just as the different objects of the world possess their specific characteristics, Brahman may possess a character, not met with in the objects of the world, viz., that of being at once the material and the efficient cause.

The Sāṅkhya Doctrine.

The Sāṅkhya contends that *prakṛti* which is perpetually in motion and which is independent of conscious control is the material cause of the universe. At creation (*sṛṣṭi*), *prakṛti*, influenced by the presence of the *puruṣa* near by, enters upon a course of heterogeneous evolution (*visadr̥śa-pariṇāma*) and produces *mahat* (the intellect) and the like. Even at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*), *prakṛti* is changing, but then, instead of assuming diverse forms such as *mahat* and *ahanikāra*, it reproduces itself (*sadr̥śa-pariṇāma*).

Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine.

Nārāyaṇārya considers the Sāṅkhya account as far from being satisfactory, because it does not show how creation and dissolution could alternate. The belief that the contact of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* suffices to set the latter on a career of creation is inadequate. For, as the *puruṣa* is devoid of action, good or evil (*niṣkriyā*), he could never be in contact (*saṁyoga*) with *prakṛti*.

The Sāṅkhya may urge that the conjunction needed for starting the process of creation is merely the presence of the *puruṣa* near *prakṛti* (*sannidhānamātra*). But this is no solution for the difficulty. Since the *puruṣa* is eternal and omnipresent, the condition necessary for evolution (i.e., *saṁyoga*) is always present and *prakṛti* must be always creative and dissolution would be impossible.

The suggestion that the past *karma* (*adr̥śta*) of souls accounts for the nearness of *puruṣa* to *prakṛti* is unacceptable. For, on the Sāṅkhyan hypothesis, the *puruṣa* is not an agent (*kartā*) and could consequently, have no *adr̥śta*. Even if it is admitted that the souls have *adr̥śta*, it requires extreme credulity to suppose that all souls have simultaneously engaged in similar actions which attain fruition at the same time and lead to a common result, viz., the creation of the universe. Hence it is impossible to subscribe to the view that *prakṛti* is the material cause of the universe. The more reasonable view is that the Omnipotent Brahman is at once the material and the efficient cause of the world.

Against this position it may be urged that, if the complex whole of reality (i.e., Brahman along with souls and matter) is the material cause of the world, it would be the effect as well; since the Vēdāntin advocates *sat-kārya-vāda* (the doctrine that the cause and the effect

are non-different). It would then follow that God and souls are both subject to modification. This criticism does not touch the Viśiṣṭādvaitic position; for God and soul may be changeless, and yet be an effect; even as ākāśa which is without change is considered an effect, in so far as it is one of the five elements constituting the body. To be an effect is merely to exist in a different state (*avasthā*). At creation, Brahman becomes the Inner Self of sentient and non-sentient entities existing in a gross state; and souls acquire knowledge that blossoms forth. Hence God and souls could reasonably be described as effect. But it must be noted that, when God and souls are said to pass from one state to another, it is only their form that changes, (*svabhāva-anya-thābhāva*), and not their essential nature (*svarūpa*). Change of essential nature (*svārūpa-anyathābhāva*) is noticed only in the case of material things and not in souls or God.

Thus, even though they are effects, God and souls do not cease to be eternal. The mere fact of their passing from one state to another will not make them non-eternal. There is no contradiction in maintaining that Brahman and souls are the material cause and that they are eternal.

Even though Brahman, souls and matter are the material cause and, as such, the effect also, there is no danger of their natures being mixed up (*svabhāva-saṁkara*). Just as, in a parti-coloured cloth made out of a mass of white, black and red threads, there is no mixing up of colours, the respective colours being noticed only in the corresponding parts, even so there is no mixing up of the several characteristics of God, souls and matter in the complex whole of reality. Scriptural passages like the following bear out this view. "From *prakṛti* which is termed *māyā*, the Supreme Self who directs *māyā* creates the world, while the other (i.e. the finite self) is over-powered and deluded by *māyā*."³¹

It may be asked: Why should Brahman alone be spoken of as the material cause, when in truth Brahman, souls and matter function in that capacity? The explanation is that, even though all the three form the material cause, Brahman is frequently referred to as the material cause, since souls and matter are the inseparable modes of Brahman, are dependent upon Brahman and constitute His body.

One merit of this theory is that it furnishes a satisfactory basis for reconciling conflicting upaniṣadic texts—those that speak of Brahman as being without any change, those that describe Him as the material

cause of the universe and those that refer to 'the world as having Brahman for its Self. Scriptural passages which regard ultimate reality as unitary and those which refer to it as being two-fold can be harmonised and shown to be appropriate only on this view. Texts dealing with meditation (*dhyanā*) and those revealing the nature of reality (*tattva*) alike agree in stating that reality is single, because Brahman has souls and matter for His body. Since the soul and the body are distinct from each other, Brahman, the Inner Self of all, is sometimes spoken of as distinct from souls and matter, which constitute His body.

7. THE NATURE OF THE FINITE SELF

(*Puruṣa-svarūpa-nirṇayādhikāra*).

In this chapter the author describes the *jīva* as a spiritual entity, distinct from the body, the senses and the like. It is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*) and eternally in possession of knowledge. Each *jīva* is a part (*aṁśa*) of the Supreme Self and an agent (*kartā*). The *jīvas* are many.³² Before establishing his own view, Nārāyaṇārya reviews rival doctrines regarding the self.

The Cārvāka Doctrine.

The Cārvāka denies the existence of a spiritual principle distinct from the body. Stated briefly, the contention of the Cārvāka is as follows:—The ātman who is the knower shines forth as 'I' (*aḥam*). Judgments, such as "I am stout", "I am lean", equating 'stout' and 'lean', which are bodily features, with 'I' (*aḥam*), the soul, indicate that the body is itself the soul. Knowledge, says he, is a property of the body, as is evident from the sentence "I know". There is appropriateness, he thinks, in considering the body to be the possessor of consciousness (*cetana*); for, unlike the jar which is admitted to be non-intelligent both by the materialist and by the believer in the self as an independent principle, the body functions as the seat of the senses (*indriyāśraya*).

The two objections that may be raised against this view are—

- (i) If consciousness (*caitanya*) is a special quality (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) of the body, it must be present in its cause, namely, the particles of matter. But as the atoms are devoid of consciousness, the body constituted of

32. Compare—

Dehendriya-maṇaḥ-prāṇa-dhībyo'nyoa'nanyasādhanaḥ |

Nityo vā'pi pratikṣetram ātmā binnaḥ svataḥ sukhī ||

Siddhitraya, Ātmasiddhi, p. 8. Annamalai University Philosophical Series.

them cannot possess *caitanya*. (ii) If the atoms were to possess consciousness, there must be as many conscious entities (*cetana*) as there are atoms in the body. These objections are dismissed as being valueless, since they contradict perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is the only means of valid knowledge accepted by the materialist.

Refutation of the Cārvāka Doctrine.

Some of the counts in Nārāyaṇārya's indictment of the Cārvāka position may briefly be mentioned:—(i) How, Nārāyaṇārya asks, can the body which is cognised as something external (*parāk*) and referred to as 'this' (*idam*) be identified with the soul which is an inner principle (*pratyak*) and which appears as 'I' (*aham*)? (ii) If the 'I' were to signify the body, its parts must necessarily be apprehended when there is self-consciousness. But, as a matter of fact, even when the senses are under control and when self-consciousness arises there is no awareness of the organs of the body. (iii) Judgments such as "I am stout", "I am lean" refer not merely to the body, but also to a principle distinct therefrom. And hence the usage "my body", and not "I am the body".

The Cārvāka may suggest that the expression "my body", like the phrase "the body of the doll", has to be understood in a secondary sense (*aupacārika*), and not literally. But the Cārvāka forgets that the two cases are quite dissimilar. In the case of the doll, there is no body over and above the doll; hence the need for interpreting the expression "the body of the doll" in a secondary sense. The body is the doll itself. But in regard to the body of a sentient being, there is no such need for adopting a secondary significance.

The Cārvāka might ask:—If the body and the self are wholly disparate, how do they come to be identified at all? A possible explanation of this confusion is that of these two entities one is perceptible, while the other is not. If both were perceptible, their different features such as number, size and colour would make any confusion between them impossible. A second explanation is the self and the body resemble each other in one respect, viz., their activities are dependent upon desire. The self resembles, wills and infers only at the instance of its desires; the body too has its activities such as lying down, sitting and standing, determined by desires. The wise, however, avoid this confusion and realise that the soul is a knower (*jñātā*), is without parts (*niravayava*) and is distinct from the body.

The Doctrine that the Self is the Senses.

In order to escape the difficulties met with by the Cārvāka school in identifying the soul with the body, some have preferred to equate

it with the senses (*indriya*). If the "I" refers to the senses, their parts need not be known when self-consciousness arises. For they have neither qualities, such as visible colours, nor perceptible magnitude. And knowledge which is the result (*phala*) of the activity of the senses (*indriya-vyāpāra*) must, properly speaking, belong only to the senses, even as the results of sacrifice inhere in the person performing the sacrifice. That is why Satyatapas speaks of the 'seeing eye'.³³

Refutation of this View.

The theory that the senses are the soul cannot stand scrutiny. Do the senses function as the self individually or collectively? They cannot function individually; for, in that event, what one organ had perceived cannot be recollected by another. But such a recollection does exist. We do say "I touch what I saw yesterday". Nor can the second alternative be true; for, in the case, every object would have to be perceived by all the senses. Again, with the loss of any one of the organs, there would be no recollection of what has been cognised by that organ. Further, with the disappearance of any of the organs, the ātman would have to perish. But none of these consequences is true. Bearing in mind the fact that if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would meet with death and that if he spoke the truth, it would be extreme cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like that. Satyatapas's words should not be considered as lending support to this argument.

The Doctrine that the Soul is Identical with Manas.

There is another school which identifies the soul with mind (*manas*), imagining that thereby it can get over the difficulties which beset the

33. See *Varāha-Purāṇa*, ch. 98, verses 1-26. One day when Satyatapas was engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the vicinity of the sage's hermitage. Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired of the sage if he saw a boar nearby and said that if the animal could not be traced, he himself, his children and his dependant's would have to die of starvation. The sage found himself in a dilemma—if he furnished the information regarding the animal's hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken refuge; if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of the hunter and his dependents. After a moments' reflection, Satyatapas replied, "Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak. The eye that sees has no tongue to report on what it perceives; the tongue that speaks has no eye to see. Wherefore do you ask me?" Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the boar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Viṣṇu and Indra respectively and blessed him.

foregoing theories. But the stumbling-block in the way of this identification is that *manas* is really an instrument (*karana*) of knowledge, and cannot be treated as the agent (*kartā*) in acquiring knowledge.

The View that Prāṇa is the Soul.

Yet others treat the vital breath (*prāṇa*) as the soul. This view is dismissed by Nārāyaṇārya with the remark that *prāṇa* cannot possess consciousness (*caitanya*), any more than the air outside (*vāyu*).

The Advaitic Theory that Consciousness (saṁvit) is the Soul.

Instead of identifying the soul with material entities, such as the body (*deha*), senses (*indriya*), mind (*manas*) and vital breath (*prāṇa*), still others (the Advaitins) equate it with consciousness or knowledge (*saṁvit*), an immaterial principle (*aśāḍa*). Being self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), according to this view, consciousness shines by its mere being. Consciousness, unlike the jar and other material objects, does not fail to shine and is eternal.

The Advaitin anticipates a possible objection to his view that consciousness is self-luminous. Just as the senses reveal objects without presenting themselves, even so knowledge by its very existence illumines objects like the jar, but does not manifest itself. The fact of knowledge having arisen is inferred from the peculiar illumination or manifestedness (*prākāṣya*) produced in the objects known. The Advaitin replies to this objection as follows: There is no such thing as *prākāṣya*, and it is possible to account for all cognition of objects and their uses in daily intercourse (*vyavahāra*) without postulating this mysterious principle. If the jar, for example, was not referred to or used before, it was because there was no previous knowledge of it and not because there was no *prākāṣya*. Again, consciousness (*saṁvit*), like the lamp, can never manifest objects without manifesting itself. The cognition "This is a jar" includes awareness of *saṁvit* also. That is why we say, "I know the jar", "I know the cloth", implying thereby that we are at once conscious of *saṁvit* and the object illumined by it. Therefore, *saṁvit*, being an immaterial principle, may well be identified with the ātman.

Refutation of the Advaitic Doctrine.

This view does not find favour with Nārāyaṇārya. His objections to it may be stated as follows. The judgment "I know the jar" clearly implies that *jñāna* is an attribute of, and not identical with, the inner principle "I". *Samvit*, *anubhūti* and *jñāna* are relative terms,

depending, for their full meaning, upon a reference to the knowing subject (*āśraya*) and the object known (*viṣaya*). Hence *saṁvit* in itself cannot be the *ātman*. The *ātman* is distinct from the body, the senses, the mind (*manas*), the vital breath (*prāṇa*) and consciousness (*saṁvit*). It is the possessor of *jñāna*, as is evident from the statement "I know". All this is beautifully set forth in the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru episode in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.

How, the Advaitin may ask, can knowledge (*saṁvit*), an inner principle (*pratyak*), be equated with the 'I' (*ahamartha*), an external entity (*parāk*)? That knowledge is an inner principle (*pratyak*) will be readily conceded; for, unlike external objects, it never appears as 'this' (*idam*). Though it is not so obvious that the 'I' is *parāk*, a moment's reflection will show that it must be reckoned among external entities; since it shines only when knowledge is manifest even as objects in the outer world are revealed only when consciousness shines forth. The Advaitin may, thus, reiterate his conclusion that the soul is no other than knowledge itself, which is accepted as being self-luminous both by himself and the Viśiṣṭadvaitin.

Questioning the correctness of the premises on which the Advaitin takes his stand, the author establishes that it is the "I" (*ahamartha*), and not knowledge, that is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) in the strict sense of the term, and also *pratyak* (inner). Since the "I" (*ahamartha*) shines for its own sake, whereas knowledge (*jñāna*) shines for the sake of the soul, the former is the truly inward principle (*pratyak*), while the latter is not. Again *svaprakāśa* signifies 'shining forth for one's own sake'. Taken in this sense, the "I" (*ahamartha*) alone can be characterised as *svaprakāśa*. Knowledge, on the contrary, is not *svaprakāśa* in the strict sense of the term. For even though it shines without depending upon any extraneous factor, knowledge resembles external objects in shining for the sake of the self, and not for its own sake. If knowledge is usually described as being self-luminous, it is only by a figure of speech. Since it invariably appears as a quality of the "I", the truly inward principle (*pratyak*), *jñāna* is, in ordinary speech, said to be *svaprakāśa* and as being other than *parāk*.

If the "I" (*ahamartha*) is described as *svaprakāśa* in the sense that it does not depend upon *jñāna* for its *prakāśa* (manifestation), why, the Advaitin may ask, is not the "I" manifest when no objects are cognised?

The Siddhāntin points out that the Advaitin, who identifies eternal self-luminous consciousness (*saṁvit*) with the soul, has to explain why *saṁvit* is not manifest when no object is known. Perhaps his expla-

nation would be that *saṁvit* does manifest itself even then, but that its existence is not referred to, since at that time it is not in contact with the *ahamkāra* and external objects. A similar explanation, it is urged by Nārāyaṇārya, can be furnished by the Siddhāntin also.

Pursuing another line of argument, the Advaitin contends that the "I" (*ahamartha*) cannot be the *ātman*, which is universally accepted as being a changeless entity (*nirvikāra-vastu*). The character of being a knower (*jñātṛtva*), that is, being an agent in the activity of *jñāna* (*jñāna-vyāpāra*), which is essentially a kind of change (*vikāra*), cannot be attributed to the *ātman*. If it were subject to this modification, the *ātman* would be degraded to the level of the non-sentient body. It follows, says the Advaitin, that *jñātṛtva* is a quality illegitimately transferred (*adhyāsa*) to *jñāna*.

Characterising the opponent's argument as being unintelligible, the author says that *jñāna* is not an activity (*kriyā*) and that its possessor is not an agent (*kartā*). Like rays of light (*prabhā*), *jñāna* is a transparent substance; and it exists as an eternal attribute of *ātman*. Hence it is reasonable to regard *jñāna* as an attribute. It is ridiculous to maintain, he continues, that the *ātman* resembles the body in being devoid of *jñātṛtva* and that *jñātṛtva* is illegitimately transferred to *jñāna*. Being imperceptible (*adrśya*), *jñāna* cannot be the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of this transference. Besides, this position involves the defect of mutual dependence (*parasparāśraya*). If *jñātṛtva* is to be wrongly superposed, it must have been known before the *adhyāsa* is effected; and yet *jñātṛtva* is realised only after *adhyāsa*. To escape this difficulty, the Advaitin may say that *jñātṛtva* is not realised after *adhyāsa*, but that it already existed in the *antaḥkaraṇa* and that it is superimposed on *jñāna* which is changeless. Nārāyaṇārya meets this by saying that he has already established that the self is not mere knowledge and that there is no warrant for believing in a *jñāna* whereon *jñātṛtva* could be superimposed. He goes on to say that, on the view that the "I" (*ahamartha*) is wrongly transferred to *jñāna*, there must arise the cognition "I am knowledge", even as the shell is known as silver. But such a cognition never arises. Rejecting the Advaitic view as untenable, he concludes that the soul is the possessor of eternal *jñāna* and is the self-luminous entity known as "I".

Possible Objections to Nārāyaṇārya's View.

This conception of the soul possessing eternal knowledge as its attribute may be criticized in several ways. How can *jñāna*, it may be asked, be characterised as everlasting in the face of the familiar experience that it has an origin (*utpatti*) and a destruction (*nāśa*)? If knowledge is eternal, no useful function could be assigned to the

senses as instruments of knowledge. Moreover, the scriptures assert that knowledge is absent in sleep (*suṣupti*).

The Author's Reply to Objections.

Nārāyaṇārya states in answer that the scriptures teach that knowledge is eternal. For example "The self is an eternal knower," "The knowledge of the knower is never lost". Knowledge is not newly acquired by the self; even as lustre is not freshly acquired by the gem when it is polished. The removal of impurities merely helps to reveal the lustre which was already inherent in it. Reference to the origin (*utpatti*) and the destruction (*nāśa*) of knowledge merely signifies the presence and the absence respectively of the contact of knowledge with objects. Similarly, scriptural texts speaking of the absence of knowledge in sleep denote that at that time there is no contact with the objects of the world outside. Though knowledge is eternal, it is obscured by karma during the period of mundane existence; hence, in the samsāric state, knowledge uses the senses (*indriya*) as its channel for proceeding outward and getting into contact with external objects. The senses are not, therefore, unnecessary. Since knowledge is said to proceed outward, it must necessarily be a substance, and not a quality.

Once it is established that knowledge is eternal, the Buddhist doctrine that the self is consciousness changing every moment (*kṣaṇika-vijñāna*) stands condemned.

The Souls Infinite in Number.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory, the souls are many and each self is distinct from others. "He who is unitary, supremely conscious and truly eternal among a host of eternal conscious entities...."³⁴ Passages like these unequivocally declare that the released souls (*mukta*) and those in bondage (*samsārin*) are different and infinite in number. The divergencies in the pleasures and sufferings of men also point to the plurality of souls.

The Soul is Aṇu.

Some scriptural passages³⁵ referring to the jīva's passing out (*utkrānti*) of the body, proceeding towards certain places (*gati*) and returning to the world (*āgati*) imply that it is atomic (*aṇu*) and not all-pervasive (*vibhu*). There are also passages which explicitly assert that

34. *Svet. Up.*, VI.12.

35. *Brh. Up.*, IV, iv. 2; *Kaus. Up.*, I. 9; and *Bṛh. Up.*, VI, iv. 6.

the soul is atomic. For example: "The self which is atomic and in which *prāṇa* exists in a fivefold form is to be understood by the mind which has been purified."³⁶ Though atomic, the soul has no difficulty in experiencing what happens in any part of the body. Just as a lamp placed in one part of the room sends out rays of light all round and illumines the entire room, the soul located in one part of the body becomes aware of what is happening in every part of the body with the aid of its knowledge.³⁷ On the view that the soul is all-pervasive (*vibhu*), all souls would be everywhere. But the fact that no one is ever found to declare another's body as his own is a clear testimony to the view that the soul is atomic.

The Soul an Amśa of Brahman.

Upaniṣadic texts contrast the nature of Brahman and that of the *jīva*. The Lord is the controller (*niyantā*) ; the *jīva*, the controlled; the Lord is omniscient (*sarvajña*); the *jīva* is endowed only with fragmentary knowledge (*kiñcijña*). How then, it may be asked, can the soul be treated as the *amśa* of the Lord? The reply is by *amśa* is meant the part of a complex whole and not the part of the self-same object. The qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) is an *amśa* of the complex whole (*viśiṣṭa-dravya*). In a complex whole we do distinguish between the qualification (*viśeṣaṇāmśa*) and the entity possessing the qualification (*viśeṣyāmśa*). On the basis of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* it is possible to justify all reference to the *jīva* as an *amśa* of the Lord. In other words, on the basis of the relation of the embodied soul and the embodiment, the *jīva* may quite well be treated as an *amśa* of Brahman. The *jīva* cannot be considered to be an *amśa* of the Lord in any other sense.

On the view that Brahman and the *jīva* are related as master and servant, there must be difficulty in treating the soul as a part of God ; since the master and the servant are wholly distinct from each other.

Those who maintain that the *jīva* is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman are confronted with the same difficulty; for the *jīva* is phenomenal (*aparamārtha*) and cannot be a part of absolute Reality.

The Bhedābheda-vādins too must find it hard to render intelligible the doctrine that the *jīva* is an *amśa* of Brahman. For, on the hypothesis that Brahman itself under the influence of *upādhi* becomes the *jīva*, the defects of the *jīva* would have to be attributed to Brahman.

36. *Muṇḍ. Up.*, III.i.9.

37. Compare *Vedānta-Sūtra*, II, iii. 26 and IV. iv. 15.

The Bhedābheda-vādin might urge that just as the impurities found in spaces limited by jars and the like do not infect cosmic space, the imperfections of the jīva, who is no other than Brahman limited by *upadhis*, do not afflict Brahman. But this analogy is unhelpful; because formless Brahman cannot be said to be limited by *upadhis*. Further, in the analogy cited space is not limited by jars and the like, but is in contact with them. And if Brahman is, likewise, in contact with *upadhi*, the imperfections flowing from them would certainly afflict Brahman. Vedāntic texts teaching that Brahman is taintless would be contradicted. Thus on his philosophical presuppositions, the Bhedābheda-vādin cannot show how the soul can be an *aṁśa* of Brahman.

As the advocates of the doctrine of *śakti-vikṣepa* speak of Brahman as the *aṁśin* and the jīva as the *aṁśa* on the basis of soul-body relation, the author has no quarrel with them on this point. Thus it has been shown that the jīva is an *aṁśa* of the Lord.

The Soul is an Agent.

The soul is an agent (*kartā*); otherwise scriptural injunctions prescribing sacrificial duties and meditation (*upāsana*) for the attainment respectively of heaven and mokṣa would become pointless. The Vedic mandates cannot be addressed to those who are devoid of agency. According to a *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV. iii. 12) the self, in the state of sleep, "goes wherever he likes." The same upaniṣad in an earlier chapter, speaks of the soul as taking to himself, with the aid of his intelligence, the intelligence of the senses, and as moving about in his own body as he pleases (II. i. 17-18). Thus the self is explicitly declared to be the agent in activities such as taking and moving about.

Certain *śruti* and *smṛti* passages seem to support the view that *prakṛti* is the source of all activity and that the puruṣa is only an enjoyer. For example, the *Taittirīya* text—*Vijñānam yajñam tanute karmāṇi tanute*—speaks of *vijñāna* as the agent in sacred and secular duties. Again, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (Ch. III, verse 27) declares that the self deluded by *ahamkāra* looks upon himself as the agent in all activities which are brought about by the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*. In the face of these, how, it may be asked, is the soul to be considered the agent? The reply is that the term *vijñāna* occurring in the *Taittirīya* text refers to the soul and not to *buddhi*; for *buddhi*, which is non-intelligent, cannot be directed to do this or that. Further, the *Gītā* verse cited only shows that the activity of the jīva depends upon five factors of which the self is but one; and he is specifically mentioned by the name *kartā*. Hence, he who views the isolated self as an agent has no true insight.

8. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIDHI

(Vidhi-svarūpa-nirṇayādhikāra)

After a critical consideration of the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara conceptions of *vidhi* (injunction), Nārāyaṇārya establishes the thesis that *vidhi* is the command of any trustworthy person (*āpta*) interested in our welfare (*hita-kāma*).

The View that Vidhi is Śabda-Bhāvanā.

The Bhāṭṭas maintain that *vidhi* is *śabda-bhāvanā*. Their arguments may be stated as follows:—*Vidhi* (literally what prompts a person to act) must be *śabdha-bhāvanā*, since the latter prompts actions directed to certain ends. From the consciousness of meaning arising from words, every word must be inferred to have an activity (*vyāpāra*), called *abhidhā*. In the case of mandatory suffixes—the Sanskrit *liṅ* and the like—the activity is signified by these suffixes themselves; and it is termed *bhāvanā* or *pravartanā*, since it brings into being or initiates activity (*pravṛtti*).

Of the several objections that may be raised against this theory, the first is that this activity (*abhidhā*) cannot be attributed to *śabda*; for the latter is either a quality or a substance. If *śabda* is a quality, it cannot have an activity; for activity cannot be attributed to a quality. If *śabda* is a substance, it cannot enter upon activity; since it is all-pervasive.

The Bhāṭṭas meet this objection by pointing out that *śabda* may be a quality and yet possess an activity. Take for example, they say, the text “*Aruṇayā ekahāyanyā pingākṣyā gavā somaṁ krīṇāti.*” Here the activity of marking off a particular animal from the rest is attributed to redness (*āruṇya*). Even on the view that *śabda* is an all-pervasive substance, *śabda* may, like the self, possess action. Change of place (*parispanda*) may be impossible; but modal changes may be attributed to *śabda*.

Another objection to the Bhāṭṭa view is as follows:—*Abhidhā* has to be defined as the knowledge of *śabda* (word); for it is only the word known that gives rise to awareness of meaning. But the knowledge of a word cannot be considered its activity (*vyāpāra*).

In reply to this, the Bhāṭṭas state that action (*vyāpāra*) is the occasional feature (*dharma*) with whose aid an object is able to produce its effect. If this is admitted, it is easy to demonstrate, say the Bhāṭṭas, that knowledge can be treated as an activity. The potential suffix *liṅ*, by being known, becomes responsible for human activity.

Yet another difficulty in the way of attributing to *śabda* an activity called *abhidhā* and conceived as a form of knowledge (*jñāna*) is as follows: If this view were correct, *śabda* would have to be at once the agent (*kartā*) and the object (*karma*) in the self-same activity, namely, knowledge. The statement: *Śabda reveals meaning*" (*śabdaḥ artham abhidhatte*) indicates that *śabda* is an agent in knowledge. Again the proposition "I know *śabda*" (*śabdam jñāmi*) shows that *śabda* is the object (*karma*) of knowledge. How can *śabda* be at once the agent (*kartā*) and the object (*karma*) in an identical activity?

The Bhāṭṭas brush aside this objection and argue as follows:—"An identical act viewed from the stand-point of the different results achieved may have different objects (*karma*). What figures as *karma* in a given act considered as leading to one result may function as the agent (*kartā*) in the same act treated as accomplishing another result. Take the proposition "He raises and lowers the axe". The axe is the object (*karma*) in the act of raising and lowering. But consider the statement "The axe splits the firewood into two". The axe functions as the agent in the same act, now called *chinatti*, in the light of the result namely, cutting into two. Similarly, in the self-same activity called *abhidhā* there may be different objects (*karma*) in connection with its diverse results. In respect of the production of human activity, the same act is referred to as *bhāvanā*; and it has human activity for its *karma*. E.g., "*Śabda* gives rise to human activity." In respect of human activity, the self-same *abhidhā* is termed *pravartanā*; and it has *puruṣa* (man) for its object. E.g., "*Śabda* prompts the *puruṣa* to act." Thus, a given activity is called *jānāti*, when the result aimed at is the manifestation of objects (*viśaya-prakāśa*). Here the *śabda* associated with manifestation is the object. E.g. *śabdam jānāti*. The same activity goes by the name of *abhidadhāti*, when the end in view is the awareness of meaning (*artha-pratīti*); in this case, the meaning (*artha*) constitutes the object. E.g. *śabdaḥ artham abhidadhāti*. That very activity is referred to as *bhāvayati*, when the goal sought is initiation of activity, and it has activity (*pravṛtti*) for its object. E.g. *pravṛttim bhāvayati*. The self-same activity may also be designated *pravartayati* when the end in view is *pravṛtti*; here the *puruṣa* associated with *pravṛtti* is the object (*karma*)."

A further difficulty in the way of the Bhāṭṭa theory is this. Even granting that *śabda* has *abhidhā* for its activity, the latter cannot generate action, for what leads to an action is the consciousness that it is the means to the realisation of desires (*samihita-sādhana-tā-jñāna*). Moreover, there is no need to distinguish *liṅ* from other words and maintain that *abhidā* is the very significance of *liṅ*.

The Bhāṭṭa reply is : True *iṣṭa-sādhana-tā-jñāna* leads to activity, but it is wrong to suppose that the *abhidhā* of words does not prompt action. For soon after listening to commands actions ensue indicating thereby that *liṅ* denotes an activity which is termed *abhidhā* and which is very different from the activity of other words. As for the last objection, the Bhāṭṭas reply that there is nothing to prevent the *vyāpāra* of a word from being the very significance of that word.

Refutation of the Bhāṭṭa View.

Nārāyaṇārya thinks that there is no warrant for the belief that *śabda* possesses an activity known as *abhidhā*. It is unreasonable to contend, says Nārāyaṇārya, that the very significance of words expressing commands testifies to its existence; for *liṅ* is nowhere understood to have such a significance. Nor is it convincing, says he, to maintain that the presence of such an activity is inferred from the fact that when commands are listened to, action follows; for all that this could prove is that *liṅ* leads to action. From the fact that a person undertakes an action it could not be said that he must have listened to *liṅ*. When the very existence of *liṅ* which has generated action cannot be inferred from the latter, it must be even more impossible to prove the existence of a mysterious *abhidhā* said to be possessed by words.

The author next points out that activity is of two kinds—effort (*prayatna*) and movement (*parispanda*)—and that *śabda* can engage in neither of these. Being non-sentient, *śabda* cannot put forth effort ; and being a quality, it cannot move. The Bhāṭṭas cited the example of the text “Aruṇayā ekahāyanyā pingākṣyā . . .” to show that a quality may enter upon activity. But this is unsatisfactory, because, in the example adduced, a *vyāpāra* has not been attributed to a quality.³⁸

The Bhāṭṭa contention that the activity called *abhidhā* is the knowledge of the word (*śabda*) is untenable ; for *jñāna* is a quality of the self, and can never be an activity of *śabda*.

The proposition—“Śabdah artham abhidhatte”—does not show that, in the *vyāpāra* known as *abhidhā*, *śabda* is the agent ; for *abhidhā*, being identical with knowledge, can only reside in the self, and never in *śabda*. By identifying *abhidhā* with *prākāṣya* one may attempt to show that *abhidhā* may well reside in *śabda*. But this attempt is foredoomed to failure ; because there is no such thing as *prākāṣya*.

Nārāyaṇārya further points out that, if *liṅ* can denote *abhidhā* directly, without the aid of some other *vyāpāra*, then *śabda* may well convey meanings directly, without the aid of *abhidhā*.

He also shows that just as knowledge manifests objects without the intervention of any *vyāpāra*, words also may convey meaning without the aid of any *vyāpāra*. In commenting on the expression 'buddhijanma' occurring in *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, Kumārila says that knowledge reveals objects by the mere fact of its origination and not with the aid of any other activity.

Besides, even granting that there is *śabda-bhāvanā*, it cannot be *vidhi*, for it does not prompt action. Though repeated often, *śabda* would not prompt action, so long as there is no *iṣṭa-sādhana-tā-jñāna*. Thus the conception of a *śabda-bhāvanā*, which has *puruṣa-pravṛtti* for its *sādhya* (what is to be accomplished), *liṅ-jñāna* for its *sādhana* (means) and *prāśastya-jñāna* for its *itikartavyatā* (instrumental cause), stands condemned.

The Prābhākāra View.

According to the Prābhākara school, what prompts a person to act is the consciousness that it is something to be accomplished (*kārya*) by him. All persons, whether they act at the instance of others or at their own instance prompted by love, anger or fear, enter upon activity when there arises the consciousness that it is their duty to do so (*kāryatā-jñāna*). Since *kārya* (what has to be accomplished) is the direct cause of activity, other factors being merely casual circumstances, *kārya*, which is the significance of *liṅ*, must be treated as *vidhi*. In worldly affairs this *kārya*, which depends for its existence upon human effort (*kṛti*), is found to be no other than action (*kriyā*). But in the case of Vedic injunctions, like "He that desires heaven should sacrifice," the significance of the command cannot be *kārya*, which is of the nature of action. For he who desires heaven finds it difficult to imagine how action, which is momentary, could be the means of heavenly bliss to be secured in the distant future. Therefore, he concludes that the *kārya* which is the significance of Vedic commands must be very different from *kriyā* and that it must persist till the goal is reached. For the reason that it is not something met with in everyday experience, it is called *apūrva*. Since it directs the *puruṣa* towards itself, it is also termed *niyoga*.

As vedic injunctions are thus proved to signify *kārya* of this unique kind, it is only in a secondary sense that injunctions to secular duty refer to *kārya* understood as *kriyā*. Once it is demonstrated that *liṅ* signifies only *niyoga*, it follows that even in Vedic injunctions referring to actions, which bear no fruit and obligatory duties of an occasional character, *liṅ* denotes only *niyoga*.

Refutation of the Prābhākara View.

The main counts in Nārāyaṇārya's indictment of the Prābhākara view are the following:—(1) the *Prābhākara* notion of *kārya* is unintelligible. For it must be either what is accomplished by effort (*kṛti-sādhya*) or the goal of effort (*kṛtyuddēśya*) or both these at once. But it cannot be the first, since, on that alternative, sacrifice also would have to be treated as *kārya*. Nor can it be the second; as, on that view, heaven would have to be considered *kārya*. Nor yet can it be the third; for the *kārya* which the Prābhākara speaks of cannot be the goal of endeavour. 'Goal of endeavour' signifies the end to secure which a person starts on a course of action; and this end is either the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. But *kārya* is neither of these. Hence it cannot be the goal of endeavour.

Should the Prābhākara contend that, though heaven is the end aimed at, *niyoga* may be treated as the goal of endeavour in so far as it leads to heaven, Nārāyaṇārya replies that it only amounts to equating *kārya* or *niyoga* with *iṣṭasādhana* (the means for obtaining objects of desire).

(2) *Kārya* cannot be the meaning of *vidhi*; since knowledge of *kārya* is not responsible for activity. Even when there is the knowledge that a certain thing ought to be done, action may not follow.

(3) The Prābhākara argued that after one hears the injunction "He who desires heaven should sacrifice" there arises the consciousness "This is to be performed by me (*mama idam kāryam*)," and that this consciousness, coming, as it does, soon after hearing the injunction, must be the import of that *vidhi*. This argument is fallacious; for all that the *vidhi* conveys is that sacrifice is the means for the realisation of heaven. The consciousness "This is something to be undertaken by me" is a desire; and it forms no part of the significance of *vidhi*.

(4) There is no point in the contention that, since action is momentary, it cannot be the means for the realisation of heaven; and that, therefore, something other than *kriyā*, viz., *niyoga*, must be posited. It will be shown presently that sacrifice itself is the means for heaven and that there is no need to posit *niyoga*.

The Views of Nārāyaṇārya.

Nārāyaṇārya's view may be stated as follows:—*Niyoga* (the command of the trustworthy person interested in our welfare), *vidhi* (injunction) and *pravartanā* are interchangeable terms. The boy notices that commands issue from the teacher and are followed by

certain activities on the part of the pupils. As a result of frequent experience of this kind, the utterance of certain words and some actions get associated in his mind. So that, after some time, whenever he hears certain words some ideas are involuntarily recalled to mind. It is only at a subsequent stage that he wishes to know why certain words are related to certain meanings and learns that words have the potency (*śakti*) to signify certain meanings. Thus, even before a person understands the power of words to signify meanings, he learns their significance. That is why the Buddhistic theory that *śabda* is a variety of inference stands condemned. Only when the universal connection between two things has been grasped would it be possible to infer one from the other. Since the meanings of words are understood even before the nature of the relation between words and meanings is ascertained, it would be impossible to maintain that the knowledge obtained from words is inferential knowledge.

It may be asked whether the suffix *lin* and *pravartanā* have been experienced together to enable the mind to recall one from the other. Nārāyaṇārya answers this question in the affirmative and says that, when the boy finds the pupil entering upon some activity on hearing the master's command, he learns that the master wished that the pupil should act in a specific way and, therefore, issued the command. When the boy wishes to induce others to act, he adopts the same procedure and is directly aware of the *pravartanā* existing in himself. From this he readily infers that all persons must be using commands to induce action of one sort or another in others. Hence, it follows that *lin* signifies the command of the trustworthy person (*āpta*).

The objector may say that if the potential suffix *lin* signifies what induces a person to perform activities calculated to securing his well-being (*hita*), it would follow that scriptural texts are the composition of some *puruṣa* (*pauruṣeya*); for *hita-pravartanā* is understood, in everyday life, from the utterances of the trustworthy person himself or from those of his agent.

Nārāyaṇārya replies as follows:—Even when a king does not directly communicate his orders to his subjects and does not even cause his ministers to do so, the latter may understand his mind and tell the subjects that the king expects them to do certain things. And the subjects may take them to be the king's orders and obey them. Similarly, the Vedic texts, without being the utterances of God or of his agents, may yet be taken to be the Lord's mandates.

The objector may again urge that the foregoing only shows that Vedic duties are the injunctions of the Lord; and that it does not indicate that they have to be performed. To this Nārāyaṇārya replies

that there are texts describing these injunctions as the commands of the Lord, that they have to be obeyed, and that neglect of these duties entails punishment. The following passages may be cited as examples:—A *Taittirīya* text commencing with the words “After imparting instruction in the Veda, the preceptor enjoins the pupil to to practise certain virtues” ends by saying that these are the commands of the Lord, the advice of persons interested in our welfare and that they are the essence of the Vedic teaching.³⁹ A text from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upaniṣad declares, “Verily, O Gārgi! men become subject to, and praise those who, realising that *dāna* and the like are the commands of the Imperishable, give gifts (*dāna*); the divinities praise the sacrificer; and the ancestral deities (*pitṛs*) praise those who perform the *darvī-homa*”.⁴⁰

The doctrine that Vedic injunctions are the commands of the Lord does not, in the least, contradict the view that the Vedas are eternal (*nitya*). Though the Vedic passage—“Agnīd agnīn vihara”—is the command of the *adhvaryu* to *Āgnīdhra*, the Veda does not cease to be eternal. Likewise, vedic injunctions may be the command of the Lord, and yet be eternal.

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that, since the sacrifice is momentary, it cannot lead to heaven and that, therefore, an *apūrva* which could lead to the fruit of sacrifice has to be posited. But this is needless; for the Lord Himself who is pleased at finding the sacrificer obeying His command as also the divinities, such as Agni and Indra, who receive the sacrificial offering, may grant the fruits. So the sacrifice itself may lead to the fruits thereof. It may be asked: How can the divinities be spoken of as receiving sacrificial offering and as distributing the fruits thereof in the face of scriptural statements to the effect that the Supreme Self Himself receives these offerings and rewards the sacrificer? The reply is that, since the divinities are after all His subordinates (*aṅga*) and constitute His body, what pleases them pleases the Supreme Self too. Their enjoyment constitutes His enjoyment. The scriptures declare that the Supreme Self who is worshipped by sacrifices and meditation (*upāsana*) distributes heavenly enjoyment (*bhoga*) and final release (*apavarga*). If the divinities are usually spoken of as dispensing rewards, it is because the Lord has conferred upon them the power of rewarding men for sacrificial duties. Hence, Nārāyaṇārya concludes that in ordinary life *vidhi* constitutes the

39. Tait. Up. I. 11.

40. Bṛh. Up., III.viii, 8.

command of the person issuing the instruction; and that in the Veda, *vidhi* signifies the command of the Lord. Nārāyaṇārya claims for his theory the support of *Śrī-Bhāṣya*.

9. ON THE NATURE OF THE MEANS TO MOKṢA

(*Nisreyasa-sādḥana-nirṇayādhikāra*)

Introductory.

Although there is concensus of opinion making *vedana* (knowledge) the means for the attainment of transcendental felicity (*mokṣa*), philosophers have held divergent views regarding the precise nature of *vedana*. Some treat it as knowledge afforded by Upaniṣadic texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*). Others think that it denotes the combination of *sāṅkhya* and *yoga* (*sāṅkhya-yoga-samuccaya*). But Nārāyaṇārya supports the view that *vedana* is *bhakti* resulting from the seven-fold factors of purity arising from partaking good food (*viveka*), non-attachment to objects of desire (*vimoka*) repeated meditation on the blessed form of the Lord (*abhyāsa*), the performance of the five-fold *yajñas* and the like (*kriyā*), virtues such as wishing well to all, straightforwardness, mercy, non-injury, gift, and not coveting another's property (*kalyāṇa*), not feeling depressed over the loss of things and persons held near and dear (*anavasāda*), and the absence of undue elation (*anuddharṣa*).

The View that Vedana is Vākyaajanyajñāna.

Upaniṣadic texts, such as "The knower of Brahman crosses sorrow," proclaim that knowledge of the nature of ultimate reality obtained from the Vedānta is the means of *mokṣa* which is no other than cessation of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛtti*). In the mind purified by the performance of sacrificial duties, Vedāntic texts generate the knowledge that is capable of terminating ignorance concerning the nature of Brahman. Till the undesirable activities of the senses, inner and outer, cease, this knowledge of Brahman does not bear fruit.

Acquisition of right knowledge consists of three stages—*śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. *Śravaṇa* refers to the first stage when the aspirant learns from a competent guru the meaning of the different Vedāntic texts. *Manana* stands for the stages when the pupil reflects upon what he has been taught in order to rid the mind of the doubt (*asambhāvanā*) that the truth conveyed may not be right. *Nididhyāsana* is meditation upon the identity between the *jīva* and Brahman designed to eradicate long established habits of thought (*viparīta-bhāvanā*) and to secure the conviction that the truth cannot

be anything else. When this meditation is continued for long, the knowledge obtained from the upaniṣadic texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*) becomes direct intuition of Brahman (*aparokṣa-sākṣātkāra*) competent to terminate *ajñāna* and its products, root and branch.

A possible objection to the Advaitic view is that *śabda* (scriptural testimony) cannot generate intuitive perception (*sākṣātkāra* or *aparokṣa-jñāna*). The Advaitins meet this objection by pointing out that whether *śabda* generates *parokṣa-jñāna* or *aparokṣa-jñāna* would depend upon the nature of the object known (*prameya*). When *śabda* dispels *ajñāna* concerning the existence of material objects, such as jars, they are not manifested at once. Not being self-luminous, they could shine only when some *pramāṇa* or other operates. On the contrary, when the *avidyā* concerning the self-luminous Ātman is dispelled, the self shines without the aid of any of the *pramāṇas*. Hence, in the case of the Self or Ātman, *śabda* generates direct, intuitive perception (*aparokṣa-jñāna*).

Meditation (*dhyāna*) cannot, says the Advaitin, terminate *avidyā*; for *saṃsāra* which is essentially unreal can be dispelled by knowledge arising from the *pramāṇas*, and not by meditation (*dhyāna*).

Refutation of the Advaitic View.

Nārāyaṇārya rejects the Advaitic view on the following grounds :

(i) Since scriptural texts, such as "The Self (Ātman) is to be seen" and "The Self (Ātman) is to be known," prescribe meditation (*dhyāna*) on the Self as the means to mokṣa, and since the knowledge born of scriptural texts cannot be enjoined (*vidheya*), knowledge arising from scriptures cannot be the means for attaining final release. Cessation of *avidyā* can never result from mere acquaintance with the import of Vedāntic texts.

(ii) There is little force in the Advaitic contention that knowledge afforded by Vedāntic texts does not bear fruit immediately, and that it dispels *avidyā* only after all the obstacles have been removed with the aid of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididdhyāsana*. For the obstacles preventing *vākya-janya-jñāna* from producing its result immediately are, on the Advaitic theory, illusory (*mithyā*), and must, therefore, disappear the moment knowledge of reality arises.

The Advaitin may seek to defend his position by saying that the obstacles may persist even when *vākya-janya-jñāna* has arisen, just as the cognition of two moons persists even when the conviction has arisen that there is but a single moon.

But this line of defence, says Nārāyaṇārya, is weak. The analogy is unhelpful, because the cognition of two moons is caused by some defect in the visual apparatus which is real and which is removable by an ointment. So long as the defect is not rectified (i.e., so long as the cause of the illusory perception of the double moon exists), the illusion is bound to persist, even after the conviction has arisen that the moon is single. Unlike the defect in the eye, the obstacles preventing the removal of avidyā are illusory and are, therefore, bound to cease the moment *vākya-janya-jñāna* arises.

The Advaitin may suggest that the knowledge which is capable of terminating the obstacles arises only at the completion of the stages of *manana* and *nididdhyāsana* when the doubt (*asambhāvanā*) concerning the correctness of the teaching imparted by the *guru* is resolved, and when long-established habits of thought (*viparīta-bhāvanā*) which are opposed to this teaching are broken. They might also add that when knowledge of Vedāntic texts dawns upon the mind, it does dispel *avidyā* forthwith. But this suggestion has no value; because when the causal factors necessary for *vākya-janya-jñāna* are present, it must arise immediately, and cannot wait for *manana* and *nididdhyāsana*.

(iii) The Advaitic view that *śabda* (Vedāntic text) generates intuitive apprehension (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) runs counter to experience. It is not open to the Advaitin to contend that *śabda* may produce *parokṣa-jñāna* or *aparokṣa-jñāna* according to the thing known; for, on his view, the Ātman is not an object of knowledge (*prameya*).

The Advaitin may urge that, although the Ātman is not really an object of knowledge, still it may be considered as such (i.e., as a *prameya*) in a secondary sense, in so far as the knowledge furnished by the *pramāṇas* dispels ignorance concerning the Ātman. To this Nārāyaṇārya replies that ignorance (*ajñāna*) concerning the Ātman must either be the Ātma-svarūpa itself or must have the Ātman for its basis (*āśraya*), and that it has already been shown that it cannot be either of these. Hence the Ātman cannot be called a *prameya* even in a secondary sense.

(iv) Since *samsāra* is real, and not phenomenal, the Advaitin cannot justly contend that knowledge arising from the *pramāṇas*, and not *dhyāna*, is competent to dispel *samsāra*.

(v) The texts cited by the Advaitin in support of the view that *vākya-janya-jñāna* is the means to mokṣa bear a different interpretation. Take, for example, the passage: "Those who practise *yāma* and the like, acquiring true knowledge of reality from the upaniṣadic texts, following the path of self-surrender (*nyāsa*), and

attaining mental purification, attain the Lord in the *Brahma-loka* and are freed from bondage to *samsāra*".⁴¹ Since self-surrender which arises after the understanding of the Vedāntic texts is also regarded as the means, *vākya-janya-jñāna* is not, by itself, the direct means of liberation.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga Samuccaya Vāda.

Some advocate the view that *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are the conjoint means of release from bondage. They interpret *Sāṅkhya* to mean 'the determination of the nature of reality' (*tattvānām avadhāraṇam*). It includes two phases—*śravaṇa* and *manana*. *Yoga*, too, is twofold—*jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*. Of these, *jñāna-yoga* is divisible into two forms—*sambhūti* and *vināśa*. *Sambhūti* is meditation on reality conceived as possessing qualities (*saviśeṣa-dhyāna*). *Vināśa* is meditation on reality looked upon as having no qualities (*nirviśeṣa-dhyāna*). *Karma-yoga* is accomplished through speech (*vāk*), body (*kāya*) and external objects. It entails the performance of duties which please the Lord, the avoidance of all other actions and the renunciation of the fruits of actions.

The view that *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are together the means of attaining mokṣa is said to be based on scriptural texts like the following.—“The universal cause is attainable by *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*”⁴² (*tat kāraṇam sāṅkhya-yogādi gamyam*). Of the two varieties of yoga—*jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*—the ascetics (*parivrajakas*) follow the former alone, while the rest have to practise both. And in every case, *jñāna-yoga* includes both *sambhūti* and *vināśa*. The following are some of the texts which seem to support this view.—“He who knows *vidyā* (*jñāna*) and *avidyā* (*karma*) conjointly, after crossing *samsāra* with the aid of *avidyā*, acquires immortality (*amṛta*) with the help of *vidyā*”.

Vidyāñca avidyāñca yas tad vedo' bhayam saha |
Avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyayā 'mṛtamaśnute ||⁴³

“He who knows *sambhūti* and *vināśa* conjointly, after crossing *samsāra* (*mṛtyu*) with the aid of *vināśa*, attains immortality (*amṛta*) with the help of *sambhūti*.”

Sambhūtiñca vināśañca yas tad vedo' bhayam saha |
Vināśena mṛtyum tīrtvā sambhūtyā 'mṛtamaśnute ||⁴⁴

41. *Tait. Up.*, X, 22.

42. *Śvet. Up.*, VI, 13.

43. *Īśa. Up.*, 11.

44. *Īśa. Up.*, 14.

Refutation of Sāṅkhya-yoga Samuccaya Vāda.

Sāṅkhya and *yoga* cannot be considered the conjoint means of liberation; for, as Nārāyaṇārya points out, scriptural texts not only declare that *vedana* is the means for achieving mokṣa, but also deny that there are other means therefor. Take, for example, the following text—"Knowing Him thus, he becomes immortal".⁴⁵

Further, the text—"Tat kāraṇam sāṅkhya-yogādi gamyam"—does not mean that Brahman is attainable by *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* as understood by the advocate of *Samuccaya-vāda*, but really asserts that Brahman is to be intuited by *jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*.

Moreover, the passage—"Vidyāṅca avidyāṅca yas tad vedo'bhayam saha . . ." does not bear out the view that *vidyā* and *avidyā* are conjointly the means for an identical goal, namely, mokṣa. For it states explicitly that *vidyā* leads to immortality; while *avidyā*, meaning what is other than *vidyā* (i.e., karma, prescribed duties), terminates the past deeds (karma) which prevent the rise of true knowledge. It is thus clear that *vidyā* alone is the real means for mokṣa.

Similarly, the text—"Sambhūti vināśaṅca yas tad vedo'bhayam saha . . ." does not declare that *sambhūti* and *vināśa* are the joint means of mokṣa; for they subservise different ends. Besides, the terms *sambhūti* and *vināśa* do not refer, as the advocate of *samuccaya-vāda* thinks, to *saviśeṣa-dhyāna* and *nirviśeṣa-dhyāna* respectively. *Sambhūti*, which literally denotes 'fullness' or 'perfection', here signifies, in a secondary sense, *vidyā*, in so far as *vidyā* is the means of attaining perfection. Likewise, the word *vināśa* which literally signifies that which perishes, refers, in a secondary sense, to karma, since the results brought on by karma are perishable. There is nothing in the text which could even remotely favour the interpretation that *sambhūti* and *vināśa* stand respectively for *saviśeṣa* and *nirviśeṣa dhyānas*.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Doctrine.

On the strength of upaniṣadic passages like—"The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme."⁴⁶ — the Viśiṣṭādvaitin maintains that *vedana* is the means of release. *Vedana*, otherwise known as *bhakti* (loving devotion), is different from, and is the result of, the knowledge afforded by Vedāntic texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*). It originates only in the mind (*manas*) which has been cleansed of its impurities by *viveka*, *vimoka*, *abhyāsa*, *kriyā*, *kalpāṇa anavasāda* and *anuddharṣa*. *Vedana* is referred to by terms, such as *dhyāna*, *upāsana* and *dhruvānusr̥ti*; and it

is akin to intuitive perception (*sākṣātkāra*). It is in itself exceedingly blissful, because the object of devotion is the very embodiment of bliss.

This interpretation of the meaning of *vedana* has the full support of the scriptures. That *vedana* is not to be confounded with *vākya-janya-jñāna* (knowledge born of scriptural texts) is taught in passages, such as "Having understood (the import of the upaniṣadic texts), he meditates on it"⁴⁷ (*anuvidya vijānāti*), and "Having known it, let him practise meditation"⁴⁸ (*vijñāya prajñām kurvīta*). Here the expression 'having understood' and 'having known' (*anuvidya*, *vijñāya*) merely refer to *vākya-janya-jñāna*; while the statements 'he meditates on it' and 'let him practise meditation' (*vijānāti*, *prajñām kurvīta*) enjoin meditation.

Brahmanandī has shown that *vedana* is gained only with the aid of *viveka*, *vimoka*, *abhyāsa*, *kriyā*, *kalyāṇa*, *anavasāda* and *anuddharṣa*. The scripture is explicit on the point that it is only the mind that has been rendered pure that intuitively apprehends the Real. *E.g.* "With the mind purified." and "It is seen by the mind ennobled." *Viveka* is mental purity obtained by excluding from the body impure food. *Vimoka* is non-attachment to objects of desire. *Abhyāsa* denotes repeated meditation on God. *Kriyā* signifies the performance of the duties appropriate to a person's station in life. *Kalyāṇa* means the practice of virtues like straightforwardness, truthfulness, non-injury and charity. *Anavasāda* is freedom from despondency even in the presence of the most trying and gloomy situations. *Anuddharṣa* is the opposite character; it signifies freedom from elation in the presence of situations productive of joy.

Since *dhyāna* (meditation), *upāsana* (worship) and *dhruvānusmṛti* (steady remembrance) are spoken of in different places in the upaniṣads as the means of liberation, and since the scriptures refuse to recognise anything except *vedana* as the path of release, it necessarily follows that *dhyāna*, *upāsana* and *dhruvānusmṛti* are synonymous with the term *vedana*.

The fact that *vedana*, which is akin to intuitive apprehension, becomes direct and immediate perception (*sākṣātkāra*) of Reality is learnt from texts such as the following:—"When he directly perceives Him who is of the golden hue. . . ." and "When He is seen. . . ."

Passages like the following:—"He is attained only by him whom He chooses; and he reveals His form only to him (whom he chooses)"⁴⁹—teach that *vedana* is of the nature of loving devotion (*bhakti*). Thus it is evident that *vedana* which is the means of mokṣa is knowledge which partakes of the nature of loving devotion (*bhakti*).

47. *Chānd. Up.*, VIII.xii.6.

48. *Bṛh. Up.*, VI.iv.21.

49. *Kaṭh. Up.*, II.23.

Exception may be taken to the view that *bhakti* is the means of release on the ground that, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and elsewhere, *karma* is held out as the means therefor. In one place, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* declares that persons like Janaka attained the perfected state only by traversing the path of *karma*. Elsewhere it is stated that the Lord Viṣṇu is worshipped only by him who performs the duties appropriate to his caste and station in life, and that no other form of worship pleases the Lord.

But this objection is lacking in force; for the verse quoted from the *Bhagavad-Gītā* does not state that *karma* is the means of transcendental felicity (*niśreyas*); but it only asserts that persons like King Janaka attained *siddhi* by following *karma-yoga*. This *siddhi* really denotes *jñāna-yoga*; for there are passages declaring that *karma* is the means of *jñāna-yoga* and that *mokṣa*, which is of the nature of the realisation of Brahman, is attained by supreme devotion (*para-bhakti*). Again, the statement that the performance of caste duties alone pleases the Lord and that nothing else moves Him contains not even the faintest suggestion that the performance of duties procures release directly.

The objector may say that since *upāsana* is said to be responsible for rooting out demerits (*pāpa-kṣaya*), it cannot be considered the means of liberation. He may add that *upāsana* cannot be the means at once for the removal of demerits and the realisation of *mokṣa*; for it is a well-known dictum that each *karma* has but a single result. He may go on to state that *upāsana*, unlike *jyotiṣṭoma* and so forth which can be performed several times and which may, on each performance, bear a different fruit, cannot be performed more than once. For *upāsana* is of the nature of steady and uninterrupted meditation continued till the hour when the soul parts once and for all from the body.

In reply to this objection, Nārāyaṇārya cites the authority of Āpas-tamba for saying that even action performed but once may bear more fruits than one. Moreover, since the meditation has the Supreme Lord Himself for its object there is nothing of value which it cannot secure. Several passages may be cited to prove that the loving contemplation of the Lord leads to diverse results, such as the destruction of demerits (*pāpakṣaya*), the access to *arcirādi-mārga* and the attainment of Brahman.

Prapatti-mārga.

In addition to *bhakti* the Viśiṣṭādvaitin accepts another path to liberation known as *prapatti*. *Nivedana*, *nikṣepa*, *nyāsa* and *prapadana* are alternative names for *prapatti*.

What leads to the supreme goal of life (*apavarga*) or to lesser benefits like heaven (*abhyudaya*) is termed *dharma*. It is of two kinds— (i) *siddha* (what exists as a fact, i.e. God) and (ii) *sādhya* (what has to be accomplished, i.e., sacrifice, gift and the like). There is nothing novel in speaking of God as an ever present means (*siddhopāya*) of release; for *śruti* and *smṛti* texts actually describe Him as *Dharma*. E.g. “..... Krishna, the ancient *Dharma* (*sanātana dharma*);” “Desirous of attaining mokṣa, I take refuge in Him who created the four-faced Brahmā and passed the Vedas on to him.” Thus, the Lord Himself may be adopted as the means to mokṣa. To adopt Him as the means is to surrender oneself to Him with the fervent prayer that as one is ignorant, sinful and unable to save oneself, the Lord Himself must, from out of His unbounded mercy, be one’s saviour.

While *bhakti-mārga* is to be followed only by persons who are qualified to study the Veda and who are mentally and spiritually fitted for undertaking the long and arduous process of training which *bhakti* involves, salvation along the path of self-surrender is open to all without distinction of caste or rank. Persons who cannot enter upon the path of *bhakti* either because they lack the necessary qualification (*adhikāra*) or because they do not possess the requisite mental and spiritual development and those who are unable to bear even for a minute longer the suffering of *samsāra* and are therefore intensely desirous of attaining Brahman immediately fling themselves on God’s compassion with the firm faith (*mahāviśvāsa*) that He will save. The Lord overlooks the faults of the devotee and saves him from the distress of *samsāra*.

10. THE NATURE OF MOKṢA

(*Niśreyasa-svarūpa-nirṇayādhikāra*)

Introductory.

The nature of the ultimate goal of life, *mokṣa*, has been differently conceived by the different systems of Indian thought. Nārāyaṇārya passes in review the Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Jaina, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Prābhākara, Bhāṭṭa, Advaita and Bhedā-bheda views on this question and finally expounds the Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of *mokṣa*.

The Buddhistic View.

Of the two types of Buddhistic idealism, the school known as Mādhyamika thinks that liberation consists in becoming vacuity (*śūnya*) by continual meditation on reality as vacuity (*śūnya*). The other type designated as the Yogācāra school considers *mokṣa* to be the state when the stream of consciousness or succession of ideas (*viññāna-santāna*) is

no longer artificially sundered into subject and object. This state is to be won by meditation on reality as momentary and as constituted of *sva-lakṣaṇas*, each of which is unique and describable only as itself.

Refutation of the Buddhistic View.

The gravamen of charge against these conceptions of liberation is they are inconsistent with the Buddhistic denial of a self persisting through the states of *samsāra* and release; for the notion of release implies previous bondage of the self as a distinct entity.

The Jaina Doctrine.

According to Jainism, salvation consists in reaching the top of the universe, known as *lokākāśa*. It is attained by the person, who, by right knowledge (*samyag-darśana*) and right conduct (*samyak-cāritra*), becomes free from bondage to karma and shines in his pristine purity.

Refutation of the Jaina Doctrine.

The Jaina account of liberation is unintelligible, because it implies that the soul proceeds and reaches the heights called *lokākāśa*. But the self, which is in its essential nature unchanging cannot proceed anywhere. Nor is it said by them that there is some other conscious entity ordaining its movement.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View.

The ideal of life as represented by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is one wherein the soul is divested of all its specific qualities (*viśeṣa-guṇa*), such as *jñāna*, pain and pleasure.

Refutation of the Nyāya View.

The main defect of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view is that it virtually amounts to stating that the self is destroyed at release; for then it is bereft of all experience. No one would ever care for a *mokṣa* of this barren sort. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* may perhaps argue that, as *mokṣa* denotes complete absence of miseries, it may become an object of human aspiration. But this argument has no value; for so long as it is held that the released soul does not realise its freedom from the travails of *samsāra*, a goal of that nature will never be sought by man. Does any one, asks *Nārāyaṇārya*, treat the absence of miseries on the part of a block of stone or wood as a *puruṣārtha*?

The Mīmāṃsā Doctrine.

Since the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā* defines *mokṣa* in a manner very similar to that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the criticisms levelled

against the latter apply with equal force to the former. The Bhāṭṭa school, however, maintains that mokṣa is a state of bliss (*ānanda*)⁵⁰ brought on by knowledge born of *manas*.

Criticism of the Bhāṭṭa View.

Lacking the necessary equipment of senses and the like and being unconnected with objects, the released soul must be denied knowledge and pleasure which depend respectively on the possession of instruments, such as the senses, and on contact with objects. How, then, can the Bhāṭṭas treat mokṣa as the experience of bliss resulting from *jñāna* when they deny the necessary instruments and objects ?

Bhāṭṭas may suggest in reply that the self is, in itself, pleasurable (*anukūla*) and that *manas* is eternally present and that consequently, the self may well experience pleasure in the state of liberation. But this suggestion, says *Nārāyaṇārya*, is valueless; because, even though *manas* is eternal, there can be no conjunction between the self and *manas*; for conjunction presupposes activity in one or both the relata and there could be no activity in either of these all-pervasive substances (*manas* being *vibhu* in their view). And even granting that knowledge and pleasure can arise in mokṣa, the Bhāṭṭa position is not free from defects. Since what originates must perish sooner or later, mokṣa would be impermanent.

Examination of the Advaitic View.

According to the Advaitins, mokṣa is the cessation of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛtti*). *Nārāyaṇārya* subjects this view to severe scrutiny and raises several objections to it. For one thing, if *avidyā-nivṛtti* signifies the destruction or negation of *avidyā*, then *avidyā* will always persist alongside of Brahman in one form or another thereby militating against the absolute monism of the Advaitins. For negation whether it be anterior negation (*prāg-abhāva*) or subsequent negation (*dhvamsābhāva*), denotes existence of the object in question in a different form. The anterior negation of the jar, for example, refers to its existence as clay; while the subsequent negation of the jar signifies its existence as potsherd.

To obviate this difficulty, the Advaitin may urge that *avidyā* is no substance (*dravya*) and that, therefore, its negation cannot mean its existence in some form or other. But this is no escape, because, if *avidyā*

50. The interpreters of Kumārila are not agreed on this point. While some *Mīmāṃsakas*, like the authors of *Māna-meyodaya*, maintain that mokṣa is a state of bliss, others like *Pārthasārathi* have questioned this interpretation and described mokṣa negatively as involving neither pleasure nor pain. See *Śāstra-Dīpikā*, pp. 126-8.

is not a substance, the world (*prapañca*) which is its handiwork cannot be a substance.

Again, if the Advaitin argues that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is Brahman itself, and not something distinct therefrom, Nārāyaṇārya replies that, as Brahman is eternal, knowledge of reality would be unnecessary for attaining Brahman. Moreover, since, on this view *avidyā-nivṛtti* is eternal, bondage which is the product of *avidyā* would for ever be impossible.

Nārāyaṇārya next points out that, if mokṣa were to signify the cessation of *avidyā*, it would be a negative result (*abhāva*) and, as such, it could not be an object of human endeavour (*puruṣārtha*); for none ever seeks a purely negative goal. If the Advaitin says that mokṣa means the removal of pain (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*) and that it may well be a *puruṣārtha*, Nārāyaṇārya replies that he has already shown that *duḥkha-nivṛtti* cannot be a *puruṣārtha*.

Recognising the difficulty involved in conceiving mokṣa in a purely negative manner, the Advaitin may seek to give it positive content by urging that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not, in itself, the goal, but that mokṣa consists in the appearance of Brahman in its true form as bliss consequent upon the removal of *avidyā*. This contention is unhelpful; because the manifestation of Brahman in its true form presupposes earlier obscuration (*tirodhāna*). And Brahman which is without distinctions of any kind and which is self-luminous can, at no time, be clouded.

And it has already been shown that, consistently with his philosophical position, the Advaitin cannot maintain that Brahman is of the nature of bliss. Even if it is conceded that Brahman is of the nature of bliss and that it manifests itself in this form when *avidyā* terminates, it would not follow that this could be a *puruṣārtha*. For it is most natural for a man to entertain the desire for happiness. He would scarcely say "let me manifest myself; let me be myself."

The Advaitin may urge that it is the direct experience of bliss that is sought. To this Nārāyaṇārya replies that experience necessarily presupposes an experiencer and that the admission of an agent amounts to abandoning the rigorous monism of the Advaitin.

Refutation of the Bhedābheda Doctrine.

Those who believe that the jīva is no other than Brahman under limiting conditions (*upādhi*) maintain that mokṣa is the state when Brahman is freed from these limiting adjuncts. In other words, mokṣa consists in the jīva becoming Brahman.

Nārāyaṇārya rejects this view as unsatisfactory for various reasons. What, he asks, does 'becoming Brahman' mean? If it signifies the dis-

appearance of limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*), it would, he says, be a purely negative result, and could not, for reasons already assigned, be considered the goal of life. If, however, it is interpreted positively to refer to the *jīva* who is associated with *upādhi* being identical with Brahman who is not so associated with *upādhis*, Nārāyaṇārya replies that he has already refuted the theory that the *jīva* is Brahman limited by *upādhis*.

Nārāyaṇārya further asks: Is the identity of the *jīva* with Brahman an ever-present fact? Or, is it acquired after the *upādhis* have been removed with the aid of knowledge of Reality? If it is the former, there would be no need to adopt any means for securing mokṣa. If it is the latter, the *jīva* must be either similar to Brahman, or must be distinct therefrom in the state of samsāra but later, at mukti, it must become identical with Brahman. The first alternative would militate against the monistic hypothesis of the Bhedābheda-vādin. The second alternative is equally unacceptable because an entity distinct from Brahman could never become identical with it.

Moreover, śruti and smṛti texts may be adduced in plenty to show that, at release, the *jīva* does not become one with Brahman. In view of this, the scriptural text—"The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman Himself"—must be interpreted to mean that the released soul attains to such similarity with Brahman as would justify his being called Brahman Himself.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic View.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, mokṣa consists in the eternal, illimitable and direct experience of Brahman who holds absolute sovereignty over the natural and the supernatural domains. This experience is obtained only by the person who, by constant worship, pleases the Lord, and gets rid, with the aid of the Lord's grace (*prasāda*), of all his merits and demerits (*puṇya* and *pāpa*). Even as straw and the like cannot stand before fire and are forthwith consumed by the flames, the good and bad deeds of the devotee melt away before the grace of the Lord. Just as water particles standing over the lotus leaf have no contact therewith, the past karma of the true devotee does not touch him any longer. With the load of karma thus lifted, he traverses the path of the gods (*devayāna*) wherein angels, such as Arcis, conduct the pilgrim on his onward march, and on reaching the Supreme Light (*Param Jyotis*), he shines in his true nature. Qualities, such as freedom from evil, which have so long been obscured by *avidyā* in the shape of karma, now shine forth. Except in the matter of the creation and sustenance of the world, which are the exclusive prerogatives of Brahman, the released soul becomes similar (*parama-sāmya*) to Brahman.

Unlike heavenly enjoyment which is impermanent, the experience of Brahman is everlasting. He who attains release never again returns to mundane existence. Since the soul exists for the sake of the Lord (i.e., since he is the *śeṣa*, and the Lord, the *śeṣin*), consistently with his true nature, he places himself at the disposal of the Lord, bows his will to that of the Lord and finds service (*kainkarya*) to Him a source of infinite joy (*rasāvaha*).

Several charges have been levelled against this view. For one thing, it has been said that, while the worship (*upāsana*) of *Saguṇa-Brahman* enables the self to attain similarity with Brahman, meditation upon Brahman in its true nature as a qualityless entity (*nirguṇa*) leads to a more ultimate goal, namely, oneness with Brahman itself. Nārāyaṇārya's reply to this charge is that worship of a qualityless Brahman (*nirguṇopāsana*) is impossible. The descriptions of the several *vidyās* (forms of worship) set forth in the scriptures uniformly end by stating that Brahman possesses qualities, such as bliss (*ānanda*). Further, he has already shown that Brahman is *saguṇa* and not *nirguṇa*.

A second charge is that if liberation is a state of enjoyment, the released soul must be characterised by love or attachment (*rāga*), and must necessarily reap its consequence, namely, pain (*duḥkha*). This criticism, says Nārāyaṇārya, goes wide of the mark; for it supposes that every kind of love is the harbinger of pain. The fact is that it is only the love that arises from subjection to karma that brings pain in its train. Far from causing misery, love of God enhances our joy.

A third objection takes the following form.—“The *jīva*, caught up in the wildfire of *samsāric* life, longs for escape from miseries and for the securing of happiness. For this purpose, he undertakes a long and arduous life of self-discipline only to find himself confronted with a life of eternal service and dependence. Is this not a case of labour wholly lost? All service is necessarily taxing and painful in its consequence. Further, in worldly life independence is praised as a thing of value, and dependence condemned. The scriptures too denounce in strong terms the life of servitude and dependence. A *mokṣa* of this kind must, therefore, be scarcely different from *samsāra*.”

Nārāyaṇārya's reply is that the *jīva* is not baulked of his hopes of attaining bliss in *mokṣa*. On the contrary, he does attain what he has striven for. It is an error to imagine that in every case service is painful. When the scriptures condemn service they really decry only the service that brings trivial results (*alpa phala*) and misery, and service rendered to undesirable persons. If the scriptures made a

sweeping condemnation of all service, there would be no room for laudable forms of service, such as helpfulness to the *guru*. Likewise dependence (*pāratantrya*) is not an evil in every case. Thus it is to be concluded that service to, and dependence on, the Lord are certainly a source of joy.

श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

भूमिका.

श्रीमन्नारायणार्थप्रतिभाद्रविणनिक्षेपायमाणं नीतिमालाभिधानं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं जीवित-
मिव जागर्ति श्रीमद्विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य । आदर्शविमलोऽयं प्रबन्धः नातिसंक्षेपविस्तर-
रमणीयैः प्रस्फुटार्थैः वाक्यजालैः न केवलं कुशाग्रधिषणानाम् , अपि तु मृदुप्रज्ञानामपि हृदय-
मावर्जयतीति नेदमनुभवापेतं वचनम् । तदेतत्प्रबन्धरत्नमियता कालेन केवलं श्रवणपथगोचरं
भूत्वा, दिष्ट्येदानीं दृष्टिपथमवतीर्णं विद्वज्जनानुभाव्यं भवतीति महदिदं पण्डितमण्डलीभागधेयम् ।
एतत्प्रबन्धप्रणेता नारायणार्याः कदा कतमं देशमलमकुर्वन्निति अदसीयैः अन्यदीयैर्वा
वचनैर्नेदन्तया निर्णेतुं शक्यते ; अथापि श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्तस्यैव तत्र तत्र श्रीभाष्य-
वाक्यान्मुदाहृत्य व्यवस्थापनात् , श्रीमद्वेदान्तदेशिकगुरुवर्यैः स्वप्रबन्धेष्वेतन्नीतिमालावाक्यानां
भूयिष्ठमुदाहरणाच्चेमे आचार्याः श्रीभाष्यकाराणामर्वाचीनाः श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहागुरुणां प्राची-
नाश्चेति सामान्यतो निर्णये मन्यामहे न विमर्शका विप्रतिपद्येरन्निति । तथा हि—श्रीम-
न्न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने जडद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे¹ ‘यत्तु नीतिमालायां नारायणार्यैरुक्तं “ज्ञानस्य तु
परात्त्वाभावमात्रमेव न तु प्रत्यक्तवम्” इति ।’ तथा तत्रैव परिच्छेदे² ‘नारायणार्यैस्तु
सम्भूतिविनाशशब्दौ फलद्वारा लक्षणया विद्याकर्मविषयावुक्तौ “विदुषो विद्यासाध्यस्याप-
वर्गस्य सम्यगभिवृद्धिरूपत्वात्” इत्यादिना’ इति । एवमीश्वरपरिच्छेदे³ ‘अयमेवार्थः
नारायणार्यैरप्युक्तः “गुणैरियत्ताराहित्याद्वैस्तुना अपरिच्छिन्नत्वञ्चावगम्यते” इति’ इति ।

1. न्याय सिद्धा Śrī Vaiṣṇava Siddhānta Grantha Ratnamālā Edition, Madras पुट 16.

2. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट 162, 163.

3. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट 212.

तत्रैवाद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे^४ 'यत्तु नारायणार्यैरुक्तं "संस्थानमेव जातिः तत्प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेऽपि द्वितीयादिपिण्डेषु सौसादृश्यात्प्रतिसन्धीयमानं स्वाश्रयेषु वस्तुषु एकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनं भवति । इति' एवं 'देवप्रीत्यादिकं वा' इति^५ तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापश्लोकस्य व्याख्यानावसरे 'आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे' इति नारायणार्याणामुक्तिः सर्वार्थसिद्धौ प्रस्तूयते । तथा तत्रैव 'आप्तस्याहुर्नियोगं हितमभिलषितं केऽपि भाष्याशयस्थम्' इत्यत्र सर्वार्थसिद्धौ^६ 'स्वपक्षनिष्ठानामेव केषाञ्चिदीश्वरनियोगरूपविधिपक्षं विविच्य दर्शयति' इत्यवतरणदर्शनात् श्लोके केचित्पदेन नारायणार्या अभिप्रेता इति स्पष्टमवगम्यते । एवं न्यायपरिशुद्धावपि^७ 'नारायणार्यैस्त्वेवमुक्तम्' इत्यारभ्य 'आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे । भाष्यकारोऽपि भगवानेतदेवान्वमन्यत' इति नीतिमालावचनमनूयते । तथा 'विध्युत्तयाधीत्य वेदान्' इति सारावलीश्लोकस्य^८ व्याख्याने चिन्तामणौ कुमारवरददेशिकः वचनमिदमुदाहरति ।

एवं मीमांसापादुकायां^९ 'सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यत्' इति श्लोके नारायणार्यास्सबहुमानं निर्दिश्यन्ते वेदान्तगुरुभिः । अतो निश्चप्रचमिदं वक्तुं शक्यते श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्तनिष्ठा

४. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट ३७५.

५. देवप्रोत्सादिकं वा विदितमिह विधिप्रत्ययस्यास्तु वाच्यं
नात्रान्योन्याश्रयो न श्रुतपरिहरणं नापि क्लृप्तिर्गिरिष्ठा ।
प्राधान्यं स्याच्च किञ्चिन्नृपमजननयात्सिद्धमेतच्च शास्त्रे-
रित्थं त्वर्थाविरोधेऽप्यतिगरिमभयान्नेष्यते शब्दशक्तिः ॥

Tatva-Muktā-Kalāpa पुट ६८०, Prof. Ramamiśra Śāstri, edition, Benares.

६. Tatva-Muktā-Kalāpa पुट ६८४.

७. न्याय परि (Memorial edition, Madras) पुट २८३.

८. अधिकरणसारावली श्लो. २०.

९. सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यद्विदुरथ च मिथो व्याहतं वृत्तिकाराः
प्राज्ञैर्नारायणार्यैस्तदिह विदधिरे सम्मतास्तूत्रभेदाः ।
सामाचार्योक्तिरेषा समरमुखगता तत्र सत्सङ्गृहीतेः

नत्वा नृत्वेनमाह द्रमिड्युवरपि ब्रह्मविद्वाक्यमाप्यम् ॥ मी. पा. श्लो. ११.

नारायणार्याः श्रीमन्निगमान्तगुरूणां प्राचीनाश्चेति । कचिदेतेषां नारायणार्याणां सिद्धान्त-
मननुमन्यमाना अपि निगमान्तगुरवः तत्र तत्र सबहुमानमेतानाचार्यान्निर्दिशन्तः स्वीयमाद-
रातिशयमाविष्कुर्वन्ति ।

एते च नारायणार्याः जैमिनीयानि मीमांसासूत्राणि पौनस्त्यादिदोषदूषितानि
मन्वानाः सङ्गृह्य सूत्राण्यन्यानि प्राचीकशन्निति पादुकापरित्राणे कुमारवरददेशिकाः प्रतिपा-
दयन्ति । तथा हि—‘सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यत्’ इति पादुकाश्लोके इमानि परित्राणवाक्यानि¹⁰
‘अत एव प्राज्ञा नारायणार्याः परिमितगभीराणि परस्परविरोधादिरहितानि सूत्राणि प्रणीय,
अधिकरणानां पञ्चशतीमेव मीमांसाशास्त्रमाचक्षते । अन्यानि पुनरधिकरणानि पौनस्त्यादि-
दोषदूषितान्यकथयन् यत्तु प्राज्ञैर्नारायणार्यैस्सङ्गृह्य कथनं न तज्जैमिनीयवचन-
दूषणायते । जैमिनिर्हि मन्दामन्दसकलशिष्यसंवित्तिसौकर्यार्थं मन्दप्रयोजनान्यधिकरणानि
पृथगनुकथयाञ्चकार । नारायणार्यास्तु प्रौढविद्वज्जनपरिग्रहाभिसन्धिना प्रधानार्थप्रकाशनेन
तुल्यन्यायतया सर्वमप्यर्थजातं परिमितेन ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण प्राचीकशन्निति द्वयोरप्यैकरस्यसिद्धि-
रिति न विरोधगन्धः’ इति । अतश्चेदमवगम्यते यदेते नारायणार्या न केवलमुत्तरमीमांसायां
पूर्वमीमांसायामप्यनितरसाधारणेन पाण्डित्यविमर्शयोः प्रकर्षेण व्यराजन्त इति । परन्तु
एतेषां मीमांसासङ्ग्रहः प्रौढविद्वज्जनहृदयङ्गमः नाद्य यावदस्माकं चक्षुर्विषयमवतरति ।
हन्त ! श्रीभगवद्रामानुजसिद्धान्तस्य अथवा सर्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य इदमेकं शोचनीयं वैशंसं
यद्बहूनां प्राचामाचार्यवर्याणां प्रबन्धाः भाग्यवैषम्यादस्माकं श्रोतुमपि दुर्लभतां गमिता इति ।

नारायणार्यनामकः कश्चिद्गीताभाष्यकर्ता श्रीमन्निगमान्तगुरुभिः तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां
न्यायपरिशुद्धौ चोदाह्रियते । यथा तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां¹¹ ‘अनियतधर्मपरित्यागोऽत्र विवक्षित
इति नारायणार्यव्याख्यायामपि नानुष्ठानविरोधः’ इति । यथा वा न्यायपरिशुद्धौ¹²

10. मी. पा. (edited by Navanītam Krishnamachariar), grantha script पृष्ठ 16.

11. गी. भा. Ananda Press, पृष्ठ 947.

12. न्याय परि. (Memorial edition) पृष्ठ 101.

‘उक्तञ्च नारायणार्यैः भगवद्गीताभाष्ये ‘प्रसिद्धमपि विज्ञानं वादे यो नाम निहुते । स सदस्यैर्नियन्तव्यो व्यवस्था नान्यथा यतः’ इति । नीतिमालाकर्तारस्तु नारायणार्याः नूनमेतस्मादन्य एव भवितुमर्हन्ति ; यत एते सर्वार्थसिद्धौ निगमान्तगुरुभिः स्वपक्षनिष्ठत्वेन व्यपदिश्यन्ते¹³ । गीताभाष्यप्रणेतास्तु नारायणार्याः सिद्धान्ततीर्थकरेभ्यः पृथक्कृत्य पिशाचरन्तिदेवशङ्करयादवादिमध्ये गीताभाष्यतात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां¹⁴ तैरेव निगमान्तगुरुभिः परिगण्यन्ते । यथा ‘पिशाचरन्तिदेवगुप्तशङ्करयादवप्रकाशभास्करनारायणार्ययज्ञस्वामिप्रभृतिभिः स्वं स्वं मतमास्थितैः परश्शतैः भाष्यकृद्भिः अस्मत्सिद्धान्ततीर्थकरैश्च भगवद्यामुनाचार्यभाष्यकारादिभिरविगीतपरिगृहीतोऽयमत्र सारार्थः’ इति ।

श्रीपाञ्चरात्ररक्षायां नित्यानुष्ठानस्थापनाधिकारे ‘भाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्यैः वज्जिवंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः’ इत्यारभ्य काश्चन कारिका उदाहृताः¹⁵ । एतेऽपि श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्याः नीतिमालाप्रणेतृभ्यो नारायणार्येभ्यो व्यतिरिच्यन्त एव ; यत एते ‘वज्जिवंशेश्वराः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्याः’ इति सोपपदं निर्दिश्यन्ते । नीतिमालाकर्तारस्तु निरुपपदं नारायणार्या इत्येव तत्र तत्र व्यपदिश्यन्ते । अत एव नीतिमालाकर्तुः नारायणार्याद्व्यवर्तयितुं ‘श्रीभाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्यैः वज्जिवंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः’ इति निर्दिशन्ति निगमान्तगुरुवः । வாங்கிப் பரக்கூ நம்பி इति भाषायां प्रसिद्धाः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्याः पाञ्चरात्ररक्षायामसकृदुदाहृतानां नारायणमुनीनां गुरुव इति सुस्पष्टमवगम्यते ; यतस्तत्रैव नित्यव्याख्यानाधिकारे नारायणमुनीन्प्रकृत्य ‘तद्गुरुभिः वज्जिवंशेश्वरैः’ इति प्रतिपादितमस्ति ।

13. cf. स्वपक्षनिष्ठानामेव केषाञ्चित् ईश्वरनियोगरूपविधिपक्षं विविच्य दर्शयति । सर्वार्थसिद्धिः पुट ६८४. Page 684.

ईश्वरनियोग एव विधिरिति पक्षः नारायणार्याणामेवेति तैरेवान्यत्र सर्वार्थसिद्धौ न्यायपरिशुद्धौ च प्रतिपाद्यते । Cf. भूमिका पुट २.

14. गी. मा. पुट 952.

15. श्रीपाञ्च-रक्षा (edited by Raghavachariar, Madras, Grantha Script) पुट ३०.

श्रीः

नीतिमालाविषयानुक्रमणी.



पु.

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‘ सत्यं ज्ञानम् ’ इति वाक्ये विशिष्टैक्यमेव सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयमिति प्रतिपादनम्	१८-१९
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श्रुत्यर्थापत्त्यनुमानप्रत्यक्षादिभिः प्रमाणैरविद्या सिद्धयतीति पूर्वपक्षः	२१-२२
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ब्रह्मणस्सगुणत्वे श्रुतिप्रदर्शनम्	”
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श्रुतिप्रामाण्यात्सर्वस्य परमात्मशरीरत्वसमर्थनम्	”
शरीरलक्षणप्रदर्शनम्	४०

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TEXTUAL READINGS.

Page	Line	Reading in the book	Variant Reading.
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4	10	मविरोधयन्नेव	मवबोधयन्नेव हि
5	11	परमपुरुषाराधन	परमपुरुषसमाराधन
9	3	साक्षात्कारेण	साक्षात्कारेण वा
„	16	तेषु तेषु तेषां	तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु तेषां
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„	18	भाव्यभयहेतु	भाव्युभयव्यवहारहेतु
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NOTES.

Page 30. Line 11.

Cf. *Jigñāsādhikaraṇa* in *Śrī Bhāṣya*

“நிரஸ்தாஸிலடு:ஸோஹ்மநந்தானந்தமாக் ஸ்ராட் ।

பவேயமிதி மோக்ஷார்த்தி ஸ்ரவணாதௌ ப்ரவர்த்தே ॥

அஹ்மர்த்தவிநாஸத்ரேந்மோக்ஷ இத்யப்யவஸ்யதி ।

அபஸர்பேதஸௌ மோக்ஷகதா ப்ரஸ்தாவகந்த: ॥

மயி நஸ்தே஽பி மத்तो஽ந்யா காசித் ஶஸிரவஸ்திதா ।

இதி தத்ஸாஸ்யே யத்ந: கஸ்யாபி ந பவிஸ்யதி ॥”

Compare also *Siddhitrāya* of Yāmunācārya, pp. 60-1 (Anna-malai University Edition).

“நஹி மயி நஸ்தே஽பி கோ஽பி ப்ரகாஸ: ஸ்யாஸ்யதீதி கஸ்தித்ஸேக்ஷாவான்மயஸ்யதி ॥”

Page 44. Line 7.

Cf. Vedānta Deśika's *Tātparyā Candrikā*, an elaborate commentary on *Gītā Bhāṣya* by Bhagavān Rāmānuja.

“நச் லோகே நிமித்தோபாடானபேததர்ஸனமாத்ரஹ்ரோஃ ; லோகிககாரணவிலக்ஷணத்வா-
च्छुतिसिद्धस्य ब्रह्मणः अन्ततो वैशेषिकादिभिरपि घटेश्वरगतसंयोगविभागद्वित्वपृथक्त्वादि-
कार्येष्वीश्वरस्यैव निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं चाभ्युपगतमिति नास्मन्मते दोषः । तथा बुद्धिपूर्वक-
स्वसुखोत्पादनादावपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥”

Page 47, Line 20.

Cf. Vedānta Deśika's *Paramatabhaṅga* in the chapter *Lokā-
yatika Bhaṅga*—

“ஆகையால் பலவாய் கரணங்களாய் தோற்றுகிற வஸூராதிகளிற் காட்டில்
வ்யதிரித்தான ஆத்மா ப்ரத்யக்ஷன். கண் காணுகின்றது செவ்வி கேளாடுகின்றது
என்றபுப்போலே சொல்லும் வ்யபதேஸங்களும் ஸபகாரத்தாலே என்னுமிடம் என்
கண் காணுகின்றதென்கையாலே சித்தம், சலதபாவின் வாக்யம் ஶரணாஸ்தரக்ஷணாபிஸந்தி
யாலே அந்யபரம் ॥”

Page 59.

For a refutation of the Bhāṭṭa view see Vedānta Deśika's
Seśvara Mīmāṃsā, p. 15

“तथा च शाबरमुत्त्वमायितम्” etc.

“यत्तु शब्दभावनेति कुमारिलकुक्षतिः” etc.

BHĀVANĀVIVEKA

BY

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WITH

VIṢAMAGRANTHIBHEDIKA

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नैतत्सारम्—

कार्यं विभागसंयोगलक्षणं चलतीति धीः ।

१आलम्बतां ततो नान्यो विशेषो गम्यते^२स्थितात् ॥ १७ ॥

स खलु परिस्पन्दोऽक्षगोचरः पूर्वोत्तरदेश^३विभागसंयोगफलो-

एतद्वृषयितुमाह—नैतत्सारम्—

कार्यं विभागसंयोगलक्षणं चलतीति धीः ।

आलम्बते(तां) ततो नान्यो विशेषो गम्यते स्थितात् ॥ (इति) ॥

अयमर्थः—भवत्वाश्रयव्यतिरिक्तमालम्बनं चलतिप्रत्ययस्य, तथापि न पूर्वोत्तर-देशविभागसंयोगातिरिक्तं किञ्चिदस्ति तद्वेतुभूतं परिस्पन्दाख्यं वस्तु । किन्तु(न्तु त)कार्य-त्वाभिमतौ देशसंयोगविभागौ चलतीति प्रत्ययो गोचरयति । न च स्थितादस्थितस्य विशेषः ततोऽन्य उपलभ्यत इति श्लोकस्यार्थः ।

एतमेवार्थं स्पष्टीकरोति—स खल्वित्यादिना । स खलु परिस्पन्दोऽक्षगोचरो-ऽभ्युपगम्यमानः पूर्वोत्तरदेशविभागसंयोगफलोऽभ्युपगम्यते परिस्पन्दवादिना । तथा च सति तावेव संयोगविभागौ उभयवादिसंप्रतिपन्नौ विषयो करोत्ये(त्वे)ष चलतिप्रत्ययः, न तद्वेतुत्वेनाभिमतं परिस्पन्दाख्यमर्थान्तरम्, एकतरवाद्यसिद्धेः । ननु न वस्तु सत्ता-मात्रेण प्रतीतेर्विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यते, किन्तु तदनुविद्धतया । न (च) चलतीतिप्रत्यये संयोगविभागयोरनुवेधोऽस्ति । तत्र कथं तद्विषयभावः इत्याशङ्क्याह—न खल्विति । अयमर्थः—पूर्वोत्तरदेशविभागसंयोगावप्रतिपद्यमानः पुरुषश्चलतीति न प्रतिपद्यते, किन्तु

१. आलम्बते—क, ख.

२. लक्ष्यते—क, ख, ग, घ, ङ.

३. देशसंयोगविभागफलः—ग, घ; संयोग-फल-ङ

ऽभ्युपगम्यते^१ । तथा च तावेव^२ गोचरयत्वेऽपि प्रत्ययः । न खलु पूर्वो-
त्तरदेशहानोपादाने अप्रतिपद्यमानश्चलतीति बुध्यते । न च स्थिता-
न्निपुणतोऽपि निरूपयद्भिरन्यो विशेषः^३ चलतीति लक्ष्यते^४ ।

ननु^५ चलित्वा स्थितोऽपि संयोगविभागवानेव^६, न चलतीति

प्रतिपद्यमान एवेति । यदि पुनः संयोगविभागौ न चलतीतिप्रत्ययस्य विषयो
स्याताम्, तदा तदप्रतिपत्तावपि चलतीतिप्रत्ययः उदी(दि)यात् । न चोदेति । तस्मादव-
गम्यते पूर्वोत्तरदेशविभागसंयोगविषयः चलतीतिप्रत्ययः इत्यक्षरचतुष्टयाधिकस्य श्लोक-
पूर्वार्धस्यार्थः ।

ननु संयोगविभागयोः चलतीतिप्रतीतौ प्रतीतिः चलत्यर्थव्यतिरिक्तयोरपि सतोः
तत्साहचर्यनियमादुपपद्यते । अतश्चलतिप्रत्ययविषयस्ताभ्यामन्य एवेत्याशङ्क्य उत्तरतया
वि(अव)शिष्टश्लोकैकदेशं व्याचष्टे—न च स्थितादिति । अस्ति तावत्स्थिता^७दस्थितस्य
कश्चिद्विशेषः । स च पर्यालोच्यमानः संयोगविभागाभ्यामन्यो^{१०} न गम्यते । व्यतिरेके
निश्चिते तत्साहचर्यात्तत्प्रतीतौ प्रतीतिरिति वक्तुं वा शक्येत । न च व्यतिरेको निश्चितः,
^{११}प्रमाणाभावादिति ।

इदानीं चलतिप्रत्ययस्य संयोगविभागमात्रोलम्बनत्वपक्षेऽतिप्रसङ्गं चोदयति—ननु
चलित्वा स्थितोऽपीति । अयमर्थः—चलित्वा स्थितोऽपि देवदत्तः पूर्वोत्तरदेशविभागसंयोग-

१. अभ्युपेयते—ख, ख, ग, ड.

७. 'एव' नास्ति—ग, घ, ड.

२. गोचरयत्वे—क, ख.

८. अतश्चलतिः—छ.

३. पूर्वोत्तरदेशापादानो—ड.

९. दितिः । तस्य—च.

४. न्यो व्यापारः—ग, घ, ड.

१०. न्योज्ज—छ

५. लभ्यते—क.

११. प्रमाणभावादिति—च.

६. चलत्वात्—ग, घ, ड.

गम्यते । अन्यतरकर्मजन्मनोश्च संयोगविभागयोर्द्विष्टत्वेनोभयत्र^१-
क्रियाप्रत्ययप्रसङ्गः । स्थाणुश्चेनयोर्विभागमात्रम्, एकत्र समुदितयो-
स्तद्वेतुत्वमिति चेत्—अन्यतरकर्मजन्मनोरुभयोरपि^२ प्रसङ्गः ; यदा
स्थाणुरेकेन श्येनेन संयुज्यतेऽन्यतश्च वियुज्यते । न च क्रमविशेष-

वानेवेति चलतीति प्रतीयेत । न च प्रतीयते । किञ्च, यत्रान्यतरकर्मजन्मानौ संयोगविभागौ,
यथा स्थाणुश्चेनयोः, तत्र स्थाणौ श्येने चोभयत्रापि चलतीतिप्रत्ययप्रसङ्गः । न हि स्थाणु-
श्चलतीति प्रतीयते, किन्तु श्येन एवेति । तदेतदाह—अन्यतरकर्मजन्मनोरित्यादिना ।
तत्र शङ्कते—स्थाणुश्चेनयोरित्यादिना । अयमभिप्रायः—संयोगविभागमात्रालम्बनत्वेऽपि
चलतिप्रत्ययस्य न स्थाणौ प्रसङ्गः, संयोगविभागयोः समुदितयोस्तत्राभावात्, विभागमात्रस्यैव
भावात् । तथाहि—उत्पतति श्येने तेन विभागमात्रं स्थाणोर्भवति, न तु देशान्तरसंयोगः ।
न तु विभागमात्रं चलतीति प्रत्ययस्यालम्बनम्, आश्रयान्तरसमवेतसंसंयोगसहितं वा, किन्त्वे-
कलाश्रये समुदितयोस्तत्संयोगविभागयोश्चलतिप्रत्ययविषयत्वमिति । एवमाशङ्कं दर्शयित्वा उत्तर-
माह—अन्यतरकर्मजन्मनोरिति । अन्यतरस्य संयोगविभागौ यदा समुदिता(व)न्यतर-
स्मिन्नुत्पद्येते, तदा तत्रापि चलतिप्रत्ययप्रसङ्गः । एतदेवोदाहरणनिष्ठं दर्शयति—यदा स्थाणु-
रिति । यदा स्थाणुरेकेन श्येनेन संयुज्यते, श्येनान्तराच्च वियुज्यते, तदा^४ श्येनकर्मजन्मानौ
संयोगविभागौ स्थाणौ समुदितौ विद्येते इति स्थाणुश्चलतीति प्रत्ययः प्रसज्येत ।
ननु क्रमविशेषवन्तौ संयोगविभागौ चलतीति प्रत्ययस्यालम्बनम् । तथाहि—पूर्व-
देशविभागपुरस्सरोत्तरदेशसंयोगवांश्चलतीति प्रतीयते । ततो युगपच्छ्येनद्वय(विभाग)संयोगवति
स्थाणौ न तत्प्रसङ्ग इत्याशङ्क्याह—न च क्रमविशेषवन्ताविति । विशिष्टक्रमोपेतौ संयोगविभागौ

१. नोभयक्रिया—ग, घ, ङ.

२. 'अपि' नास्ति—ग, घ, ङ.

३. 'अन्यतश्च वियुज्यते'—नास्ति—ङ.

४. यथा—च.

५. 'तदा'—नास्ति—च.

६. चलतिप्रत्ययस्य—छ.

वन्तौ तदालम्बनम् । पुरःसंयुक्त^१श्येनान्तरविभागपुरस्सरेऽपि श्ये-
नान्तर संयोगेऽभावात् ।

उच्यते—

अच्छिन्नोत्पत्तयो देशविशेषत्यागसङ्गमाः ।

^२तद्गोचराः पदार्थानामाकाशो देश इष्यते ॥ १८ ॥

न खलु संयोगविभागमात्रे^३ चलतीति प्रत्ययः । अपित्व^४-
विच्छिन्नोत्पादसंयोगविभागप्रबन्धे^५ । स्थिते च तदभावः । नच

चलतिप्रत्ययस्यालम्बनमित्येतदपि न युक्तम् । कुतः ? पूर्वसंयुक्तश्येनान्तरविभागपुरस्सर-
श्येनान्तरसंयोगो यदा भवति स्थाणोः, तदापि चलतिप्रत्ययस्याभावात् । तस्मान्न संयोग-
विभागालम्बनश्चलतिप्रत्यय इति ॥

अस्योत्तरमाह—उच्यते—

अच्छिन्नोत्पत्तयो देशविशेषत्यागसङ्गमाः ।

तद्गोचराः पदार्थानामाकाशो देश इष्यते ॥ (इति) ॥

अयमर्थः—न संयोगविभागमात्रं चलतिप्रत्ययस्यालम्बनम् । नचार्थान्तरम्, किन्तु
त एव संयोगविभागा अच्छिन्नोत्पत्तयस्तस्य गोचराः । चलित्वा स्थिते च तेषामेवविशिष्टा-
नामभावान्न चलतिप्रत्ययप्रसङ्गः । सर्वेषामेव पदार्थानामाकाशं देशसंयोगमात्रात् । (देशः।

१. श्येनविभाग—क, ग, घ, ङ.

२. तद्गोचरः—क, ख ; तद्गोचर—ग, घ, ङ.

३. माने—क, ख.

४. अच्छिन्नो—क, ख.

५. प्रबन्धः—ग, घ, ङ.

६. अच्छिन्नोत्पत्तय इति—च.

७. माकाशं—ङ.

८. माकाशं देशः न संयोगमात्रात्—च ;

१स्थाणौ देशविशेषविषयौ २संयोगविभागौ ; संयोगिमात्रस्या३देश-
त्वात् । नहि श्येनौ स्थाणोर्देशाविति प्रतियन्ति लौकिकाः । आकाश
एव तु सकलदेशिपदार्थानां देश इति प्रतीमः । अतस्तत्प्रदेश-
संयोगविभागावेव तदालम्बनमिति स्थाणौ न प्रसङ्गः ॥

ननु व्योम्नोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वाद्वायुवनस्पतिसंयोगविभागवत्त-
त्संयोगविभागानां प्रत्यक्षावृत्तित्वेनानैन्द्रियकत्वादिन्द्रियजन्मनः
६प्रत्यक्षस्य विषयता न युक्ता ।

तत्संयोगविभागाभ्यामेव 'चलति' इति प्रत्ययः । न संयोगविभागमात्रात् । अत-
७स्थाणौ श्येनसंयोगविभागवत्यपि८ आकाशेन संयोगविभागयोरभावात्तद्देशसंयोगविभागः
विषयत्वाच्चलतिप्रत्ययस्य न प्रसङ्ग इति । तदेव प्रपञ्चयति—न खल्वित्यादिना प्रसङ्ग इत्यन्तेन ।
नात्र तिरोहितमिव किञ्चिदस्ति ।

सकलपदार्थानामाकाशं देशः, तत्संयोगविभागाश्च चलतिप्रत्ययविषया इत्युक्ते चोद-
यति—ननु व्योम्नः ९ इति । अयमभिप्रायः—आकाशस्य रूपादिरहितत्वेनाप्रत्यक्षत्वात्त-
त्संयोगविभागानामपि प्रत्यक्षत्वमयुक्तम्, १०प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षवृत्तिवात्, यथा वायुवनस्पतिसंयोग-
विभागानाम् । चलतिप्रत्ययश्चेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानादैन्द्रियकः । अतोऽस्य न तद्विष-
यता युक्तेति ।

१. स्थाणोः देशविषयोः—क. ख.

६. प्रत्ययस्य—ग, घ, ङ.

२. 'संयोगविभागौ' इत्यादिः 'तत्प्रदेश'

७. स्थाणोः—घ.

इत्यन्तो ग्रन्थः क, ख. मातृकयोर्न दृश्यते.

८. 'अपि' नास्ति—छ.

३. स्यादष्टत्वात्—ङ.

९. व्योम इति—छ.

४. 'विभाग' नास्ति—क, ख, ङ.

१०. प्रत्यक्षात् प्रत्यक्ष—छ.

५. त्वादिति च जन्मनः—ख.

न न^१ युक्ता । अन्यथा—

कथं गम्येत वयसो नियता^२धारदेशता ।

चलतोऽक्षातिवृत्ताश्चेद्विहायोदेशसङ्गमाः^४ ॥ १९ ॥

‘अप्रत्यक्षत्वे हि ^६नभोविभागसंयोगादीनां कथं पतति पतत्रिणि ‘देशभेदाधिकरणज्ञानम् ? क्रियया कारणेन कार्यानुमानादिति चेत्—न ; नियतदे^३शाधिकरणप्रतीतेः । इह प्राप्तः^५ नेह इति ^{१०}नियतप्रत्ययो न देशविशेषसंयोगाप्रत्यक्षतायामवकल्पते । वियद्विततालोक^{११}निवहभेदादुपपन्न ^{१२}इति चेत्—स^{१३} एव तर्ह्याकाशदेश इति ^{१४}तद्वर्तिसंयोगविभागौ प्रत्यक्षौ ।

अत्रोत्तरमाह—नन युक्ता । अन्यथा—

कथं गम्येत वयसो नियताधारदेशता ।

चलतोऽक्षातिवृत्ताश्चेद्विहायोदेशसङ्गमाः ॥ (इति) ॥

अयमभिप्रायः—अप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि नभसः तत्संयोगविभागानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमेष्टव्यम् । अन्यथा कथं गम्येत इह प्राप्त इति । अत्र हि इह प्राप्त इति नभोभागेन संयोगः पतत्रिणोऽवगम्यते । तच्च नोपपद्यते, यदि विहायोदेशसङ्गमाः आकाशदेशसंयोगाः अक्षातिवृत्ताः इन्द्रियागोचराः भवेयुरिति । एतद्व्याचष्टे—अप्रत्यक्षेत्यादिना । तत्र शङ्कते—^{१५}क्रियया

१. ननु युक्ता—ग, घ, ङ. अयं नास्ति—
ख मातृकायाम्.

२. अपदेशता—ग, घ, ङ.

३. अक्षातिवृत्ताश्चेत्—ग, घ, ङ.

४. सङ्गमान्—क, ख.

५. प्रत्यक्षत्वे—क, ख.

६. नभोभागविभागसंगमानां कथं खं पतेति—ख.

७. देशविशेषा—क, ख.

८. देशधारताप्र—क, ख. देशधारप्र—
ग, घ, ङ.

९. प्राप्तौ—क.

१०. ‘नियतप्रत्ययो’ नास्ति—ख.

११. निचर्यावयव निबन्धनत्वात्—ग, घ, ङ.

१२. मिति—ख, ग, घ, ङ.

१३. ‘स एव तर्ह्याकाशदेशः’ इति नास्ति—क.

१४. तद्वृत्ति—क, ख.

१५. क्रियाकारणेनेति—च.

अपि च—प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्ष^१वृत्त्योरपि संयोगविभागयोः सिद्धयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वकल्पना युक्ता, ^२न त्वसिद्धस्य कर्मणः । ताभ्यामेव तर्हि

कारणेनेति । अयमाशयः—क्रिया संयोगविभागयोः हेतुभूता प्रत्यक्षगृहीता स्वकार्याणां संयोगविभागानां अनुमाने लिङ्गं भवति, ततश्च इह प्राप्त इति देशविषयमनुमानमिति नोक्तदोष इति । एतन्निराकरोति—न नियतदेशाधिकरणप्रतोतेरिति । इह प्राप्तो नेह इति न विशिष्ट-देशसंबन्धनियतः प्रत्ययो विशिष्टदेशनियतपदार्थाश्रितसंयोगाप्रत्यक्षतायामवकल्पते । पुन-
श्शङ्कते—वियद्विततालोकनिवहभेदादुपपन्न इति चेदिति । वियत्याकाशे विततो यः आलोक-
निवहः, तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात्तत्संयोगस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वोपपत्तेः तद्वेदादेव इह प्राप्तो नेह इति प्रत्यय
उपपन्न इति चेदिति । परिहरति—स एव तर्हीति । इहेति प्रत्ययस्यालोकनिवहो विषयश्चेत्
स एवाकाशदेश इति तद्वर्तिसंयोगविभागो प्रत्यक्षाविति ॥ यद्यप्याकाशसंयोगविषय एव इहेति
प्रत्ययः, आकाशं चाप्रत्यक्षम्, तथापि तत्संयोगविभागानामेव चलतिप्रत्ययालम्बनत्वं ग्रहीतुं
युक्तम्, न तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मण [एव] इति ।

एतदेव हेत्वन्तरेण द्रढयति—अपि चेत्यादिना । अयमर्थः—देशसंयोगविभाग-
योस्सद्भावस्तावत् ^३सिद्धः । प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षवृत्तित्वेन तु प्रत्यक्षत्वमेव सन्दीत्य(न्दिह्य)मानं
वर्तते । कर्मणः पुनस्सद्भावोऽप्यसिद्धः । दूरे प्रत्यक्षता । तत्र कर्मणः स्वरूपप्रत्यक्ष-
त्वद्वयकल्पनातस्सिद्धयोः संयोगविभागयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वमात्रकल्पनं वरम्, लाघवादित्यभि-
प्रायः । एवं क्रियायाः प्रत्यक्षत्वे निराकृते तत्सद्भावं संयोगविभागकार्यलिङ्गकेनानु-
मानेन समर्थयतां मतमनुभाष्य(ष)ते—ताभ्यां तर्हीत्यादिना । भवतु संयोगविभागावेव प्रत्यक्षौ,
न क्रिया । ^४तान्तु संयोगविभागाभ्यां लिङ्गाभ्यामनुमिमिमहे । कथं पुनः संयोगविभागयोः
क्रियां प्रति हेतुत्वमित्याशङ्क्याह—कादाचित्कयोरहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेरिति । संयोगविभागौ

१. वृत्तयो—ख.

२. न त्वप्रसिद्धस्य—ख.

३. सिद्धप्रत्यक्षा—च.

४. ताम्यान्तु—च

५. पत्तिरिति—च.

संयोगविभागाभ्यां क्रियामनुमिमीमहे, कादाचित्कयोरहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः । कादाचित्क^१त्वादेव चाश्रयमात्रहेतुत्वायोगात् हेत्वन्तरापेक्षणात् ।

नैतत्सारम् ; यतः—

नित्यत्वे सर्वदा जन्म स्यात्संयोगविभागयोः ।

अनित्यत्वे^२ऽस्य यो हेतुस्तयोरेवास्तु तेन किम् ॥ २० ॥

तद्वि कर्म संयोगविभागाभ्यां नित्यमनित्यं वा अनुमीयते । नित्यत्वे हेतुसन्नि^३धानाद्धेत्वन्तरानपेक्षत्वाच्च सदा संयोगविभागो-

तावत्कादाचित्कौ, न नित्यौ । अतस्तयोरहेतुत्वं नोपपद्यते । भवितव्यमन्येन केनचिद्धेतुना । भवतु कादाचित्कत्वाद्धेतुमात्रापेक्षा संयोगविभागयोः । हेतुत्वं च ^४तदाश्रयस्यैवाश्रीयताम् । तत्र कथं तद्व्यतिरेकिणी क्रिया अनुमीयते इत्येतामाशङ्कामपनेतुमाह—कादाचित्कत्वादिति । आश्रयमात्रहेतुत्वानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायां यदनयोः कादाचित्कत्वम्, ततः कादाचित्कत्वादाश्रयव्यतिरिक्तस्य हेतोरनुमातुं शक्यत्वादनुमेया क्रिया । कथं तर्ह्यश्रयमात्रस्य हेतुत्वानुपपत्तिः ? उच्यते । सत्यप्याश्रये कदाचिदेव संयोगविभागावुत्पद्येते, न सर्वदा । अतो न तन्मात्रहेतुकौ । यश्च तद्व्यतिरिक्तो हेतुः तयोः, सा क्रियेत्युच्यते ।

एतन्निराकरोति—नैतत्सारम्—(यतः)

नित्यत्वे सर्वदा जन्म स्यात्संयोगविभागयोः ।

अनित्यत्वेऽस्य यो हेतुस्तयोरेवास्तु तेन किम् ॥

यत्संयोगविभागाभ्यामनुमातुमिष्टं कर्म तस्य नित्यत्वं वा स्यात्, अनित्यत्वं वा । नित्यत्वे सर्वदा तत्कार्यत्वाभिमतयोस्संयोगविभागयोर्जन्म स्यात् । न चास्ति । अनित्यत्वे अस्यापि

१. त्वादेवाश्रयहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः तन्मात्रहेतुत्वा-
नुपयोगात्—स्र.

३. धानात्तदन्यानपेक्षणात्सर्वदा—क, स्र.

४. तदाश्रित—च.

२. तस्य हेतुः—क, स्र.

त्पादप्रसङ्गः । अनित्यत्वे तु^१ तस्यापि हेतुमत्त्वात्तद्धेतुत्वमिमतादेव तत्सिद्धिरिति^२ किमन्तर्गडुना कर्मणा ।

यस्तु मन्यते—नित्यत्वादन्तरङ्गत्वाच्च कर्मैव कारणं संयोगविभागयोः, न प्रयत्नादि^३, बहिरङ्गत्वात्^४ व्यभिचारित्वाच्च । तथाहि—कर्मैकार्थसमवायिनः संयोगविभागसंस्काराः । कर्मणि च सति

कर्मणोऽन्यो हेतुरन्वेष्ट्यः पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन । तथा च सति यः कर्मणो हेतुत्वेनाभिमतोऽर्थः स तयोरेव संयोगविभागयोर्हेतुरस्तु, किमन्तराले कल्पितेन कर्मणा । अमुमेवार्थं स्पष्टीकरोति—तद्वीत्यादिना कर्मणेत्यन्तेन ग्रन्थेन ।

कर्मणो यो हेतुरभिप्रेतः स संयोगविभागयोरेवास्तु, ^५न कर्म तयोः कारणमित्युक्ते शङ्कते—^६न नित्यत्वा (यस्तु मन्यते—नित्यत्वा) दित्यादिना । अयमर्थः—कर्मैव संयोगविभागयोः कारणम्, न तत्कारणत्वाभिमतः प्रयत्नादिः । नित्यं हि कर्म अन्तरङ्गम् । नित्यत्वं कार्याव्यभिचारित्वमभिप्रेतम् । अन्तरङ्गत्वं च कार्येणैकार्थसमवायः । अतो नित्यत्वादन्तरङ्गत्वाच्च कर्मैव कारणम् ; न प्रयत्नादिः (दि), वैपरोत्यात्, यतस्तद्वहिरङ्गम्, व्यभिचारि च । तथाहीत्यादिना कर्मणो नित्यत्वमन्तरङ्गत्वञ्च दर्शयति । यस्मिन्करचरणादौ कर्मणस्समवायः, तस्मिन्नेव संयोगविभागसंस्काराणामपीत्यन्तरङ्गत्वम् । अत्र संस्कारशब्देन इष्वादिसमवायिनो वेगादेर्ग्रहणम् । तस्य च संयोगविभागाभ्यां तुल्यन्यायत्वात्पासङ्गिकमभिधानम् । कर्मणि च सतीत्यादिना कर्मणो नित्यत्वं दर्शयति । कर्मणि सति नियमेन संयोगविभागयोर्भावः । ततः कार्यं प्रति कर्म न व्यभिचरति । ननु कर्मणि सति नियोगतः ^७कार्यभावः कुतो ज्ञायते इत्याशङ्क्याह—कार्यानुमितस्येति । यः कार्येणैवानुमीयते हेतुः प्रमाणान्तरस्यागोचरः, ^८कार्याभावे तस्य सत्तायां प्रमाणं नास्ति । कार्यैकगम्यस्य कार्याभावे

१. 'तु' नास्ति—क, ख.

२. किन्तर्गडुना कर्मणा—क, ख. किमन्तर्गत-
गडुना—ङ.

३. प्रयत्नादिः—ग, घ, ङ.

४. व्यभिचाराच्च—क, ख.

५. 'न' नास्ति—छ.

६. 'न' नास्ति—छ.

७. कार्याभावः—छ.

८. अगोचरं—ख.

१नियोगतस्तत्सद्भावः, २कार्यानुमितस्य हेतोस्तदभावे सत्ताप्रमाणा-
भावात् । ३प्रयत्नस्त्वात्मस्थः । सत्यपि च प्रयत्ने बहुषु संयुक्तेषु
४कश्चिदेव ५प्रयत्नाद्देशान्तरं प्राप्नोति ।

स वक्तव्यः—

प्रसिद्धस्यान्तरङ्गत्वान्नित्यत्वाद्धेतुता भवेत् ।

अकारणत्वमन्यस्य यदि कर्म ततः कथम् ॥ २१ ॥

बहुसमवधाने हि नित्यत्वान्तरङ्गत्वाभ्यां प्रसिद्धसद्भावं वस्तु

प्रमाणाभावादभाव एव कर्मणोऽवसीयत इति न तस्य कार्यं प्रति व्यभिचार इति । प्रयत्न-
स्त्वात्मसमवायित्वाद्बहिरङ्गं न भिन्नाधिकरणस्य कार्यस्य कारणं भवितुमर्हतीत्यर्थः । प्रयत्नस्य
कार्यं प्रति व्यभिचारं दर्शयति—सत्यपि च आत्मस्थे प्रयत्ने बहुषु शरीरावयवेषु प्रयत्नवता
आत्मना संयुक्तेषु कश्चिदेवैकः शरीरावयवः संयोगविभागकार्यवान् भवति, न सर्वः । अतो
व्यभिचारी प्रयत्नो न हेतुर्भवितुमर्हति—इति ।

एवं पराभिप्रायमाशङ्क्योत्तरमाह—स वक्तव्य इति । 'यस्तु मन्यते' इत्यत्र यच्छब्देन
'स वक्तव्यः' इत्यत्र तच्छब्दस्य संबन्धः ।

प्रसिद्धस्यान्तरङ्गत्वान्नित्यत्वाद्धेतुता भवेत् ।

अकारणत्वमन्यस्य यदि कर्म ततः कथम् ॥ इति ॥

नित्यत्वान्तरङ्गत्वाभ्यां हेतुभ्यां प्रसिद्धसद्भावस्य वस्तुनः हेतुत्वमात्रमेवानेकपदार्थसन्नि-

१. 'नियोगतः' इत्यादिः 'कश्चिदेव' इत्यन्तो

ग्रन्थः नास्ति—क, ख. मातृकयोः ।

२. तत्कार्या—ग, घ.

३. किञ्चिदेव—ग, घ, ङ.

४. निर्देशात्—क, ख.

५. समाववस्तु—ख.

हेतुरिति १ व्यवस्थाप्यते, नत्वप्रसिद्धसद्भावस्य कल्पना । तद्विपरीत-
स्य हेतुत्वमनुपपन्नमिति, तादृशमप्रसिद्धसद्भावमपि परिकल्प्यत
इति यदि मतम्, हन्त तर्हि कर्मणोऽपि तदकारणमापतति ।

अथ मतं^४ व्यधिकरणमपि^५ सम्बन्धात् कुतश्चिच्च^६ प्रतिबन्धाद्
दृष्टव्यभिचारमपि^७ तत्कर्मणः कारणम्, संयोगविभागाभ्यां^८ किम-

धानकृतसन्देहापोहनेन^९ व्यवस्थापयितुं युक्तम्, न पुनरप्रसिद्धसद्भावस्य वस्तुनः स्वरूपसिद्धि-
रपीति । यदि मन्येत व्यभिचारिणो बहिरङ्गस्य च कारणत्वं न संभवतीति अप्रसिद्धसद्भाव-
मपि कर्म कारणं कल्प्यत इति । तदेतदनुपपन्नम् । कर्मणोऽपि पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन ततः
प्रयत्नादिकारणदुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गादिति । एतद्विवृणोति—बहुसमवधाने इत्यादिना ।
अयमर्थः—यत्रैकं प्रसिद्धसद्भावं वस्तु केनचित्कार्येणान्वयव्यतिरेकि भवति, बहवश्चान्ये पदार्थाः
सन्निहिता भवन्ति, तत्रेदमेवास्य कारणं नान्यत् सन्निधानाविशेषेऽपीति विवेकमात्रं नित्यत्वान्त-
रङ्गत्वाभ्यां शक्यावधारणम्, न पुनरप्रसिद्धसद्भावस्य सद्भावकल्पना इति श्लोकपूर्वार्धस्यार्थः ॥
उत्तरार्धं व्याचष्टे—तद्विपरीतस्येत्यादिना^{१०} हन्त तर्हीत्यतः ११ प्राक्तनग्रन्थेन परमतमनुभाष्योत्तर-
१२ मुत्तरेणापततीति (तीत्यन्तेनाह ?) इति विभागः ।

पुनश्शङ्कते—अथ मतमिति । यद्यपि प्रयत्नादि व्यधिकरणमात्मस्थत्वात् तथापि
तत्कर्मणः कारणं भवत्येव, सम्बन्धान्तरस्य भावात्^{१३} [संबन्धोऽस्ति] । अन्यथा
सर्वव्यापारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । ततश्च तद्द्वारकः शरीराश्रितेन [न] कर्मणा आत्मस्थस्य प्रयत्नादेः

१. विविष्यते—ख.

२. सत्समावस्य कल्पनात्—ख.

३. मसिद्धसत्समाव—ख.

४. 'मतं'—नास्ति—क, ख, ग, घ, ङ.

५. संबन्धात् केनचित् कुतश्चित्—ग, घ.

६. 'च'—नास्ति—ख.

७. 'तत्'—नास्ति—ख.

८. विभागादिभिः—ख.

९. पोहेन—ङ.

१०. रीतेत्यादिना—च.

११. प्राक्तनेन—ङ.

१२. मुत्तरेणा ... यद्यपि—च.

१३. भावात् ... व्यापारोच्छेद—च.

पराद्धम्? ^१येन ^२दृष्टं कारणं परित्यज्यादृष्टं मृग्यते । प्रायेण च कर्महेतवः संयोगविभागेकाधिकरणा इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

हेतुसत्ता च कार्येण ततः प्रागनुमीयते ।

वर्तमानावभासः स्यान्न ^३क्रियाधिगमस्ततः ॥ २२ ॥

कार्योपजननं प्रत्यनन्तर^४कालीनं ^५हेतुसत्त्वं तदुपयोगि, न

सम्बन्धोऽस्तीति तस्य तत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यत इति न बहिरङ्गत्वविरोधः । न चापि व्यभिच^६-
रितत्वविरोधः, यतः कारणस्य कार्यव्यभिचारः कुतश्चित्प्रतिबन्धादुपपद्यते—यथा दहनेन्धन-
संयोगस्य धूमकारणस्य मन्त्रादिप्रतिबन्धात्कार्यस्य व्यभिचारः, तथेहापि प्रयत्नाश्रयेणात्मना
सम्बन्धे सर्वशरीरावयवानां समाने सत्यपि कर्त्तृकर्मणोऽनुदयः^७ कुतश्चिददृष्टात्प्रतिबन्धा-
दुपपद्यत इति । हन्त तर्हि भवतैव भवन्मतं परित्यक्तम् ! भवदुक्तेनैव न्यायेन प्रयत्नादेः
संयोगादिकार्यहेतुत्वस्यापि संभावितत्वात् कर्मकल्पनायाः प्रमाणाभावात् ॥

इतश्च संयोगविभागाख्यकार्यानुमेयक्रिया न संभवतीत्याह—

हेतुसत्ता च कार्येण ततः प्रागनुमीयते ।

वर्तमानावभासस्यान्न क्रियावि(धि)गमस्ततः ॥ (इति) ॥

कार्योदयात्प्राक्कालसंबन्धिनी हेतुसत्ता अनुमीयते, न कार्यकालसंबन्धिनी । ततश्च
चलतीति प्रत्ययः न वर्तमानाकारो भवेत्, भवति च । तस्मात् नासौ संयोगादिकार्यलिङ्ग-
जन्मेति श्लोकस्यार्थः ।

अस्यैव प्रपञ्चः कार्योपजननमित्यादिः । अस्यायमर्थः—यत्कार्यपूर्वक्षणवर्ति हेतोः

१. यत्—ख, ऊ.

२. दृष्टं परित्यज्यादृष्टं/करणं कल्प्यते—क, ख.

३. क्रियावगम—ऊ.

४. कालं—क, ग, घ, ङ.

५. 'हेतुसत्त्वं' इत्यादिः 'कार्यकालं' इत्यन्तो

ग्रन्थो नास्ति—ऊ.

६. चारित्व—छ.

७. अनुदयं—छ.

कार्यकालम्^१, तस्य तदा सिद्धत्वात् । अतः^२कार्येण कारणमनुमि-
मानः^३तत्प्राक्कालमेवानुमिमीते, न वर्तमानकालम् । तथा च फल-
लिङ्गात्मजन्मा^४ ततः प्राक्कालक्रियागोचरः प्रत्ययो न^५वर्तमानाव-
ग्रहः स्यात् ।

सत्त्वम् तदेव कार्योत्पत्तौ उपयोगि, न कार्यसमकालीनम्, तदा कार्यस्य सिद्धत्वात् साध्या-
वस्थस्यैव च तस्य कारणापेक्षणात्, अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अतः कार्यपूर्वक्षणवर्तिकारण-
सत्त्वं कार्येणानुमीयते इति श्लोकपूर्वार्धस्यार्थः । ननु च प्राक्कालीनमेव हेतुसत्त्वं
फललिङ्गेनानुमीयताम्^६, किमेतावता हीयते ? सर्वथा संयोगविभागलक्षणफललिङ्गानुमेया
क्रिया सिध्यतीत्याशङ्कोत्तरतया उत्तरार्धाविष्करणायाह—तथा चेति । यद्ययं क्रियाप्रत्ययः
फललिङ्गजन्य(न्म)तया ततः प्राक्कालक्रियाविषय इष्यते, तदा न कदाचिदपि वर्तमानाकारः
स्यात् । नचैवमस्ति । तस्मान्न फलानुमेया क्रिया ॥

ननु चलतिप्रत्ययस्य संयोगविभागविषयत्वाद्वर्तमानाकारत्वमुपपद्यते । क्रियाज्ञानं
ह्यन्यदेव संयोगविभागप्रभवम्^७, तच्च न वर्तमानाकारम्—इति । अत्रोच्यते । यदि चलति-
प्रत्ययातिरेकेणान्यः क्रियाग्राही प्रत्यय उपलभ्येत, तदा स्यादेतच्चोद्यम् । नच तदस्ति । अत-
श्चलतिप्रत्ययस्य वर्तमानाकारत्वे क्रियाप्रत्ययो न वर्तमानाकार इति न^८ शक्यं वक्तुम् ।
तस्मान्नानुमेया क्रिया कार्येण ॥

कारणस्य वर्तमानतया अनुमानानुपपत्तौ अनुपपत्त्यभावो हेतुः सामान्येन पूर्वमुक्तः^९
[इति] ; इदानीं कार्यक्षणे कारणस्याभावनिश्चयादपि न वर्तमानतया अनुमानं शक्यत इति
प्रकृते विशेषतोऽनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनायाह—अपि च—

१. कालः—ख.

२. कार्येणमनु—क, ग, घ, ङ.

३. तत्काल—क, ग, घ, ङ. 'अतः'
इत्यादिः 'काल' मिलन्तो ग्रन्थः नास्ति—ङ.

४. जन्म तत्प्राक्काल—क.

५. वर्तमानाकारग्रहः—ङ.

६. मीयते—च.

७. विभागलिङ्गप्रभवम्—छ.

८. 'न' नास्ति—ख.

९. युक्तमिति—ख.

अपि च—

संयोगान्तं वर्तमानं तत उन्नीयते कथम् ।

विभागतो मीयमानं स्थाणावप्येतदापतेत् ॥ २३ ॥

संयोगान्तं^१ कर्म संयोगोत्पादज्ञानक्षणोत्तरकालमनुमीय^२-
मानं न वर्तमानम् । संयोगविभागौ तु वर्तमानौ । ^३ज्ञानानुरूपश्च

संयोगान्तं वर्तमानं तत उन्नीयते कथम् ।

विभागतो मीयमानं स्थाणावप्येतदापतेत् ॥ (इति) ॥

अयमाशयः—किं संयोगादेव केवलादनुमातुमिष्टं कर्म, किं वा केवलाद्विभागात् ,
अथवोभाभ्यामपि संयोगविभागाभ्याम् ? यदि तावत्केवलात्संयोगात् उभाभ्यां समुदिताभ्यां
वा अनुमीयेत, तदा न वर्तमानमनुमातुं शक्यम् । संयोगोत्पत्तिजज्ञानक्षणद्वयोत्तरक्षणे ह्यनु-
मानज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अनुत्पन्नस्याज्ञातस्य च लिङ्गत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्याञ्चावस्थायां न कर्म वर्तमानम्,
तस्य फलोत्पत्तिमात्रापवर्गित्वात् उत्तरक्षणेऽवस्थानाभावात् । अथ विभागमुत्पाद्य संयोगोत्पत्ति-
पर्यन्तं कर्म तिष्ठतीति विभागक्षणे वर्तमानमेवेति विभागादेव केवलात्तस्यानुमानं मन्यते सः,
तदा स्थाणावपि श्येन इव तद्विभागवति कर्मानुमानप्रसङ्ग इति तात्पर्यम् ।

अत्रैषा अक्षरयोजना । ^४संयोगा(गोऽ)न्तोऽवधिर्यस्य तत्संयोगान्तं प्रकृतं कर्म तत्
ततः संयोगाल्लिङ्गात् कथं वर्तमानम् उन्नीयते अनुमीयते ? न कथञ्चिदपि वर्तमानतया अनु-
मातुं शक्यते । विभागतो हेतोरनुमीयमानं कर्माभ्युपगम्यमानं स्थाणावप्यनुमेयमापतेदिति ।

एतदेव विवृणोति—संयोगान्तमित्यादिना । ननु संयोगविभागविषयत्वेऽपि क्रिया-
प्रत्ययस्यैतत् ^५दूषणं समानमेवेत्याशङ्क्याह—संयोगविभागौ त्विति । तुशब्देन शङ्कामपा-

१. संयोगान्तकर्म—क, ख.

२. काले मीय—क, ख.

३. ज्ञानस्वरूपादु—क, ख. ज्ञानरूपादु—
ग, घ, ङ.

४. संयोगान्तो विधिः—च. गान्तोऽवधिः—ङ.

५. यस्यैकदूषणं—च.

विषयो १ न तद्विपरीतः । तस्मात्तयोरेव चलतीतिप्रत्ययविषयता,
न २ तु कर्मणः ।

अथ विभागानुमेय^१त्वात्तमुपजनय्य ४ आसंयोगोत्पादं व्यव-
स्थानाद्वर्तमानमनुमीयत इति । तदसत् । स्थाणावपि प्रसङ्गात्,
विभागस्य तुल्यत्वात् । ५ तत् गुणविशेष एव धातूपादानः क्रिया,

करोति । न चलतिप्रत्ययस्य संयोगविभागविषयत्वे वर्तमानाकारत्वविरोधः, तयोर्वर्तमानत्वात्,
ज्ञानस्य तत्कार्यलिङ्गप्रभवत्वानभ्युपगमात् एककालत्वोपपत्तेः । नन्ववर्तमानमपि कर्म वर्त-
मानाकारस्य प्रत्ययस्य विषयः स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह—ज्ञानानुरूप इति । यदाकारोऽयं (रो यः)
प्रत्ययः तस्य तदाकार एव विषयो भवति न तद्विपरीतः, अन्यथा भ्रमत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नचास्य
भ्रमत्वमस्ति, तद्धेतुद्वयाभावादिति । तस्मादित्युपसंहरति ।

श्लोकोत्तरार्धव्यावर्त्यामाशङ्कां दर्शयति—अथेत्यादिना अनुमीयते इत्यन्तेन ग्रन्थेन ।
अस्यायमर्थः—पूर्वदेशविभागमुत्पाद्योत्तरदेशसंयोगोत्पत्तिपर्यन्तमवस्थानं कर्मणोऽस्तीति विभाग-
क्षणे वर्तमानमेव । अतो विभागेन केवलेन वर्तमानमेव कर्मानुमीयत इति । तन्निराकरणार्थ-
तयोत्तरार्धं व्याचष्टे—तदसदित्यादिना तुल्यत्वादित्यन्तेन ग्रन्थेन । इदानीं संयोगविभागादि-
गुणविशेषविलक्षणक्रियापदार्थाभावमुपपादितमुपसंहरति—तद्गुणविशेष एवेत्यादिना अभिधेय
(यः स्यात्) इत्यन्तेन ग्रन्थेन । अस्यायमर्थः—(तत्) तस्माद्यथोक्तेन न्यायेन, गुणविशेष एव

१. न तु—क, ग, घ, ङ.

५. तस्मादगुण—ग, घ, ङ.

२. 'तु' नास्ति—ख.

६. दानक्रिया—ख.

३. मेयत्वं तमुप—क, ख.

४. आसंयोगाद्व्यवस्थानात्—ङ. संयोगोत्पा-

दावस्थानात्—ख.

न १तु तदतिरिच्यमानात्मा क्रियापदार्थः, २यः प्रत्ययस्य धातोर्वा अभिधेयः स्यात् ।

यदप्यनुमानम्—यत्सर्वेषु ३साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु सत्सु कदाचित्पचतीति प्रत्ययो भवतीति । तन्न—

सिद्धेर्गुणविशेषेण ४ पचतीत्यपि ५ संविदः ।

क्रियापदार्थस्यान्यस्य नानुमानं ६प्रकल्पते ॥ २४ ॥

धात्वभिधेयः क्रियाव्यवहारगोचरः केनचिदुपाधिना, न ततस्तत्त्वान्तरं क्रियापदार्थः, यः प्रत्ययस्यार्थो धातोर्वेति विचार्येत । सिद्धे हि धर्मिणि धर्माणां विचारः प्रवर्तते इति ।

इदानीं क्रियावादिना क्रियासद्भावसाधनायोपन्यस्तमनुमानं दूषणायानुभाषते—
यद्य(द)पीत्यादिना भवतीत्यन्तेन ग्रन्थेन । अयमर्थः—पचतीत्येष प्रत्ययः धर्मित्वेनोपादीयते, कर्त्रादिसकलकारकव्यतिरिक्तार्थान्तरालम्बन इति साध्यो धर्मः । तेषु सन्निहितेष्वपि कदाचिदेवोत्पद्यमानत्वात् । यस्मिन्प्रतीयमानेऽर्थे यः कदाचिदेव प्रत्यय उत्पद्यते, स तदतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनो दृष्टः—यथो सतोरपि दण्डदेवदत्तयोः कदाचिदेवोत्पद्यमानो दण्डीति प्रत्ययः तदतिरिक्ततत्संबन्धालम्बन इति । यच्च सर्वातिरिक्तं तत्संबन्धि पचतिप्रत्ययालम्बनम् ७, तत्कर्मेति । एतद्दूषयितुमाह—तत्र(न्न)—

सिद्धेर्गुणविशेषेण ८ पचतीत्यपि संविदः ।

क्रियापदार्थस्यान्यस्य नानुमानं प्रकल्पते ॥ (इति) ॥

१. न तदतिरिच्यमाना इति चापदार्थः—ख.

न तु तदतिरिच्यमानः—ङ.

२. 'यः' नास्ति—ख.

३. सन्निहितेषु साधनेषु कदाचित् पचतीत्येतत्—ख.

४. विशेषणं—ख.

५. लभि—ङ.

६. प्रवर्तते—क, ख; प्रकल्प्यते—ग, घ, ङ.

७. लम्बनभूतं—ङ.

८. विशेषणेति—ख.

यः खलु तण्डुलावयवेषु विभागलक्षणः १प्रशिथिलसंयोग-
लक्षणो वा गुणभेदस्तस्य सन्निहितेष्वपि साधनेषु कदाचिद्भावात्त-
न्निबन्धनः २पचतीति प्रत्यय इति ४न तत्र ५ ६क्रियापदार्थानुमानं
युक्तम् ।

तत एव तर्हि गुणविशेषात्कादाचित्कात्तदस्तु । अन्यथा

अयमर्थः—किं पचतीति प्रत्ययस्य सर्वकारकातिरिक्तं किञ्चिदालम्बनमस्तीत्येताव-
न्मात्रं साध्यते, किं वा क्रियापदार्थं आलम्बनमिति ? आद्ये कल्पे सिद्धसाध्यताप्रसङ्गः,
सर्वकारकातिरिक्तस्य गुणविशेषस्य पचतिप्रत्ययालम्बनत्वस्याभ्युपगमात् । अथ गुणविशेषस्या-
लम्बनत्वानुपपत्त्या पारिशेष्यात्क्रियापदार्थसिद्धिरित्यभिप्रायः, सोऽपि न समीचीनः, चलतीति
प्रत्ययस्य(स्येव) पचतीति प्रत्ययस्यापि गुणविशेषेणोपपत्तेः । द्वितीये तु कल्पे दृष्टान्ताभावः।
नहि कचिदपि क्रियालम्बनः कश्चित्प्रत्ययः क्रियापलापवादिनः प्राप्तिद्वोऽस्ति, येन दृष्टान्तः
स्यात् । अतो गुणविशेषातिरिक्तस्य क्रियापदार्थस्यानुमानं न प्रकल्पत इति श्लोकस्य तात्पर्यार्थः ।
नात्राक्षरवैषम्यमस्ति । यो गुणविशेषः पचतिप्रत्ययस्योपपादकोऽभिप्रेतः तस्य स्वरूपनिरूपण-
द्वारेण तदुपपादकत्वोपपादनायाह—यः खल्वित्यादि । अस्ति तावत्तण्डुलानां स्थाल्युदरवर्तिनि
वारिणि सूक्ष्मैरग्न्यवयवैः व्याप्तैः विपरिवर्तमानानामवयवेषु विभागलक्षणो गुणविशेषः
प्रशिथिलसंयोगलक्षणश्च । १तयोश्च सत्स्वपि साधनेषु कदाचिदेव भावात् कादाचित्कस्य २०च
पचतीति प्रत्ययस्य विषयत्वोपपत्तेः न तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य क्रियापदार्थस्यानुमानं युक्तमिति ।

पुनः क्रियानुमानवाद्याह—तत एवेत्यादि । अयमर्थः—मा भूत्पचतीति प्रत्ययात्कि-

१. लक्षणो वा शिथिल—ख.

२. अवयवसंयोग—ग, ड.

३. पचतीत्यपि—क, ग, घ, ङ.

४. 'न' नास्ति—क, ग, घ, ङ.

५. ततः—ख.

६. क्रियानुमानं—क.

७. विशेषणो—च.

८. व्याप्ते—च.

९. 'तयोश्च' नास्ति—च.

१०. 'च' नास्ति—च.

साधनसन्निधिमात्र एवैष स्यात् । न, ^१कर्मण्यपि तथा प्रसङ्गात् ;
कर्मान्तरानुमाने चानवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् ;^२ अग्निसंयोगस्य च^३ क्रमेण
भावात् प्रकृष्यमाणत्वाच्च तद्धेतोर्न^४ तस्य साधनसन्निधिमात्र एव
भावः । तस्यैव तर्हि संयोगस्य कारणं कर्मेति चेत्—न, प्रयत्नादेरेव
कर्महेतोस्तद्धेतुत्वात् ।

यानुमानम्, तस्य गुणविशेषैवोपपत्तेः । येन गुणविशेषेण तस्योपपत्तिर्निरूपिता, तत्, एव
गुणविशेषात्क्रियानुमानमस्तु, तस्य क्रियाप्रभवत्वात् । यदि पुनरस्य क्रियाप्रभवत्वं नाङ्गी-
क्रियते साधनसन्निधिमात्रनिबन्धनत्वश्चाभ्युपगम्यते, तदा ^५साधनसन्निधिमात्र एव(ष) भावः
स्यात् । न चास्ति । अतः क्रियानुमानं युक्तमेवेति । एतन्निराकरोति—नेत्यादिना ।
अयमर्थः—न गुणविशेषादपि हेतोः कर्मानुमानं युक्तम्, कर्मण्यपि तथा प्रसङ्गात् । नहि
कर्मापि साधनसन्निधिमात्र एव भवति । अतस्तत्रापि कर्मान्तरमनुमेयं स्यात् । कर्मा(न्तरा)-
नुमाने चानवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । यत्पुनरुक्तं क्रियानुमानवादिनः(ना)—क्रियानपेक्षत्वे पक्षति-
प्रत्ययस्यालम्बनाभिमतस्य गुणविशेषस्य साधनसन्निधिमात्र एव भावप्रसङ्ग इति । तत्राह—
अग्निसंयोगस्येति । योऽयमग्निसंयोगः तण्डुलावयवानाम्, स तेषां विभागलक्षणगुणविशेषस्य
हेतुः । स च क्रमेण भवति, क्रमेण च प्रकृष्यते । त(त)स्तस्य तद्धा(द्धे)तोः क्रमेण भावात्
प्रकृष्यमाणत्वाच्च न तस्य साधनसन्निधिमात्र एव भावप्रसङ्ग इति । क्रियानुमानवादिनो
मतं शङ्कते—तस्यैव तर्हीति । यद्यग्निसंयोगलक्षणो गुणविशेष एव तण्डुलावयवसमवायिनो
गुणविशेषस्य कारणम्, (न) कर्म, (तर्हि) तस्यैवाग्निसंयोगस्य कादाचित्कस्य कारणम्
कर्मेति । एवं क्रियावादिनो मतमाशङ्क्योत्तरमाह—न, प्रयत्नादेरित्यादिना । अयमर्थः—
कर्मवादिना कर्महेतुत्वाभिमतो यः प्रयत्नादिः तस्यैव तद्धेतुत्वोपपत्तेः (न) कर्मकल्पनायां
प्रमाणमस्त्येति ।

१. कर्मणापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात्—क, ख.

कर्मणोऽपि तथा प्रसङ्गात्—ग, घ, ङ.

२. अनवस्थापातात्—क, ख, ग, घ, ङ.

३. 'च' नास्ति—क, ख, ग; 'तु'—ङ.

४. 'न' नास्ति—क, ख.

५. 'साधन'—नास्ति—ख.

तदित्थं यागादिव्यतिरिक्तभावनाभावात्—

यागेन भावयेत्स्वर्गमित्यर्थः परिकल्पितः ।

स्वर्गकामस्य यागे तु नियोगः सम्प्रतीयते ॥ २५ ॥

सत्यां १ हि भावनायां यागस्य करणत्वम्, २ कर्मापेक्षित्वाच्च

इदानीं भावनानिराकरणस्य फलं दर्शयति—तदित्थं यागादिव्यतिरिक्तभावना-
भावात्—

यागेन भावयेत्स्वर्गमित्यर्थः परिकल्पितः ३ ।

स्वर्गकामस्य यागे तु नियोगः सम्प्रतीयते ॥ इति ॥

तस्मादेवमुक्तन्यायेन भावनाया यागादिव्यतिरिक्ताया अभावात् यागेन स्वर्गं भावयेदि-
त्येषोऽर्थः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रप्रभवः ४, न शब्दार्थः । कस्तर्हि शब्दार्थः ? स्वर्गकामस्य
यागे तु नियोग इति ।

एतदेव प्रपञ्चयति—सत्यां हीत्यादिना । यदि धात्वर्थव्यतिरिक्ता भावना शब्द-
प्रतिपाद्या विद्यते, तदा तदपेक्षया यागस्य करणत्वम् स्वर्गस्य कर्मत्वं चावधार्येत ।
कथम् ? भावनाया भाव्यापेक्षणीत्वात् या भाव्यं प्रत्यपेक्षा तया हेतुभूतया स्वर्गस्य
कर्मत्वावधारणम् । ननु स्वर्गकाम इति पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन निर्दिष्टस्य स्वर्गस्य स्वर्गं
कुर्यादिति साध्यत्वेनानिर्दिष्टस्य कथं सत्यामपि भावनायां भाव्यत्वेन सम्बन्ध इत्या-

१. 'हि'—नास्ति—ऊ.

३. कल्प्यते—छ.

२. करणत्वं कमपिज्ञायां पुरुष—ग, घ.

४. प्रधानो—च.

कमपिज्ञणीयत्वात् यस्यापेक्षायां—ऊ.

तस्यापेक्षायां पुरुषविशेषणस्यापि ^१ इष्टेः सामर्थ्यात्कर्मत्वमवधार्यते । तदभावे तु मन्दान्विप्रलब्धुमेष ^२ परिकल्पननिमित्तो वाक्यार्थो— यागेन भावयेत्स्वर्गमिति ^३ । पुरुषविशेषस्य ^४ तु नियोगो यागे ^५ ऽवगम्यते ।

शङ्कापाकरणायाह ^६—पुरुषविशेषणस्यापीत्यादिना । पुरुषविशेषणस्यापि इष्टेः इष्ट्यमाणस्य स्वर्गादिः(देः) सामर्थ्यात् वस्तुसामर्थ्यात् इष्टसंयुक्तवाक्यगतेष्टानिष्टपदार्थयोरनन्यार्थत्वावगमात्(योरनन्यार्थत्वादन्यार्थत्वावगमात् ?) असत्यपि भावनासाध्यताप्रतिपादके शब्दे साध्यत्वमवधार्यते आख्यातेन प्राधान्येन प्रतिपादितायां भावनायां विद्यमानायाम् । तस्यास्त्वभावे पूर्वोक्तन्यायबलान्निश्चिते का(मन्दा)न्विप्रलब्धुमेष भवता स्वमनीषिकयोत्प्रेक्ष्य परिकल्पितो वाक्यार्थो—‘यागेन भावयेत्स्वर्गम्’ इति । एवं श्लोकस्य पूर्वार्धं व्याख्यायोत्तरार्धमधुना व्याचष्टे—पुरुषविशेषस्येत्यादिना । स्वर्गकामनाविशिष्टस्य पुरुषस्य यागे नियोगोऽवगम्यते, न तु स्वर्गसाध्यत्वमित्यर्थः ।

ननु नियोगसामर्थ्यादेव स्वर्गसाध्यत्वं सिध्यति असत्यामपि भावनायाम् । कथम् ? विधिर्हि नियोगः । स च पुरुषप्रेरणात्मकः परम्परयाप्यपुरुषार्थे स्वात्मानमलभमानः स्वविषयस्य यागादेः पुरुषार्थस्वर्गसाध्यत्वमुपकल्पयति । उक्तं हि—

‘विधातुं तमतिक्रम्य स्वर्गादेस्साध्यतेष्यते ।’

इति विध्यधोनं स्वर्गादिसाध्यत्वज्ञानम् । विधिवृत्तिविद्धिस्तथा ७विधिविवेकारम्भेऽप्युक्तम्—

१. इष्टस्य—क. ख ; स्वर्गस्येष्टस्य—ग, घ, ङ.

२. कल्पोऽपरिमितो—क. कल्पोऽपरिचितो—ख.

३. ‘इति’—नास्ति—ग, घ, ङ.

४. तु—नास्ति—क, ग, घ, ङ.

५. यागे गम्यते—ग, घ, ङ.

६. पहरणायाह—ख.

७. ‘विधि’—नास्ति—ख.

‘ साधने पुरुषार्थस्य सञ्जिरन्ते त्रयीविदः ।

बोधं १ विधिसमायत्तमतः स प्रविचिच्यते ॥’ इति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—सत्यं विधिनिबन्धनं पुरुषार्थसाध्यत्वज्ञानम् ; विधिरेव तु भावनाया अभावे न सिध्यति, तस्य २सविषयत्वात्, अभावार्थस्य च विषयत्वानुपपत्तेः । अतो विधि-स्वरूपलाभाय भावना अपेक्षिता ॥

नन्वेवन्तर्हि भावनाया भाव्यापेक्षिणीत्वं स्वर्गसाध्यत्वसिद्धौ हेतुत्वेनोक्तं विरुध्येत, तस्या विध्यधीनत्वात् । नैतदेवम्, सामान्यविशेषभेदेन व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः । साध्यसामान्य ३-सिद्धिर्हि भावनाधीना, पुरुषार्थरूपसाध्यविशेषसिद्धिर्विधिनिबन्धना । भावना हि भाव्यमात्र-मपेक्षते नैकान्ततः पुरुषार्थमेव, विधिसम्बन्धात् पुरुषार्थरूपे भाव्यविशेषे नियम्यते । तथा आह—

‘ विधावनाश्रिते साध्यः पुरुषार्थो न लभ्यते ।’ इति ॥

नन्वेवन्तर्हि साध्यविशेषसिद्धिहेतुर्विधिरेव सामान्यसिद्धिमाक्षिपति, सामान्यसिद्धि-मन्तरेण विशेषसिद्धयनुपपत्तेः । अतो नार्थो भावनाया । न ; उक्तोत्तरत्वात् । उक्तं हि—विधेस्स्वरूपमेव भावनापेक्षमिति ॥ यच्च भावनाकांक्षानिबन्धनं स्वर्गादिसाध्यत्वज्ञानमुक्तम् तद्भावनायाः प्राधान्यमङ्गीकृत्योक्तम्—प्रधानाकांक्षावशवर्ती हि पदार्थान्तरसम्बन्ध इति । अपि च, प्रेषणाध्येषणानुमोदनेष्टसाधनताप्रभेदः पुरुषप्रेरणात्मको विधिलोके लिङ्गाद्यर्थस्समधिगतः । स एव वेदेऽपि तदर्थो ग्राह्यः, नान्यः । तत्र तावच्छ्रेयस्साधनतालक्षणो विशेषो नासत्यां भावनायां संभवति । नहि साधनं (श्रेयस्साधनं) ४साधनं विना सिध्यति । ५साधनं च भावना । अतो भावनाया अभावे श्रेयस्साधनरूपस्य विधेरसंभवात् प्रैषादयः परिशिष्यन्ते ।

१. विधौ—छ.

२. सविषय—छ.

३. सामग्री—छ.

४. साधना—छ.

५. साधना—छ.

१तस्मिंस्त्वनुष्ठिते स्वर्गादिफलं स्वतोऽन्यतो वा कुतश्चिद्भविष्यति, २नैव वा; ३नत्वयमर्थः शक्योऽभ्युपगन्तुम् ।

ननु पुरुषविशेषणमप्येतन्न सम्भवति, अयोगान्ययोगाल-

ते च पुरुषधर्मा वेदस्यार्थवत्त्वेन (वेदार्थत्वेन) परिगृह्यमाणाः पौरुषेयत्वं बलादापादयन्ति । तत्र वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमेवास्तमियात्, कुतः स्वर्गादिसाध्यत्वसिद्धिरित्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ॥

प्रकृतमनुसरामः । ननु असति स्वर्गस्य यागसाध्यत्वे कामनायोगादवगम्यमानसाध्यत्वं विरुध्येतेत्याशङ्क्याह—तस्मिंस्त्वनुष्ठिते इति । तस्मिन् यागेऽनुष्ठिते स्वर्गादिफलं स्वत एव विना कारणेन भविष्यतीति गृह्यताम् । ननु कादाचित्कस्य अकारण(ण)कस्योत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेत्याशङ्कामपनेतुमाह—अन्यतो वा कुतश्चिदिति । अन्यतो वा यागव्यतिरिक्तात् कुतश्चित्कारणाद्भविष्यतीति करुष्यतामिति । अन्यदपि कारणं नोपलभ्यते । अकारणञ्च कार्यजन्म न संभवति । तत्र स्वर्गस्य यागसाध्यत्वाभावे जन्मैव न संभवतीत्याशङ्क्याह—नैवेति । नैव वा भविष्यति ५स्वर्गादिः, नत्वनवगम्यमानो यागेन भावयेत्स्वर्गमित्येषोऽर्थः शक्योऽभ्युपगन्तुमिति ।

तत्र भावनावादी चोदयति—नन्विति । एतत्स्वर्गकामत्वं पुरुषविशेषणमपि न संभवति । कुतः? व्यवच्छेदफलं हि विशेषणम् । व्यवच्छेदश्च त्रिविधः व्यवच्छेद्यभेदात्—अयोगव्यवच्छेदोऽत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदोऽन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदश्चेति । एषामन्यतमः स्वर्गकामत्व-विशेषणफलत्वेनाभ्युपगन्तव्यः; स्वर्गः काम्य एव भवति नाकाम्य इत्ययोगव्यवच्छेदः; स्वर्गः काम्यो ६भवत्येव न (न) भवतीत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदः; स्वर्ग एव काम्यो नान्य इत्यन्ययोग-व्यवच्छेदः । एषामन्यतमोऽप्यत्र न भवति । कथम्? यदि तावदिहायोगव्यवच्छेद आश्रीयते

१. तस्मिन्मातु—क, ग, घ, ङ.

२. नैव वायमर्थः—ङ.

३. नत्वमर्थः शक्योऽभ्युपगन्तुम्—ख.

४. मेव न—क, ग, घ, ङ.

५. स्वर्गादि—छ.

६. एव भवति न न भवती—झ.

न्तायोगानामन्यतमस्यापि^१ व्यवच्छेदासंभवात् । जात्या च^२ तस्या-
भावात् ।

साध्यत्वमपि^३ तर्ह्यनुपपन्नम्, स्वर्गस्य तथा अनिर्देशात्,

स्वर्गः काम्य एवास्य भवति नाकाम्यः कदाचिदित्येवं रूपः, सोऽत्र न संभवति, ईदृशस्य कस्यचिदसम्भवात् । न हि कश्चिदपि सदा स्वर्गं कामयतेऽनुष्ठाता, सुषुप्त्याद्यवस्थासु कामनानुपपत्तेः । नाप्यन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदः संभवति । नहि कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य स्वर्ग एव कामना नियतो(ता) भवति, अन्नपानादिविषयान्तरकामनाया अप्यवश्यंभावित्वात् । नाप्यत्यन्ता-योगव्यवच्छेदस्संभवति, अत्यन्तायोगस्यात्यन्तमप्राप्तत्वात् । नहि कस्यचिदपि स्वर्गकामनया अत्यन्तमयोगस्संभवति । सर्वो हि जन्ममरणान्तराले कदाचित्स्वर्गादि कामयत एवेति । अतः पुरुषविशेषणत्वमपि स्वर्गकामत्वं(त्वे) न सम्भवति । ननु स्वर्गकामत्वं नाम जातिरस्ति ब्राह्मण्यादिवत् । अतस्तस्य विशेषणत्वे नोक्तदोष इत्याशङ्क्याह—जात्या चेत्यादि । कामना-योगनिमित्त(ता)स्य शब्दस्य पुरुषेषु वृत्तिः । न स्वर्गकामत्वं नाम जातिरस्तीत्यर्थः ।

एवं भावनावादिना चोदिते पुरुषविशेषणत्ववादी प्रतिवक्ति—साध्यत्वमित्यादिना । भवत्पक्षेऽप्यनुपपत्तिः समाना, यतः साध्यत्वमपि स्वर्गस्य न सिध्यति । कुत इति चेत्, तत्राह—तथा अनिर्देशादिति । स्वर्गमिति साध्यत्वेन निर्देशाभावादित्यर्थः । ननु साध्यत्वेन निर्देशाभावेऽपि सामर्थ्यात्स्वर्गस्य भावनायां भाव्यत्वेन संबन्धः सिध्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह—विशेषणस्यैव चार्थात् (भावना)संबन्धाभ्युपगमादिति । अयमर्थः—पुरुषविशेषणस्य^४ सतः स्वर्गकामपदार्थस्यार्थाद्भावनासम्बन्धोऽभ्युपगम्यते नाविशेषणस्य । विशेषणत्वं च भव^५तैवापा-

१. तरस्यापि—ख.

२. तत्त्वामाव्यात्—ख.

३. तस्यानुप—ख.

४. 'हि'—नास्ति—ख.

५. स्यैव सतः—छ.

६. तैवोपाकृतम्—छ.

विशेषणस्यैव १ चार्थाद्भावनासम्बन्धाभ्युपगमात् । वर्तमानेच्छा-
विशेषणत्वमितरस्याप्यविरुद्धम् ।

न, फलनिमित्तयोरन्यतरापत्तेः । निमित्तत्वे च यावज्जीव-
२ श्रुत्युपसंहारे तदानर्थक्यम् ३, अनुपसंहारे त्वेतस्याः ।

कृतम् । तत्र कथं स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वसिद्धिरिति । यस्य स्वर्गे कामना वर्तते स स्वर्गकामः
इति वर्तमानायाः स्वर्गेच्छाया विशेषणत्वे न कश्चिद्विरोधः । अतो विशेषणस्यैव ४ सतोऽर्था-
द्भावनासम्बन्धः सिध्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह—वर्तमानेच्छेत्यादि । इतरस्य नियोगवादिनः पक्षेऽपि
यदास्य स्वर्गकामना वर्तते तदा नियोग इत्यविरुद्ध एष निर्वाह इत्यर्थः ।

एवमुभयोरपि पक्षयोः समानौ चोद्यपरिहाराविति नियोगवादिनोक्ते पुनर्भावावादी
विशेषविवक्षया आह—न, फलनिमित्तयोरित्यादिना । (न) वर्तमानेच्छाविशेषणत्वं भवत्पक्षे-
ऽवकल्पते । कथम् ? फलनिमित्तयोरन्यतरापत्तेः । तथाहि—यदिदं काम्यमानं स्वर्गादि
पुरुषविशेषणभूतम् तेन फलेन वा निमित्तेन वा अन्यतरेण भवितव्यम् । दृश्यते हि
द्वय्यपीयं गतिः नियोज्यविशेषणस्य, यथा—‘आरोग्यकामो मितमश्नीयात्’ इत्यादावारोग्यस्य
फलत्वम् ; यथा च—गृहदाहादेः क्षामवत्यादौ निमित्तत्वम् । न चैवंजातीयकविशेषण-
स्यान्या गतिरुपलभ्यते । तत्र तावत्स्वर्गादेः फलत्वं भवता नाभ्युपगम्यते । मा भूत्फलत्वम्,
निमित्तत्वे को विरोधः इत्याशङ्क्याह—निमित्तत्वे चेत्यादि । अयमर्थः—अस्ति तावत्
‘यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्’, यावज्जीवं दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेत’ इत्येवमाद्या जीवन-
निमित्ता श्रुतिः, तस्य(स्याः) स्वर्गकामनयोपसंहारो वा स्यात् अनुपसंहारो वा । उपसंहारपक्षे
तदानर्थक्यम्, [ए]तस्या जीवनश्रुतेरानर्थक्यम् । कथम् ? एवं हि तदा अर्थस्त्यात्—स्वर्ग-
कामस्सन् यदा जीवति तदा यजेतेति । तत्र कामश्रुत्यैव जीवनमर्थाक्षिप्तं प्रतीयते, जीवत

१. ‘व’-नास्ति—ख. स्यैवार्था भावना—ऊ.

२. श्रुतासंहारे—ख.

३. -र्थक्यम्, संहारे विशेषणश्रुतेरेतस्याः—ख.

४. सतो—च.

स्यात्तावदेष नित्येषु परिहारो १ नानित्येषु । २ अपि चानर्थक्यं
स्यादित्यनर्थो नावगन्तुं शक्यत इत्युक्तम् । पुनरुपदेशाद्वा स्वर्ग-
कामः पुनः प्रयोक्ष्यत इति नानर्थक्यम् ।

एव कामनोपपत्तेः । अतो जीवनश्रुतिरनर्थिकैव स्यात् । अनुपसंहारपक्षे दूषणमाह—
अनुपसंहारे (तु) ३ एतस्या इति । अनुपसंहारपक्षे ४ एतस्याः कामश्रुतेः । आनर्थक्यमित्यनु-
षज्यते । कथं पुनरनुपसंहारे कामश्रुतेरानर्थक्यम् ? । उच्यते । एवं हि तदा अर्थस्यात्—
स्वर्गकामो ५ यजेत जीवन्त्यजेत इति । तत्र जीवनश्रुत्या सामान्यप्रवृत्तया कामिनोऽप्युपसङ्ग्र-
हात् तस्यापि तथैव प्रवृत्तिसिद्धेः किं कामश्रुत्या प्रयोजनम् ।

एवं भावनावादिना स्वर्गकामनाया निमित्तत्वे निराकृते पुनरपि पुरुषनियोगवाद्याह—
स्यात्तावदित्यादि । एष कामनाया निमित्तत्वस्य परिहारो निराकरणम् नित्येष्वेव स्यात् ,
येष्वग्निहोत्रदर्शपूर्णमासादिष्वन्यया नित्यत्वं श्रुत्या प्राप्तम् । येषु त्वन्या नित्यत्वप्रापिका
श्रुतिर्नास्ति पशुकामग्रामकामादिनिमित्तसम्बन्धिषु कर्मसु, तत्रैष परिहारो नावकाशं लभते ।
नहि तत्र जीवनश्रुत्युपसंहारानुपसंहारविकल्पोऽवसरी । तस्मान्न सार्वत्रिकोऽयं परिहार इति ।
ननु मा भूदनित्येष्वेष परिहारः, नित्येषु तु पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन निमित्तपक्षे श्रुतेरानर्थक्यं
भवत्येव । अतः काम्यश्रुतयो भाव्यविशेषसमर्पणपरा एव भवितुमर्हन्तीत्याशङ्क्याह—
अपि चेति । आनर्थक्यं भवतीत्येतावता नाप्रतीयमानोऽर्थोऽभ्युपगन्तुं शक्यते । नहि स्वर्ग-
कामपदस्य स्वर्गस्य भाव्यत्वाभिधाने सामर्थ्यमस्ति । नाप्यर्थात्तस्य भाव्यत्वसिद्धिः अप्र-
सिद्धायां भावनायां सम्भवति । तत्प्रसिद्धिश्च पुरस्तान्निरस्ता । अतो ६ भवत्वानर्थक्यं
कामश्रुतेः । किं कुर्मः ? नैतावता अनवगम्यमानोऽर्थोऽवगम्यत इति शक्यते वक्तुमिति ।
इदानीमानर्थक्यपरिहारोऽपि कथञ्चिच्छक्यत इत्याह—पुनरुपदेशेत्यादि । यावज्जीव-

१. न काम्येषु—क, ख.

३. एकस्या—च.

२. अपि च नानर्थक्यमित्यर्थः शक्योऽवगन्तु-
मित्युक्तम्—क, ख. अपि चानर्थक्य-

४. एकस्याः—च.

मित्यर्थो नावगन्तुं शक्यते इत्युक्तम्—ऊ.

५. 'यजेत'—नास्ति—छ.

६. भावनानर्थक्यं—च.

१बुद्ध्वैतदेवं भगवान्ददर्श खलु बादरिः ।

न द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारव्यतिरिक्तेऽस्ति शेषता ॥ २६ ॥

द्रव्यगुणयोः २खलु योग्यता । अतः कारकविभक्तितो वा

श्रुत्यैव स्वर्गकामस्याप्यनुष्ठाने प्राप्ते स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति पुनरुपदेशसामर्थ्यात्स्वर्गकामः पुनरपि यः (प्रयो)क्ष्यत इति स्वर्गकामस्य पुनःप्रयोगप्रापणपराः कामश्रुतयोऽर्थवत्य एवेत्यनवद्यम् ।

प्रतिपादितमर्थं बादर्याचार्यमतानुसारेण द्रढयन्नाह—

बुद्ध्वैतदेवं भगवान्ददर्श खलु बादरिः ।

न द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारव्यतिरिक्तेऽस्ति शेषता ॥ इति) ॥

एतद्भावनाया निष्प्रमाणकत्वं ज्ञात्वा भगवान्बादरिः द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ते शेषता नास्तीति मेने । द्रव्यं ब्रीह्यादि, गुणोऽरुणिमादिः संस्कारोऽवघातादिः ३ तेष्वेव यागादि(याग)४क्रयणादिकायां क्रियायां शेषभावः । यत्तु तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तं यागः, फलं, पुरुषश्चेति त्रयम् तत्र शेषभावो नास्ति—न यागस्य फलशेषभावः, नापि फलस्य पुरुषशेषभावः, नापि पुरुषस्य ब्रीह्यादिद्रव्यवैलक्षण्येन फलस्वामितया कर्मणि शेषभाव इति ।

एतदेव विवृणोति—द्रव्यगुणयोरित्यादिना । द्रव्यं ब्रीह्यादि, गुणोऽरुणिमादिः, तयोः क्रियायां यागक्रयणादिकायां शेषभावोऽवगम्यत इति व्यवहितेन संबन्धः । तयोः शेषभावः योग्यत्वात्कारकविभक्तितो वेति हेतुद्वयं विकल्पेनोक्तम् । तत्र योग्यत्वमिति सामर्थ्यमुच्यते । अस्ति हि सामर्थ्यं द्रव्यगुणयोः सिद्धस्वभावत्वात्साध्यस्वभावां क्रियां निर्वर्तयितुम् । अतः क्रियानिर्वर्तनसामर्थ्याद्द्रव्यगुणयोः क्रियां प्रति शेषभावोऽवगम्यते । कारकविभक्तिरिति करण-

१. बुद्ध्वेदमेव—ख.

२. तादियस्त्वेव—छ.

३. खलु निलयोर्योगः, ततः—क, ख.

४. क्रियणादि—च.

क्रियायां शेषभावोऽवगम्यते^१ । संस्कारोऽपि सम्मार्गादिः^२ शब्दतो वस्तुतो वा कर्मसम्बन्धी, तत्र^३ आपन्नशेषत्वः तन्मुखेन^४ क्रियायां शेषभावं यायात् ।

विभक्तिस्तृतीयेह गृह्यते । श्रूयते हि सा 'ब्रीहिभिर्यजेत', 'अरुणया क्रीणाति' इति । सा च प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य साधकतमत्वमभिदधाना क्रियां प्रति शेषभावमवगमयतीति । भवत्वेवं द्रव्य-
गुणयोः शेषभावावगमः, संस्कारस्य कथमित्यत आह—संस्कारोऽपीत्यादि । यस्तु सम्मार्गाव-
घातादिसंस्कारः सोऽपि क्रियायां शेषभावं यायादिति सम्बन्धः, तत्र हेत्वपेक्षायामुक्तम्—
कर्मसम्बन्धीति । यतोऽसौ संस्कारोऽवघातादिः ब्रीह्यादिकर्मसम्बन्धीति । अस्य कर्मसम्बन्धे
हेतुद्वयं विकल्पेनोक्तम्—शब्दतो वस्तुतो वेति । द्वितीयाविभक्तिरिह शब्द इत्युच्यते ।
श्रूयते हि सा 'ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि', 'ब्रीहीनवहन्ति' इति । सा च प्रातिपदिकार्थस्येप्सिततमत्वं
प्रकाशयन्ती क्रियां प्रति प्राधान्यं गमयति । वस्तुत इति—वस्तुस्वभावादित्यर्थः ।
सकर्मकोऽयमवघातादिः संस्कारः, सकर्मकस्य च कर्मनिष्ठतास्वभावः, अतो वस्तुस्वभावादपि
^५स कर्मसम्बन्धी । भवतु संस्कार्येण ब्रीह्यादिना संस्कारस्यावघातादेः सम्बन्धः ।
कथमेतावता यागादिक्रियाशेषभाव इत्यपेक्षायामुक्तम्—तत्रेत्यादि । ब्रीह्यादिसंस्कार्यद्रव्यशेष-
भूतोऽवघातादिः ^६संस्कारः, तन्मुखेन—प्रधानभूतब्रीह्यादिमुखेन—क्रियाशेषभावः(वं) प्रातिपद्यत
इति संस्कारविशिष्टस्य ब्रीह्यादेर्यागादिक्रियाशेषभावः । नच विशेषणस्य संस्कारस्य शेषभाव-
मन्तरेण तद्विशिष्टस्य शेषभाव उपपद्यत इति ।

१. भावो गम्यते—ग, घ, ङ.

२. शब्दतो वा—घ.

३. आपन्नशेषत्वं—क. प्रातिपन्नशेषत्वं—ग,
घ, ङ.

४. क्रिया यायात्—ग, घ, ङ.

५. 'स'—नास्ति—च.

६. संस्कारः तज्ज्ञापनप्रधानभूतब्रीह्यादिब्रीह्या-
मित्येन क्रियाशेषभावं प्रातिपद्यतइति संस्कार-
विशिष्टस्य ब्रीह्यादेः यागादिक्रियाहेतुभू
... .. नच विशेषणस्य—ङ.

१यागस्तु प्रकृत्या २अकर्मको देवताकर्मको वा कथं स्वर्गेण सम्बध्येत? भावनाकर्मणा३ तेन तद्व्यवहितः संबध्येत । सा च नास्तीति ४मन्यमानो भगवान्बादरिर्द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेष्वेव५ शेषभाव इति मेने—इति ६पूर्वः पक्षः ॥

एवं द्रव्यगुणसंस्काराणां शेषभावमुपपाद्येदानीं व्यतिरिक्ते शेषता नास्तीत्युक्त-मुपपादयितुमाह—यागस्त्वित्यादि । यागस्तु न कथञ्चिदपि स्वर्गेण सम्बध्येत । कथम् ? न तावच्छब्दतोऽवगम्यते सम्बन्धः ; तत्प्रतिपादकशब्दाभावात् । नापि वस्तुतः, यतः स्वभावेनाकर्मको यागो द्रव्यत्यागसङ्कल्परूपः, देवताकर्मको वा देवपूजालक्षणत्वात् । ७सर्वथापि न स्वर्गकर्मकः । अतो वस्तुतोऽपि न यागः स्वर्गेण सम्बध्यते । एतेन फलपुरुषयोरपि शेषभावो निरस्तः, यागसाध्यः८स्वर्गभावा(वना)सम्भवापेक्षत्वात्तस्येति । ननु सत्यामपि भावनायां भावनैव स्वर्गेण सम्बध्यते न यागः । तत्र किमिदमुच्यते बुद्धवैतदेवमि(ती)त्याशङ्क्याह—(भावनाकर्मणा इत्यादि । अयं भावः—) यदि तु भावना भवेत् तदा तदाकाङ्क्षावशात्स्वर्गस्य भाव्यत्वमवगम्यते । ततश्च भावनाकर्मणा सता स्वर्गेण भावनाव्यवहितो यागः सम्बध्येत । यद्यपि साक्षान्न सम्बध्यते तथापि भावनायां करणत्वेन तद्व्यवहितः स्वर्गेणापि सम्बध्यते, सा च भावना पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन नास्तीति भगवान्बादरिः द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेष्वेव शेषभाव इति मेने इति । उक्तं हि—‘द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु बादरिः’ इति ॥

इति भावनाविवेकटीकायां नारायणविरचितायां१० विषमग्रन्थ(न्थि)भेदिकाख्यायां पूर्वपक्षप्रकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

१. यागादिस्तु—ग, घ, ऊ.

२. अकर्मा—ख.

३. ‘तु’—अधिकं वर्तते—क, ख.

४. मन्यमानो बादरिराचार्यो—क, ख.

गम्यमानो भगवान्—घ, ऊ.

५. शेषभावं मेने—ग, घ, ऊ.

६. ‘पूर्वः पक्षः’ नास्ति—ग, घ, ऊ.

७. सर्वदा—च.

८. संबध्येत—छ.

९. स्वर्गभावात् भावापेक्षत्वात्तस्येति—छ.

१०. विरचितायां पूर्वपक्षः समाप्तः ।—छ.



DR. RAJA SIR ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR KT., LL.D.,
Pro-Chancellor

University Notes

OUR CHANCELLOR:

On the retirement of His Excellency Lord Erskine, G.C.I.E., in March, 1940, His Excellency Captain the Hon'ble Sir Arthur Oswald James Hope who succeeded to the Governorship became our Chancellor. Lord Erskine was taking a very kind interest in this University throughout his period of office and we are sure that the same kindness and solicitude will be extended to us by our new Chancellor.

OUR PRO-CHANCELLOR :

His Excellency the Viceroy has been pleased to nominate our Pro-Chancellor to the central Legislative Assembly. We tender our most hearty congratulations to our Pro-Chancellor.

OUR VICE-CHANCELLOR:

The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar P.C., C.H., LL.D., our Vice-Chancellor has announced his decision to retire from office with effect from the 27th June, 1940. It has been a rare piece of good fortune to have a man of his eminence as our Vice-Chancellor. In one of the previous issues of the Journal we have dealt in detail on the Services rendered to our country by this great son of India. He came to us with a vast fund of experience culled from many fields and many climes and a wisdom that has been gained by years of loving labour. Undoubtedly our University profited considerably during the years of his stewardship. He has brought this University into the main current of Indian life and thought and we are deeply thankful to him for all that he has done to the University. His retirement is a great loss to this University and we hope that his solicitude and affection for the University will continue even in his retirement.

We cannot conclude this note better than by quoting in full the Address presented to him by the members of the University Staff on the eve of his retirement :

Five years have fled, five short years, since that proud day in the summer of 1935 when we welcomed you to this place and commended ourselves to your care and guidance. Long before that, indeed, as early as 1929, you had been promised to us and we had all but obtained you. But if, in that matter, the Chancellor and the Pro-Chancellor of the Uni-

versity proposed, the Government of India disposed. East Africa was the gainer by our loss. Your assumption of office here was deferred. But luckily, deferred only it was. It came off at last and our hearts rejoiced.

Short indeed has been the time during which you presided over the destinies of this University. But how useful to all, how glorious! You came, you saw, you improved. You have made the institution a place of universal knowledge. You gave our Department of Natural Science free scope to expand. You stabilised our Department of Philosophy. You have developed the Institute of Music. You have made the Tamil Research Institute permanent. The residents of the Hostel enjoy to-day the benefit of real Reading Rooms. Knowledge, to their eyes, rich with the spoils of time is made week after week to unroll her ample page. To you we owe the unique feature of our week-end talks. But the Library, we should say, has been your special favourite. The very brick walls and wooden shelves have become alive, as it were, at your magic touch; and as the tomes pour in, day after day, the louder the call for room, the readier the supply of it. Under your inspiration the library staff have realised more than ever that their function is to help readers to books and that books exist to be read.

You have made Annamalainagar really a place of universal learning. Scholars flock to it from all quarters. Their number has more than doubled itself in these five years, and so has the accommodation in the Hostel. In your choice of the new teachers, there is a good proportion of the alumni of our University. Augustus found Rome brick and left it marble; you found Annamalainagar a town and are to-day leaving it a city.

Beloved Sir, these concrete services we can recount and perhaps even presume to appraise. But how can we evaluate that noblest of all services that we have received at your hands—the sublime example of the spirit of service and sacrifice you have placed before us? In these days, for *nothing* have you given to the University your invaluable services. “Is there any provision in your Laws for an Honorary Vice-Chancellor?” you asked, and being told there was, “An Honorary Vice-Chancellor then I am” you declared. “Which University in the world would not give *anything*, to be under the stewardship of Mr. Sastri?” asked the Mahatma the other day, and each one of us said to himself in answer. “We are to-day under his stewardship, and we give nothing for it.” And then the courtesy, the easy affability, the patience and forbearance that you have always exercised, have made the Vice-Chancellor’s Bungalow a school of liberal education for us.



THE RT. HON'BLE V. S. SRINIVASA SASTRI, P.C., C.H., LL.D.,
Vice-Chancellor (1935-40)

You have also given us an enhanced status in the academic world. In all gatherings of educationists in India, we, as Mr. Sastriar's colleagues, are assured of distinguished seats and honoured places.

We would gladly and earnestly beg that the day of our parting be put off at least by a year. But we have not got the heart to do so, seeing that your health cries for rest. We shall, at all times, profit by the examples and precepts you have given us these five years. We now pray, and shall ever pray, for a long life of health and strength for you, that the world might long draw on your experience and wisdom. We promise to give a good account of ourselves as your trusted colleagues and admiring disciples.

OUR EX-VICE-CHANCELLOR:

Dewan Bahadur S. E. Runganadhan who was our Vice-Chancellor from 1929-1935 has been appointed Adviser to the Secretary of State for India. We heartily congratulate him on his attaining this unique position.

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The Madras University has awarded the Degree of Doctor of Science to Mr. A. Narasinga Rao, M.A., L.T., Professor of Mathematics for his thesis.

We heartily congratulate Dr. A. Narasinga Rao on this distinction he has won.

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Sri P. Vaidyanathan, M.A., Research Scholar in Economics was awarded a research scholarship by the University of Sydney, Australia. The Syndicate of this University has granted him a fellowship to enable him to prosecute his studies at Sydney.

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Sri P. Panchapakesa Sastriar has been awarded the Degree of Master of Oriental Learning and Sri T. Appanna and Sri T. P. Palaniappa Pillai, the Degree of Bachelor of Oriental Learning by the Madras University.

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FOUNDER'S DAY:

The Tenth Founder's Day was celebrated on the 30th September 1939. Sri T. T. Krishnamachariar, B.A., M.L.A., delivered the Address.

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CONVOCATION:

The Ninth Annual Convocation of the University was held on Friday the 6th October, 1939. Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, LL.D., Kt., of Chettinad, Pro-Chancellor of the University presided. Mr. H. C. Papworth, M.A., I.E.S., Principal, Presidency College, Madras, delivered the Address to the graduates of the year.

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PUBLICATIONS:

The following books were published during the year:

Tamil Text-Book on Chemistry Vol. I By Sri N. Ananthavaidyanathan, M.A.

Nyayakulisa by Prof. R. Ramanujachariar and Sri K. Srinivasa-chariar.

Report on the working of Prohibition in Salem District by Sri C. Jagannathachari, M.A., M.Litt.

Jagannatha Panditha by Sri V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar, M.A.

Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure by Sri P. Panchapakesa Sastriar, M.O.L.

The Madras Agriculturist Relief Act—A study by Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu and Sri P. Vaidyanathan, M.A.

The Syndicate has sanctioned the publication of the following books:

History of Gingee By Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasachariar, M.A.

History of Tamil Literature By Sri Mahavidan R. Raghava Ayyangar.

The Nayaks of Tanjore By Sri V. Vridhagirisan, M.A., M.Litt.

Text-books on Physics in Tamil By Sri R. K. Visvanathan, M.A.

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TEXT-BOOKS IN TAMIL:

Arrangements have been made with the Heads of Departments of Study for the preparation of suitable text-books in Tamil on the following subjects of study under Part III of the Intermediate:

- | | |
|---------------|----------------------------|
| 1. History. | 4. Botany. |
| 2. Economics. | 5. Zoology. |
| 3. Geometry. | 6. Educational Psychology. |

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RESEARCH DEGREES:

The following candidates were awarded M.Litt. and M.Sc. Degree at the last Convocation:

Name	Degree	Subject
Sri N. V. Mallaiya, M.A.	M.Litt.	Sanskrit
Sri Kopparti Venkata Rao, M.A.	"	Economics
Sri V. Sitaraman B.Sc.	M.Sc.	Mathematics
Sri S. Aravamudhachari, B.A.	"	Chemistry
Sri K. Ganapathi, B.Sc.	"	"
Sri A. S. Narayanaswami, B.Sc. (Hons.).	"	Physics
* * * * *		

The following candidates were declared qualified for the award of M.Sc. Degree.

Sri S. R. Govindarajan,	M.Sc.	Physics
Sri V. K. Srinivasan	"	Botany

The following candidates have been registered for the M.Litt., M.Sc. and Ph.D. Degrees:—

Sri N. V. Mallaiya, M.A., M.Litt.	Ph.D.	Sanskrit
Sri C. Jagannathachari, M.A., M.Litt.	Ph.D.	Economics
Sri S. Tiruvengadaitan, B.A. (Hons.)	M.Litt.	Economics
Sri D. Krishna Ayyar, B.Sc.	M.Sc.	Physics
Sri C. S. Krishnamurti, B.A.	M.Litt.	Economics
Sri V. S. Govindarajan, B.Sc.	M.Sc.	Chemistry
Sri S. Krishnamurti, B.Sc.	"	"
Sri S. Ramaswami, B.Sc.	"	"

Sri C. R. Srinivasan.	M.Sc.	Botany
Sri C. K. Srinivasan, B.A. (Hons.)	M.Litt.	History
Sri T. S. Balasubrahmanyam, B.Sc.	M.Sc.	Botany
Sri R. Lakshminarasimhan, B.A. (Hons.).	M.Litt.	History

* * * * *

HONOURS COURSES IN BOTANY :

The Syndicate has sanctioned the proposal for starting Honours Courses in Botany from July next.

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Brown University, Rhode Island :

Selected topics in function theory of a complex variable by Otto Syasz.

Theory of abstract spaces by David Tamarkin

The Service

Lingnan Science Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1.

The Modern Student

The Empire Times

Madras Y.M.C.A. Bulletin

Subodin

Indian Swarajya

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Ethnology, Folklore and Archaeology in the U.S.S.R.

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B Physics " " "

C Chemistry " " "

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14 Nos. 1 to 3.

1. Das Wachstum der Korperlange des Menschen.

2. Studies in the Gems Astelia Banks Et Solander.

3. Examen Rosarum Sneciae Granskringavden Svenska Florans Rosa-Former.

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Etudes sur un probleme de Majoration.

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Wealth and Welfare.

Hermathena : Literature, Science and Philosophy.

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An Hand Von Elektroneninterferenzen Studiert.

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Indian Academy of Sciences—Abstracts of papers.

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, Hanoi (Indo-China).

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Monographs*

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